“His violent prejudices against our West-Indian and American settlers,
appeared whenever there was an opportunity.” * * * “Upon an occasion,
when in company with several very grave men at Oxford, his toast was:
‘Here’s to the next insurrection of the negroes in the West Indies!’ I,
with all due deference, thought that he discovered a zeal without
knowledge.”
This was surely bold in Boswell!
Since the culmination of the great British lexicographer, it has been
unusual to hear a whisper in question of his high moral accuracy, of his
singularly nice mental training, or the perspicuous and lofty display of
these qualities in all his works. Even at this day, such a whisper may
be proof of temerity. But truth is of higher import than the fear of
individual rebuke, or of our literary faith that any one hero in the
walks of erudition heretofore went down to the tomb without one mental
or classical imperfection.
* * * * *
Argument in favour of a negro claiming his liberty, referred to in
_Boswell’s Life of Johnson_, p. 132.
“It must be agreed that in most ages many countries have had part of
their inhabitants in a state of slavery; yet it may be doubted whether
slavery can ever be supposed the natural condition of man. It is
impossible not to conceive that men in their original state were equal;
and very difficult to imagine how one would be subjected to another but
by violent compulsion. An individual may, indeed, forfeit his liberty by
a crime; but he cannot by that crime forfeit the liberty of his
children. What is true of a criminal seems true likewise of a captive. A
man may accept life from a conquering enemy on condition of perpetual
servitude; but it is very doubtful whether he can entail that servitude
on his descendants; for no man can stipulate without commission for
another. The condition which he himself accepts, his son or grandson
would have rejected. If we should admit, what perhaps may with more
reason be denied, that there are certain relations between man and man
which may make slavery necessary and just, yet it can never be proved
that he who is now suing for his freedom ever stood in any of those
relations. He is certainly subject by no law, but that of violence, to
his present master, who pretends no claim to his obedience but that he
bought him from a merchant of slaves, whose right to sell him never was
examined. It is said that according to the constitutions of Jamaica he
was legally enslaved; these constitutions are merely positive, and
apparently injurious to the rights of mankind, because whoever is
exposed to sale is condemned to slavery without appeal, by whatever
fraud or violence he might have originally been brought into the
merchant’s power. In our own time, princes have been sold, by wretches
to whose care they were intrusted, that they might have an European
education; but when once they were brought to a market in the
plantations, little would avail either their dignity or their wrongs.
The laws of Jamaica afford a negro no redress. His colour is considered
as a sufficient testimony against him. It is to be lamented that moral
right should ever give way to political convenience. But if temptations
of interest are sometimes too strong for human virtue, let us at least
retain a virtue where there is no temptation to quit it. In the present
case there is apparent right on one side, and no convenience on the
other. Inhabitants of this island can neither gain riches nor power by
taking away the liberty of any part of the human species. The sum of the
argument is this: No man is by nature the property of another. The
defendant is, therefore, by nature, free. The rights of nature must be
some way forfeited before they can be justly taken away. That the
defendant has, by any act, forfeited the rights of nature, we require to
be proved; and if no proof of such forfeiture can be given, we doubt not
but the justice of the court will declare him free.”
The author of this production has artfully surrounded his subject with
such a plausibility of concessive proposals, doubtful suggestions,
indefinite words and propositions, as will require a sifting of his
ideas into a more distinct view. And we fear some will find his argument
thus vague and indeterminate; the mind will pass it by, as one of those
learned masterpieces of logic, so distant from the eye of our common
judgment, that they will sooner yield their assent than endure the
labour of examination.
The first suggestion we would offer on the subject of this production is
its total inapplicability to the case. The negro was held a slave in
Jamaica. The inquiry was not, whether he was so held in obedience to the
British law regulating the institution of slavery in Jamaica. The only
question was, whether a slave in Jamaica, or elsewhere, who had by any
means found his way into Scotland, was or was not free by operation of
law. Not a word is directed to that point. And the court of session must
have regarded its introduction before them as an argument in the case,
as idle and as useless as would have been a page from his Rasselas. The
British government established negro slavery by law in all her colonies,
but made no provision by which the slave, when once found on the shores
of England, could be taken thence again into slavery.
The object, no doubt, was wholly to prevent their introduction there, in
favour to her own labouring poor. The British monarchy retained the
whole subject of slavery under its own control. The colonies had no
voice in the matter. They had no political right to say that the slave,
thus imposed on them, should, after he had found his way into any part
of the British Isles, be reclaimed, and their right of property in him
restored. Their political condition differed widely from the condition
of these United States at the formation of this republic.
