[Footnote 1: We are pleased at an opportunity afforded us of
presenting our readers in anticipation with an extract of great beauty
from the _second_ volume of Major Lee's Life of Napoleon. This volume
will not be published for some time—many laborious investigations
operating to delay the work much longer than was anticipated by its
author. We are indebted to Major Lee himself for the MS,—who sends it
to us from Paris.]
Bonaparte, having despatched the affairs which on the evening of the
action of Fombio called him back to Placentia; having adjusted the
amount of contribution imposed on that town, provided for the
immediate passage of his rear division across the Po, and signed an
armistice with the commissioners of the Duke of Parma, hastened to
rejoin his advance, and to resume the personal direction of its
movements. He arrived at Casal Pusterlengo at 3 o'clock on the morning
of the 10th, and marched without delay in pursuit of Beaulieu. Early
in the forenoon, and at some distance in front of Lodi, with the
grenadiers under Lannes, he reached the Austrian rear guard, composed
of the grenadiers of Nadasti, and two squadrons of hussars, with two
field pieces; which detachment, Beaulieu, that he might gain time to
withdraw his main body, encumbered with a heavy train of artillery,
across the Adda, had directed to defend to the last the approach to
Lodi. The ground they occupied was found to be so strong that it was
necessary to execute several manœuvres before they could be
advantageously attacked. The onset of the French was made with that
ardor which the presence of their general, and the confidence of
victory {542} inspired. The defence, which was as obstinate as the
post was important, was persisted in until the French battalions
pouring along in succession, the Austrians were nearly surrounded.
They at last gave way, leaving their killed and wounded, with one
field piece, on the field; and were pursued so closely into Lodi, that
they could neither shut the gates nor cross the river before the
French van-guard was in possession of the town.
Beaulieu's main body, upon which the fugitives retreated, consisting
of 12,000 infantry, 4,000 horse, and 30 pieces of artillery, was drawn
up behind field-works on the left bank of the Adda, and immediately
opposite to Lodi; the artillery, in front, looking on the bridge, and
the cavalry, a little withdrawn, on the flanks. From this position, in
which he felt at last safe and unassailable, the Austrian general
directed a violent cannonade on the town of Lodi, as soon as he
perceived it was occupied by the French; and expecting rather to
dislodge his adversary than to be himself disturbed, he declined
destroying the bridge over the Adda, and thus interrupting his direct
communication with Milan. To avoid and to mitigate the effect of this
cannonade, Bonaparte sheltered his infantry and horse, as fast as they
came up, behind the rampart of the town, which ran along the bank of
the river; and planting advantageously his own artillery, opened a
fire, which though supported by fewer guns, was more effectual than
the enemy's, inasmuch as the Austrians were uncovered. Notwithstanding
the strength of Beaulieu's ground, Bonaparte perceived, that with men
like his, it was not impregnable; and persevering in his design of
intercepting Wukassowich and Colli in their retreat to Mantua, he
resolved, even under the Austrian guns, to force the passage of the
Adda. The attempt was hazardous; but the soul of the enterprise
consisted in its danger, and the main chance of success, in its
apparent impossibility, which, so long as the bridge remained entire,
was only apparent. To prevent its destruction, he proceeded in person,
in full exposure to the Austrian artillery, to place two guns in such
positions that their cross fires, which assisted by Berthier he
himself tried, covered the farther end of the bridge, and rendered all
approach to it impracticable. The freedom with which he exposed
himself while making his skill as an artillery officer, instrumental
to his success as their general, delighted the troops extremely, and
was the occasion of their conferring on him that rank, which rendered
him famous in the annals of the bivouac, as “the Little Corporal.”
Then, comparatively at leisure, he made his preparations for forcing
the passage, ordering the artillery officers to maintain their fire
with unabated spirit, and directing Massena to give the rest of the
troops, who were drawn up behind the rampart, and had been in constant
exertion from 3 o'clock in the morning, a hasty breakfast and a short
repose.
The force which he had in hand at Lodi was more formidable in
character than numbers, consisting of three brigades of Massena's
division, the grenadier corps lately commanded by Laharpe, and a
reserve of light cavalry under general Beaumont, in all about 13,000
men; Gen. Kilmaine with the principal part of the horse, and Gen.
