In those “Elements of Moral Science,” we find the following, p. 29:
“From what has been said, it may be seen that there exists, in the
actions of men, an element which does not exist in the actions of brutes
* * * * * * We can operate upon brutes only by fear of punishment, and
hope of reward. We can operate upon man, not only in this manner, but
also by an appeal to his consciousness of right and wrong; and by such
means as may improve his moral nature. Hence, all modes of punishment,
which treat men as we treat brutes, are as unphilosophical as they are
thoughtless, cruel, and vindictive. Such are those systems of criminal
jurisprudence which have in view nothing more than the infliction of
pain upon the offender.”
It was unnecessary to inform us that man possesses higher mental
endowments than the brute. But the main object of the author in the
foregoing paragraph is his deduction; that, because we can operate on
man by an appeal to his consciousness of right and wrong, therefore any
other mode of governing him is wrong. This _consequent_ we fail to
perceive. We also fail in the perception that his postulate is
universally true: which we think should have been proved before he can
claim assent to the deduction. If this our view be correct, we beg the
reverend author to reflect how far he may have made himself obnoxious to
the charge of sophistry!
If President Wayland intends, by the clause,—“and by such means as may
improve his moral nature,”—to include _corporeal punishment_, then his
mind was unprepared to grapple with the subject; for, in that case, the
whole paragraph is obscure, without object, and senseless. We most
readily agree that to govern man by appeals to his consciousness of
right and wrong is highly proper where the mind is so well cultivated
that no other government is required.
But, however unhappy may be the reflection, too large a proportion of
the human family will not fall within that class. How often do we see
among men, otherwise having some claim to be classed with the
intelligent, those of acknowledged bad habits; habits which directly
force the sufferer downward to poverty, disgrace, disease, imbecility,
and death,—on whom argument addressed to their “consciousness of right
and wrong,” “is water spilled on the ground.”
Children, whose ancestors have, for ages, ranked among the highly
cultivated of the earth,—each generation surpassing its predecessor in
knowledge, in science, and religion,—have been found to degenerate,
oftener than otherwise, when trained solely by arguments addressed to
their reason, and unaccompanied by physical compulsion.
What then are we to expect from man in a savage state, whose ancestors
have been degenerating from generation to generation, through untold
ages,—him, who has scarcely a feeling in common with civilized man,
except such as is common to the mere animal,—him, whom deteriorating
causes have reduced to the lowest grade above the brute?
Domberger spent twelve years in passing through the central parts of
Africa, from north to south. He found the negroes, in a large district
of country, in a state of total brutality. Their habits were those only
of the wild brutes. They had no fixed residences. They lay down wherever
they might be when disposed to sleep. They were not more gregarious than
the wild goats. So far as he could discover, they had not a language
even, by which to hold intercourse with each other. They possessed no
power by which they were enabled to exhibit moral degradation, any more
than the wild beasts.
Hanno, the Carthaginian navigator, in his Periplus, eight hundred years
before the birth of Christ, gives a similar account of a race he calls
Gætuli.
It is possible that man, in these extreme cases, where there is very
little to unlearn, might sooner be regenerated, elevated to
civilization, physical and mental power, than in other cases where there
may be far more proof of mental capacity, but where the worst of
intellectual and physical habits have stained soul and body with,
perhaps, a more indelible degradation.
It would be a curious experiment, and add much to our knowledge of the
races of man, to ascertain how many generations, under the most
favourable treatment, it would require to produce an equal to Moses, or
a David, a Newton, or the learned Dr. Wayland himself, (if such be
possible,) from these specimens of man presented before us! And we now
inquire, what course of treatment will you propose, as the most
practical, to elevate such a race to civilization?
It appears to us God has decided that slavery is the most effectual.
“Therefore my people are gone into captivity, because they have no
knowledge.” _Isa._ v. 13. “And they forsook the Lord, and served Baal
and Ashteroth. And the anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, and he
delivered them into the hands of the spoilers that spoiled them, and he
_sold_ them into the hands of their enemies round about.” _Judg._ ii.
13, 14. See also, iii. 6–8. “If his children forsake my law and walk not
in my judgments: if they break my statutes, and keep not my
commandments: then will I visit their transgressions with the rod and
their iniquity with stripes.” _Ps._ lxxxviii. 30–32. “He that troubleth
his own house shall inherit the wind: and the fool shall be the servant
(עֶבֶד _ebed_, _slave_) to the wise of heart.” _Prov._ ii. 29. “And her
daughters shall go into captivity. Thus will I execute judgments in
Egypt: and they shall know that I _am_ the Lord.” _Ezek._ xxx. 18. _See
also the preceding part of the chapter._
It is highly probable that among savage tribes, punishment and the
infliction of pain are often applied with no higher view than to torture
the object of displeasure. But to us it seems remarkably unfortunate, in
a student of moral and civil jurisprudence, to suggest that legal
punishment, among civilized men, is ever awarded or ordered with any
such feeling. If our education has given us a correct view of the
subject, the man who inflicts pain even on the brute, solely on the
account of such a feeling, instantly, so far as it is known, sinks to
the grade of a savage; and much more explicitly when the object of
revenge is his fellow man. On the contrary, when “the offender” has
given unquestionable evidence of a depravity too deeply seated for any
hope of regeneration, and the law orders his death, it selects that mode
of execution which inflicts the least suffering, and which shall have
also the greatest probable influence to deter others who may be downward
bound in the road of moral deterioration. There never has been a code of
laws among civilized nations, where the object of punishment was to
inflict pain on the implicated; only so far as was thought necessary to
influence a change of action for the better. The object of punishment
invariably has been the improvement of society.
If the Rev. Dr. Wayland had been teaching legislation to savages, or,
perhaps, their immediate descendants, his remarks, to which we allude,
might have been in place. But may we inquire to what cause are _we_
indebted for them?
Permit us to inquire of the Doctor, where now are to be found the
“systems of criminal jurisprudence” to which he alludes? Does he imagine
that such system has some _likeness_ to the government of the civilized
man over his slave? Or, in their government, does he propose to abolish
corporeal punishment, because he may think that will destroy the
institution itself? For “a servant (עָ֑בֶד _abed_, _a slave_) though he
understand, he will not answer.” _Prov._ xxix. 19.
We cannot pass over the paragraph we have quoted, without expressing the
most bitter regret to learn from Dr. Wayland’s own words, that he
recognises the fact, without giving it reproval, that “we” punish
“brutes” with no other view than to inflict pain. To _us_, such an idea
is most repugnant and awful! And we hope—we pray Him who alone hath
power to drag up from the deep darkness of degradation, that the minds
of such men may be placed under the controlling influence of a rule that
will compel to a higher sense of what is proper, and to a more clear
perception of what is truth!
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