The Confederate government had been displeased by Johnston’s conduct of
the campaign. President Jefferson Davis and other civilian officials had
hoped that the Confederates would be able to regain Tennessee or at
least to draw Sherman into a situation in which a severe defeat would be
inflicted upon him. Instead, after 10 weeks of campaigning, Johnston was
backed up against Atlanta and there was no assurance that he would even
try to hold that important center. These circumstances led Davis to
remove Johnston from command of the army and to replace him with John B.
Hood, who was promoted to the temporary rank of full general.
Davis’ replacement of Johnston with Hood is one of the most
controversial acts of the war. Relations between the President and
Johnston had not been friendly since a dispute over the general’s rank
in 1861. Disagreements over strategy and tactics as well as the
personalities of the two men exacerbated matters in 1862 and 1863.
During Johnston’s tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee, the
situation became worse as communications between the two broke down
almost completely. Davis promoted officers in the army without
consulting Johnston, who maneuvered in the field without informing the
government of his plans and operations in any meaningful detail.
Davis saw that Johnston had yielded much valuable territory to the
enemy. Important officials in the government began to urge that the
general be removed from command. On July 9, Davis sent his military
adviser, Gen. Braxton Bragg, to report on the situation in Georgia.
Bragg visited Johnston, learned nothing of the general’s plans, and
reported that it appeared the city would be abandoned. Other evidence
brought to the President’s attention—such as Johnston’s suggestion that
prisoners held in south Georgia be sent to safer points—seemed to
confirm Bragg’s assessment that Atlanta would not be defended. On July
16, Davis telegraphed Johnston: “I wish to hear from you as to present
situation and your plan of operations so specifically as will enable me
to anticipate events.” The general’s reply of the same date read in
part:
As the enemy has double our numbers, we must be on the defensive. My
plan of operations must, therefore, depend upon that of the enemy.
It is mainly to watch for an opportunity to fight to advantage. We are
trying to put Atlanta in condition to be held for a day or two by the
Georgia militia, that army movements may be freer and wider.
This vague reply did not satisfy Davis and on July 17 he issued the
order that removed Johnston from command. In great haste, Johnston wrote
out an order relinquishing his position and thanking the soldiers for
their courage and devotion. By the afternoon of the 18th he had left
Atlanta and the Army of Tennessee in the none-too-steady hands of John
Bell Hood.
Much debate has swirled around Davis’ decision. Johnston and his
partisans have argued that the general’s removal made inevitable the
loss of Atlanta, the reelection of Lincoln, and the defeat of the
Confederacy. They contend that had Johnston remained in command, the
city would have been held, or that if it were surrendered, the army at
least would not have been weakened and would have continued as an
effective unit.
Hood and Davis maintained that Johnston’s long retreat had demoralized
the army, that Johnston would not have held Atlanta, and that the
Confederacy’s only chance for success lay in replacing Johnston with a
bold commander who could strike Sherman a blow that would send the
Northerners reeling back to Chattanooga.
Most historians have tended to accept Johnston’s position. There can be
no definite answer, of course, but it does seem that Johnston would have
evacuated the city rather than lose a large portion of his army fighting
for it. This would have saved the army but, coming after the long
retreat from Dalton, might have so demoralized it that desertion and
disgust would have ended its career as an effective fighting force. If
the retention of Atlanta was essential to the life of the Confederacy,
President Davis seems justified in his decision to remove Johnston. It
was the Confederacy’s misfortune that no bold, intelligent, and lucky
general was available to take his place. But one thing was certain—with
Hood leading the Southerners, the pattern of the campaign would change.