be, in the common sense of the Word, _Free Agents_. As Man is a Part of
this great Machine, the Universe, his regular Acting is requisite to the
regular moving of the whole. Among the many Things which lie before him
to be done, he may, as he is at Liberty and his Choice influenc'd by
nothing, (for so it must be, or he is not at Liberty) chuse any one, and
refuse the rest. Now there is every Moment something _best_ to be done,
which is alone then _good_, and with respect to which, every Thing else
is at that Time _evil_. In order to know which is best to be done, and
which not, it is requisite that we should have at one View all the
intricate Consequences of every Action with respect to the general Order
and Scheme of the Universe, both present and future; but they are
innumerable and incomprehensible by any Thing but Omniscience. As we
cannot know these, we have but as one Chance to ten thousand, to hit on
the right Action; we should then be perpetually blundering about in the
Dark, and putting the Scheme in Disorder; for every wrong Action of a
Part, is a Defect or Blemish in the Order of the Whole. Is it not
necessary then, that our Actions should be over-rul'd and govern'd by an
all-wise Providence?--How exact and regular is every Thing in the
_natural_ World! How wisely in every Part contriv'd! We cannot here find
the least Defect! Those who have study'd the mere animal and vegetable
Creation, demonstrate that nothing can be more harmonious and beautiful!
All the heavenly Bodies, the Stars and Planets, are regulated with the
utmost Wisdom! And can we suppose less Care to be taken in the Order of
the _moral_ than in the _natural_ System? It is as if an ingenious
Artificer, having fram'd a curious Machine or Clock, and put its many
intricate Wheels and Powers in such a Dependance on one another, that
the whole might move in the most exact Order and Regularity, had
nevertheless plac'd in it several other Wheels endu'd with an
independent _Self-Motion_, but ignorant of the general Interest of the
Clock; and these would every now and then be moving wrong, disordering
the true Movement, and making continual Work for the Mender: which might
better be prevented, by depriving them of that Power of Self-Motion, and
placing them in a Dependance on the regular Part of the Clock.
VIII. _If there is no such Thing as Free-Will in Creatures, there can be
neither Merit nor Demerit in Creatures._
IX. _And therefore every Creature must be equally esteem'd by the
Creator._
These Propositions appear to be the necessary Consequences of the
former. And certainly no Reason can be given, why the Creator should
prefer in his Esteem one Part of His Works to another, if with equal
Wisdom and Goodness he design'd and created them all, since all Ill or
Defect, as contrary to his Nature, is excluded by his Power. We will sum
up the Argument thus, When the Creator first design'd the Universe,
either it was His Will and Intention that all Things should exist and
be in the Manner they are at this Time; or it was his Will they should
_be_ otherwise, _i.e._ in a different Manner: To say it was His Will
Things should be otherwise than they are, is to say Somewhat hath
contradicted His Will, and broken His Measures, which is impossible
because inconsistent with his Power; therefore we must allow that all
Things exist now in a Manner agreeable to His Will, and in consequence
of that are all equally Good, and therefore equally esteem'd by Him.
I proceed now to shew, that as all the Works of the Creator are equally
esteem'd by Him, so they are, as in Justice they ought to be, equally
us'd.
* * * * *
Sect. II. _Of_ Pleasure _and_ Pain.
I. _When a Creature is form'd and endu'd with Life, 'tis suppos'd to
receive a Capacity of the Sensation of_ Uneasiness _or_ Pain.
It is this distinguishes Life and Consciousness from unactive
unconscious Matter. To know or be sensible of Suffering or being acted
upon is _to live_; and whatsoever is not so, among created Things, is
properly and truly _dead_.
