Advance of the 2nd column--Landsman's Drift to Kopje
Allein--Description of camp--Plan of campaign--Discovery of Port
Durnford--It becomes the base of 1st division--Troops composing 1st
column--Crealock's journey to Durnford.
The force thus gathered at Landsman's Drift was now quite ready for an
immediate advance. It was therefore determined to push on this column
(2nd) at once. Accordingly, on the 27th May the troops were formed up in
line of contiguous quarter-columns by eight a.m., and after the General
and his staff had ridden down the ranks, making a minute and detailed
inspection, the various columns moved off by fours in succession from
the right precisely at nine a.m. Newdigate's Division, which led the
way, consisted of the 21st Fusiliers, the 94th Foot, the 58th Foot, and
the 2nd battalion 24th Regiment, together with a wing of the King's
Dragoon Guards, a wing of the 17th Lancers, a battalion of Native
Contingent, two batteries of Royal Artillery, and a company of
Engineers. The crossing of the Buffalo at Landsman's Drift was commenced
at half-past nine, and the rear had crossed by two o'clock. The exact
distance to Kopje Allein as the crow flies is said to be ten miles, but
the route taken was somewhat circuitous, so as, for the sake of the
waggons, to avoid many bad places, swamps, morasses, and mud-holes,
which abound in this part of the country. The country between the Blood
river and the Buffalo is tolerably well supplied with water,
comparatively open, but singularly treeless in its character, though
there were patches here and there along the road, and the district
seemed well adapted for cattle posts and grazing purposes. Indeed there
could be seen a number of large deserted kraals and homesteads, which
had once evidently been the depôts of pastoral wealth and prosperity.
These sites of industry had suffered a hard and rough usage in the
terrible necessities of war. These depredations were largely caused by
the foraging parties in search of fuel, the great want in all our camps.
Supplies, indeed, on more than one occasion, were brought even as far as
from the northern slopes of the Durnberg, a distance of twenty miles.
Most of the best information in regard to the topographical features of
this portion of the campaign was furnished by the very excellent reports
drawn up by Colonel Buller, Lord William Beresford, and, above all, the
Prince Imperial, whose pen and pencil gave a vivid and life-like idea of
the physical characteristics of this line of advance.
On the 16th instant Colonel Buller's second patrol returned at noon to
General Wood's camp at the Wolf's kraal, and had been so successful in
its reconnoitring operations that its officers were able to report that
no large bodies of Zulus were within twenty miles of the Blood river,
or, indeed, anywhere between the White Umvolosi and the Buffalo river.
The same evening on which the patrol started it bivouacked at Kopje
Allein, and, indeed, it was owing to the excellent reports made by
Buller and his staff that the place was chosen as one of the links in
the line of advance. A few Zulus there were, it is true, hovering about
in the distance, and attempts were made by feigned attacks and feigned
retreats to lure the troops into ambush, but Buller was far too old a
soldier to be taken in by such wiles. When the men had got steadily on
the summit of the hill they were exploring, the Zulu skirmishers
disappeared into some of the caves surrounding Sirayo's old kraal, and
nothing but some huts full of mealies could be found. The patrol that
night slept on the slopes of the Ingutu mountains, and the following
morning scouted in a southerly direction in rear of the Ingwe range, as
far as the White Umvolosi, showing in a tolerably plain manner that the
country about there was quite denuded of its population, at least
between the Buffalo river and the White Umvolosi, while to the eastward
and the northward of the latter river there were plenty of Zulus and
cattle, but no large or important bodies were assembled north of the
Isandaka range.
The Prince Imperial had won all hearts during these three days in the
saddle and night bivouac, and was seen to have considerably improved in
health since his last visit to the camp.
