THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
On Sunday, December 29, 1895, an armed force commanded by Dr. Jameson
and Captain Willoughby invaded the territory of the Republic of the
Transvaal. The object of the Jameson Raid was to combine with a body
of disaffected Englishmen, living at Johannesburg, in order to upset
the Government of the Transvaal, and, thereby, to provoke the
intervention of the neighbouring British Commissioner, and so lead to
the remission of the grievances of the Uitlander population. Such
intervention, in the opinion of those responsible for the Raid, was
not intended to result in the absorption of the South African
Republic by the British Empire, though this point has never been made
altogether clear. The English in Johannesburg, the Uitlanders as
they were called in Dutch, failed, however, to meet the invaders, and
Jameson and his men were captured without difficulty by the troops of
the Republic, and were handed over to the Imperial Government to be
tried and punished. Subsequently, a select Committee of the House of
Commons was appointed to investigate the causes of the Raid. The
Committee, which numbered amongst its members Mr. Labouchere, met for
the first time on February 5, 1897. The directors of the British
South Africa Company, Messrs. C. J. Rhodes, Jameson, Alfred Beit,
Lionel Phillips, and Rutherford Harris, were represented by Counsel.
Mr. Labouchere frequently told me that he had never felt altogether
{427} satisfied with the composition of the Committee. There were
not enough stalwart Radicals on it. It was composed as follows: Sir
Michael Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr.
Chamberlain, the Attorney-General, Mr. Cripps, Sir W. Hart Dyke, Mr.
Jackson, Mr. Wharton, Mr. George Wyndham, Sir William Harcourt, Sir
Henry Campbell Bannerman, Messrs. John Ellis, Sidney Buxton, Blake,
Labouchere, and Bigham (now Lord Mersey). Mr. Labouchere found his
chief support in Mr. Blake, but even he fell off towards the end, and
the member for Northampton registered his solitary vote for the
second reading of the alternative report with which he wished to
replace that of the chairman. The chairman's report finally adopted
by the Committee may be summarised as follows:
"(1) Great discontent had for some time previous to the incursion
existed in Johannesburg, arising from the grievances of the
Uitlanders.
"(2) Mr. Rhodes occupied a great position in South Africa; he was
Prime Minister of Cape Colony, and, beyond all other persons, should
have been careful to abstain from such a course as that which he
adopted. As Managing Director of the British South Africa Company,
as director of the De Beers Consolidated Mines and the Gold Fields of
South Africa, Mr. Rhodes controlled a great combination of interests:
he used his position and those interests to promote and assist his
policy. Whatever justification there may have been for action, on
the part of the people of Johannesburg, there was none for the
conduct of a person in Mr. Rhodes' position, in subsidising,
organising, and stimulating an armed insurrection against the
Government of the South African Republic, and employing the forces
and resources of the Chartered Company to support such a revolution.
He seriously embarrassed both the Imperial and Colonial Governments,
and his proceedings resulted in the invasion of the territory of a
state which was in friendly relations with Her Majesty, in breach of
the obligation to {428} respect the right to self-government of the
South African Republic under the conventions between Her Majesty and
that state. Although Dr. Jameson 'went in' without Mr. Rhodes'
authority, it was always part of the plan that these forces should be
used in the Transvaal in support of an insurrection. Nothing could
justify such a use of such a force, and Mr. Rhodes' heavy
responsibility remains, although Dr. Jameson at the last moment
invaded the Transvaal without his direct sanction.
"(3) Such a policy once embarked upon inevitably involved Mr. Rhodes
in grave breaches of duty to those to whom he owed allegiance. He
deceived the High Commissioner representing the Imperial Government,
he concealed his views from his colleagues in the Colonial Ministry
and from the Board of the British South Africa Company, and led his
subordinates to believe that his plans were approved by his superiors.
"(4) Your Committee have heard the evidence of all the directors of
the British South Africa Company, with the exception of Lord Grey.
Of those who were examined Mr. Beit and Mr. Maguire alone had
cognisance of Mr. Rhodes' plans. Mr. Beit played a prominent part in
the negotiations with the Reform Union; he contributed large sums of
money to the revolutionary movement, and must share full
responsibility for the consequences.
"(5) There is not the slightest evidence that the late Commissioner
in South Africa, Lord Rosmead, was made acquainted with Mr. Rhodes'
plans. The evidence, on the contrary, shows that there was a
conspiracy to keep all information on the subject away from him. The
Committee must, however, express a strong opinion upon the conduct of
Sir Graham Bower, who was guilty of a grave dereliction of duty in
not communicating to the High Commissioner the information which had
come to his knowledge. Mr. Newton failed in his duty in a like
manner.
"(6) Neither the Secretary of State for the Colonies nor {429} any of
the officials of the Colonial Office received any information which
made them, or should have made them or any of them, aware of the plot
during its development.
"(7) Finally, your Committee desire to put on record an absolute and
unqualified condemnation of the Raid and of the plans which made it
possible. The result caused for the time being grave injury to
British influence in South Africa. Public confidence was shaken,
race feeling embittered, and serious difficulties were created with
neighbouring states."[1]
It is impossible to quote even such a summary as I have just given of
Mr. Labouchere's Draft Report. He began by indicating the
difficulties under which the Committee laboured:
"(1) Your Committee decided, in the first instance, to limit its
inquiries into that portion of the matters submitted to it for
investigation having relation to the Jameson Raid.
"(2) A considerable amount of oral and documentary evidence has been
placed before it. But its task was rendered difficult. Some of the
witnesses, who were either cognisant of the Jameson plan, or who took
part in the Jameson Raid, displayed an unwillingness to make a clean
breast of all that they knew, and in many instances witnesses refused
to answer questions that the Committee considered might properly be
put to them. Lord Rosmead could not be called as a witness on
account of ill health, although Mr. Rhodes had referred to him in his
evidence as able to answer questions, to which that gentleman was not
willing to reply. Documents of the greatest importance, in
possession of one of the witnesses, were not forthcoming,[2] nor was
an opportunity given to all the members of your Committee to examine
him as to the statement that he had made in evidence in connection
with them, nor was he reported to your House for contumacy, with a
view to your House taking action to {430} overcome it. It seemed
probable from the evidence that much in regard to the document had
been stated to the War Office, as a ground for its taking certain
action with respect to the officers concerned in the Raid. But
witnesses from that office were not examined as to these
communications. Although these documents were in the hands of his
solicitor, who informed your Committee that Mr. Rhodes claimed them
as his property, and would not allow him to produce them, no direct
application was made to Mr. Rhodes by your Committee to allow them to
be produced. Other documents of a similar character were secured by
your Committee only after Mr. Rhodes had left the country. He was
not, consequently, examined in regard to their or as tenor, to his
action in respect to them.