All _Pain_ and _Uneasiness_ proceeds at first from and is caus'd by
Somewhat without and distinct from the Mind itself. The Soul must first
be acted upon before it can re-act. In the Beginning of Infancy it is as
if it were not; it is not conscious of its own Existence, till it has
receiv'd the first Sensation of _Pain_; then, and not before, it begins
to feel itself, is rous'd, and put into Action; then it discovers its
Powers and Faculties, and exerts them to expel the Uneasiness. Thus is
the Machine set on work; this is Life. We are first mov'd by _Pain_, and
the whole succeeding Course of our Lives is but one continu'd Series of
Action with a View to be freed from it. As fast as we have excluded one
Uneasiness another appears, otherwise the Motion would cease. If a
continual Weight is not apply'd, the Clock will stop. And as soon as the
Avenues of Uneasiness to the Soul are choak'd up or cut off, we are
dead, we think and act no more.
II. _This Uneasiness, whenever felt, produces_ Desire _to be freed from
it, great in exact proportion to the Uneasiness._
Thus is _Uneasiness_ the first Spring and Cause of all Action; for till
we are uneasy in Rest, we can have no Desire to move, and without Desire
of moving there can be no voluntary Motion. The Experience of every Man
who has observ'd his own Actions will evince the Truth of this; and I
think nothing need be said to prove that the _Desire_ will be equal to
the _Uneasiness_, for the very Thing implies as much: It is not
_Uneasiness_ unless we desire to be freed from it, nor a great
_Uneasiness_ unless the consequent Desire is great.
I might here observe, how necessary a Thing in the Order and Design of
the Universe this _Pain_ or _Uneasiness_ is, and how beautiful in its
Place! Let us but suppose it just now banish'd the World entirely, and
consider the Consequence of it: All the Animal Creation would
immediately stand stock still, exactly in the Posture they were in the
Moment Uneasiness departed; not a Limb, not a Finger would henceforth
move; we should all be reduc'd to the Condition of Statues, dull and
unactive: Here I should continue to sit motionless with the Pen in my
Hand thus------and neither leave my Seat nor write one Letter more. This
may appear odd at first View, but a little Consideration will make it
evident; for 'tis impossible to assign any other Cause for the voluntary
Motion of an Animal than its _uneasiness_ in Rest. What a different
Appearance then would the Face of Nature make, without it! How necessary
is it! And how unlikely that the Inhabitants of the World ever were, or
that the Creator ever design'd they should be, exempt from it!
I would likewise observe here, that the VIIIth Proposition in the
preceding Section, viz. _That there is neither Merit nor Demerit_, &c.
is here again demonstrated, as infallibly, tho' in another manner: For
since _Freedom from Uneasiness_ is the End of all our Actions, how is it
possible for us to do any Thing disinterested?--How can any Action be
meritorious of Praise or Dispraise, Reward or Punishment, when the
natural Principle of _Self-Love_ is the only and the irresistible Motive
to it?
III. _This_ Desire _is always fulfill'd or satisfy'd_,
In the _Design_ or _End_ of it, tho' not in the _Manner_: The first is
requisite, the latter not. To exemplify this, let us make a Supposition;
A Person is confin'd in a House which appears to be in imminent Danger
of Falling, this, as soon as perceiv'd, creates a violent _Uneasiness_,
and that instantly produces an equal strong _Desire_, the _End_ of which
is _freedom from the Uneasiness_, and the _Manner_ or Way propos'd to
gain this _End_, is _to get out of the House_. Now if he is convinc'd by
any Means, that he is mistaken, and the House is not likely to fall, he
is immediately freed from his _Uneasiness_, and the _End_ of his Desire
is attain'd as well as if it had been in the _Manner_ desir'd, viz.
_leaving the House_.
All our different Desires and Passions proceed from and are reducible to
this one Point, _Uneasiness_, tho' the Means we propose to ourselves for
expelling of it are infinite. One proposes _Fame_, another _Wealth_, a
third _Power_, &c. as the Means to gain this _End_; but tho' these are
never attain'd, if the Uneasiness be remov'd by some other Means, the
_Desire_ is satisfy'd. Now during the Course of Life we are ourselves
continually removing successive Uneasinesses as they arise, and the
_last_ we suffer is remov'd by the _sweet Sleep_ of Death.