From the notes and sketches made by the officers above named the
following data may be adduced:--The key of the road from the Utrecht to
the Ulundi country is undoubtedly the Inhlazatye mountain, and, although
this road runs along a narrow ledge with a precipice on the one side and
with huge boulders on the other, interspersed with thorns and bush, yet
still it is actually the most direct line of advance upon Ulundi. This
Inhlazatye mountain covers a vast extent of country, has an immense
quantity of thorn-bush over it, is very broken and steep, but
undoubtedly can be turned by an invading force from the north either to
the east or to the west, probably the latter, where little bush worth
mentioning would have to be passed through. The most commanding and open
positions are upon the highlands to the south of the White Umvolosi and
Umtatoosi rivers, girdling the new capital, Ulundi. These are the
Emtonjaneni hills (which are called Magnibonium on most maps), near the
White Umvolosi, and the Tyoe and Entumeni heights in rear of the
Umtatoosi, all healthy positions, well watered, and with abundant grass
and wood. From the Emtonjaneni hills, explored by Colonel Buller, who
estimates them at 200 feet high, the circle of royal kraals on the
farther side of the White Umvolosi can be seen; three roads lead to the
rear into the colony, the upper, central, and lower. The Ekowe,
Entumeni, and Ungoga ranges, from 1500 to 2000 feet above the sea level,
dominate the valley of the Umtatoosi. Healthy positions suitable for
cavalry encampments may be found on these heights, well wooded and
watered, with excellent grass and roads leading to the rear into the
colony; and here Marshall's cavalry kept open our communications and
effectually severed connexion between the Zulu's right and left impis.
These central and coast lines, which are joined by a cross-road, both
follow the course of the Umtatoosi.
During the march, and whenever the country would admit of such
formation, the leading corps halted, and the extended line of march was
curtailed by the succeeding regiment forming upon its left; waggons came
up in a sort of deployment into line, and certain simple movements were
practised which would be carried out in case of sudden attack. Lord
Chelmsford invariably made a great point of concentrating his waggons
whenever the slightest opportunity offered. General Newdigate and
General Wood between them had 900 waggons, and it may easily be imagined
what a column 450 of these would make. Allowing 30 yards to each--and
that is not much, there being 16 or 18 oxen to each load--each column of
baggage alone is 15 miles long, but to this distance must be added 5
yards interval, and this gives 18 miles to defend. Of course, the forage
for the large cavalry force made one of the greatest strains upon the
commissariat, and all had to be sacrificed to this necessity. This
column and Crealock's were in this respect not upon a par, as it had to
provide for not less than 2000 horses, each receiving 12 lb. of corn
daily; which gave a total of 24,000 lb. daily, or 3000 lb. per waggon
load, or 6 waggons daily to supply them. At this rate, therefore, it
required 120 waggons to carry the oats for the cavalry alone. All Lord
Chelmsford's and the staff horses were, however, placed upon half
rations.
Ibabanango, which Lord Chelmsford had selected as an advanced depôt for
the united forces of his column and that of Wood, is again situated
about midway between this place (Kopje Allein) and the king's kraal at
Ulundi. The troops in this camp consisted of a company of Engineers, the
cavalry brigade, two batteries of Royal Artillery, four line battalions,
and 800 natives. The encampment was rather extensive, but this upon
sanitary grounds and the best medical advice. The battalions were
encamped as at open order, front as in line, with a depth of 116 yards,
which is unusual, for half the above frontage is the usual encampment,
and 30 yards were left between each of the four battalions. Each
regiment of cavalry usually occupies 172 yards of front and 130 yards of
depth, but its camp can be condensed to 120 yards of front by crossing
heel-ropes, and this, for defensive reasons, was the plan adopted by
General Marshall. This could not be done with Cape or Indian remounts,
as entire horses would fight if so close to each other; but English
horses are so accustomed to this proximity that it was found they throve
better when allowed companionship. To each battery of artillery was
allowed a frontage of 133 yards, with a depth of 114 yards, or 70 yards
front at close order, while from centre to centre of the tents 10 paces
were allotted. The kitchens were simple enough, being nothing more than
a trench to catch the wind and hold the usual pattern of Flanders or
Torrens kettle--the former, weighing 8-1/2 lbs., holding twelve quarts,
and cooking for eight men, while the latter weighs 3-1/2 lbs., holds six
quarts, and cooks for five men. Whenever the ground was too wet for a
trench, two parallel sod walls answered the same purpose, and two
trenches, 10 feet long, 9 inches broad, and 12 inches deep were allowed
for a company of 120 men. The medical arrangements were as elaborate as
could be made consistent with the limited means of transport, but what
was deficient in quantity was made up in excellence of detail. Medical
officers and stretcher-bearers usually moved in front of the camp, and
the temporary hospital was always placed in the least exposed position
near at hand, while the field-hospitals were always in rear. One
medical officer was allotted to each battalion of infantry, regiment of
cavalry, or battery of artillery--more could not be spared. One bearer
company and two field-hospitals were allotted to each division. This
bearer company included 206 men, part natives, 101 mules or horses, and
30 waggons. The field-hospitals had each 75 men, 52 mules, and 10
waggons, while each field-hospital had equipment for 200 sick.