Mesnard with a brigade of infantry, had been detached in the morning
from Casal; the first to the left for the double purpose of keeping
free that wing of the army, and of hanging upon the flank of the
Austrian divisions in their retreat from Milan to Cassano; the second
to the right, for security on that side, and with instructions to
observe and act against the garrison of Pizzighitone. Serrurier's
division being the last in crossing the Po, and having been directed
to occupy Pavia, was at some distance in the rear; while Augereau's,
which had encamped the previous night at Borghetto, was following by
the way of Casal the progress of the advance. To this General,
therefore, as additional force might be required at Lodi, orders were
sent to expedite his march, and close up with the front as soon as
possible.
Although the chief reliance for success in this undertaking, was to be
on the courage and alacrity of the troops engaged in it, two
circumstances enabled Bonaparte to bring its issue, in some degree,
within the range of calculation. One of these was the information of
the inhabitants, that at the present stage of the water, the Adda was
fordable for cavalry, at a point half a league above the town; and the
other, his own observation, that the Austrian commander, in order to
shelter his troops from the French artillery as the French were
sheltered from his own, had withdrawn his mass of infantry and his
corps of horse behind a swell in the surface of the ground, to a
position so much in the rear, that it placed them farther from the
Austrian guns, than the French grenadiers would be when prepared to
rush across the bridge. In the first he perceived an opportunity of
annoying the right flank of the enemy, and distracting his attention
at a critical moment; in the second, and more important one, the
practicability, by a sudden and impetuous charge, of reaching his guns
before his infantry could interpose; and in both the probability that
his own column of attack, would be exposed but for an instant, to the
enemy's artillery. Upon the edge of this sharp inference, which few
minds would have had the acuteness to shape or the firmness to act
upon, the fate of the day was to turn.
At 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when the men were refreshed, and when
Augereau's immediate junction might be counted on, he directed Gen.
Beaumont with the cavalry and four pieces of light artillery, to pass
the Adda at the ford above, and having gained a footing on the
opposite bank, to cannonade the right flank of the Austrians, and if
practicable, to charge them. A column of attack 4,000 strong, composed
of grenadiers, and having the second battalion of carabiniers or light
infantry grenadiers, in front,[2] was formed under the orders of
Massena behind the rampart of the town, with the leading sections so
close to the gate, that by merely facing to the left, they would be
ready to spring upon the bridge. The rest of Massena's troops had
orders to follow in the charge instantly. The time required for the
_detour_ of the cavalry, Bonaparte employed in passing through the
ranks of the grenadiers, by a few energetic expressions encouraging
their zeal and rousing their intrepidity. Shouts of “long live the
republic!” repeated by a thousand voices, welcomed his appearance, and
proclaimed, that troops who had {543} turned the Alps and traversed
the Po, were not to be stopped by the Adda.[3] The cannonade was
continued with fury on both sides; when the guns of Beaumont being
heard on the left, and the Austrian fire seeming to slacken at the
sound, Bonaparte himself gave the word to advance. The drums beat the
charge; and the assailants issuing from behind the wall, like a band
of giants sprung from the earth, suddenly changed the face of the
conflict and quickly brought it to a closer decision. Wheeling to the
left, the leading sections rushed upon the bridge against a storm of
fire, which at the first onset, was so fatal, that the head of the
column reeled under its destruction. Bonaparte, aware that his attempt
must prove instantly successful or dreadfully abortive, perceived the
disorder in a moment, and in a moment repaired it. He hastened to the
front, and seconded by Berthier, Massena, Cervoni, d'Allemagne,
Lannes, Dupat, and the Commissary Salicetti, gave a fresh impulse to
the charge; and the column closing its ranks and quickly redressing
its disordered front, sprang forward with more determined valor and
more ardent steps. The bridge, two hundred yards long, was instantly
cleared. Dupat was the first officer across; Bonaparte himself was
next after Lannes. The soldiers, impatient to get across, and crowding
on their leaders, were seen as they approached the shore, some sliding
down the timbers of the bridge, others leaping off into the water, and
then speeding up the bank to close with the enemy. Displaying as
rapidly as they passed, they threw in a close and a deadly fire, and
falling upon the Austrian artillery before it could be supported,
dispersed the men or killed them at their pieces. Then with fury they
rushed upon the infantry, which, neither in time for rescue, nor in
spirit for revenge, was advancing. A struggle too fierce to be
lasting, ensued. The Austrians, discouraged by frequent defeats and
constant misfortunes, were unnerved by this unexpected attack, which
like a blast of death had swept across the river; and their line was
already pierced and mangled, when Augereau coming up with his light
brigade under Gen. Rusca, led it keenly into action and completed this
double victory, which at one blow, severed a strong line of defence,
and routed a formidable army. Part of Beaulieu's force fled, with
their general, into the Venetian territory to Crema, part to
Pizzighitone, some even to Cremona. His hussars endeavoring to cover
the retreat, made several charges, which, owing to the firmness of the
French infantry, were not successful.
