Chapter III: Pitfalls in Socialism

I

In its early days, socialism was a revolutionary movement of which the

object was the liberation of the wage-earning classes and the

establishment of freedom and justice. The passage from capitalism to

the new régime was to be sudden and violent: capitalists were to be

expropriated without compensation, and their power was not to be

replaced by any new authority.

Gradually a change came over the spirit of socialism. In France,

socialists became members of the government, and made and unmade

parliamentary majorities. In Germany, social democracy grew so strong

that it became impossible for it to resist the temptation to barter

away some of its intransigeance in return for government recognition

of its claims. In England, the Fabians taught the advantage of reform

as against revolution, and of conciliatory bargaining as against

irreconcilable antagonism.

The method of gradual reform has many merits as compared to the method

of revolution, and I have no wish to preach revolution. But gradual

reform has certain dangers, to wit, the ownership or control of

businesses hitherto in private hands, and by encouraging legislative

interference for the benefit of various sections of the wage-earning

classes. I think it is at least doubtful whether such measures do

anything at all to contribute toward the ideals which inspired the

early socialists and still inspire the great majority of those who

advocate some form of socialism.

Let us take as an illustration such a measure as state purchase of

railways. This is a typical object of state socialism, thoroughly

practicable, already achieved in many countries, and clearly the sort

of step that must be taken in any piecemeal approach to complete

collectivism. Yet I see no reason to believe that any real advance

toward democracy, freedom, or economic justice is achieved when a

state takes over the railways after full compensation to the

shareholders.

Economic justice demands a diminution, if not a total abolition, of

the proportion of the national income which goes to the recipients of

rent and interest. But when the holders of railway shares are given

government stock to replace their shares, they are given the prospect

of an income in perpetuity equal to what they might reasonably expect

to have derived from their shares. Unless there is reason to expect a

great increase in the earnings of railways, the whole operation does

nothing to alter the distribution of wealth. This could only be

effected if the present owners were expropriated, or paid less than

the market value, or given a mere life-interest as compensation. When

full value is given, economic justice is not advanced in any degree.

There is equally little advance toward freedom. The men employed on

the railway have no more voice than they had before in the management

of the railway, or in the wages and conditions of work. Instead of

having to fight the directors, with the possibility of an appeal to

the government, they now have to fight the government directly; and

experience does not lead to the view that a government department has

any special tenderness toward the claims of labor. If they strike,

they have to contend against the whole organized power of the state,

which they can only do successfully if they happen to have a strong

public opinion on their side. In view of the influence which the

state can always exercise on the press, public opinion is likely to be

biased against them, particularly when a nominally progressive

government is in power. There will no longer be the possibility of

divergences between the policies of different railways. Railway men

in England derived advantages for many years from the comparatively

liberal policy of the North Eastern Railway, which they were able to

use as an argument for a similar policy elsewhere. Such possibilities

are excluded by the dead uniformity of state administration.

And there is no real advance toward democracy. The administration of

the railways will be in the hands of officials whose bias and

associations separate them from labor, and who will develop an

autocratic temper through the habit of power. The democratic

machinery by which these officials are nominally controlled is

cumbrous and remote, and can only be brought into operation on

first-class issues which rouse the interest of the whole nation. Even

then it is very likely that the superior education of the officials

and the government, combined with the advantages of their position,

will enable them to mislead the public as to the issues, and alienate

the general sympathy even from the most excellent cause.

I do not deny that these evils exist at present; I say only that they

will not be remedied by such measures as the nationalization of

railways in the present economic and political environment. A greater

upheaval, and a greater change in men's habits of mind, is necessary

for any really vital progress.

II

State socialism, even in a nation which possesses the form of

political democracy, is not a truly democratic system. The way in

which it fails to be democratic may be made plain by an analogy from

the political sphere. Every democrat recognizes that the Irish ought

to have self-government for Irish affairs, and ought not to be told

that they have no grievance because they share in the Parliament of

the United Kingdom. It is essential to democracy that any group of

citizens whose interests or desires separate them at all widely from

the rest of the community should be free to decide their internal

affairs for themselves. And what is true of national or local groups

is equally true of economic groups, such as miners or railway men.

The national machinery of general elections is by no means sufficient

to secure for groups of this kind the freedom which they ought to

have.

