By June 10, Sherman was ready to resume the advance. The Southerners had
taken up a line north of Marietta that ran from Brush Mountain on the
east to Pine Mountain in the center to Lost Mountain on the west.
McPherson moved against the right flank of this line, Thomas against the
center, and Schofield against the left. Rain fell almost every day and
hampered the Northern advance. For several days there was heavy
skirmishing in which the Federals captured Pine Mountain and made gains
at other points. Bishop-General Polk was killed on Pine Mountain by a
Union artillery shell on June 14, when he foolishly exposed himself to
enemy fire. Maj. Gen. William W. Loring commanded Polk’s Corps for
several weeks until a permanent replacement, Lt. Gen. Alexander P.
Stewart, took command.
By the 16th, Schofield’s advance had been so successful that the
Southerners were forced to give up Lost Mountain. For several days,
Johnston tried to hold a new line that ran west from Brush Mountain and
then turned southward. This line was enfiladed by the Federal artillery,
however, and during the night of June 18-19 the Confederates abandoned
it and took up a new position extending along the crest of Kennesaw
Mountain and off to the south. Hardee’s Corps held the left of this
line, Loring’s was in the center, and Hood’s was on the right.
When Sherman encountered this strong position, he extended his lines to
the south to try to outflank Johnston. He moved most of McPherson’s army
to the area directly in front of Kennesaw Mountain and placed Thomas’
army in line on McPherson’s right with orders to extend to the right. In
the days that followed, McPherson and Thomas were engaged in what
amounted to a siege of the Southern position. Little progress could be
made on the ground but the artillery on both sides was used in attempts
to batter and weaken the enemy. Day after day, the big Union guns
pounded the Southern line, their fire being answered by Confederate
cannon high on Kennesaw Mountain.
Meanwhile, Sherman drew Schofield’s army in from the Lost Mountain area
and ordered it to move south on the Sandtown Road, which ran west of the
Federal position toward the Chattahoochee. After a long and muddy march,
Schofield’s men reached Nose’s Creek at dark on June 19. On the
following day, they crossed the swollen stream and drove the Southerners
away. The bridge was rebuilt; on the 21st their advance was resumed.
That same day, the right of Thomas’ army established contact with
Schofield near Powder Springs Road.
Johnston had seen the Federal right being extended and was aware of the
dangers it presented to his line of communications. To meet this threat
the Confederate commander shifted Hood’s Corps from the right of his
line to the left during the night of June 21-22. By early afternoon of
the 22d, Hood’s men were in position on Hardee’s left.
Early on the 22d, the right of the Northern line resumed its advance.
The XX Corps of Thomas’ army moved east on Powder Springs Road,
supported by some of Schofield’s troops. By midafternoon, they reached
the vicinity of Valentine Kolb’s farm. The rest of Schofield’s army
continued down Sandtown Road to the Cheney farm, where it occupied a
position overlooking Olley’s Creek.
In the early part of the afternoon, the Federals captured several
Southerners from whom they learned that Hood had moved to the
Confederate left. From this they concluded that an attack upon the
Federal line was imminent. Quickly the Northern commanders closed up
their units and began to construct protecting works, using fence rails
or whatever material was at hand. Skirmishers were thrown out, and they
soon encountered an advancing line of Southerners. Just what brought
about this attack is not clear. Perhaps the activities of the Northern
skirmishers led the Confederates to think that the Federals were
attacking. Hood may have believed that when the skirmishers fell back he
had defeated an assault on his new position and decided to pursue the
beaten enemy. At any rate, the Southern advance precipitated a battle at
the Kolb farmhouse in which several Confederate attacks were hurled back
by the Federals. Hood lost about 1,000 men. Northern casualties were
about 300. After the battle, Hood fell back to his original position,
extending the Southern line southward to Olley’s Creek. For several
days, there was relative calm along the lines which now ran from the
railroad north of Marietta to Olley’s Creek southwest of the town.
Meanwhile, the rains ceased and the June sun began to dry the land.