Fortunately the health of the troops was exceptionally good.
Instead of an advance from Rorke's Drift, it was now determined to take
a line from Kopje Allein to Blood river, across the more northern spurs
of the Ingutu hills, and endeavour to ultimately strike the road laid
down in the maps, between the Alarm and the Isipizi hills. This route
was to be taken by General Wood's flying column in advance, and General
Newdigate's division, of which actually it was intended to form an
integral portion. The former consisted of the 13th and 90th Regiments of
Light Infantry and five companies of the 80th Regiment, all of them in
splendid and hard-working condition, and devoted to their brilliant
leader. Wood's cavalry consisted of 900 mounted men belonging to various
corps, and commanded by the Rupert of South Africa, Redvers Buller,
whose men were ready to follow him anywhere, and die for him to a man,
after his splendid self-devotion at Zlobani and elsewhere. Wood, who
made friends wherever he moved, had some valuable allies in Oham's
people, who, hating the tyranny of Cetywayo, were invaluable as scouts
and spies to the flying columns. The arrangements for the line of
advance were as follows:--Wood's flying column was to keep in advance
of Newdigate's division by about five miles, while in front of the
former a veil of cavalry was to keep in advance about ten miles,
connected by intervening files. Each morning orderlies were to report
whether the front and rear were perfectly clear, nor was an advance to
be made until such was known. In case of any enemy attacking Wood, the
latter was to be at once supported by Marshall, who could circle round
and take the Zulus in the rear, a principle of strategy they strongly
object to. Crealock, with the aid of the naval authorities, was at the
same time to push forward from Fort Chelmsford, and, if the landing at
Port Durnford was reported practicable, force the Umvolosi and operate
in conjunction with the 2nd column from his base at Port Durnford.
Lord Chelmsford had long seen that the best method to obviate the almost
overwhelming difficulties of transport would be to form some seaport on
the Zulu coast. Delagoa Bay was at first selected; but considerable
difficulty was found in arranging with the Portuguese Government as to
our landing a force in the neighbourhood, and that scheme was
consequently abandoned. It then became evident that if a seaport, or
even ever so small a landing-place could be provided at the mouth of the
Umlalasi, it would be at once the nearest and best base of operations
for any force moving from the Tugela upon Ulundi or Cetywayo's other
stronghold.
Furthermore, as far back as December, 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone
wrote to Sir Bartle Frere, informing his Excellency that two
gentlemen--Mr. E. Rathbone and Mr. H. W. Taylor--wished to call
attention to the fact that, from personal observations they had made,
they were satisfied that a practicable landing-place on the Zulu coast
could be found. These gentlemen, it is true, as Sir Theophilus pointed
out, differed as to the precise spot on the coast, but both agreed that
it was near the Tugela mouth, and but a very few miles intervene between
the one place described and the other. This discovery was made
twenty-seven years ago, in the year 1852, and, so far from being kept a
secret, was published for general information in the _Natal Mercury_.
H.M. gunboat "Forester" was accordingly despatched to thoroughly explore
this part of the coast; no less than three minute and careful surveys
were made, and finally, on May 26th, she returned with the welcome
intelligence that a fine lagoon existed close to the mouth of the
Umlalasi, with a sheltered outlet, and that, from the soundings taken
for five miles on either side of the river, there was no actual obstacle
to a landing being practicable at all tides and all seasons.
There was, however, at the mouth of the river, a bar on which the surf
broke heavily; and in bad weather experience proved on more than one
occasion that this formed an impassable barrier even to the most
determined attempts to make a landing.
This spot was christened Port Durnford, and steps were immediately taken
to form there a fort and depôt of supplies for the 1st column, in
command of which was General Crealock.
