John Bell Hood, the new commander of the Confederate forces, found
himself in a difficult position on the morning of July 18, 1864. Hood
was young—only 33—and relatively inexperienced in handling large bodies
of troops. After graduation from West Point (in the same class with the
Federal generals McPherson and Schofield) he had served with the U.S.
Army until the spring of 1861, when he resigned and cast his lot with
the Confederacy. In the early years of the war Hood had risen rapidly in
rank—a rise more than justified by his outstanding leadership at the
brigade and division level.
Until the summer of 1863, Hood had been physically one of the most
magnificent men in the Confederate Army. A woman who knew him in 1861
described him as “six feet two inches in height, with a broad, full
chest, light hair and beard, blue eyes, with a peculiarly soft
expression, commanding in appearance, dignified in deportment,
gentlemanly and courteous to all.” By the time he took command of the
Army of Tennessee, Hood’s appearance had undergone some changes. His
left arm dangled uselessly at his side, smashed by a Federal bullet at
Gettysburg in July 1863. His right leg was gone, cut away at the hip
following a wound received at the Battle of Chickamauga in September
1863. Hood suffered great pain from these wounds, and no doubt he should
have been retired from field command; but he was not the kind of man who
could stay away from the army during a war.
After recovering from his second wound, he was sent to the Army of
Tennessee as a corps commander and had served in that capacity until
Davis selected him to succeed Johnston. He may have been taking a
derivative of laudanum to ease his pain and some students of the war
believe that this affected his judgment. Many soldiers in the army
distrusted Hood’s ability. Some officers resented his promotion over the
heads of generals who had served with the army since the beginning of
the war. Hood himself believed that the army had been demoralized by
Johnston’s long retreat and hence was unlikely to fight well.
Nor could the tactical situation have brought Hood any encouragement.
Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland was advancing southward directly toward
Atlanta, while the armies of McPherson and Schofield were east of the
city, advancing westward. Two of the four railroads that connected
Atlanta with the rest of the Confederacy were in Federal hands. Unless
Hood could keep the remaining lines open, the city was doomed.
[Illustration: BATTLES AROUND ATLANTA]
Battle of Peachtree Creek JULY 20
Battle of Ezra Church, JULY 28
Battle of Atlanta JULY 22
On July 19, the Army of the Cumberland crossed Peachtree Creek, but as
it advanced, it drifted toward the west. Thus by the afternoon a gap had
developed in the Northern line between Thomas on the right and Schofield
in the center. Hood decided to concentrate the corps of Hardee and
Stewart against Thomas. The Confederate commander hoped to overwhelm the
isolated Army of the Cumberland before help could arrive from McPherson
and Schofield. Hood relied upon his former corps, temporarily commanded
by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham, and the cavalry to defend the area
east of Atlanta. The attack on Thomas was set for 1 p.m., July 20.
Early in the morning of the 20th, while the Southerners were preparing
to assail the right of the Federal line, the Northerners east of Atlanta
moved west along the Georgia Railroad toward the city. Their progress
was so rapid that Hood felt it necessary to shift his army to the right
in an effort to strengthen the forces defending the eastern approaches
to Atlanta. This movement led to such confusion in the Confederate ranks
that the attack against Thomas was delayed for about 3 hours. When the
Southerners were finally ready to strike, Thomas’ men had had time to
establish and partly fortify a position on the south side of Peachtree
Creek.
What Hood had planned as a quick blow against an unprepared Northern
army thus developed into a headlong assault against a partially
fortified line. For several hours the Southerners threw themselves
against the Federals. Most of the attacks were halted before they
seriously threatened the Union position, but for a short while it
appeared that some of Hardee’s men would sweep around the left of
Thomas’ line and win a great victory. Hastily, Thomas assembled
artillery batteries and directed their fire against the Southerners.
Eventually the Confederates were driven back.
While fighting raged along Peachtree Creek, McPherson continued to push
toward Atlanta from the east. By 6 p.m., Hood was forced to call upon
Hardee for troops to reinforce the Southern lines east of the city. This
order drew from Hardee the reserve division that he was preparing to
throw into the assault against Thomas and forced him to abandon the
attack. The first of Hood’s efforts to cripple the Federal army had
failed, although at the time some Southerners saw it as a blow that
slowed Federal progress.
Northern casualties in the Battle of Peachtree Creek were reported at
1,600. Estimates of Southern losses (mostly from Federal sources) range
from 2,500 to 10,000. It seems now that 4,700 is a reliable estimate of
Confederate casualties.
[Illustration: _Gen. John B. Hood_]
The battle later became a source of controversy between Hood and Hardee.
Hood, smarting under the criticism of Joseph E. Johnston and others,
blamed the failure to crush Thomas on Hardee. The corps commander, Hood
charged, had failed to attack at the proper time and had not driven home
the assault. Hardee, who had outranked Hood when they were both
lieutenant generals and who may have been disgruntled at serving under
his former junior, replied that the delay was caused by Hood’s decision
to shift the line to the right and that the assault had not been as
vigorously executed as it normally would have been because Hood’s
late-afternoon order to send reinforcements to the right had deprived
the attackers of the unit that was to deliver the final blow. Postwar
commentators mostly favor Hardee and a careful examination of the
evidence supports this view.