"(3) Owing to these causes your Committee cannot pretend to have
become possessed of a perfect and full knowledge of everything
connected with the Jameson plan and the Jameson Raid. It has
consequently only been able to weigh evidence against evidence, and
to deduce from what has been submitted to it the inferences that seem
to flow therefrom."[3]
He proceeded to stigmatise, even more severely than the Report
adopted by the Committee, the political conduct of Mr. Rhodes, for
whom, in private, he had conceived considerable personal admiration.
In paragraph 25 of Mr. Labouchere's Draft Report was this statement:
"Your Committee is, however, of the opinion that they (Messrs. Rhodes
and Beit) merit severe punishment. Mr. Rhodes is a Privy Councillor,
he was a Cape Premier, and he was the autocrat of Rhodesia when the
conspiracy that your Committee has investigated was in preparation,
and when it was sought to carry it out. He deceived his Sovereign,
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the High Commissioner of
South Africa, the Governor of the Cape Colony, his colleagues in the
Cape Cabinet, the Board of the Chartered {431} Company, and the very
persons whom he used as his instruments in his nefarious designs; and
he abused the high positions which he held by engaging in a
conspiracy, in a success of which his own pecuniary interests were
largely involved, thus inflicting a slur on the hitherto unblemished
honour of our public men at home and in our colonies. Mr. Beit is a
German subject. In conjunction with Mr. Rhodes he fomented a
revolution in a state in amity with us, and promoted an invasion of
that state from British territory. These two men, the one a British
statesman, the other a financier of German nationality, disgraced the
good name of England, which it ought to be the object of all
Englishmen to maintain pure and undefiled."
The only other important point in Mr. Labouchere's Draft Report was
that referring to the alleged complicity of the Colonial Office in
the Raid. While Mr. Labouchere admitted that the evidence in no way
showed that any such complicity had existed, he regretted that the
question had not been probed to the bottom, "because the slightest
appearance of any indisposition to do this by your Committee may lead
some persons erroneously to suppose that there may be some truth in
the statements of witnesses connected with the Jameson plan that the
secret aims of Mr. Rhodes were more or less clearly revealed to Mr.
Chamberlain and to Mr. Fairfield."
He expressed himself very strongly in the following article on the
Chartered Company in _Truth_:
If the events of the past week have not opened the eyes of Englishmen
at large to the character of the patriots and heroes who have too
long ruled the roost in South Africa, our boasted national common
sense must indeed be a pitiful sham. What is the position? The
South African Republic is a state originally brought into existence
by the Boers treking from Cape Colony into the wilderness, and
establishing themselves beyond what were then the limits of British
colonisation. We tricked them once into surrendering their
independence, merely reserving a suzerainty as against their right to
conclude treaties with foreign {432} states without our consent. But
since that was done, gold was discovered within their territory, and
this has led to the migration of a vast number of English and men of
other nationalities into the region where the Boer imagined that he
was safe from pursuit. On the whole, these settlers, considering how
unwelcome their presence must have been, have not been badly treated.
The taxation is not excessive, and the condition of the mining
industry is infinitely better than it is ever likely to be under the
Chartered Company. Out of all those who have dabbled in Transvaal
mining shares during the last year I wonder how many know the facts
respecting the relation of the companies to the Government of the
country. The Government charges on every mining claim a ground rent
or royalty of 10s. a month. To a company owning fifty claims this
means a ground rent of £300 a year--a very reasonable charge, when
from thirty to sixty per cent. can be earned on the capital of the
Company. As against this what do the Chartered Company charge? One
half the net profits of all mines worked under their jurisdiction.
This alone should teach shareholders of the Transvaal mines how
little they have to gain from the overthrow of Boer Government by the
Rhodes gang, and how thankful they may be for the course of events
last week.
The non-Boer population, however, at Johannesburg and elsewhere have
a genuine grievance on the question of the franchise and other rights
of citizenship. In order to maintain their exclusive sovereignty in
the land the Boers insist upon a fifteen years' residence for full
naturalisation.... The period is too long, and it would be prudent
on the part of the Boers to reduce it. There is no reason to suppose
that they would refuse to do so, were the demands of the Uitlanders
advanced in a regular manner.... But even were the Boers ever so
deaf to justice and so blind to their own interests as to meet the
Uitlander case with an obstinate _non possumus_, what pretext does
this afford for armed intervention by the Chartered Company? A
pretence it is true has been made that, before commencing their Raid,
Jameson and his men resigned their positions under the Company; but
even if such a form were gone through, it is obviously only a
colourable pretence. The invading force was drilled, armed, and
maintained by the Company. At its {433} head was the administrator
of the Company. On his staff was the Company's generalissimo. It
took with it the ammunition, equipment, and horses of the Company....
Neither in the political aims of the Uitlanders, nor the position of
the Johannesburgers was there a shadow of justification for Jameson's
Raid..... The proceedings bear their character on their face and are
of a piece with all that has gone before in the history of the
Company. The design was to play the Matabele coup again on a bigger
field. What was the origin of the Raid on Lobengula? The Company
had obtained Lobengula's permission to occupy Mashonaland and dig
there for gold, and had no further right beyond this. When occupied,
Mashonaland was found to have no paying gold. The shares of the
Company were unsalable rubbish. A pretext was therefore found for
making war on Lobengula and seizing Matabeleland--a pretext as
transparently dishonest as the pretext for the invasion of the
Transvaal. All the circumstances showed in that case as in this,
that the coup had been carefully prepared long beforehand. When the
train had been laid, a quarrel was picked with the Matabele, who had
entered Mashonaland at the Company's request, and they were attacked
and shot down by this same Jameson while doing their best to retire
in obedience to his orders. Instantly the whole of the Company's
forces, all held in readiness, entered Matabeleland under the
pretence that the Matabele and not the Company were the aggressors.
Lobengula's savages were mowed down by thousands with Maxims. Those
who were taken prisoners were killed off to save trouble. The envoys
sent by the King to try and make terms were barbarously murdered.