To Commodore Sullivan, Major Barrow, and the captain of H.M.S.
"Forester" principally belong the honours of the discovery; and while
the sailors worked heartily seaward and along the dangerous and
difficult coast, Barrow and his riders found out all the roads which led
to the point selected. It had been arranged that General Crealock, with
the advanced guard of the 1st division should move down the Umlalasi to
a point carefully surveyed by Barrow, and which was subsequently, in
compliment to the gallant young prince, called Fort Napoleon. Thence he
was to proceed to Port Durnford, to meet the "Forester."
Hitherto the advance had been slow; but when it is remembered that forts
were constructed at every strategic point of defence--at the Amatikula,
the Inyezani (respectively Forts Chelmsford and Crealock), and the whole
of the road between this place and the Tugela had been put into working
order by fatigue parties and Engineers, it is clear there was no real
ground for complaint of the delay. Every stream had been bridged, either
with pontoons, casks, or trestles, and trees had been cut down, rocks
and boulders blown up, as well as gradients eased and facilities for
transport carried out. Forts Pearson, Tenedos, Chelmsford, Crealock, and
Napoleon were garrisoned by the less robust men of the column. Six
companies of the 88th, with the headquarters, held Fort Chelmsford,
while a wing of the 99th performed the same office at Fort Crealock. The
regular communications along this line of advanced forts were placed in
charge of one of the best men out there, namely, Colonel Hugh Rowlands,
41st Regiment, whose eye for country, tact, and temper with the natives
and incessant vigilance eminently qualified him for such a
responsibility.
At this time the force of the 1st division stood as follows:--General
Crealock, Brigadiers Bray and Rowlands; two batteries of artillery and
one ammunition column; Royal Engineers, 30th company and C troop;
infantry, six battalions, viz.:--the Buffs, 57th, 60th, 88th, 91st, and
99th Regiments, two squadrons of mounted infantry, the Natal Horse, the
native scouts; as pretty and compact a little division as any moderately
ambitious general could wish to command, and it speaks well for the
chief's admirable temper under difficulties that, chafed as he now was,
and tied as it were by the leg, by want of transport, he kept working
incessantly without a murmur at the forts, bridges, fords, roads, and
other requisites.
In accordance with the above-mentioned arrangement, General Crealock,
Commodore Richards, and Lord Gifford set forth on the 25th June for Port
Durnford, taking with them the advance-guard of the 1st division.
At first the road was over a level and sandy plain, with numerous small
granite hills in different directions, and although there was not much
vegetation for the first two or three miles of the road, it opened on to
a more picturesque-looking champaign country, where the soil appeared
teeming with fertility, and the air was balmy and pure. The country
here, however, is arid and parched during the dry season, but in the
rains, which last from November till May, it is well watered, and large
crops of maize are grown, which by the end of June are usually ripened
and fit for cutting. Large crops of malama are also grown, and it is
upon the stalks of this that the cattle are mostly fed in the drought,
when they appear in good condition, notwithstanding its seeming want of
nutriment.
Here a halt was made; vedettes were placed, and a meal was partaken of.
Then, after half an hour's rest, they again pushed on, and soon came to
an undulating and extremely romantic-looking valley, shut in on either
side by some huge granite hills. Ascending the highest of these, they
looked down upon the Indian Ocean, Port Durnford, and the "Forester,"
standing off about a mile from the shore, and evidently on the look-out.
From this point to the outlet of the Umlalazi the country was fairly
open, and the landscape fertile and partly cultivated. The only obstacle
to progress was a rocky and rather narrow ridge, through which, however,
ran a fairly open kloof, with a small and tributary stream winding its
way to the Umlalazi. Here was the road, and another two hours saw them
through the kloof without question or attack, and they cantered along
the grassy slopes to the bright and shingly beach, upon which a couple
of boat's crews, despatched when they were first sighted, were occupied
in preparing a very excellent dinner of ship's rations for the tired and
hungry men.
General Crealock highly approved of the position, and a fort and other
works were at once traced out, thus rendering complete the cordon of
posts that had been drawn all round the south of Zululand, right from
the sea to the left attack (or 2nd column), and through which it was
impossible for Cetywayo to force a way, and which rendered his capture
or submission a mere question of time.