IV. _The fulfilling or Satisfaction of this_ Desire, _produces the
Sensation of_ Pleasure, _great or small in exact proportion to the_
Desire.
_Pleasure_ is that Satisfaction which arises in the Mind upon, and is
caus'd by, the accomplishment of our _Desires_, and by no other Means at
all; and those Desires being above shewn to be caus'd by our _Pains_ or
_Uneasinesses_, it follows that _Pleasure_ is wholly caus'd by _Pain_,
and by no other Thing at all.
V. _Therefore the Sensation of_ Pleasure _is equal, or in exact
proportion to the Sensation of_ Pain.
As the _Desire_ of being freed from Uneasiness is equal to the
_Uneasiness_, and the _Pleasure_ of satisfying that Desire equal to the
_Desire_, the _Pleasure_ thereby produc'd must necessarily be equal to
the _Uneasiness_ or _Pain_ which produces it: of three Lines, _A_, _B_,
and _C_, if _A_ is equal to _B_, and _B_ to _C_, _C_ must be equal to
_A_. And as our _Uneasinesses_ are always remov'd by some Means or
other, it follows that _Pleasure_ and _Pain_ are in their Nature
inseparable: So many Degrees as one Scale of the Ballance descends, so
many exactly the other ascends; and one cannot rise or fall without the
Fall or Rise of the other: 'Tis impossible to taste of _Pleasure_,
without feeling its preceding proportionate _Pain_; or to be sensible of
_Pain_, without having its necessary Consequent _Pleasure_: The _highest
Pleasure_ is only Consciousness of Freedom from the _deepest Pain_, and
Pain is not Pain to us unless we ourselves are sensible of it. They go
Hand in Hand; they cannot be divided.
You have a View of the whole Argument in a few familiar Examples: The
_Pain_ of Abstinence from Food, as it is greater or less, produces a
greater or less _Desire_ of Eating, the Accomplishment of this _Desire_
produces a greater or less _Pleasure_ proportionate to it. The _Pain_ of
Confinement causes the _Desire_ of Liberty, which accomplish'd, yields a
_Pleasure_ equal to that _Pain_ of Confinement. The _Pain_ of Labour and
Fatigue causes the _Pleasure_ of Rest, equal to that _Pain_. The _Pain_
of Absence from Friends, produces the _Pleasure_ of Meeting in exact
proportion. _&c._
This is the _fixt Nature_ of Pleasure and Pain, and will always be found
to be so by those who examine it.
One of the most common Arguments for the future Existence of the Soul,
is taken from the generally suppos'd Inequality of Pain and Pleasure in
the present; and this, notwithstanding the Difficulty by outward
Appearances to make a Judgment of another's Happiness, has been look'd
upon as almost unanswerable: but since _Pain_ naturally and infallibly
produces a _Pleasure_ in proportion to it, every individual Creature
must, in any State of _Life_, have an equal Quantity of each, so that
there is not, on that Account, any Occasion for a future Adjustment.
Thus are all the Works of the Creator _equally_ us'd by him; And no
Condition of Life or Being is in itself better or preferable to another:
The Monarch is not more happy than the Slave, nor the Beggar more
miserable than _Croesus_. Suppose _A_, _B_, and _C_, three distinct
Beings; _A_ and _B_, animate, capable of _Pleasure_ and _Pain_, _C_ an
inanimate Piece of Matter, insensible of either. _A_ receives ten
Degrees of _Pain_, which are necessarily succeeded by ten Degrees of
_Pleasure_: _B_ receives fifteen of _Pain_, and the consequent equal
Number of _Pleasure_: _C_ all the while lies unconcern'd, and as he has
not suffer'd the former, has no right to the latter. What can be more
equal and just than this? When the Accounts come to be adjusted, _A_ has
no Reason to complain that his Portion of _Pleasure_ was five Degrees
less than that of _B_, for his Portion of _Pain_ was five Degrees less
likewise: Nor has _B_ any Reason to boast that his _Pleasure_ was five
Degrees greater than that of _A_, for his _Pain_ was proportionate: They
are then both on the same Foot with _C_, that is, they are neither
Gainers nor Losers.
