As to the opinion of the people which some think, in such cases, is to
be implicitly obeyed; near two years tranquillity, which followed the
act, proved abundantly that the late horrible spirit was, in a great
measure, the effect of insidious art, and perverse industry and gross
misrepresentation. But suppose that the dislike had been much more
deliberate, and much more general than I am persuaded it was.—When we
know that the opinions of even the greatest multitudes are the
standard of rectitude, I shall think myself obliged to make those
opinions the masters of my conscience. But if it may be doubted
whether Omnipotence itself is competent to alter the essential
constitution of right and wrong, sure I am that such _things_ as they
and I, are possessed of no such power. No man carries farther than I
do the policy of making government pleasing to the people. But the
widest range of this politic complaisance is confined within the
limits of justice.... “But if I profess all this impolitic
stubbornness I may chance never to be elected into Parliament.” It is
certainly not pleasing to be put out of the public service. But I
wish, in being a member of Parliament, to have my share of doing
good and resisting evil. It would therefore be absurd to renounce my
objects in order to obtain my seat.
In his speech, upon his arrival at Bristol, and at the conclusion of
the poll in 1774, he says—
I am sorry I cannot conclude without saying a word on a topic touched
upon by my worthy colleague. I wish that topic had been passed by, at
a time when I have so little leisure to discuss it. But since he has
thought proper to throw it out, I owe you a clear explanation of my
poor sentiments on that subject. He tells you that the “topic of
instructions has occasioned much altercation and uneasiness in this
city,” and he expresses himself (if I understand him rightly) in favor
of the coercive authority of such instructions. Certainly, gentlemen,
it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative, to live in
the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most
unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to
have great weight with him; their opinion high respect; their business
unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his
pleasures, his satisfactions to theirs; and, above all, ever and in
all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiassed
opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not
to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he
does not derive from your pleasure—no, nor from the law and the
constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which
he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you not his industry
only, but his judgment, and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he
sacrifices it to your opinion. My worthy colleague says his will ought
to be subservient to yours. If that be all the thing is innocent. If
government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without
question, ought to be superior. But government and legislation are
matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination—and what sort
of reason is that in which the determination precedes the discussion;
in which one set of men deliberate and another decide; and where those
who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from
those who hear the arguments?