“It is important to remember that two grounds of moral obligation are
distinctly recognised in the gospel. The first is our duty to man as
man, that is, on the ground of the relation which men sustain to each
other; the second is our duty to man as a creature of God, that is, on
the ground of the relation which we all sustain to God. On this latter
ground, many things become our duty which would not be so on the former.
It is on this ground that we are commanded to return good for evil, to
pray for them that despitefully use us, and, when we are smitten on one
cheek, to turn also the other. To act thus is our duty, not because our
fellow-man has a right to claim this course of conduct from us, but
because such conduct in us will be well-pleasing to God. And when God
prescribes the course of conduct which will be well-pleasing to him, he
by no means acknowledges the right of abuse in the injurious person, but
expressly declares, ‘Vengeance is mine and I will repay it, saith the
Lord!’ Now, it is to be observed, that it is precisely upon this latter
ground that the slave is commanded to obey _his_ master. It is never
urged, like the duty of obedience to parents, _because it is right_; but
because the cultivation of meekness and forbearance under injury will be
well-pleasing unto God. Thus servants are commanded to be obedient to
their own masters, ‘in singleness of heart, as unto Christ; doing the
will of God from the heart, with good-will doing service, as to the
Lord, and not to man.’ _Eph._ v. 5–7.
“Servants are commanded to count their masters worthy of all honour,
that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed. 1 _Tim._ vi.1.
That they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things.
_Titus_ iii. 9.
“The manner in which the duty of servants or slaves is inculcated,
therefore, affords no ground for the assertion that the gospel
authorizes one man to hold another in bondage, any more than the command
to honour the king, when that king was Nero, authorized the tyranny of
the emperor; or the command to turn the other cheek when one was
smitten, justifies the infliction of violence by an injurious man.”
Added to the foregoing, we find the following note:
“I have retained the above paragraph, though I confess that the remarks
of Professor Taylor, of the Union Theological Seminary of Virginia, have
led me seriously to doubt whether the distinction, to which it alludes,
is sustained by the New Testament.”
Why then did he retain it?
In his preface to the fourth edition, which is inserted in the present,
after expressing his acknowledgments for the criticisms with which
gentlemen have favoured him, he says—
“Where I have been convinced of error, I have altered the text. Where I
have only _doubted_, I have suffered it to remain; as it seemed
profitless merely to exchange one _doubtful_ opinion for another.”
We beg to know what _doubtful opinion_ would have been introduced by the
deletion of this, which he acknowledges to be doubtful? Why did he not
go to the Bible, and inquire of Jesus Christ and the apostles for advice
in such a case? “And immediately Jesus stretched forth his hand, and
caught him, and said unto him, O thou of little faith, wherefore didst
thou doubt?” _Matt._ xiv. 31.
In _Matt._ xxi. 21, we find that the doubting mind is destitute of
Christian power; and the same in _Mark_ xi. 23. Jesus, speaking to his
disciples, says to them, _Luke_ xii. 29, “Neither be ye of a doubtful
mind.” Does any one imagine that Luke would have left any thing in his
book that he thought doubtful? But we find in _Rom._ xiv. 1, “Him that
is weak in the faith receive ye, but not to doubtful disputations.” This
surely needs no comment. The poison of doubt is rejected in 1 _Tim._ ii.
8; and the apostle in _Rom._ xiv. 23, says, “And he that doubteth is
damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith, for whatsoever is not
of faith is sin.” How awful is the condition of him who shall attempt to
preach a doctrine, and that an important one too, as the doctrine of the
Bible, of which he doubts! A doctrine in which he can have no faith! Who
shall say it would not be a palpable attempt to change the meaning and
alter the sense of the Scripture from its true interpretation?
“Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye
diminish aught from it, that ye may keep the commandments of the Lord
your God, which I command you.” _Deut._ iv. 2.
“But there be some that trouble you, and pervert the gospel of Christ.
But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you
than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed. As we
said before, so say we now again, if any man preach any other gospel
unto you than that ye have received, let him be accursed.” _Gal._ 1.
7–9.
“I Jesus have sent mine angel to testify unto you these things in the
churches. * * * For I testify unto every man that heareth the words of
the prophecy of this book, if any man shall add unto those things, God
shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book; and if any
man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God
shall take away his part out or the book of life.” _Rev._ xxii. 16–19.
“Every word of God is pure. * * * Add not unto his words, lest he
reprove thee, and thou be found a liar.” _Prov._ xxx. 5–6.
We have not seen the remarks of Professor Taylor; but we can easily
imagine that a professor of theology, free from the delirium of
abolitionism, would not have found it a difficult labour to prove that
the main point of the author’s argument was contradicted by Scripture,
and that even he himself attempted to sustain it only by assumption. We
regret that President Wayland has not given us Professor Taylor’s
remarks that made him “doubt.” We, however, will venture our “remark”
that the author’s assertion, “the inculcation of the duty of slaves
affords no evidence that the Scriptures countenance slavery, more than
the command to honour the king authorized the tyranny of Nero,” is a
comparison where there is no parallel. Dr. Wayland must first make it
appear that all kings, or chief magistrates, are, necessarily, wicked
tyrants, like Nero; and that the wicked tyranny is a part and parcel of
the thing to be honoured, before his parallel between slavery and
monarchy can be drawn; and since, then, the deduction will be useless,
we suppose he will not make the attempt.