They, as colonial dependants, had no power to dictate protection to
their own rights, or to insist on a compromise of conflicting interests
to be established by law.
Dr. Johnson’s argument is exclusively directed against the political and
moral propriety of the institution of slavery as a state or condition of
man anywhere, instead of the true question at issue. The argument, taken
as a whole, is, therefore, a sophism, of the order which dialecticians
call “_ignoratio elenchi_;” a dodging of the question; a substitution of
something for the question which is not; a practice common among the
pert pleaders of the day—sometimes, doubtless, without their own
perception of the fact. In regard to him who uses this sophism to effect
the issue, the conclusion is inevitable,—he is either dishonest or he is
ignorant of his subject. And when we come to examine this celebrated
production as an argument against the moral propriety of the existence
of the institution of slavery in the world, we shall find every pillar
presented for its foundation a mere sophism, now quite distinctly, and
again more feebly enunciated, as if with a more timid tongue, and left
to inquiry, adorned by festoons of doubt and supposition.
We shall requote some portions, with a view to their more particular
consideration. And, first, “Yet it may be doubted whether slavery can
ever be supposed the natural condition of man.” This clause, when put in
the crucible, reads, “Yet slavery can never exist in conformity to the
law of God.” Whoever doubts this to be the sense, we ask him to suppose
what the sense is! The author did not choose these few words to express
the proposition, because the law of God _could_ readily be produced in
contradiction: “_Whosoever committeth sin is the servant_ (δοῦλος,
_doulos_, SLAVE) _of sin_.” Besides, then, he loses the benefit of the
sophism,—the substitution of the condition of man in his fallen state,
through the ambiguity of the word “natural,” for the condition of the
first man, fresh from the hand of the Creator. This sophism is one of
great art and covertness; so much so, that it takes its character rather
from its effect on the mind than from its language; and we therefore
desire him who reads, to notice the whole chain of thought passing in
the author’s mind,—lest he forget how our present state is the subject
of contemplation offered as data, when, on the word “natural,” as if it
were a potter’s wheel, our _original condition_ is turned to the front,
a postulate, from which we are left to compare and conclude.
The doctrine of the Bible is, that slavery is the consequence of sin. If
“natural” be taken to mean the quality of a state of perfect holiness
and purity, then slavery cannot be the natural condition of man; no
_doubts_ are required in the case. But if “natural” is used to express
the quality of our condition under sin, sinking us under the curse of
the law, then the propriety of its use will not be “doubtful,” when
applied to slavery, because it is a consequent of the quality of the
condition. “Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which
are written in the book of the law to do them.” The proposition, as thus
explained, we think of no value in the argument; but, as left by the
author, obscure, its real meaning and intent not obviously perceived nor
easily detected, and he may have thought it logical and sound.
“It is impossible not to conceive that men, in their original state,
were equal.”
Here is another sophism, which the learned call _petitio principii_,
introduced without the least disguise,—the assumption of a proposition
without proof, which, upon examination, is not true. If the author mean,
by “original state,” the state of man in paradise, we have no method of
examining facts, except by a comparison of Adam with Eve, who was placed
in subjection. And if we may be permitted to examine the state of holy
beings more elevated than was man,—“For thou hast made him a little
lower than the angels,”—then, by analogy, we shall find it possible to
conceive that men, in the original state, were not equal, since even the
angels, who do the commands of God, are described as those “that excel
in strength.”
But if Dr. Johnson mean the state of man after the fall, then Cain was
told by God himself, that, if he did well, he should have rule over
Abel.
“And very difficult to imagine how one would be subjected to another,
but by violent compulsion.” The object of this singular remark is to
enforce the proposition, That slavery is incompatible with the law of
God, which is not true.
“And if the servant shall plainly say, ‘I love my master * * * I will
not go out free:’ then his master shall bring him * * * and he shall
serve (be a slave to) him for ever.”
But if it shall be said the value of the passage quoted resides in the
term “violent compulsion;” that “violent compulsion,” sufficient to make
a man a slave, is incompatible with the law of God, then it will have no
weight in the argument, because the “violent compulsion” used may be in
conformity to the law of God. “And I will cause thee to serve (be a
slave) to thine enemies in the land which thou knowest not.”
