The answers, the obvious answers, are (1) 'mist' and (2) 'sunshine.'

In Mr. Max Muller's opinion these riddles 'could not but lead to what we

call popular myths or legends.' Very probably; but this does not aid us

to accept the philological method. The very essence of that method is

the presumed absolute loss of the meaning of, e.g. 'the Dark One.' Before

there can be a myth, ex hypothesi the words Dark One must have become

hopelessly unintelligible, must have become a proper name. Thus suppose,

for argument's sake only, that Cronos once meant Dark One, and was

understood in that sense. People (as in the Norse riddle just cited)

said, 'Cronos [i.e. the Dark One--meaning mist] swallows water and wood.'

Then they forgot that Cronos was their old word for the Dark One, and was

mist; but they kept up, and understood, all the rest of the phrase about

what mist does. The expression now ran, 'Cronos [whatever that may be]

swallows water and wood.' But water comes from mist, and water nourishes

wood, therefore 'Cronos swallows his children.' Such would be the

development of a myth on Mr. Max Muller's system. He would interpret

'Cronos swallows his children,' by finding, if he could, the original

meaning of Cronos. Let us say that he did discover it to mean 'the Dark

One.' Then he might think Cronos meant 'night;' 'mist' he would hardly

guess.

That is all very clear, but the point is this--in devinettes, or riddles,

the meaning of 'the Dark One' is _not_ lost:--

'Thy riddle is _easy_

Blind Gest,

To read'--

Heidrick answers.

What the philological method of mythology needs is to prove that such

poetical statements about natural phenomena as the devinettes contain

survived in the popular mouth, and were perfectly intelligible except

just the one mot d'enigme--say, 'the Dark One.' That (call it

Cronos='Dark One'), and that alone, became unintelligible in the changes

of language, and so had to be accepted as a proper name, Cronos--a god

who swallows things at large.

Where is the proof of such endurance of intelligible phrases with just

the one central necessary word obsolete and changed into a mysterious

proper name? The world is full of proper names which have lost their

meaning--Athene, Achilles, Artemis, and so on but we need proof that

poetical sayings, or riddles, survive and are intelligible except one

word, which, being unintelligible, becomes a proper name. Riddles, of

course, prove nothing of this kind:--

Thy riddle is easy

Blind Gest

To read!

Yet Mr. Max Muller offers the suggestion that the obscurity of many of

these names of mythical gods and heroes 'may be due . . . to the riddles

to which they had given rise, and which would have ceased to be riddles

if the names had been clear and intelligible, like those of Helios and

Selene' (i. 92). People, he thinks, in making riddles 'would avoid the

ordinary appellatives, and the use of little-known names in most

mythologies would thus find an intelligible explanation.' Again, 'we can

see how essential it was that in such mythological riddles the principal

agents should not be called by their regular names.' This last remark,

indeed, is obvious. To return to the Norse riddle of the Dark One that

swallows wood and water. It would never do in a riddle to call the Dark

One by his ordinary name, 'Mist.' You would not amuse a rural audience

by asking 'What is the mist that swallows wood and water?' That would be

even easier than Mr. Burnand's riddle for very hot weather:--

My first is a boot, my second is a jack.

Conceivably Mr. Max Muller may mean that in riddles an almost obsolete

word was used to designate the object. Perhaps, instead of 'the Dark

One,' a peasant would say, 'What is the Rooky One?' But as soon as

nobody knew what 'the Rooky One' meant, the riddle would cease to

exist--Rooky One and all. You cannot imagine several generations asking

each other--

What is the Rooky One that swallows?

if nobody knew the answer. A man who kept boring people with a mere

'sell' would be scouted; and with the death of the answerless riddle the

difficult word 'Rooky' would die. But Mr. Max Muller says, 'Riddles

would cease to be riddles if the names had been clear and intelligible.'

The reverse is the fact. In the riddles he gives there are seldom any

'names;' but the epithets and descriptions are as clear as words can be:--

Who are the mother and children in a house, all having bald heads?--The

moon and stars.

Language cannot be clearer. Yet the riddle has not 'ceased to be a

riddle,' as Mr. Max Muller thinks it must do, though the words are 'clear

and intelligible.' On the other hand, if the language is _not_ clear and

intelligible, the riddle would cease to exist. It would not amuse if

nobody understood it. You might as well try to make yourself socially

acceptable by putting conundrums in Etruscan as by asking riddles in

words not clear and intelligible in themselves, though obscure in their

reference. The difficulty of a riddle consists, not in the obscurity of

words or names, but in the description of familiar things by terms, clear

as terms, denoting their appearance and action. The mist is described as

'dark,' 'swallowing,' 'one that fears the wind,' and so forth. The

_words_ are pellucid.

Thus 'ordinary appellatives' (i. 99) are _not_ 'avoided' in riddles,

though _names_ (sun, mist) cannot be used in the question because they

give the answer to the riddle.

For all these reasons ancient riddles cannot explain the obscurity of

mythological names. As soon as the name was too obscure, the riddle and

the name would be forgotten, would die together. So we know as little as

ever of the purely hypothetical process by which a riddle, or popular

poetical saying, remains intelligible in a language, while the mot

d'enigme, becoming unintelligible, turns into a proper name--say, Cronos.

Yet the belief in this process as a vera causa is essential to our

author's method.

Here Mr. Max Muller warns us that his riddle theory is not meant to

explain 'the obscurities of _all_ mythological names. This is a

stratagem that should be stopped from the very first.' It were more

graceful to have said 'a misapprehension.'

Another 'stratagem' I myself must guard against. I do not say that _no_

unintelligible strings of obsolete words may continue to live in the

popular mouth. Old hymns, ritual speeches, and charms may and do

survive, though unintelligible. They are reckoned all the more potent,

because all the more mysterious. But an unintelligible riddle or

poetical saying does not survive, so we cannot thus account for mythology

as a disease of language.

Modern Mythology · 第 123 / 171 题