[Footnote 2: When Alexander's officers dissuaded him against
attempting the passage of the Granicus, and particularly at a late
hour in the day, he said—“The Hellespont would blush, if after having
crossed it, I should be afraid of the Granicus.”—_Plutarch's Life of
Alexander._]
[Footnote 3: Napoleon in his despatch reporting to the government the
battle of Lodi (Moniteur, 20th May, 1796) says, his column of attack
was formed of grenadiers, with the “second battalion of carabiniers in
front.” In the French army there are both foot and horse carabiniers,
the former of which were employed at Lodi, and are the grenadiers of
the light infantry.]
But the marches and fighting of the day had so much exhausted the
victorious troops, that though still eager for glory they were panting
for breath, and the pursuit was not carried far beyond the field of
battle. The Austrians left on the ground 1,200 men killed and wounded,
and in possession of the French 1,000 prisoners, 600 horses, 20 guns,
and several stand of colors. Bonaparte's loss scarcely exceeded 200 in
killed and wounded; such was the rapidity and effect of a movement
which, with the nicest calculations of judgment, seemed to combine the
wild boldness of inspiration.[4]
[Footnote 4: Formally announcing to his readers a minute description
of the battle of Lodi, (vol. iii. p. 128) the author of Waverley
prefaces it by assuring them that the Adda falls into the Po at
Pizzighitone, a town at least twenty-five miles above its mouth; which
is like saying that the Tiber falls into the sea at Rome. Another
error into which he falls, requires more serious notice, because he
founds on it a general prospective imputation of untruth against
Napoleon, in reference to his military despatches, and his posthumous
works. At page 134, this free and fanciful historian says—“Bonaparte
states that they only lost 200 men during the storm of the passage. We
cannot but suppose that this is a very mitigated account of the actual
loss of the French army. So slight a loss is not to be reconciled with
the horrors of the battle, as he himself detailed them in his
despatches; nor with the conclusion, in which he mentions, that of the
sharp contests which the army of Italy had to sustain during the
campaign, none was to be compared with that ‘terrible passage of the
bridge of Lodi.’”
Now the truth is, Napoleon never “details” nor even mentions, “the
horrors of the battle” of Lodi, in any of his despatches. In that of
the 22d Floreal, 11th of May, he says—“Although since the commencement
of the campaign we have had some severe affairs, and it has frequently
been necessary to expose the troops to fire in the freest manner, none
of our struggles has come up to the terrible passage of the bridge of
Lodi.” Here is certainly no “_detail_ of the horrors of a battle,”
implying a conflict and slaughter of some duration. On the contrary,
in the body of the same despatch, he had previously described the
severity of the affair, as existing only for a moment. “The grenadiers
presented themselves on the bridge, which is 200 yards in length; the
fire of the enemy was terrible; the head of the column seemed even to
hesitate; _a moment's hesitation_ and all would have been lost. The
generals sensible of this, threw themselves in front, and decided the
struggle _while it was yet balanced_. This formidable column overthrew
every thing opposed to it; the enemy's artillery was _instantly_
taken. _In the twinkling of an eye_ his army was completely
dispersed.” Salicetti's despatch is conceived in similar terms. The
charge was made “with the rapidity of lightning”—the column hesitated
“for an instant”—and renewing the charge, carried the Austrian
artillery “in a moment.” In his account dictated to Montholon, (vol.