The King himself fled and died before he could be captured. His
territory and the flocks and herds of his people were parcelled out
among the Company and the band of freebooters who had been collected
by promises of loot. One million new shares were created by
Jameson's principals and colleagues, and, in the subsequent boom,
shares were unloaded on the British public at prices ranging up to £8
per share. Matabeleland, however, has proved no richer in paying
gold than Mashonaland. The shares have been going down again. What
were the Chartered gang to do next? In the Transvaal there are
extensive paying gold mines, and money which the gang would like to
pocket is going elsewhere. Forthwith {434} the Chartered Company's
forces are marshalled again. A sudden and obviously factitious
agitation springs up at Johannesburg. Rumours of deadly peril to the
alien population are put in circulation, goodness knows whence. The
women and children are packed off--so it is said, but no one knows
why or at whose instigation. Simultaneously a message imploring aid
from the quaking citizens reaches Jameson, no one knows how, and in a
moment the fighting doctor and his bold buccaneers are once more over
the border. There, however, all resemblance between the two coups
ends. The Chartered heroes have not to deal this time with naked
half-armed savages, but with white men as well armed as themselves,
and as well able to use their arms. There are Maxim guns on the
other side this time and Krupp guns as well. Result: after a few
hours' fighting, the conquerors of Matabeleland are killed or taken
prisoners, and the doughty Jameson and his staff are lodged in
Pretoria Gaol. I have no desire to exult over their fate. It is a
shameful and abominable business all round, out of which no
Englishman can extract a grain of satisfaction. But if ever men died
with their blood on their own heads, they are the men who fell in
this raid, and if ever prisoners of war deserved scant mercy, Jameson
and his comrades are those prisoners. They may thank their stars
that they have fallen into the hands of men who are not likely to
treat them as they themselves treated the Matabele wounded and
prisoners.[4]
He continued his attack in a series of articles. The burden of his
argument was always the impurity of motive arising from the financial
interest involved. "What a comment on our morality," he writes on
April 2, "has been our action during the last few months! We
quarrelled with the Americans about Venezuela about a bog in which we
fancied there might be gold; we remain in Egypt because we are
looking after the interest on Egyptian bonds, and finding salaries
for a herd of English employees; we are engaged in a Soudan
Expedition because Dongola is fertile, and its possession will afford
a plea to us to violate our pledges to leave {435} Egypt; we are
disputing with President Kruger because he has fallen out with a crew
of company mongers; we are backing up a company in Rhodesia because
its shares have been put up to a high premium on the Stock Exchange.
But, pledged as we are to see that there is good government in
Armenia, we are supinely looking on whilst Armenian men are being
slaughtered, Armenian women ravished, and Armenian villages burnt.
Why? Because there is no money to be made in protecting Armenians,
and our financiers have no interests in Armenia."[5]
Mr. Labouchere thought, rightly or wrongly, that the Imperialism of
Mr. Rhodes was little more than a mask to cover the desire for
financial expansion. Not that he thought badly of Mr. Rhodes
personally. He thought that he deceived himself in perfectly good
faith. While he detested his aims, he could not help admiring the
energy and skill with which they were promoted, and something simple
and direct in the character of the man himself.
The estimate I had formed of Mr. Labouchere's opinion of Mr. Rhodes
as a private individual was recently confirmed by the following
extract from a letter which I received from Mr. Charles Boyd
containing a reminiscence of an interview he had with Mr. Labouchere
in 1897:
That was the year [he wrote] of the British South Africa Commission
of which he (Mr. Labouchere) was a member, and which, as George
Wyndham's Secretary, I regularly attended; he was, of course, very
much "over the way," in Mr. Jaggers's sense, to what one may call the
Imperialist view of the South African question. It was, I think, in
May, or, at all events, near the end of the sitting of the
Commission, that I conceived the spirited notion of offering myself
for the post of Imperial Secretary to the High Commissioner for South
Africa, Sir Alfred Milner, then recently appointed; though without
official experience, I had some good backers on the strength of some
little {436} study of the South African problem. Among these was one
of the kindest of men, the late Mr. Moberley Bell, manager of the
_Times_, with whom one morning I sat in his house in Portland Place
considering that forlorn hope, as it most properly proved to be of my
ambition. "The only thing is," said Mr. Bell, "what are you going to
do with Labby? You know you are a child of the opposite camp." I
agreed with gloom that, if I had any chance, and Mr. Labouchere "took
notice," my antecedents might not be a recommendation. The imperial
South African Association was then about a year old, and active and
formidable enough to have caught the eye of _Truth_. Mr. Bell,
leaning his big head on his big hand, had a benevolent inspiration.
"If I were you," he said, "I'd jump into the nearest hansom and drive
straight to 5 Old Palace Yard. It's a sort of move he may quite well
love. You will be 'squaring Labby,'" and Mr. Bell dismissed me with
his blessing. Yet a little and somewhat nervous-like I stood in the
presence of your Uncle, in that wonderful room which you will so well
remember giving on the green turf of the Abbey precincts. I stated
my case, and displayed one or two testimonials, including that of his
friend Sir Charles Dilke. "And now," said I indignantly, "if I do
have any chance, I am told that I am in danger of _Truth_." "Nothing
of the kind," said Mr. Labouchere. "I have, to begin with, a
considerable admiration for George Wyndham, and, as for yourself,
your having the nerve to come straight to me is sufficient proof of
your fitness for the Imperial Secretaryship or for anything else,"
and with a graceful movement of his wrist he disengaged some
cigarettes from a sort of gilded network basket of the same, which
depended from the wall, and bade me sit down and smoke. He talked of
the Commission, and asked me what I thought of the evidence of Mr.
Rhodes, with whom, of course, he had considerably crossed swords, not
to say whom he had bated. I expressed, possibly with an air of
defiance, an extreme sense of Mr. Rhodes' candour. "But bless you,"
said Mr. Labouchere, "I know all that as well as you. I like Rhodes,
I like his porter and sandwiches. An entirely honest, heavy person.
On the other hand, did you ever see anything so fatuous as the
performance of H----?"
Presently he returned to my candidature, and said, "I'd better write
you a testimonial myself, and that will allay your fears..."
{437}
As is well known, the troubles of South Africa did not come to an end
with the settlement of the Jameson Raid. The aggrieved Uitlanders
had not availed themselves, when it came to the point, of Dr.
Jameson's action, and their unredressed grievances--that they
suffered from serious grievances was admitted even by Mr.