The parallel that might have been sustained is this: The inculcation of
the duty of slaves to obey their masters does not authorize masters to
abuse their power over their slaves, any more than the command to honour
the king authorized the tyranny of Nero;—from which the deductions are,
that masters have a right to command their slaves as things in their
peculiar relation, and not as things having a different relation. The
master has no right to command a slave, as if the slave stood in the
relation of a horse; nor even a horse, as if the horse stood in the
relation of a piece of timber: so the king has no right to govern his
subjects as if they were idiots or brutes, but as enlightened free-men,
if such be their condition.
The object of the government is the happiness no more of the governor
than of the governed. This principle, so profusely illustrated in
Scripture, it would seem the abolitionists run to shipwreck, in every
approach they make towards it.
There are a class of abolition writers who never fail to compare St.
Paul’s instruction, to live in obedience to the civil authority, (making
no exception even when the worst of monarchs are in power,) with his
instruction to slaves to obey their masters; and then say that no
argument is to be drawn from the latter in favour of slavery, any more
than there is from the former in favour of the wickedness of the Emperor
Nero. To some, this position may look quite imposing; while others will
associate it with the false position of a wicked, unprincipled lawyer,
who is ambitious only to gain his case, and cares not by what falsehood,
or by what means. But it is truly mortifying to see such an argument
presented, and attempted to be sustained, by any one who pretends to be
an honest man, and a disciple of the Lord Jesus Christ. And we cannot
but reflect that such an one must be in one of three predicaments;
either in that of the lawyer, or his understanding must be so obtuse he
cannot reason, or so crazed by fanaticism as to be equally stultified in
intellect. Yet these men present this argument, or position, with an air
which displays the utmost confidence of their having obtained a victory,
and of their having established for themselves a lofty intellectual
character.
Jesus Christ and his apostles everywhere reprimanded and condemned
crime, outrage, and oppression, whether to superiors, equals, or
inferiors. Yet these qualities of action must take their character from
the facts of the case. The parent will feel it his duty to compel, by
force, his froward child to do right; yet the same action directed to
his neighbour, or equal, may be manifestly wrong, or even sinful. The
crimes of monarchs and the crimes of masters are everywhere condemned,
as well as the crimes of all other men. Yet to be a monarch or a master
is nowhere condemned, _per se_, as a sinful condition of itself.
All history agrees that Nero was a wicked, bad prince; he was wicked and
bad because his acts were wicked and bad; not because he was a prince or
an emperor. Slaves are ordered to be obedient to their masters. Is there
any one so crazy as therefore to suppose that the master has a right to
overwork, starve, murder, or otherwise misuse his slave? We are all
commanded to be obedient to the civil power. Does this give the chief
ruler the right to practise the wickedness of Nero?
Is there any proof that Philemon murdered, or was recklessly cruel to
his slaves? What justice is there in comparing his character as only on
an equality with that of Nero? Was Nero, with all his sins, admitted
into the church of Christ? Where is the parallel between him and the
“beloved” of the apostle?
We feel authorized to affirm that St. Paul would have rejected from the
church a slaveholder, who murdered, starved, or otherwise maltreated his
slaves, because these crimes would have been proof of his want of the
Christian character. The same evidence of wicked conduct would have
excluded any other man, even the emperor, from the church; yet, since
slaveholders, who had not been guilty of such enormities, were admitted
to the church, and distinguished as “beloved,” this fact becomes proof
that slaveholding is no evidence of a sinful character. So monarchs and
emperors, who gave proof of the possession of the Christian character,
were always admissible to the Christian church. This fact also becomes
demonstration, that being a monarch or an emperor gave no proofs of a
sinful character.
Will Dr. Wayland undertake to prove that the admission of Constantine to
the Christian church gave any license to the wicked murders and hateful
hypocrisy of the Emperor Phocas? Or will he venture to extend his
argument, and say that the command of marital and filial obedience
proves nothing in their favour; since we are commanded to yield a like
obedience to the king, although that king be the wicked Phocas? The fact
is, the mere character of chief-magistrate, of husband, of parent or
slaveholder, is quite distinct from the character which their acts may
severally heap upon them. It is, therefore, quite possible for us to
reverence and obey the king, yet hold in contempt the person who fills
the throne.
Civil government, the relations of parent and child, husband and wife,
and slavery itself, are all ordinances of Divine wisdom, instituted for
the benefit of man, under the condition of his fallen state. But because
these relations are in accordance with the ordinances of God, it by no
means follows that the abuses of them are so.
Suppose those who wish to abolish the institution of marriage should
present the same argument in their behalf which Dr. Wayland has in this
case, it will surely be just as legitimate in the one as the other. But
will not Dr. Wayland readily say that there is no parallel between the
particular relations compared? We doubt not, he would consider it too
stupid to even require refutation.
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