iii. p. 214) Napoleon, who could hardly have anticipated a calumny of
this kind, says—“the column traversed the bridge at a running pace, in
a few seconds,” and “was not exposed to the fire of the enemy, except
at the very moment when it wheeled to the left upon the bridge.” All
this shows that the “storm of the passage” instead of consisting of a
“_detail_ of horrors,” was a momentary hurricane of shot, which swept
off in an instant from the head of the column 200 men. Now the head of
the column, could only have been a certain portion of the whole
column. As the second battalion of carabiniers was in front, let us
suppose this battalion constituted the head, and had got upon the
bridge. We learn from a previous statement of Napoleon's, which is not
disputed, (Montholon, t. 3, p. 205) that the ten battalions of
grenadiers collected at Tortona, composed a force of 3,500 men. They
had been marching and fighting ever since; but let us estimate the
second carabiniers at 300; supposing them all on the bridge when the
Austrians fired, and we have two thirds of them killed and wounded in
a single instant! If this was not _a sharp affair, a hot fire, a
terrible passage,_ it is doubtful whether the annals of war furnish
any thing that is. Cæsar lost but 200 men at the battle of Pharsalia,
although the struggle had been at one moment so warm, that the brave
Crastinus and thirty centurions fell.—_Bello civili. L. 3, C. 99._
The head of the column being thus shattered, had the Austrian
artillery quickly repeated and vigorously sustained their fire, the
attempt of Napoleon must have failed. But it is evident that they were
daunted and confused by the sudden rush of the French upon the bridge,
by the opening of Beaumont's guns upon their flank, and by the want of
support from their own infantry; and after delivering one fire, served
their guns unsteadily and made little effectual resistance; for of all
the distinguished persons who sprang to the front of the column, eight
in number, not one was even wounded. This agrees perfectly with
another passage of Napoleon's report, which is of itself a {544}
refutation of Sir Walter's calumny. “If we have lost but few men, it
is owing to the promptitude with which the charge was executed, and to
the sudden effect produced on the enemy, by the imposing mass and
dreadful fire, of our intrepid column.”
But the author of Waverley, finding that no authentic narrative of
this action furnished the desired “horrors of the battle,” resolved,
it seems, in order to color his charge of wilful and habitual
misstatement against Napoleon, to prepare a set of horrors of his own,
expressly for the occasion. At page 133, therefore, he asserts, in
opposition to the report of Napoleon, that of Salicetti, the memoires
of Napoleon, the histories of Jomini and Desjardins, all of which were
in existence when he wrote, that “from the windows of the houses on
the left side of the river, the soldiers who occupied them, poured
volley upon volley of musketry on the thick column as it endeavored to
force its way over the long bridge.” This _detail_ seems with little
variation to be transposed from his own spirited account of the battle
of Bothwell bridge. “But the bridge was long and narrow, which
rendered the manœuvres slow as well as dangerous, and those who first
passed had still to force the houses, from which the covenanters
continued to fire.”—_Old Mortality_, chapter xxxii. After this it
would be needless to remark upon the next passage in Sir Walter's
commentary, which runs thus: “In fact, as we may take occasion to
prove hereafter, the memoranda of the great general, dictated to his
officers at St. Helena, have a little too much the character of his
original bulletins; and while they show a considerable disposition to
exaggerate the difficulties to be overcome, the fury of the conflict,
and the exertions of courage by which the victory was attained, show a
natural inconsistency, from the obvious wish to diminish the loss
which was its unavoidable price.”]
The French cavalry, with the exception of a small party headed by
Marmont, and composed mostly of Bonaparte's escort, took no part in
the action, and received none of the General's praise. It was alleged
that the ford was found less practicable and the circuit more
extensive, than had been counted upon. But the conduct, or rather the
nullity of this corps, at Lodi could hardly have lessened the
dissatisfaction which Bonaparte expressed the day before in a letter
to Carnot. “I will confess to you, that since the death of Stengel, I
have not a single fighting man among the superior officers of cavalry.
I wish you would send me two or three Adjutants General, who have
risen in the dragoons, possess a spark of military fire, and are
firmly resolved never to make skilful retreats.” It was not until the
French had reached the borders of the Mincio, and by capture or
contribution had furnished their troopers with heavy horses; and when
Murat, being returned with promotion from Paris, had an opportunity of
displaying that unbounded courage which gave a romantic splendor to
the technical force of his charges, that the cavalry of the army of
Italy began to prove worthy of their General's skill in war, and to
rival the infantry in prowess.[5] The conduct of the grenadiers, and
particularly of the battalion of carabiniers, was above praise or
description. When Bonaparte asked for the names of the men who formed
the leading section of the column, for the purpose of mentioning them
honorably in his report, the names of the whole battalion were handed
him. Léon, a sergeant of the thirty-second, whose courage had been
noticed at Monteligino and Montinotte, and Laforge, a grenadier of the
twenty-first, remarkable for activity and strength, appear however to
have been most conspicuous. The sergeant, after passing the bridge in
the front section, led the assault upon the Austrian batteries. The
grenadier, throwing himself into the enemy's intrenchments, slew five
men with his own hand. Among the generals in like manner, the
gallantry of Berthier was judged pre-eminent. To these circumstances
Bonaparte made allusion in his report. “Were I to mention all who
distinguished themselves, I should be obliged to name all the
carabiniers and grenadiers of the light division, and almost all the
officers of the staff. But I must not forget the intrepid Berthier,
who himself acted as gunner, horseman, and grenadier, on this
memorable day.”[6] Yet however excellent the spirit of the troops and
the conduct of the officers, few victories were ever, in so great a
degree, the result of the General's sagacity and courage, as that of
Lodi.[7] His modesty in making no reference to himself in his report,
was as heroic as his conduct in the battle.