“An individual may indeed forfeit his liberty by crime, but he cannot
forfeit the liberty of his children.”
This, as a proposition, presents a sophism of the order _non causa pro
causa_, in reverse. We all agree a man may forfeit his liberty by crime;
but how are we to deduce from this fact that the liberty of the child
cannot be affected by the same crime? The truth is, the crime that
deprives a parent of liberty, may, or may not, deprive the child. The
framework of this sophism is quite subtle; it implies the sophism, “_a
dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter_,” to have full effect on the
mind. Because, in truth, the crime that deprives the parent of liberty
does not invariably involve the liberty of the child, we are, therefore,
asked to assent to the proposition that it never does. But, perhaps, an
analysis of the proposition before us may be more plain to some, when we
remark, what is true in all such compound sophisms, that the proposition
containing it is divisible into two distinct propositions.
In this case, the first one is true,—the second not. If, by crime, a man
forfeits his life, he forfeits his liberty. If he is put to death
previous to a condition of paternity, its prospect is cut off with him.
Those beings who, otherwise, might have been his descendants, will never
exist. Hence rude nations, from such analogy, in case of very high
crimes, destroyed, with the parent, all his existing descendants.
Ancient history is full of such examples. The principle is the same as
the more modern attaint, and is founded, if in no higher law, in the
common sense of mankind; for, when the statute establishing attaints is
repealed, the public mind and the descendant both feel that the attaint
essentially exists, even without law to enforce it. Who does not
perceive that the descendants of certain traitors are effectually
attainted at the present day, even among the most enlightened nations.
He who denies that the crime of the parent can affect the liberty of the
child, must also deny that the character of the parent can affect him; a
fact that almost universally exists, and which every one knows.
“Let his children be continually vagabonds and beg; * * * let his
posterity be cut off; * * * let the iniquities of his fathers be
remembered with the Lord.”
This doctrine was recognised and practised by the church, even in
England, in the more early ages. Let one instance suffice. About the
year 560, Mauricus, a Christian king of Wales, committed perjury and
murdered Cynetus,—whereupon, Odouceus, Bishop of Llandaff, in full
synod, pronounced excommunication, and cursed, for ever, him and all his
offspring. See Milton’s ΕΙΚΟΝΟΚΛΑΣΤΗΣ, cap. 28.
This principle actively exists in the physical world. The parent
contracts some loathsome disease—the offspring are physically
deteriorated thereby. He whose moral and physical degradation are such
that slavery to him is a blessing, with few exceptions, will find his
descendants fit only for that condition. The children of parents whose
conduct in life fostered some mental peculiarity, are quite likely, with
greater or less intensity, to exhibit traces of the same. “The parents
have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge.” The
law is not repealed by the mantle of love, which, in mercy, the Saviour
has spread over the world, any more than forgiveness blots out the fact
of a crime. The hope of happiness hereafter alleviates present
suffering, but, in no sense, annihilates a cause which has previously
existed.
“A man may accept life from a conquering enemy on condition of perpetual
servitude; but it is very doubtful whether he can entail that servitude
on his descendants; for no man can stipulate, without commission, for
another.”
All that is presented as argument here, is founded upon the proposition,
that no man can stipulate for his descendants, whether unborn or not.
If what we have before said be true, little need be said on the subject
of this paragraph. For we have already seen that the conduct of the
ancestor, to an indefinite extent, both physically influences and
morally binds the condition of the offspring. It is comparatively but a
few ages since, over the entire world, the parent had full power, by
law, to put his children to death for crime, or to sell them into
slavery for causes of which he was the judge. And it may be remarked,
that such is the present law among, perhaps, all the tribes who furnish
from their own race slaves for the rest of the world. It is not
necessary here to show why a people, who find such laws necessary to
their welfare, also find slavery a blessing to them.
Civilization has ameliorated these, to us, harsh features of parental
authority; yet, to-day, the world can scarcely produce a case where the
condition of the child has not been greatly affected by the
stipulations, the conduct, the influences of the parent, wholly beyond
its control. The relation of parent has ever been found a sufficient
commission to bind these results to the condition of the offspring.
“But our fathers dealt proudly, and hardened their necks, and hearkened
not to thy commandments, and refused to obey; * * * and in their
rebellion appointed a captain to return to their bondage.”
“The condition which he (the captive) accepts, his son or grandson would
have rejected.”