It will possibly be objected here, that even common Experience shews us,
there is not in Fact this Equality: "Some we see hearty, brisk and
chearful perpetually, while others are constantly burden'd with a heavy
Load of Maladies and Misfortunes, remaining for Years perhaps in
Poverty, Disgrace, or Pain, and die at last without any Appearance of
Recompence." Now tho' 'tis not necessary, when a Proposition is
demonstrated to be a general Truth, to shew in what manner it agrees
with the particular Circumstances of Persons, and indeed ought not to be
requir'd; yet, as this is a common Objection, some Notice may be taken
of it: And here let it be observ'd, that we cannot be proper Judges of
the good or bad Fortune of Others; we are apt to imagine, that what
would give us a great Uneasiness or a great Satisfaction, has the same
Effect upon others: we think, for Instance, those unhappy, who must
depend upon Charity for a mean Subsistence, who go in Rags, fare hardly,
and are despis'd and scorn'd by all; not considering that Custom renders
all these Things easy, familiar, and even pleasant. When we see Riches,
Grandeur and a chearful Countenance, we easily imagine Happiness
accompanies them, when oftentimes 'tis quite otherwise: Nor is a
constantly sorrowful Look, attended with continual Complaints, an
infallible Indication of Unhappiness. In short, we can judge by nothing
but Appearances, and they are very apt to deceive us. Some put on a gay
chearful Outside, and appear to the World perfectly at Ease, tho' even
then, some inward Sting, some secret Pain imbitters all their Joys, and
makes the Ballance even: Others appear continually dejected and full of
Sorrow; but even Grief itself is sometimes _pleasant_, and Tears are not
always without their Sweetness: Besides, Some take a Satisfaction in
being thought unhappy, (as others take a Pride in being thought humble,)
these will paint their Misfortunes to others in the strongest Colours,
and leave no Means unus'd to make you think them throughly miserable; so
great a Pleasure it is to them _to be pitied_. Others retain the Form
and outside Shew of Sorrow, long after the Thing itself, with its Cause,
is remov'd from the Mind; it is a Habit they have acquir'd and cannot
leave. These, with many others that might be given, are Reasons why we
cannot make a true Estimate of the _Equality_ of the Happiness and
Unhappiness of others; and unless we could, Matter of Fact cannot be
opposed to this Hypothesis. Indeed, we are sometimes apt to think, that
the Uneasinesses we ourselves have had, outweigh our Pleasures; but the
Reason is this, the Mind takes no Account of the latter, they flip away
un-remark'd, when the former leave more lasting Impressions on the
Memory. But suppose we pass the greatest part of Life in Pain and
Sorrow, suppose we die by Torments and _think no more_, 'tis no
Diminution to the Truth of what is here advanc'd; for the _Pain_, tho'
exquisite, is not so to the _last_ Moments of Life, the Senses are soon
benumm'd, and render'd incapable of transmitting it so sharply to the
Soul as at first; She perceives it cannot hold long, and 'tis an
_exquisite Pleasure_ to behold the immediate Approaches of Rest. This
makes an Equivalent tho' Annihilation should follow: For the Quantity of
_Pleasure_ and _Pain_ is not to be measur'd by its Duration, any more
than the Quantity of Matter by its Extension; and as one cubic Inch may
be made to contain, by Condensation, as much Matter as would fill ten
thousand cubic Feet, being more expanded, so one single Moment of
_Pleasure_ may outweigh and compensate an Age of _Pain_.