Labouchere--festered in their minds and produced, as time went on,
deeper and more widespread dissatisfaction. Nor was the appointment
in 1897 of Sir Alfred (now Lord) Milner as British Governor of Cape
Colony and High Commissioner for South Africa by Mr. Chamberlain, who
had taken office under Lord Salisbury as Colonial Secretary,
calculated to allay the resentment of the Boers, his Imperialist
sympathies being well known. Towards the end of 1898, Sir Alfred
Milner left South Africa for England. He was away for three months,
and during his absence several things occurred to hasten the
unfortunate crisis--the outbreak of war. General Sir William Butler
had been selected to fill the chief military command in South Africa,
left vacant by the sudden death of Sir William Goodenough. Sir
William Butler, immediately on his arrival in South Africa, allowed
his sympathy with the Afrikander party to be very apparent. He was
convinced that the English population of the Transvaal had no real
grievances, and were only striving to make mischief. When Sir Alfred
Milner returned to the Cape, on February 14, 1899, he was faced by a
very different situation to the one he had left. In almost all the
towns of Cape Colony and Natal meetings had been held by the
Colonists protesting against the continuation of the existing state
of affairs in the Transvaal, and demanding the intervention of the
Imperial Government. Dutch feeling was no less agitated. Among the
extreme section of Afrikanders everywhere a movement was on foot for
the formation of a National League which should bind together all
Afrikanders in strenuous opposition to any attempt of the Imperial
power to intervene in South African affairs.[6]
{438}
In England, the first indication of what was coming was revealed to
the discerning public who read Parliamentary reports by the
publication of the army estimates, in which a sum not exceeding
£1,211,900 was asked for to cover the military expenses (March,
1899-March, 1900). Mr. Dillon asked why it was considered necessary
to increase so enormously our forces in South Africa. The Colonial
Secretary (Mr. Chamberlain) replied to the effect that the Transvaal
Republic, which borders on the colony of Natal and Cape Colony, had
enormously in creased their offensive or defensive forces within the
last few years. They had spent large sums in forts, artillery, and
rifles, and millions of cartridges had been imported. Therefore, as
long as the British Government was responsible for the peace in South
Africa, a like increase of warlike preparation was necessary on our
part. Mr. Labouchere replied aptly that the increased defensive
measures adopted by the Boers had only followed upon the scandalous
and outrageous raid which had been made upon their country by the
minions of the Chartered Company. Then a paragraph appeared in the
_Times_ to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief had been engaged in
completing the organisation and composition of the "larger force
which it will be necessary to dispatch to South Africa in the event
of the negotiations at present in progress with the Government of the
Transvaal proving unsuccessful." Mr. Labouchere asked, on July 7,
whether the officers mentioned in this communique as going to South
Africa to organise the forces, were to go into Cape Colony and into
Natal to organise them, and, if so, whether it was with the consent
of the Ministers of those Colonies? To which question Mr. Balfour
replied "I do not know."[7]
On October 17, Mr. Dillon moved an amendment to the Address in answer
to the Queen's Speech, praying for arbitration to settle the
difficulties between the two Governments, so that "an ignominious war
may be avoided between the {439} overwhelming forces of your
Majesty's Empire and those of two small nations numbering in all less
than 200,000 souls." Mr. Labouchere seconded the amendment, and
pleaded eloquently for arbitration, suggesting President McKinley as
the best arbitrator possible. The peroration of his speech was
excellent, but, alas, it fell at the time upon ears already eagerly
alert for no other sounds than the music of triumphant victory and
glorious marches home after a course of deeds of valour, which the
mere fact of British nationality was to render as easy of achievement
as an afternoon's football. It reads now with a different ring, and
testifies to the spirit of justice and temperance which were so
characteristic of all his policy in those crises when the English
nation gets stirred up, as it sometimes does, to a spirit of
hysterical enthusiasm, in comparison with which the excitability and
nervous agitation of the "foreigner" is a mere joke. "I confess that
I feel very sorry for the end of these unfortunate Boers," he said.
"They are fathers of families, they are farmers, honest and ignorant
if you like. They are fighting for that which they believe to be the
holiest and most noble of causes--their homesteads and their country.
We must all regret that their country is not only turned into a
battlefield, but that a number of these men, the breadwinners of
families, will be slain. For my part, I cannot accept the
responsibility of contenting myself with merely washing my hands of
an injustice like this. It might be a very politic thing to say:
'There is a feeling in favour of war; I protest against it, but I
wash my hands of it, and shall criticise hereafter the conduct of the
Colonial Secretary.' I have not criticised the conduct of the right
hon. gentleman in this matter except indirectly, because that is not
the question of the moment. The question is to do the best we can to
put an end to this war, and that is why I have seconded, and why I
would venture to urge the House to agree to the amendment which has
been moved, because then the war would cease in a very few days."[8]
{440}
On October 20, Mr. Labouchere pointed out that, although the total
cost of our army is £22,000,000, we are "positively spending
£10,000,000 in sending troops to South Africa." He added, with some
truth, that, as the Government had a majority, to ask the House to
vote against these proceedings was useless. But he declared that, in
his opinion, before the war was over, it would cost the country a
hundred millions. A burst of laughter and ironical cheering from the
Ministerialists greeted the statement of the member for Northampton.
They all imagined that Buller would be in Pretoria before Christmas,
and that there would even be some change out of the ten millions
voted. What a chill would have fallen over that light-hearted
assembly if some hand had written on the wall at that moment the real
sum which the South African enterprise so gaily entered upon would
cost the nation! Something well over two hundred millions did not
cover it.[9]
In March 1900, the War Loan Bill raising a sum of thirty-five
millions was passed through both Houses of Parliament. The events of
the war which had taken place by this time were, briefly, these: The
British dispatch which led up to the Boer ultimatum was presented in
Pretoria on September 25, and the mobilisation of the Boers commenced
on the 27th. The Transvaal ultimatum was presented to the British
agent on October 9, and the war began upon the 11th. At the end of
the first fortnight the English claimed the victories of Talana and
Elandslaagte, whilst the Boers could boast that they had swept the
whole of Natal down to Ladysmith. At Pretoria there was great
jubilation, and the highest expectations of success for the farmers'
arms were entertained. Before Christmas the defeats of Nicholson's
Nek, Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso had plunged England into
depths of gloom. The investment of Ladysmith had been completed, and
the first stage of the war marked by the advance of the Boers into
British territory was over. {441} On the 22nd of December, Lord
Roberts had set sail from Southampton to the Cape. To him the
British Government had turned in its hour of need to restore the
shaken prestige of the British army and to bring the war to a
successful conclusion. Their confidence was justified, though the
conclusion of the war was still far distant. The horrible disaster
of Spion Kop occurred in January, but the middle of March saw Lord
Roberts in Bloemfontein. Ladysmith and Kimberley had been relieved,
and the whole vast territory south of these points was in uncontested
occupation of the British troops.
In Mr. Labouchere's speech of March 13, on the occasion of the second
reading of the War Loan Bill, he had pleaded eloquently for a
cessation of hostilities in South Africa. The Boers, he said, had
now been driven out of British territory, but the only terms upon
which the British Government would make peace were degrading to a
brave and honest people, namely the surrendering of their
independence, and the blotting of their nationality out of existence.
"Can you tell me of any war," he asked, "in which the vanquished side
asked for terms and were told that the victors would grant terms only
in the capital of the defeated country, and on condition of their
surrendering their independence? I call this thing an iniquity, and
a disgrace to this country to propose such terms. Perhaps the
question of iniquity does not appeal to hon. gentlemen opposite. It
is not only a crime--it is a blunder. I do not believe this is a way
to establish peace and harmony and good feeling in South Africa....
You are at present appealing to the lowest passions outside of this
House. I do not believe you will succeed in the long run; it may be
that the people will be carried away by the feeling which at present
exists among Englishmen, but they will soon see that they have been
fooled into this war by the vilest body of financiers that ever
existed in this world, and that the opportunity had been taken to lay
hold of the territory and gold, which Lord Salisbury himself boasted
we did not wish for."[10]
{442}
There is no doubt that Mr. Labouchere was extremely unpopular in
England during 1900. It was difficult for the man in the street to
separate his political attitude, with regard to the war, from that of
the Irish Nationalists, with whose policy he had been so long
identified, and who welcomed the war as supplying fresh food for
their campaign of denunciation against the British Government, and
who openly expressed their exultation at the Boer successes. Mr.