This, at most, is supposititious, and, as an argument, we think,
extremely weak; because it implies, either that the acceptance of the
parent was not the result of necessity, and the wisest choice between
evils, or that the rejection, by the son, was the fruit of extravagant
pretension.
“He that is extravagant will quickly become poor, and poverty will
enforce dependence and invite corruption.” * * * “I have avoided that
empyrical morality that cures one vice by the means of another.”
_Johnson’s Rambler._
“If we should admit, what perhaps with more reason may be denied, that
there are certain relations between man and man, which may make slavery
necessary and just, yet it can never be proved, that he, who is suing
for his freedom, ever stood in any of these relations.”
We cannot pretend to know what were the particular facts in relation to
the slavery of the individual then in Scotland. It is not, however,
pretended that the facts in relation to this slave were not the facts in
relation to all others. No suggestion of any illegality as to his
slavery in Jamaica is made, other than the broad ground of the
illegality of slavery itself. This is quite evident from what follows:
“He is certainly subject, by no law but that of violence, to his present
master, who pretends no claim to his obedience, but that he bought him
from a merchant of slaves, whose right to sell him was never examined.”
In the passage under consideration, we are confined wholly to negro
slavery; and had Dr. Johnson been serious in admitting that slavery,
under “certain relations,” was “necessary and just,” he would have
yielded his case; because, then, the slave in hand would have been
placed in the category of proving that he did not exist under these
relations. Johnson well knew that slavery existed in Jamaica by the
sanction of the British Parliament, and he manifests his contempt for
it, by the assertion that the slave was held only by the law of force.
He was, therefore, not reaching for the freedom of that particular
slave, but for the subversion of slavery as a condition of man.
The author has heretofore signified a willingness to admit the
lawfulness of slavery, when induced by “crime or captivity;” but now
denies the validity of such admission, because the relations of “crime
and captivity” can never be proved. The apparent object of his admission
was merely to rally us, by his liberality, to the admission that these
relations could never be proved; and we admit they never can be in the
way he provides; and he therefore announces the demonstration of the
proposition, that slavery can never be just, because “these relations,”
which alone make it so, can never be established. But what are the
reasons? They are the very causes which render the Africans obnoxious to
the condition of slavery—the degraded, deteriorated, and savage state of
that people. The negro slave, in his transit from the interior of
Africa, is often sold many times, by one master and chieftain to
another, before he reaches the western coast, whence he was transferred
by the slave factors to the English colonies. No memory of these facts,
or of the slave’s origin, is preserved or attempted. Under these
circumstances, though each individual of these slaves induced the
condition by “crime or captivity,” such fact could never be established
in the English colony. To attempt proof there of any fact touching the
case, would be as idle and futile as to attempt such proof in regard to
the biography of a baboon. Besides, the truth is, a very large portion
of these slaves were born slaves in Africa, inheriting their condition
from a slave ancestry of unknown ages, and recognised to be slaves by
the laws and customs of the various tribes there, and sent to market as
a surplus commodity, in accordance to the laws and usages among them,
enforced from time immemorial.
So far as we have knowledge of the various families of man, we believe
it to have ever been the practice for one nation to receive the national
acts of another as facts fixed, and not subject to further investigation
or alteration by a foreign people, especially when none but the people
making the decision were affected by it. Johnson surely must have agreed
to such a practice, because an opposite course, so far as carried into
action, would have involved every nation in universal war and endless
bloodshed. Besides, the right to usurp such control would involve the
right to enslave, and can only exist when the degeneracy of a nation has
become too great a nuisance to be longer tolerated with safety by the
people annoyed: self-protection will then warrant the right.
If England makes it lawful for her subjects to buy slaves in Africa and
hold them in Jamaica, then her subjects may lawfully hold there such as
are decided by the laws of Africa to be slaves. But the author of the
argument, with all this before him, having dictated what alone shall
make a man a slave, would propose to set up a new tribunal contrary to
all international law—contrary to the peace of the world—and, finally,
as to the object to which it is to be applied, forever abortive:
wherefore his argument in effect is, because “these relations,” which he
admits would justly make a man a slave, cannot be proved, therefore what
he admits to be true is not true; and puts us in mind of the sophism:
“If, when a man speaks truth, he says he lies, he lies; but he lies when
he speaks the truth; therefore, by speaking the truth, he lies!” which
we think about as relevant to the question.