The power of officials, which is a great and growing danger in the

modern state, arises from the fact that the majority of the voters,

who constitute the only ultimate popular control over officials, are

as a rule not interested in any one particular question, and are

therefore not likely to interfere effectively against an official who

is thwarting the wishes of the minority who are interested. The

official is nominally subject to indirect popular control, but not to

the control of those who are directly affected by his action. The

bulk of the public will either never hear about the matter in dispute,

or, if they do hear, will form a hasty opinion based upon inadequate

information, which is far more likely to come from the side of the

officials than from the section of the community which is affected by

the question at issue. In an important political issue, some degree

of knowledge is likely to be diffused in time; but in other matters

there is little hope that this will happen.

It may be said that the power of officials is much less dangerous than

the power of capitalists, because officials have no economic interests

that are opposed to those of wage-earners. But this argument involves

far too simple a theory of political human nature--a theory which

orthodox socialism adopted from the classical political economy, and

has tended to retain in spite of growing evidence of its falsity.

Economic self-interest, and even economic class-interest, is by no

means the only important political motive. Officials, whose salary is

generally quite unaffected by their decisions on particular questions,

are likely, if they are of average honesty, to decide according to

their view of the public interest; but their view will none the less

have a bias which will often lead them wrong. It is important to

understand this bias before entrusting our destinies too unreservedly

to government departments.

The first thing to observe is that, in any very large organization,

and above all in a great state, officials and legislators are usually

very remote from those whom they govern, and not imaginatively

acquainted with the conditions of life to which their decisions will

be applied. This makes them ignorant of much that they ought to know,

even when they are industrious and willing to learn whatever can be

taught by statistics and blue-books. The one thing they understand

intimately is the office routine and the administrative rules. The

result is an undue anxiety to secure a uniform system. I have heard

of a French minister of education taking out his watch, and remarking,

"At this moment all the children of such and such an age in France are

learning so and so." This is the ideal of the administrator, an ideal

utterly fatal to free growth, initiative, experiment, or any far

reaching innovation. Laziness is not one of the motives recognized in

textbooks on political theory, because all ordinary knowledge of human

nature is considered unworthy of the dignity of these works; yet we

all know that laziness is an immensely powerful motive with all but a

small minority of mankind.

Unfortunately, in this case laziness is reinforced by love of power,

which leads energetic officials to create the systems which lazy

officials like to administer. The energetic official inevitably

dislikes anything that he does not control. His official sanction

must be obtained before anything can be done. Whatever he finds in

existence he wishes to alter in some way, so as to have the

satisfaction of feeling his power and making it felt. If he is

conscientious, he will think out some perfectly uniform and rigid

scheme which he believes to be the best possible, and he will then

impose this scheme ruthlessly, whatever promising growths he may have

to lop down for the sake of symmetry. The result inevitably has

something of the deadly dullness of a new rectangular town, as

compared with the beauty and richness of an ancient city which has

lived and grown with the separate lives and individualities of many

generations. What has grown is always more living than what has been

decreed; but the energetic official will always prefer the tidiness of

what he has decreed to the apparent disorder of spontaneous growth.

The mere possession of power tends to produce a love of power, which

is a very dangerous motive, because the only sure proof of power

consists in preventing others from doing what they wish to do. The

essential theory of democracy is the diffusion of power among the

whole people, so that the evils produced by one man's possession of

great power shall be obviated. But the diffusion of power through

democracy is only effective when the voters take an interest in the

question involved. When the question does not interest them, they do

not attempt to control the administration, and all actual power passes

into the hands of officials.

For this reason, the true ends of democracy are not achieved by state

socialism or by any system which places great power in the hands of

men subject to no popular control except that which is more or less

indirectly exercised through parliament.

Any fresh survey of men's political actions shows that, in those who

have enough energy to be politically effective, love of power is a

stronger motive than economic self-interest. Love of power actuates

the great millionaires, who have far more money than they can spend,

but continue to amass wealth merely in order to control more and more

of the world's finance.[2] Love of power is obviously the ruling

motive of many politicians. It is also the chief cause of wars, which

are admittedly almost always a bad speculation from the mere point of

view of wealth. For this reason, a new economic system which merely

attacks economic motives and does not interfere with the concentration

of power is not likely to effect any very great improvement in the

world. This is one of the chief reasons for regarding state socialism

with suspicion.