It was owing to their Ignorance of the Nature of Pleasure and Pain that
the Antient Heathens believ'd the idle Fable of their _Elizium_, that
State of uninterrupted Ease and Happiness! The Thing is intirely
impossible in Nature! Are not the Pleasures of the Spring made such by
the Disagreeableness of the Winter? Is not the Pleasure of fair Weather
owing to the Unpleasantness of foul? Certainly. Were it then always
Spring, were the Fields always green and nourishing, and the Weather
constantly serene and fair, the Pleasure would pall and die upon our
Hands; it would cease to be Pleasure to us, when it is not usher'd in by
Uneasiness. Could the Philosopher visit, in reality, every Star and
Planet with as much Ease and Swiftness as he can now visit their Ideas,
and pass from one to another of them in the Imagination; it would be a
_Pleasure_ I grant; but it would be only in proportion to the _Desire_
of accomplishing it, and that would be no greater than the _Uneasiness_
suffer'd in the Want of it. The Accomplishment of a long and difficult
Journey yields a great _Pleasure_; but if we could take a Trip to the
Moon and back again, as frequently and with as much Ease as we can go
and come from Market, the Satisfaction would be just the same.
The _Immateriality_ of the Soul has been frequently made use of as an
Argument for its _Immortality_; but let us consider, that tho' it should
be allow'd to be immaterial, and consequently its Parts incapable of
Separation or Destruction by any Thing material, yet by Experience we
find, that it is not incapable of Cessation of _Thought_, which is its
Action. When the Body is but a little indispos'd it has an evident
Effect upon the Mind; and a right Disposition of the Organs is requisite
to a right Manner of Thinking. In a sound Sleep sometimes, or in a
Swoon, we cease to think at all; tho' the Soul is not therefore then
annihilated, but _exists_ all the while tho' it does not _act_; and may
not this probably be the Case after Death? All our Ideas are first
admitted by the Senses and imprinted on the Brain, increasing in Number
by Observation and Experience; there they become the Subjects of the
Soul's Action. The Soul is a mere Power or Faculty of _contemplating_
on, and _comparing_ those Ideas when it has them; hence springs Reason:
But as it can _think_ on nothing but Ideas, it must have them before it
can _think_ at all. Therefore as it may exist before it has receiv'd any
Ideas, it may exist before it _thinks_. To remember a Thing, is to have
the Idea of it still plainly imprinted on the Brain, which the Soul can
turn to and contemplate on Occasion. To forget a Thing, is to have the
Idea of it defac'd and destroy'd by some Accident, or the crouding in
and imprinting of great variety of other Ideas upon it, so that the Soul
cannot find out its Traces and distinguish it. When we have thus lost
the Idea of any one Thing, we can _think_ no more, or _cease to think_,
on that Thing; and as we can lose the Idea of one Thing, so we may of
ten, twenty, a hundred, &c. and even of all Things, because they are not
in their Nature permanent; and often during Life we see that some Men,
(by an Accident or Distemper affecting the Brain,) lose the greatest
Part of their Ideas, and remember very little of their past Actions and
Circumstances. Now upon _Death_, and the Destruction of the Body, the
Ideas contain'd in the Brain, (which are alone the Subjects of the
Soul's Action) being then likewise necessarily destroy'd, the Soul, tho'
incapable of Destruction itself, must then necessarily _cease to think_
or _act_, having nothing left to think or act upon. It is reduc'd to its
first unconscious State before it receiv'd any Ideas. And to cease to
_think_ is but little different from _ceasing to be_.
Nevertheless, 'tis not impossible that this same _Faculty_ of
contemplating Ideas may be hereafter united to a new Body, and receive a
new Set of Ideas; but that will no way concern us who are now living;
for the Identity will be lost, it is no longer that same _Self_ but a
new Being.
I shall here subjoin a short Recapitulation of the Whole, that it may
with all its Parts be comprehended at one View.
1. _It is suppos'd that God the Maker and Governour of the Universe, is
infinitely wise, good, and powerful._
2. _In consequence of His Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, it is asserted,
that whatever He doth must be infinitely wise and good;_
3. _Unless He be interrupted, and His Measures broken by some other
Being, which is impossible because He is Almighty._
4. _In consequence of His infinite Power, it is asserted, that nothing
can exist or be done in the Universe which is not agreeable to His Will,
and therefore good._
5. _Evil is hereby excluded, with all Merit and Demerit; and likewise
all preference in the Esteem of God, of one Part of the Creation to
another._ This is the Summary of the first Part.