In his conclusion, Dr. Johnson frankly acknowledges the position we have
assigned him:—
“The sum of the argument is this: No man is, by nature, the property of
another. The defendant, therefore, is free by nature. The rights of
nature must be someway forfeited before they can be justly taken away.”
There are, in our language, but few words of which we make such loose
and indefinite use as we do of the word “nature,” and its variously
modified forms. It would elucidate what we wish to bring to mind
concerning the use of this word, to select some verbose author, of a
fanatical habit of thought, or enough so to favour a negligence as to
the clearness of the ideas expressed by the terms at his command, and
compare the varied meanings which his application of the word will most
clearly indicate. We do not accuse Dr. Johnson of any want of astute
learning, but we wish to present an excuse for explaining that, by his
use of the phrases, “men by nature”—“by nature free”—“the rights of
nature,” he means, _the rights established by the laws of God_. He uses
those phrases as synonyms of the Creator, of his providence influencing
the condition of man, or the adaptations bestowed on him. The laws of
nature are the laws of God. And we are bold to say, no discreet writer
uses the words differently. As a sample of its legitimate use, we quote
“Milton to Hortlib on Education:”—
“Not to mention the learned correspondence which you hold in foreign
parts, and the extraordinary pains and diligence which you have used in
this matter, both here and beyond the seas; either by the definite will
of God so ruling, or the peculiar sway of _nature_, which also is God’s
working,” &c.
We all agree that God has made the world, and all things therein, and
that he established laws for its government, and also for the government
of every thing in it. Now we must all agree that it was an act of great
condescension, love, and mercy, if God did come down from his throne in
heaven, and, from his own mouth instruct a few of the lost men then in
the world, his chosen people, what were some of his laws, such as were
necessary for them to know and to be governed by, that they might, to
the greatest possible extent, live happily in this world, and enjoy
eternal life hereafter. Do you believe he did so? You either believe he
did, or you believe the Bible is a fable. If you believe he did, then we
refer you to _Ex._ xx. and xxi., and to _Lev._ xxv., for what he did
then reveal, as his law, on the subject of slavery; not that other
important revelations were not made concerning this subject, which we
shall have occasion to notice in the course of these studies.
If we believe the Bible to be a true book, then we must believe that God
did make these revelations to Moses. Among them, one law permitted the
Israelites to buy, and inherit, and to hold slaves. And Dr. Wayland, the
author of “The Elements of Moral Science,” agrees that what was the law
of God must ever remain to be so.
It will follow then, if the laws of God authorize slavery, that a man
_by nature may be the property of another_, because, whatever you may
think the laws of nature to be, yet they can have no validity in
opposition to the laws of God. If it shall be said that Jesus Christ
repealed the law as delivered to Moses, then we answer: He says he came
not to destroy, but to fulfil the law and that he fully completed his
mission. He had no commission to repeal the law: therefore he had no
power to do so.
This portion of Dr. Johnson’s argument is consonant with the notions of
the advocates of the “higher law” doctrine, who persist that slavery is
a sin, because they think it is.
But if the law permitted slavery, then to hold, cannot be a sin, because
God “frameth not mischief by a law.” See _Ps._ xciv. 20. “Wo unto them
that decree unrighteous decrees.” _Isa._ x. 1. If the law authorizing
the Jews to hold slaves was unrighteous, then God pronounces the wo upon
himself, which is gross contradiction.
But the law is “pure, holy, and just;” therefore a law permitting sin
must be against itself—which cannot be; for, in such case, the law
recoils against itself, and destroys its own end and character.
But again: “The end of the commandment is charity out of a pure heart,
and of a good conscience, and faith unfeigned.” 1 _Tim._ i. 5. Now it is
not charity to permit that which cannot be done with a pure heart,
because then conscience and faith are both deceived.
Again: The law “beareth not the sword in vain, but to be a terror to
evil works, for he (the instrument executing the law) is the minister of
God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.”
If slavery, or to hold slaves, be sin, then also the law granting the
license to do so destroys the very object which it was enacted to
sustain. But again: If the law allows sin, then it is in covenant with
sin and the law itself, therefore, must be sin.
In short, the doctrine is pure infidelity. It is destructive to the
object of law, and blasphemous to God. What are we to think of him who
holds that God descended in the majesty of his power upon Sinai, and
there, from the bottomless treasures of his wisdom and purity,
commanding man to wash his garment of every pollution, opened to
him—what? Why, an unclean system of morals, stained by a most unholy
impurity; but which he is nevertheless to practise to the damning of his
soul! Atheism, thou art indeed a maniac!