[2] Cf. J. A. Hobson, "The Evolution of Modern Capitalism."

III

The problem of the distribution of power is a more difficult one than

the problem of the distribution of wealth. The machinery of

representative government has concentrated on _ultimate_ power as the

only important matter, and has ignored immediate executive power.

Almost nothing has been done to democratize administration.

Government officials, in virtue of their income, security, and social

position, are likely to be on the side of the rich, who have been

their daily associates ever since the time of school and college. And

whether or not they are on the side of the rich, they are not likely,

for the reasons we have been considering, to be genuinely in favor of

progress. What applies to government officials applies also to

members of Parliament, with the sole difference that they have had to

recommend themselves to a constituency. This, however, only adds

hypocrisy to the other qualities of a ruling caste. Whoever has stood

in the lobby of the House of Commons watching members emerge with

wandering eye and hypothetical smile, until the constituent is espied,

his arm taken, "my dear fellow" whispered in his ear, and his steps

guided toward the inner precincts--whoever, observing this, has

realized that these are the arts by which men become and remain

legislators, can hardly fail to feel that democracy as it exists is

not an absolutely perfect instrument of government. It is a painful

fact that the ordinary voter, at any rate in England, is quite blind

to insincerity. The man who does not care about any definite

political measures can generally be won by corruption or flattery,

open or concealed; the man who is set on securing reforms will

generally prefer an ambitious windbag to a man who desires the public

good without possessing a ready tongue. And the ambitious windbag, as

soon as he has become a power by the enthusiasm he has aroused, will

sell his influence to the governing clique, sometimes openly,

sometimes by the more subtle method of intentionally failing at a

crisis. This is part of the normal working of democracy as embodied

in representative institutions. Yet a cure must be found if democracy

is not to remain a farce.

One of the sources of evil in modern large democracies is the fact

that most of the electorate have no direct or vital interest in most

of the questions that arise. Should Welsh children be allowed the use

of the Welsh language in schools? Should gipsies be compelled to

abandon their nomadic life at the bidding of the education

authorities? Should miners have an eight-hour day? Should Christian

Scientists be compelled to call in doctors in case of serious illness?

These are matters of passionate interest to certain sections of the

community, but of very little interest to the great majority. If they

are decided according to the wishes of the numerical majority, the

intense desires of a minority will be overborne by the very slight and

uninformed whims of the indifferent remainder. If the minority are

geographically concentrated, so that they can decide elections in a

certain number of constituencies, like the Welsh and the miners, they

have a good chance of getting their way, by the wholly beneficent

process which its enemies describe as log-rolling. But if they are

scattered and politically feeble, like the gipsies and the Christian

Scientists, they stand a very poor chance against the prejudices of

the majority. Even when they are geographically concentrated, like

the Irish, they may fail to obtain their wishes, because they arouse

some hostility or some instinct of domination in the majority. Such a

state of affairs is the negation of all democratic principles.

The tyranny of the majority is a very real danger. It is a mistake to

suppose that the majority is necessarily right. On every new question

the majority is always wrong at first. In matters where the state

must act as a whole, such as tariffs, for example, decision by

majorities is probably the best method that can be devised. But there

are a great many questions in which there is no need of a uniform

decision. Religion is recognized as one of these. Education ought to

be one, provided a certain minimum standard is attained. Military

service clearly ought to be one. Wherever divergent action by

different groups is possible without anarchy, it ought to be

permitted. In such cases it will be found by those who consider past

history that, whenever any new fundamental issue arises, the majority

are in the wrong, because they are guided by prejudice and habit.

Progress comes through the gradual effect of a minority in converting

opinion and altering custom. At one time--not so very long ago--it

was considered monstrous wickedness to maintain that old women ought

not to be burnt as witches. If those who held this opinion had been

forcibly suppressed, we should still be steeped in medieval

superstition. For such reasons, it is of the utmost importance that

the majority should refrain from imposing its will as regards matters

in which uniformity is not absolutely necessary.

IV

The cure for the evils and dangers which we have been considering is a

very great extension of devolution and federal government. Wherever

there is a national consciousness, as in Wales and Ireland, the area

in which it exists ought to be allowed to decide all purely local

affairs without external interference. But there are many matters

which ought to be left to the management, not of local groups, but of

trade groups, or of organizations embodying some set of opinions. In

the East, men are subject to different laws according to the religion

they profess. Something of this kind is necessary if any semblance of

liberty is to exist where there is great divergence in beliefs.