[Footnote 5: This account of the French cavalry at Lodi is confirmed
by the words of Napoleon's report—“the ford being found very bad, the
cavalry was greatly retarded, and could not charge.” It corresponds
with the observation respecting them in his memoires (Montholon, t. 1,
p. 4.) Yet Lockhart insists, that at the battle of Lodi and during the
charge of the French grenadiers, “Beaumont pressed gallantly with his
horse upon the Austrian flank.” The same critical historian, who
appears to have written for the sole purpose of repeating or inventing
misrepresentations, copies devoutly Sir Walter's errors; one importing
that the vanguard of grenadiers who first passed the Po, was commanded
by Andreossi, and the other that the Adda falls into the Po _at
Pizzighitone_.]
[Footnote 6: In the report, neither of Napoleon nor of Salicetti, is
it stated that they were personally engaged in this charge. But at St.
Helena, “some one having read an account of the battle of Lodi, in
which it was said that Bonaparte displayed great courage in crossing
the bridge; and that Lannes passed it after him—‘Before me,’ said
Bonaparte, with much warmth; ‘Lannes passed first and I only followed
him. It is necessary to correct that on the spot’—and the correction
was accordingly made in the margin of the book.” (Haylitt, vol. i. p.
449. See also Lockhart, t. 1, p. 47.) Here _first_ must mean _before
me_; for in his despatch to the Directory of the 22d July, (Moniteur
of the 1st of August,) in reporting a successful assault on the
outworks of Mantua, and extolling the conduct of the officers engaged
in it, Napoleon says—“The chief of battalion Dupat, who commands the
brave fifth battalion of grenadiers, is the same officer who passed
the first the bridge of Lodi.” In his despatch, Bonaparte tells the
Directors that Salicetti was constantly at his side, a fact which
shows the latter was in the charge, and which otherwise would probably
not have been mentioned. He also says—“the army is under real
obligations to him,” referring no doubt by the word _real_, to the
_false_ pretensions set up, by Salicetti and his colleagues, or for
them, in regard to the storming of Little Gibraltar at Toulon, which
are noticed in the first volume (p. 365) of this work.]
[Footnote 7: After this anecdote, the author of Waverley lugs into his
narrative, the following compliment to the national vanity of his
countrymen. (Vol. iii, p. 137.) “This somewhat resembles the charge
which foreign tacticians have brought against the English, that they
gained victories by continuing, with their insular ignorance and
obstinacy, to fight on, long after the period when if they had known
the rules of war, they ought to have considered themselves as
completely defeated.” Such impertinence and bad taste deter imitation,
or it might be said, this charge against Sir Walter's compatriots has
never been urged by officers of the army or navy of the United
States—neither on the lakes nor on the ocean; at Saratoga, nor at New
Orleans, where the “flower of the peninsular veterans,” as Sir Walter
himself admits, (vol. viii. p. 474,) led by the disciple and
brother-in-law of Wellington—sought a combat with an inferior force of
western militia, and were perfectly sensible of a total defeat.
“Testis Metaurum flumen et Asdrubal
Devictus, et pulcher fugatis
Ille dies Latio tenebris.”]
Although the possession of Milan and the submission of Lombardy were
consequences of the battle of Lodi, Bonaparte was disappointed in one
of the principal objects which he hoped to gain by it. Wukassowich and
{545} Colli, feebly annoyed by Kilmaine, had crossed the Adda at
Cassano, in the forenoon of the day; he forced a passage at Lodi, and
taking the upper route, by the way of Brescia, to Mantua, were beyond
the reach of interception. Relinquishing, therefore, further efforts
against these Generals, he determined to attack Pizzighitone before it
could be put in a state of defence, and marched for that purpose on
the morning of the 11th, down the left bank of the Adda. The flight of
a few shells seconded by the cannonade of Mesnard from the right bank
of the river, compelled the garrison of three hundred men, which
Liptay had left behind him, to surrender. Cremona, a more important
fortress, opened its gates the same day to General Beaumont, who after
charging a body of the fugitives from Lodi, appeared before it with an
advance guard of cavalry.