In the course of these studies, we shall attempt to show that man is not
free in the unlimited sense with which the word is here used. Absolute
freedom is incompatible with a state of accountability. Say, if you
choose, Adam was free in paradise to eat the apple, to commit sin, yet
we find his freedom was bounded by an accountability beyond his power to
give satisfactory answer: hence the consequent, a change of state, a
circumscribing of what you may call his freedom. This, in common
parlance, we call punishment; yet our idea of punishment is inadequate
to express the full idea; because God cannot be supposed to delight in
punishment, or to be satisfied with punishment, in accordance with our
narrow views. Such would be inconsistent with the combination of his
attributes—a Being so constituted of all power, that each power is
predominant, even love and mercy. Thus the law of God clothes the effect
in mercy and positive good, inversely to the virulence of the cause, or
in direct proportion to its propriety. Thus, righteousness, as a cause,
exalteth a nation; but sin is a reproach to any people. Thus the law of
God places the sinner under the government of shame, infamy, contempt,
as schoolmasters to lead him back to virtue; and it may be observed that
the schoolmaster is more forcing in his government in proportion to the
virulence of vice, down to the various grades of subjection and slavery,
and until the poison becomes so great that even death is a blessing.
But if the mind cannot perceive that the chastenings of the Lord are
blessings, let it regard them as lessons. The parent, from the
waywardness of the child, perceives that it will fall from a precipice,
and binds it with a cord to circumscribe its walk. True, such are poor
figures to outline a higher Providence!
The Being who created, surely had power to appoint the government. Can
the thing created remain in the condition in which it is placed, except
by obedience to the law established for its government? Disobedience
must change the condition of the thing and bring it under new
restraints—a lessening of the boundaries of freedom. The whole
providence of God to man is upon this plan, and is abundantly
illustrated, in the holy books, by precept and example. These restraints
follow quick on the footsteps of disobedience, until the law—the Spirit
shall no longer strive for reformation, but say, “Cut it down; why
cumbereth it the ground?”
Is this a too melancholy view? Let us, then, look at obedience and its
consequents, and turn the eye from this downward path of mental and
physical degradation, pain, misery, want, slavery, and death, to the
bright prospect of a more elevated state of progressive improvement,
secured to us as a consequent, a reward of obedience; the physical
powers improving, the mental elevating, and all our faculties becoming
instruments of greater truthfulness, until our condition shall be so
elevated that the Creator shall say, “Come ye and sit at my right hand!”
The assertion, that “no man is by nature the property of another,”
flatters our vanity and tumefies our pride, but is, nevertheless,
untrue. We are all absolutely the property of Him who made, and who
sustains his right to dispose of us; and does so in conformity to his
law. Thus, qualifiedly, we are the property of the great family of man,
and are under obligations of duty to all; more pressingly to the
national community of which we compose a part, and so on down to the
distinct family of which we are a member. It is upon this principle that
Fleta says, (book i, chap. 17,) “He that has a companion has a master.”
See also the same in Bracton, book i. chap. 16.
If, by the laws of God, other men could have no property in us, the laws
of civil government could have no right to control us. But if the civil
government, by the laws of God, has the right to govern and control us,
so far as is for the benefit of ourselves and the community, then it
will follow, that when our benefit will be enhanced, and that of the
community, by our subjection to slavery, either temporary or perpetual,
the laws of God, in mercy, will authorize such subjection. Or, if the
state of our degradation be such that our continuance upon the earth be
an evil past all remedy, then the laws of God will authorize the civil
law to decree our exit.
The providence of God to man is practical. He never deals in the silly
abstractions of foolish philosophers. He spends no time in experimenting
by eristic syllogisms. He deals alone in his own power, which nowhere
ever ceases to act, although wholly beyond our comprehension. Man may
long for a full view of the Almighty, yet we are destined here to
perceive but the “hinder parts” of his presence—the effect of his power,
not Him! Let us worship; and, for our guidance, be content with the
pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night!
In conclusion: Should the author of “The Elements of Moral Science”
examine this argument of the great dialectician of the past century,
with his acknowledged logical acumen, free from the prejudices of his
locality, now so abundantly displayed in that portion of his work to
which we object, we would suggest the propriety of his applying the
discoveries he may make to emendations in his succeeding thousands.
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Study II.
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