Although he had inflicted heavy losses on the Southerners, Sherman seems
to have become convinced that he would not be able to capture Atlanta by
his customary tactics. Hood had constructed a line of trenches that ran
from Atlanta southward to East Point, protecting the railroads. The
Confederate fortifications were too strong to be attacked and too long
to be encircled. Sherman brought up a battery of siege guns and shelled
the city. The Southern artillery in Atlanta replied and for several
weeks helpless citizens lived in their cellars and scurried about amid
bursting shells as the artillery duels started fires and smashed
buildings, killing soldiers and civilians indiscriminately.
The Federal commander also decided to try cavalry raids in the hope that
his horsemen could reach the railroads below Atlanta and, by cutting
them, force Hood to evacuate the city. Late in July, two expeditions
were launched. One under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman was to swing to the
east to McDonough, Lovejoy Station, and Macon, tearing up the railroad
and destroying supplies as it went. These cavalrymen were then to strike
southwest to Americus where they hoped to free the 30,000 Northerners
held in the prisoner of war camp at Andersonville. The other expedition,
under Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook, was to operate to the west and join
Stoneman in attacking the Confederate lines of communication south of
Atlanta.
From the start both raids were badly managed. Much of the blame must
rest upon Stoneman who chose to go directly to Macon rather than follow
orders. The scattered Federals were faced by a well-handled Confederate
force led by Wheeler. Except for Stoneman’s column, the Northern
horsemen were driven back to Sherman’s lines after destroying some
Confederate supplies. Stoneman reached the vicinity of Macon where on
July 31 he was attacked by the Southerners and captured along with 500
of his men.
Somehow during these busy weeks, Sherman found time to write a letter to
Miss Emily Hoffman of Baltimore, the fiancée of the dead McPherson. “I
owe you heartfelt sympathy,” he wrote, adding, “I yield to none of Earth
but yourself the right to excell me in lamentations for our Dead Hero.
Better the bride of McPherson dead than the wife of the richest Merchant
of Baltimore.” Sherman described the fallen leader of the Army of the
Tennessee who had been a close friend as well as a trusted subordinate
as “the impersonation of Knighthood” and added that “while Life lasts I
will delight in the Memory of that bright particular star.”
On August 10, Hood, perhaps thinking that the defeat of Stoneman and
McCook had weakened Sherman’s cavalry, struck out at his opponent’s line
of supply. He sent cavalry commander Wheeler with 4,000 men to destroy
the railroad north of Marietta and to disrupt Sherman’s communications
with the North. Although Wheeler was able to make some temporary breaks
in the line, he was unable to reduce substantially the flow of supplies
to Sherman’s armies. The Federal commander had built strong
fortifications at the most strategic points on the railroad and his
efficient repair crews quickly rebuilt those parts of the track that
Wheeler could reach and damage. Eventually, the Confederate cavalry
drifted into Tennessee and did not rejoin Hood until the campaign was
over. Many students of the war regard Wheeler’s mission as a mistake
because the absence of the cavalry deprived Hood of the best means of
keeping posted on Sherman’s activities and thus proved fatal to the army
at Atlanta.
Wheeler’s departure led Sherman to send out a third cavalry expedition,
commanded by Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick. The Northerners reached the
railroads below Atlanta and on August 18-20 succeeded in tearing up
sections of the track. On the 20th they were driven away. Kilpatrick
reported to Sherman that the railroad had been so thoroughly wrecked
that it would take at least 10 days to repair it. However, on the
following day, the Federals saw trains bringing supplies into the city
from the south. Clearly the Northern cavalry was not strong enough to
destroy Hood’s lines of supply. New plans would have to be tried if the
Unionists were to capture Atlanta.
Meanwhile, a curious kind of optimism was developing in the Southern
ranks. Many Confederates did not see the hard battles of late July as
defeats. Rather they viewed them as successful efforts to halt the
progress of flanking columns that had threatened the city’s lines of
supply. One officer wrote on August 4 about the battles of Atlanta and
Ezra Church: “General Hood watches his flanks closely and has twice
whipped the flanking columns.” When Sherman made no new efforts to flank
the city and when the Northern cavalry raids were beaten off one after
another, many men came to believe that Atlanta had been saved. In
mid-August a Texan informed his homefolk that “affairs are brightening
here. People and army seem more confident of success.” At about the same
time, a Mississippian wrote that “The enemy seems checked in his
flanking operations on our left, as he has made no progress in that
direction for the last four or five days.” On August 28, an Alabamian
wrote his wife that “It required hard fighting to check the enemy here
after having pursued us so far.”
At the very end of August there came exciting news for the Southerners.
Sherman had fallen back! The Northerners were gone from in front of
Atlanta! Many thought Wheeler’s cavalry had cut off Sherman’s supplies
and that this had forced the Federal commander to lift the siege. Joyous
Confederates swarmed out of the city to romp over the abandoned Northern
trenches. “The scales have turned in favor of the South,” wrote Capt.
Thomas J. Key of Arkansas, “and the Abolitionists are moving to the
rear.”
[Illustration: CAVALRY OPERATIONS
JULY-AUGUST 1864]