Mr. Max Muller on our Evidence

In an earlier work, The Gifford Lectures for 1891, {96} our author had

devoted more space to a criticism of our evidence. To this, then, we

turn (pp. 169-180, 413-436). Passing Mr. Max Muller's own difficulties

in understanding a Mohawk (which the Mohawk no doubt also felt in

understanding Mr. Max Muller), we reach (p. 172) the fables about godless

savages. These, it is admitted, are exploded among scholars in

anthropology. So we do, at least, examine evidence. Mr. Max Muller now

fixes on a flagrant case, some fables about the godless Mincopies of the

Andaman Islands. But _he_ relies on the evidence of Mr. Man. So do I,

as far as it seems beyond doubt. {97a} Mr. Man is 'a careful observer, a

student of language, and perfectly trustworthy.' These are the reasons

for which I trust him. But when Mr. Man says that the Mincopies have a

god, Puluga, who inhabits 'a stone house in the sky,' I remark, 'Here the

idea of the stone house is necessarily borrowed from our stone houses at

Port Blair.' {97b} When Mr. Man talks of Puluga's only-begotten son, 'a

sort of archangel,' medium between Puluga and the angels, I 'hesitate a

doubt.' Did not this idea reach the Mincopie mind from the same quarter

as the stone house, especially as Puluga's wife is 'a green shrimp or an

eel'? At all events, it is right to bear in mind that, as the stone

house of the Mincopie heaven is almost undeniably of European origin, the

only-begotten mediating son of Puluga and the green shrimp _may_ bear

traces of Christian teaching. Caution is indicated.

Does Mr. Max Muller, so strict about evidence, boggle at the stone house,

the only son, the shrimp? Not he; he never hints at the shrimp! Does he

point out that one anthropologist has asked for caution in weighing what

the Mincopies told Mr. Man? Very far from that, he complains that 'the

old story is repeated again and again' about the godless Andamans. {97c}

The intelligent Glasgow audience could hardly guess that anthropologists

were watchful, and knew pretty well what to believe about the Mincopies.

Perhaps in Glasgow they do not read us anthropologists much.

On p. 413 our author returns to the charge. He observes (as I have also

observed) the often contradictory nature of our evidence. Here I may

offer an anecdote. The most celebrated of living English philosophers

heard that I was at one time writing a book on the 'ghostly' in history,

anthropology, and society, old or new, savage or civilised. He kindly

dictated a letter to me asking how I could give time and pains to any

such marvels. For, he argued, the most unveracious fables were

occasionally told about himself in newspapers and social gossip. If

evidence cannot be trusted about a living and distinguished British

subject, how can it be accepted about hallucinations?

I replied, with respect, that on this principle nothing could be

investigated at all. History, justice, trade, everything would be

impossible. We must weigh and criticise evidence. As my friendly

adviser had written much on savage customs and creeds, he best knew that

conflicting testimony, even on his own chosen theme, is not peculiar to

ghost stories. In a world of conflicting testimony we live by

criticising it. Thus, when Mr. Max Muller says that I call my savages

'primitive,' and when I, on the other hand, quote passages in which I

explicitly decline to do so, the evidence as to my views is

contradictory. Yet the truth can be discovered by careful research.

The application is obvious. We must not despair of truth! As our

monitor says, 'we ought to discard all evidence that does not come to us

either from a man who was able himself to converse with native races, or

who was at least an eye-witness of what he relates.' Precisely, that is

our method. I, for one, do not take even a ghost story at second hand,

much less anything so startling as a savage rite. And we discount and

allow for every bias and prejudice of our witnesses. I have made a list

of these idola in M. R. R. ii. 334-344.

Mr. Max Muller now gives a list of inconsistencies in descriptions of

Australian Blacks. They are _not_ Blacks, they have a dash of copper

colour! Well, I never said that they had 'the sooty tinge of the African

negro.' Did anybody?

Mr. Ridley thinks that all natives are called 'Murri.' Mr. Curr says

'No.' Important. We must reserve our judgment.

Missionaries say the Blacks are 'devoid of moral ideas.' What

missionaries? What anthropologist believes such nonsense? There are

differences of opinion about landed property, communal or private. The

difference rages among historians of civilised races. So, also, as to

portable property. Mr. Curr (Mr. Max Muller's witness) agrees here with

those whose works I chiefly rely on.

'Mr. McLennan has built a whole social theory on the statement' (a single

statement) 'made by Sir George Grey, and contradicted by Mr. Curr.' Mr.

McLennan would be, I think, rather surprised at this remark; but what

would he do? Why, he would re-examine the whole question, decide by the

balance of evidence, and reject, modify, or retain his theory

accordingly.

All sciences have to act in this way; therefore almost all scientific

theories are fluctuating. Nothing here is peculiar to anthropology. A

single word, or two or three, will prove or disprove a theory of phonetic

laws. Even phonetics are disputable ground.

In defence of my late friend Mr. McLennan, I must point out that if he

built a whole social theory on a single statement of Sir George Grey's,

and if Mr. Curr denies the truth of the statement, Mr. Frazer has

produced six or seven witnesses to the truth of that very statement in

other parts of the world than Australia. {100} To this circumstance we

may return.

Mr. Max Muller next produces Mr. Curr's opinions about the belief in a

god and morality among Australians. 'Here he really contradicts

himself.' The disputable evidence about Australian marriage laws is next

shown to be disputable. That is precisely why Dr. Tylor is applying to

it his unrivalled diligence in accurate examination. We await his

results. Finally, the contradictory evidence as to Tasmanian religion is

exposed. We have no Codrington or Bleek for Tasmania. The Tasmanians

are extinct, and Science should leave the evidence as to their religion

out of her accounts. We cannot cross-examine defunct Tasmanians.

From all this it follows that anthropologists must sift and winnow their

evidence, like men employed in every other branch of science. And who

denies it? What anthropologist of mark accepts as gospel any casual

traveller's tale?

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