Now our common Notions of Justice will tell us, that if all created
Things are equally esteem'd by the Creator, they ought to be equally
us'd by Him; and that they are therefore equally us'd, we might embrace
for Truth upon the Credit, and as the true Consequence of the foregoing
Argument. Nevertheless we proceed to confirm it, by shewing _how_ they
are equally us'd, and that in the following Manner.
1. _A Creature when endu'd with Life or Consciousness, is made capable
of Uneasiness or Pain._
2. _This Pain produces Desire to be freed from it, in exact proportion
to itself._
3. _The Accomplishment of this Desire produces an equal Pleasure._
4. _Pleasure is consequently equal to Pain._
From these Propositions it is observ'd,
1. _That every Creature hath as much Pleasure as Pain._
2. _That Life is not preferable to Insensibility; for Pleasure and Pain
destroy one another: That Being which has ten Degrees of Pain subtracted
from ten of Pleasure, has nothing remaining, and is upon an equality
with that Being which is insensible of both._
3. _As the first Part proves that all Things must be equally us'd by the
Creator because equally esteem'd; so this second Part demonstrates that
they are equally esteem'd because equally us'd._
4. _Since every Action is the Effect of Self-Uneasiness, the Distinction
of Virtue and Vice is excluded; and_ Prop. VIII. _in_ Sect. I. _again
demonstrated._
5. _No State of Life can be happier than the present, because Pleasure
and Pain are inseparable._
Thus both Parts of this Argument agree with and confirm one another, and
the Demonstration is reciprocal.
I am sensible that the Doctrine here advanc'd, if it were to be
publish'd, would meet with but an indifferent Reception. Mankind
naturally and generally love to be flatter'd: Whatever sooths our Pride,
and tends to exalt our Species above the rest of the Creation, we are
pleas'd with and easily believe, when ungrateful Truths shall be with
the utmost Indignation rejected. "What! bring ourselves down to an
Equality with the Beasts of the Field! with the _meanest_ part of the
Creation! 'Tis insufferable!" But, (to use a Piece of _common_ Sense)
our _Geese_ are but _Geese_ tho' we may think 'em _Swans_, and Truth
will be Truth tho' it sometimes prove mortifying and distasteful.
RULES FOR A CLUB ESTABLISHED FOR MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT[20]
[1728]
Previous Question, To Be Answered At Every Meeting
Have you read over these queries this morning, in order to consider what
you might have to offer the Junto touching any one of them? viz.
1. Have you met with any thing in the author you last read, remarkable,
or suitable to be communicated to the Junto? particularly in history,
morality, poetry, physic, travels, mechanic arts, or other parts of
knowledge.
2. What new story have you lately heard agreeable for telling in
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3. Hath any citizen in your knowledge failed in his business lately, and
what have you heard of the cause?
4. Have you lately heard of any citizen's thriving well, and by what
means?
5. Have you lately heard how any present rich man, here or elsewhere,
got his estate?
6. Do you know of a fellow citizen, who has lately done a worthy action,
deserving praise and imitation; or who has lately committed an error,
proper for us to be warned against and avoid?
7. What unhappy effects of intemperance have you lately observed or
heard; of imprudence, of passion, or of any other vice or folly?
8. What happy effects of temperance, of prudence, of moderation, or of
any other virtue?
9. Have you or any of your acquaintance been lately sick or wounded? If
so, what remedies were used, and what were their effects?
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should have occasion to send by them?
11. Do you think of any thing at present, in which the Junto may be
serviceable to _mankind_, to their country, to their friends, or to
themselves?
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lies in the power of the Junto any way to encourage?
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of which it would be proper to move the legislature for an amendment? Or
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the people?
16. Hath any body attacked your reputation lately? And what can the
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17. Is there any man whose friendship you want, and which the Junto, or
any of them, can procure for you?
18. Have you lately heard any member's character attacked, and how have
you defended it?