Labouchere did not rejoice at the British humiliation. The point
that he always had in view was the prevention of more bloodshed, and
the injustice of the annexation of new territory by the force of
numerical superiority. Further, he considered that the negotiations
which took place in the summer and autumn of 1899, before the
outbreak of war, had not been carried on with fairness towards the
Boers. After the President of the Transvaal Republic had agreed to a
seven years' Franchise Law, retrospective in its action, for the
colonists, Mr. Chamberlain took exception to a provision of the new
Bill, which required that the alien desirous of burghership should
produce a certificate of continuous registration during the period
for naturalisation. He suggested further that the details of the
scheme should be discussed by delegates appointed by Sir Alfred
Milner and the Transvaal Government (July 27). The Transvaal
Government, as it had a perfect right to do, instead of immediately
accepting Mr. Chamberlain's suggestion, submitted alternative
proposals to the British Government, which gave most liberal
concessions to the Uitlanders, the details of which were to be
discussed with the British agent at Pretoria. To these proposals
were attached certain conditions, one of which was that "Her
Majesty's Government will not insist further upon the assertion of
suzerainty, the controversy on the subject being tacitly allowed to
drop" (August 19). Mr. Conynghame Greene, the British agent at
Pretoria, wired the Boer proposals and conditions to Sir Alfred
Milner. Sir Alfred Milner wired to Mr. Conynghame Greene in reply:
"If {443} the South African Republic should reply to the invitation
to a joint enquiry put forward by Her Majesty's Government by
formally making the proposals described in your telegram, such a
course would not be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a refusal
of their offer, but they would be prepared to consider the reply of
the South African Republic on its merits."
In Mr. Labouchere's opinion, it was at this point of the negotiations
that the disingenuousness of Mr. Chamberlain's action was most
apparent. The formal reply of Her Majesty's Government to the Boer
proposals was delivered on August 30. It declared that the Boer
proposals were accepted, but that the British Government utterly
refused to consider the conditions attached to them. It was obvious
now that the Boers had no other course open to them but to fall back
upon the Commission proposed by Mr. Chamberlain on July 27, and to
which their proposals and conditions were the alternative, and,
according to Sir Alfred Milner's wire to Mr. Conynghame Greene,
understood by both Governments as such. On September 2, therefore,
they asked for further information as to the Joint Committee which
they were now _par force majeure_ and _faute de mieux_ prepared to
accept. The reply they received on September 12 was that "H.M.
Government have been compelled to regard the last proposal of the
Government of the South African Republic as unacceptable in the form
in which it was presented"; that they "cannot now consent to go back
to the proposal for which those in the note of the Government of the
Republic of August 19 are intended as a substitute"; and that, if
those proposals of the Transvaal Government, taken by themselves and
without the conditions attached by that Government, are not agreed
to, "H.M. Government must reserve to themselves the right to
reconsider the situation _de novo_ and to formulate their own
proposals for a final settlement." On September 15, the Secretary of
State of the Transvaal Republic replied that he learned with deep
{444} regret of the withdrawal of the invitation to a joint enquiry.
The proposal of August 19, made by him in the name of his Government,
involved the danger of affecting the independence of the Republic,
but his Government had set against this danger the advantage of
obtaining the assurances mentioned in the conditions. He protested
against the injustice of being asked to grant the original proposals
without the conditions annexed, and he could not understand Mr.
Chamberlain's present refusal to accept the Commission which was his
own alternative. The reply of the Republic consequently was that it
could not grant the first half of the August 19 offer without the
second, but would accept the Joint Commission which had been proposed
by Mr. Chamberlain; that it welcomed the introduction of a Court of
Arbitration, and was willing to help in its formation, but that it
was not clear what were the subjects mentioned as outside the Court
of Arbitration, and it deprecated the foreshadowing of new proposals
without specification. Mr. Reitz finally implored the acceptance of
the Joint Commission, as "if H.M.'s Government are willing and able
to make this decision it will put an end to the present state of
tension, race hatred would decrease and die out, the prosperity and
welfare of the South African Republic and of the whole of South
Africa would be developed and furthered, and fraternisation between
the different nationalities would increase." On September 25 Mr.
Chamberlain replied that no conditions less comprehensive than the
final offer of H.M. Government could be relied upon to effect the
object for which they had been striving. The dispatch concluded with
these words: "H.M. Government will communicate to the High
Commissioner the result of their deliberations in a later dispatch."
On September 30 the British agent at Pretoria telegraphed by request
of the Secretary of State of the Republic to ask what decision had
been taken by the British Government. Mr. Chamberlain replied on
October 2 that "the dispatch of H.M. Government is being prepared
{445} but will not be ready for some days." In the meantime
Parliament had been summoned to grant supplies, the Reserves were
called out, and ships were chartered to convey all available troops
to South Africa. From September 27 to October 8 the President of the
Orange Free State telegraphed frequently to Sir Alfred Milner. He
complained of the concentration of troops on the frontiers of his
State and of the Transvaal, again and again preferred his good
offices to avoid all possibility of war, and in almost every telegram
urged that Her Majesty's Government should at once make known the
"precise nature and scope of the concessions or measures, the
adoption whereof Her Majesty's Government consider themselves
entitled to claim, or which they suggest as being necessary or
sufficient to secure a satisfactory and permanent solution of
existing differences between them and the South African Republic,
whilst at the same time providing a means for settling any others
that may arise in the future." To this request Sir Alfred Milner
made no reply.[11] On October 9 the famous Ultimatum was presented
to the British agent at Pretoria. Amongst other plain statements it
contained words to the effect that the Transvaal felt obliged to
regard the military force in the neighbourhood of its frontiers as a
threat against the Republic, and that it became necessary to ask Her
Majesty's Government to give an assurance that no further troops
should be landed in South Africa, that troops on the borders of the
Republic should be withdrawn either by friendly arbitration or some
other amicable way. In the event of a refusal the Secretary of State
of the Transvaal must regard the action of Her Majesty's Government
as a formal declaration of war. War broke out, as has been said, on
October 11.
When Lord Roberts marched triumphantly into Pretoria on the 9th of
June, some important letters were found in the capital of the
Transvaal out of which great political interest was made against the
group of Englishmen, of {446} whom Labouchere was one of the most
important, who were known as the "little Englanders" in
contradistinction to the ever growing numbers of "Imperialists."