From this point, which was the present limit of his career, Bonaparte
determined to lead back his forces in order to secure the country they
had overrun; and turning his views toward Milan, resolved to impress
on that capital and other cities of Lombardy, the stamp of French
authority, in the room of that which his victories had expelled. This
operation, which first called into exercise his abilities for
government, appears to have awakened the germs of that high ambition,
which, nurtured by the possession of great civil qualities, placed him
so far above all the other Generals of his age, and conducted him to a
sphere of elevated greatness which a mind supported by military
talents alone, and ambitious only of success in war, can never reach.
In recurring to the events of his early life, he afterwards
said—“Neither my success on the thirteenth of Vendemiaire, nor in the
campaign of Montenotte, made me believe myself a superior man. It was
not until after the battle of Lodi, that I began to think I might
become a decisive actor on our political theatre. Then it was, that
the first spark of high ambition was kindled in my soul.”
Suspending for the moment his further advance towards the Adige, he
thus disposed of his troops: The light division lately commanded by
Laharpe, was distributed along the Adda from Como to Cassano; and that
of Serrurier, which had been under orders to occupy Pavia, was
recalled and posted at Lodi, Pizzighitone and Cremona, so as to
complete the possession of the line of the Adda. From this last place,
he was to observe the discomfited forces of Beaulieu, who were
reassembling behind the Oglio and the Mincio. Augereau was directed to
take possession of Pavia, and to exhibit in that celebrated city,
which was next to Milan itself in importance, one of the finest
divisions of the invading army; while to Masséna was assigned the
still more honorable duty, of receiving the keys of the noble capital
of Lombardy. At the head of his division, this distinguished General
marched from Lodi, on the 13th of May.
The hostile forces being now separated, the imperialists collecting
their shattered battalions within the Venetian frontier, and the
republicans spreading their victorious divisions over the plains of
Lombardy, the reader's attention will be inclined to turn from the
constant success of the one, and the uniform defeat of the other
party, to the conduct of their respective commanders. He will observe
that while a lamp of foresight guided the French General, the Austrian
was bewildered in a cloud of uncertainty. Though active, courageous,
and experienced, Beaulieu was throughout the struggle, as distracted
in his efforts as a sightless pugilist, who knows neither where to aim
nor to expect a blow; and although operating in the open field and in
a populous quarter of his own country, was invariably subjected to the
effect of surprise. The passage of the Po, the combat of Fombio, the
victory of Lodi, operations which constituted the leading acts of this
brilliant section of the campaign, were, each of them, the result of
an attempt, which had it been foreseen, might have been frustrated.
But while Beaulieu was guarding the Po at Valenza, Bonaparte had
passed it at Placentia; while he was preparing to support Liptay at
Fombio, that General was already defeated; and while he felt
unassailable and meditated offensive operations at Lodi, he was
himself overthrown by a blow of such quick and incalculable energy,
that it was impossible to fear, withstand, or recover from it.
The confusion and dismay which these circumstances spread through the
ranks of the imperial army, are aptly exemplified by the anecdote
which Bonaparte records of an old Hungarian captain, with whom among
other captives he fell in, while making the rounds of his camp, the
night after the surrender of Pizzighitone. The prisoner, who did not
know to whom he spoke, being asked by the General what he thought of
the state of the war, replied—“nothing could be worse, and that it was
altogether incomprehensible.” “We have to do,” he added, “with a young
General who is at one moment in our front, at another in our rear, and
the next on our flanks. One knows not how to take him. This manner of
making war, against all rules, is insupportable.”
Bonaparte on the other hand, seizing the initiative by his boldness
and maintaining it by his activity, divined the intentions of his
adversary on all occasions, and confounded them, as with the
overruling force of destiny. Accordingly, though operating with little
more than his vanguard, he predominated irresistibly in the campaign,
defeating the corps which came in his way, terrifying those which kept
out of it, and in defiance of obstructions that seemed to others
insurmountable, by an electric shock of genius and audacity, hurling
to the ground the military strength and political power of his once
gigantic antagonist.