Some matters are essentially geographical; for instance, gas and

water, roads, tariffs, armies and navies. These must be decided by an

authority representing an area. How large the area ought to be,

depends upon accidents of topography and sentiment, and also upon the

nature of the matter involved. Gas and water require a small area,

roads a somewhat larger one, while the only satisfactory area for an

army or a navy is the whole planet, since no smaller area will prevent

war.

But the proper unit in most economic questions, and also in most

questions that are intimately concerned with personal opinions, is not

geographical at all. The internal management of railways ought not to

be in the hands of the geographical state, for reasons which we have

already considered. Still less ought it to be in the hands of a set

of irresponsible capitalists. The only truly democratic system would

be one which left the internal management of railways in the hands of

the men who work on them. These men should elect the general manager,

and a parliament of directors if necessary. All questions of wages,

conditions of labor, running of trains, and acquisition of material,

should be in the hands of a body responsible only to those actually

engaged in the work of the railway.

The same arguments apply to other large trades: mining, iron and

steel, cotton, and so on. British trade-unionism, it seems to me, has

erred in conceiving labor and capital as both permanent forces, which

were to be brought to some equality of strength by the organization of

labor. This seems to me too modest an ideal. The ideal which I

should wish to substitute involves the conquest of democracy and

self-government in the economic sphere as in the political sphere, and

the total abolition of the power now wielded by the capitalist. The

man who works on a railway ought to have a voice in the government of

the railway, just as much as the man who works in a state has a right

to a voice in the management of his state. The concentration of

business initiative in the hands of the employers is a great evil, and

robs the employees of their legitimate share of interest in the larger

problems of their trade.

French syndicalists were the first to advocate the system of trade

autonomy as a better solution than state socialism. But in their view

the trades were to be independent, almost like sovereign states at

present. Such a system would not promote peace, any more than it does

at present in international relations. In the affairs of any body of

men, we may broadly distinguish what may be called questions of home

politics from questions of foreign politics. Every group sufficiently

well-marked to constitute a political entity ought to be autonomous in

regard to internal matters, but not in regard to those that directly

affect the outside world. If two groups are both entirely free as

regards their relations to each other, there is no way of averting the

danger of an open or covert appeal to force. The relations of a group

of men to the outside world ought, whenever possible, to be controlled

by a neutral authority. It is here that the state is necessary for

adjusting the relations between different trades. The men who make

some commodity should be entirely free as regards hours of labor,

distribution of the total earnings of the trade, and all questions of

business management. But they should not be free as regards the price

of what they produce, since price is a matter concerning their

relations to the rest of the community. If there were nominal freedom

in regard to price, there would be a danger of a constant tug-of-war,

in which those trades which were most immediately necessary to the

existence of the community could always obtain an unfair advantage.

Force is no more admirable in the economic sphere than in dealings

between states. In order to secure the maximum of freedom with the

minimum of force, the universal principle is: _Autonomy within each

politically important group, and a neutral authority for deciding

questions involving relations between groups_. The neutral authority

should, of course, rest on a democratic basis, but should, if

possible, represent a constituency wider than that of the groups

concerned. In international affairs the only adequate authority would

be one representing all civilized nations.

In order to prevent undue extension of the power of such authorities,

it is desirable and necessary that the various autonomous groups

should be very jealous of their liberties, and very ready to resist by

political means any encroachments upon their independence. State

socialism does not tolerate such groups, each with their own officials

responsible to the group. Consequently it abandons the internal

affairs of a group to the control of men not responsible to that group

or specially aware of its needs. This opens the door to tyranny and

to the destruction of initiative. These dangers are avoided by a

system which allows any group of men to combine for any given purpose,

provided it is not predatory, and to claim from the central authority

such self-government as is necessary to the carrying out of the

purpose. Churches of various denominations afford an instance. Their

autonomy was won by centuries of warfare and persecution. It is to be

hoped that a less terrible struggle will be required to achieve the

same result in the economic sphere. But whatever the obstacles, I

believe the importance of liberty is as great in the one case as it

has been admitted to be in the other.

Political Ideals · 第 3 / 5 章