These letters were sent to Mr. Chamberlain, and a correspondence on
the subject ensued between him and Mr. Labouchere. Mr. Labouchere
published the whole of it in _Truth_, prefacing the letters with the
following remarks:[12]
"The correspondence which I print below speaks for itself. I had not
supposed that I was one of the three M.P.'s whose letters had fallen
into the hands of Mr. Chamberlain, as I do not think that I ever
wrote to any one in Pretoria. But I did, before the war, both write
and talk to Mr. Montagu White, the Transvaal representative in
London, and it would seem that he sent some of my letters to
Pretoria. What there is requiring explanation in either my
conversations or correspondence I do not know. The advice which I
gave to Mr. White was that his Government should make reasonable
concessions, and should gain time, in order to tide over the false
impression created by Mr. Chamberlain's appeal to the passions which
had been excited by statements in regard to Boer rule derived from
the 'kept' Rhodesian press in South Africa and the correspondents of
the English newspapers, who were nearly all connected with that 'kept
press' and with the Rhodes gang. Had my advice been followed, there
would have been no war. The difficulty which stood in the way of its
being adopted was that President Kruger and other leading Boers were
fully convinced that Mr. Chamberlain had been in the counsels of the
Jameson-Rhodes conspirators of 1895, and that--no matter what
concessions the Transvaal might make--he was determined to have his
revenge for President Kruger having got the better of him on that
occasion."
Here is the correspondence:
_Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Labouchere_
COLONIAL OFFICE, Aug. 6, 1900.
SIR,--I beg to call your attention to the enclosed copy of a letter
from Mr. Montagu White, with copies of two letters {447} purporting
to have been written by you, and to inquire if you desire to offer
any explanations or observations with regard to them.--I am, Sir,
Your obedient,
J. CHAMBERLAIN.
(_Enclosure_) _Mr. Montagu White to Dr. Reitz_[13]
58 VICTORIA STREET, LONDON,
Aug. 4, 1899
DEAR DR. REITZ,--I feel tired and done for to-night. It is past six
o'clock and I still have forty miles to go before I get home. My
inclination is to wire to you, asking you to tell the British
Government to go to the devil and to do their "darnedest." It is
perfectly sickening the way one is kept in a continual state of
suspense and nervous excitement. Everything is as quiet as possible
on the surface, and there has been a tremendous decrease in press
cuttings which is a sure sign that matters are relapsing into a
normal condition. But I have been able to judge of the effect upon
our friends of hints that we may not be able to accept the proposed
Commission. Without exception, they are one and all dead against our
refusing it, and all agree that we shall have to face a very serious
crisis if we refuse the proposal, and that without the friendly
support of the majority of the newspapers which have hitherto been on
our side. Spender of the _Chronicle_, who has fought consistently
and well for us, tells me that none of them can understand in what
way we shall be worse off for accepting the Commission, for (if) your
people disagree about the finding of the report what can Mr.
Chamberlain do further? Even our best friends say that by rejecting
the report of the Industrial Commission two years ago, we have
allowed things to go so far that it is unwise to talk of
intermeddling in our home affairs as a refusal to entertain what
public opinion here endorses as a fair proposal. The essence of
friendly advice is: Accept the proposal in principle, point out how
difficult it will be to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to
statistics, etc., and how undesirable it would be to have a
miscarriage of the Commission. In other words: gain as much time as
you can, and give the public time here to get out of the dangerous
frame of mind which Chamberlain's {448} speeches have created.
Spender is of opinion that after two months' delay all danger will
have vanished. I cannot say I share his optimistic views, for this
sort of thing has been going on for three years. Labouchere said to
me this morning: "Don't for goodness sake, let Mr. Kruger make his
first mistake by refusing this; a little skilful management, and he
will give Master Joe another fall." He further said: "You are such
past masters in the art of gaining time, here is an opportunity; you
surely haven't let your right hands lose their cunning, and you ought
to spin out the negotiations for quite two or three months." I must
leave off now. Please remember one thing: I do not send you my
advice. I send you the opinions of friends and the tendency of
public feeling here.
Some one sent me some lines parodying R. Kipling's _Lest We Forget_.
I got it published in _Truth_.--Yours very truly,
MONTAGU WHITE.
(_Enclosure_) _Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Montagu White_
5 OLD PALACE YARD, S.W., Aug. 2, 1899.
DEAR MR. MONTAGU WHITE,--You will see the lines in _Truth_. I have
altered one or two words to make the grammar all right. I do hope
that President Kruger will manage to accept in some form or another
the reference (proposed conference). Bannerman and all our Front
Bench believe that it is only a way devised by the Cabinet to let Joe
climb down. The new Franchise Act stands. The _onus probandi_ of
showing that it does not give substantial representation to the
Uitlanders and yet leave the Boers masters is with Chamberlain. The
difference between five and seven years is not a ground for proof.
The details for registration do not prove it. Let President Kruger
quote our Registration Laws, which you had better send him, and do
not forget that a lodger has to register every year; he is not
automatically on the Franchise list. In connection with this, Milner
suggested in his dispatch six years. He afterwards said that six was
a mistake for five. But Chamberlain in his reply approved of six.
It is impossible to calculate the effect without knowing how many
Outlanders there are, and how long each has been in the country. To
discover the basis of inquiry would take a long time. As the {449}
decision would go by the majority, the question would be on the
Chairman, who would have a casting vote. Surely it could be arranged
with Natal; the Cape and the Orange Free State, as well as the
Transvaal, should be represented, with the Chairman an Englishman who
has not yet expressed an opinion.
My own impression is that comparatively few will ever become Boers
amongst the English; they will not like to give up their nationality.
The President has a great opportunity to give Joe another fall. If
at the same time the Dynamite Concession is abrogated there will be a
rise in many shares, and this will be regarded as a barometer that
everything is going on well and satisfactorily. The great thing is
to gain time. In a few months we shall be howling about something in
another part of the world.--Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
(_Enclosure_) _Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Montagu White_
5 OLD PALACE YARD, S.W., Aug. 4, 1899.
DEAR MR. WHITE,--It is the general opinion that Chamberlain "climbed
down." As Bannerman put it to me: "His speech was a little bluster
of his own with the main parts arranged by his colleagues, and they
sat by like policemen to see that he read them." As a matter of fact
he did read all the important parts.
If the President agrees to the Committee it will, under clever
tactics, take months to settle conditions, and then it will take
further months to come to a decision. If the basis is established
that there shall be a substantial representation of the Uitlanders,
yet not such as can endanger the majority of the Boers, no harm can
well come of the Commission. The only difficulty is that it is a
sort of recognition of our right to meddle. But this might be
avoided in two ways: (1) By getting Schreiner into it and making it a
sort of South African affair; (2) by making a bargain and agreeing
only on the understanding that there should be arbitration on all
matters affecting the true reading of the Convention. But if the
latter is proposed then the President should put in some proposal for
the Chief Justices and one Imperial Judge or Governor to be the
tribunal.
The universal opinion is that the Cabinet has forced all this {450}
upon Chamberlain, and that they are determined not to have war and to
do something to let him down easily. Salisbury's speech was
conceived on these lines, and a little vague bluster but nothing
more. I accentuated Bannerman's declaration about hostilities; this
pledges the Liberal party against war.--Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
_Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Chamberlain_
HOTEL AND PENSION WALDHAUS,
VULPERA TARASP, ENGADIN SCHWEIZ, Aug. 18, 1900.
SIR,--I beg to acknowledge your letter of Aug. 6, enclosing copy of a
letter of Mr. Montagu White, with copies of two letters "purporting
to have been written by me," and inquiring if I desire to offer any
explanation or observations with regard to them.
For what I may have written or said to Mr. Montagu White I am
responsible to the House of Commons, of which I am a member; to my
constituents who have done me the honour to send me there; and to the
law. To you I owe no sort of explanation. I ascribe, therefore,
your invitation to furnish you with one in respect to the enclosed
letters to the singular illusion that no matter what course you may
see fit to adopt, whether as a Conservative or a Liberal Minister,
all owe you a personal explanation who take the liberty to disapprove
of it, and to do their best to prevent its bringing us into
unnecessary hostilities with some foreign power. Whilst not
recognising this pretension on your part, I will, however, offer you
some observations in regard to these letters, as you apparently
desire that I should do so.
The letters of mine enclosed were, I do not doubt, written by me.
The only exception that I have to take to the copies is that a few of
the words in them are, I should fancy, erroneously copied, as they do
not make sense. The advice tendered in them seems to me to be
excellent, and I know of no reason why I should not have addressed it
to Mr. White, who was then the representative of a country with which
we were at peace. Many letters passed before the War between that
gentleman and myself. He was most desirous that all possibility of
war should be removed, and {451} that harmony and good feeling should
be established on a firm basis between Great Britain and the
Transvaal. This we both thought could only be effected by a full
recognition of the Convention of 1884, as explained by Lord Derby,
who signed it for Great Britain, and by reasonable concessions on the
part of the Transvaal Government in regard to the naturalisation and
electoral franchise of the Uitlanders domiciled in the Republic. I
therefore suggested that the Transvaal Government should grant to
such domiciled aliens naturalisation and electoral franchise of the
Uitlanders on precisely the same terms as they are granted to aliens
in Great Britain. A law thus framed would, I thought, not be open to
objection on your part, and would put an end to all the carping
criticisms raised by you in respect to small and unimportant details
in the concessions that you were forcing on the Transvaal in regard
to these matters, and which seemed to me hardly calculated to bring
about a peaceful solution of the situation. If I remember rightly
the last letters exchanged between Mr. White and myself were just
before the close of the normal session of Parliament last year. Mr.
White in his letter informed me that he had received a communication
from Mr. Reitz, the Transvaal Sec. of State, in which that gentleman
told him that, although he had always been a strong advocate for all
reasonable reforms in respect of the Uitlanders, and although he had
used all his influence to promote a peaceful solution of the pending
issues between the two countries, your despatches were so
persistently insulting in their tone, and all concessions made by his
Government were so invariably met by you with fresh demands, that
even the most moderate of the Transvaal Burghers were becoming
convinced that you were determined to oblige them either to surrender
at discretion to all that you might demand, or to defend by arms the
position secured to the Transvaal by the Convention of 1884. He
therefore suggested that the negotiations should be taken in hand by
Lord Salisbury, in which case he was convinced that a settlement
satisfactory to both sides would be easily come to. As I entirely
agreed with this opinion of Mr. Reitz, and believed that you were the
chief impediment to such a settlement, I replied to Mr. White that
the tenor of Mr. Reitz's communication should be conveyed to a
leading member of the Cabinet, and that {452} I hoped--although I did
not expect--that the suggestion would bear fruit.
As I gathered from your observations in the House of Commons that you
had not made up your mind whether you would publish the letters of
Members of Parliament to Transvaal authorities that had fallen into
your hands, I will--so far as my letters are concerned--relieve you
of further consideration by publishing them myself, together with
this correspondence. I have often urged that the public should have
the advantage of a full knowledge of all documents which are likely
to enable them to form a sound judgment in respect to the issues that
have arisen in South Africa. Might I, with all respect, venture to
suggest to you that you should follow my example? The Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs (whoever he may be) and Her Majesty's
representatives in foreign capitals correspond not only by
despatches, but by what they are pleased to term "private letters,"
which are to all intents and purposes despatches. I presume that the
same course is usual between Secretaries of State for the Colonies
and Her Majesty's Colonial Governors. You have announced that you
are in favour of a "new diplomacy" in which nothing is kept back from
the public. Would it be too much to ask you to inaugurate the "new
diplomacy" by publishing all the so-called private letters that have
been exchanged between you and the Governors of Natal and the Cape
Colony; and all the letters and despatches exchanged between these
Governors and our military commanders in South Africa, of which you
may have copies? Without these documents it is impossible that
either the House of Commons or the electors of the United Kingdom can
form a true conclusion in regard to the "diplomacy" that led to the
war, or be able to affix the responsibility on the right shoulders in
respect to our lack of preparation for hostilities in South Africa
and our initial reverses. If it is too much to hope that you will
act on this suggestion, I would venture to urge that at least you
should publish the correspondence between yourself and Mr. Hawksley
in regard to your alleged knowledge of the contemplated
Rhodes-Jameson conspiracy of 1894. Mr. Hawksley is still, and then
was, the solicitor of the Chartered Company of South Africa, and is a
close friend and confidant of Mr. Rhodes. When the Parliamentary
Committee {453} of Inquiry into all connected with the conspiracy was
sitting, Mr. Hawksley was a witness. He alluded to this
correspondence. But when I wished to examine him about it--which was
my right as a member of the Committee according to Parliamentary
usage--this was not permitted by the Committee. After the Report of
the Committee was published Mr. Hawksley made public his conviction
that, if this correspondence saw the light, a guilty knowledge of the
conspiracy would be brought home to you. When the debate on the
Report took place in the House of Commons, he placed the
correspondence in the hands of a member with instructions to read it
if you made any attack upon Mr. Rhodes. Far, however, from doing
this, you went out of your way to assert that Mr. Rhodes had done
nothing to invalidate his rights to be considered an honourable man,
although only a few days before you had agreed to a report in which
he was branded as having been guilty of dishonourable conduct. Since
then, again and again, you have been asked to produce the
correspondence. But this you have persistently refused to do,
although no public interest could suffer by the production. Yet, if
Mr. Hawksley is wrong in the inference he deduces from the
correspondence, it is obvious that its publication would go far to
allay the suspicion which led President Kruger to doubt your desire
for a peaceful solution of the strained relations that existed
between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Transvaal Republic,
and which even now militates against all good feeling between the
colonists of South Africa of British and Dutch origin.
I trust that you will excuse my venturing to make these suggestions.
I do so because I heartily agree with you as to the desirability of
the "new diplomacy." It is the only way in which that popular
control can be established over the Executive which is essential in a
self-governing community, if it is to escape from falling under the
domination of some purely unscrupulous adventurer gifted with a ready
tongue.
I believe with my leader, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, that the war
might and ought to have been avoided, and I cannot help hoping that
my letters which have fallen into your hands will show you that I
laboured to the best of my ability in order that it should be
avoided. Unfortunately these efforts were not {454} successful. The
war was commenced under a lamentable ignorance on the part of Her
Majesty's Ministers of the resistance which the two Dutch Republics
would oppose to our arms. Reverses followed owing to the meddling of
civilians in military matters. Pretoria, Johannesburg, and
Bloemfontein are in our hands. The Orange River Free State has been
annexed. The Transvaal Republic has been annexed. Under these
circumstances peace and prosperity can only be restored in South
Africa when all suspicion is removed that the Secretary of State for
the Colonies was actuated by his previous relations with the
Rhodes-Jameson conspiracy in forcing a war. I am sure, too, that you
will agree with me that it will not be right for the electors of the
United Kingdom to be called upon to pronounce an opinion on the
policy of a war which has cost us thousands of valuable lives and
tens of millions of money, as well as on the mode in which the war
has been conducted, until all that can enable them to arrive at a
conclusion has seen the light.--I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,
H. LABOUCHERE.
_P.S._--If you desire to offer any explanations or observations with
regard to your action in respect to South Africa, they will receive
due consideration.
The Rt. Hon. J. Chamberlain, etc., etc.
Mr. Labouchere wisely remarked at about this period of the South
African War: "War is war. The old Greek line holds good that in war
the great ones go mad, and the people where it takes place weep.
This must inevitably always be the case." With equal force, but less
elegance, he also remarked: "I do not waste my time in answering
abuse. I am accustomed to it and I thrive under it like a field that
benefits by the manure that is carted on to it." He must have
thriven exceedingly during the summer of 1900, for the amount of
abuse collected and thrown over him was phenomenal. Most of it was
extracted from the most shadowy appearances of fact possible. The
Conference, or Commission, referred to in the Pretoria
correspondence, was {455} understood by papers of quite high
standing, such even as the _Birmingham Post_, to be the Bloemfontein
Conference, the abortive proceedings of which had come to an end
early in June, 1899. Nevertheless, Mr. Labouchere was accused by the
press of having, in his letters to Mr. Montagu White, elaborated a
scheme, to make the conference at Bloemfontein not only a failure,
but a deliberately planned sham. With regard to the cry of treason
which was raised against him indiscriminately, the dates on the
letters--even had his communications been of a treasonable
nature--rendered such a charge childish in the extreme.
As soon as Mr. Labouchere received Mr. Chamberlain's letter with its
enclosures, which followed him to the retired Swiss Valley where he
was spending his holiday, he wrote at once to the leader of his party
telling him of what had occurred. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was
spending August at Marienbad, and wrote him the following letter in
reply:
MARIENBAD, Aug. 22, 1900.
MY DEAR LABOUCHERE,--I am much interested in your story, and shall
look forward to my _Truth_ with extra avidity. All you describe was
perfectly proper and legitimate this time last year, or indeed at any
time: and where high treason comes in I cannot see. My little
facetiousness will do the great man no harm if it is published. I
remember the fact perfectly. All the while the statesman was
speaking, Aaron-Balfour and Hur-Hicks Beach were not holding up his
hands, but watching, with anxious faces, his every word.
Mark Lockwood, who is here, told me that you were one culprit, and
that the other was no other than the ingenuous John Ellis, who was
guilty of writing to some lady asking whether the stories of strange
doings under martial law were authentic! If this is all one may
exclaim _tantæne animis cælestibus iræ_? Can our Sec. of State be so
small-minded!
What a gorgeous palace you are living in! It quite eclipses anything
here, even in your favourite St. John's Wood quarter. {456} They are
all there: at least a fair representation, ready for Him. But alas
He does not come. Weather superb here, but not much company to amuse
or interest.--Yours,
H.C.B.
The war dragged on until the May of 1902, when the Boers were obliged
to make peace, not so much on account of the military situation as
because the burghers were weary of fighting and wanted to lay down
their arms. And what else could be expected of them? Half the
national army were prisoners of war, nearly four thousand had been
killed, the rest were weakening and dwindling hourly, twenty thousand
women and children had died in the concentration camps, thousands
more were perishing on the veld. There was no help from Cape Colony,
no help from Europe, no help from the sympathetic minority in England
itself.[14] The national representatives of the South African
Republic and the Orange Free State were given three days in which to
consider the conditions of peace which were put before them by Sir
Alfred Milner, and which they were told were absolutely final. Their
answer was given on the 31st, at five minutes past eleven, only an
hour before the expiry of the term of grace. The last few moments of
their conference were occupied by President Schalk Burger, who closed
the melancholy meeting with these words:
"We are standing here at the grave of the two Republics. Much yet
remains to be done, although we shall not be able to do it in the
official capacities which we have formerly occupied. Let us not draw
our hands back from the work which it is our duty to accomplish. Let
us ask God to guide us, and to show us how we shall be able to keep
our nation together. We must be ready to forgive and forget whenever
we meet our brethren. That part of our nation which has proved
unfaithful we must not reject."
In considering the part Mr. Labouchere played in the {457}
discussions that took place in Parliament and in the press, during
the pitiful struggle, no attitude but one of admiration for his
consistency and envy of his courage can be maintained for a moment.
This chapter cannot be better closed than with a repetition of his
own words, expressed valiantly at the moment when he was of all men
in England perhaps, the most unpopular: "The best settlement that can
be made now will be worse for all parties than the settlement which
could have been effected by tact and self-restraint had the Boers
never been goaded into war. I adhere to everything that I have ever
said as to the causes that brought on this war, with all its
disastrous results. I retract not one word that I have published in
_Truth_, or spoken in Parliament, or written in any letter, or
uttered in any shape or form about the Chamberlain diplomacy and the
Chamberlain war."[15]
[1] _Times' History of the War in South Africa_, vol. i.
[2] The Hawkesley telegrams. These were subsequently published in
the _Independence Belge_.
[3] _Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa_, 1897.
[4] _Truth_, Jan. 9, 1896.
[5] _Truth_, April 2, 1896.
[6] _Times' History of the War in South Africa_, vol. ii.
[7] _Hansard_, vol. 74, July 7, 1899.
[8] _Hansard_, vol. 77, Oct. 17, 1899.
[9] Henry W. Lucy, _The Balfourian Parliament_.
[10] _Hansard_, vol. 80, March 13, 1900.
[11] _Truth_, Sept. 13, 1899.
[12] _Truth_, Aug. 23, 1900.
[13] Secretary of State of the Transvaal Republic.
[14] _Times' History of the War in South Africa_, vol. v.
[15] _Truth_, Sept. 6, 1900.
{458}