Several days after the battle at Kolb’s farm, Sherman decided on a
change in tactics—he would make a direct assault on Johnston’s lines. It
was a bold decision that offered the possibility of a great victory. The
Southern line was thinly held and a successful attack could lead to the
isolation and destruction of a large part of Johnston’s army. The
Federal commander decided to strike the Confederates at three points:
McPherson would assault the southern end of Kennesaw Mountain, Thomas
would move against a salient known as the “Dead Angle” (on what is now
called Cheatham’s Hill) several miles to the south, and Schofield would
push south on Sandtown Road and attempt to cross Olley’s Creek. June 27
was set as the date for the assault, but Schofield was to begin
demonstrations on the 26th to draw Southerners away from other portions
of the line.
[Illustration: KENNESAW MOUNTAIN]
Early on the 27th, the Federals began to probe at various points along
the Confederate trenches to distract the defenders. At 8 a.m. the
Northern artillery opened a brief but heavy fire to prepare the way for
the assaults. A few minutes later, the Federal infantry moved forward.
McPherson’s troops, advancing on both sides of Burnt Hickory Road, swept
over the Southern outposts and moved rapidly across the broken ground
toward the main Confederate trenches. Although their lines were
disordered, the blue-clad soldiers scrambled over rocks and fallen trees
until they were finally halted by the heavy fire from their entrenched
enemies. A few reached the Confederate line and were killed or captured
while fighting in their opponents’ works. Southerners on Little Kennesaw
added to the Northerners’ discomfort by rolling huge rocks down the
mountainside at them. When the Union troops realized that their attack
could not reach the Confederate lines, they broke off the engagement.
Some were able to find protection in the advanced Confederate rifle-pits
they had overrun and some managed to reach the positions from which they
had begun the assault. A few were forced to seek shelter among the trees
and large rocks on the slopes of the mountain where they remained until
darkness offered a chance to return to their own lines.
To the south, Thomas fared no better. Two columns were directed against
the Southern position—one at Cheatham’s Hill, the other a short distance
to the north. The Southerners expected no attack. Many of them were off
duty and others were relaxing in the lines. The Federal artillery,
however, alerted them to the danger and when Thomas’ infantry started
forward, the Confederates were ready.
As soon as the dense blue columns appeared in the cleared area between
the lines, the Confederates opened what one Northerner called a
“terrible” fire upon them. Men dropped rapidly but the columns continued
up the long slope toward the Southern position. “The air,” one Federal
remembered, “seemed filled with bullets, giving one the sensation
experienced when moving swiftly against a heavy rain or sleet storm.” As
the Union soldiers neared the crest of the ridge, they met the full fury
of the defenders’ fire. To one Federal it seemed as if the Confederate
trenches were “veritable volcanoes ... vomiting forth fire and smoke and
raining leaden hail in the face of the Union boys.”
Most of the attackers never reached the Confederate line. Those who did
were too few to overpower the defenders and were quickly killed or
captured. For a few brief seconds, two Northern battle flags waved on
the breastworks, but the bearers were soon shot down and within a short
time the attack had failed.
As Thomas’ left assaulting column struck that portion of the Southern
line held by the consolidated 1st and 15th Arkansas Regiments, the
gunfire ignited the underbrush and many wounded Federals faced the
terrifying prospect of being burned to death. In one of the notable acts
of the war, Lt. Col. William H. Martin, commanding the Arkansans, jumped
from his trenches waving a white handkerchief and shouting to the
Northerners to come and get the wounded men. For a few minutes, fighting
was suspended along that short stretch of the line and some of Martin’s
soldiers went to assist in moving their helpless enemies away from the
flames. When the wounded had been removed to safety, the two sides
resumed hostilities, but here too it was clear that the attack would not
be able to break Johnston’s lines.
At the Dead Angle, some of the attacking Northerners remained under the
crest of the ridge within a few yards of the Confederate trenches. There
they dug rifle pits of their own and started to burrow under the hill,
hoping to fill the tunnel with gunpowder and blow up the salient.
However, before this project had progressed very far, the Southerners
abandoned the position and thus rendered the subterranean attack
unnecessary.
While the attacks of McPherson and Thomas were being repulsed, Schofield
was gaining a clear success at the extreme right of the Union line. On
the 26th, one of his brigades crossed Olley’s Creek north of Sandtown
Road and, on the following day, cleared their opponents from the area,
securing a position several miles to the south which placed the right of
their line closer to the Chattahoochee than was the left of Johnston’s
army. From this position the Northerners could strike at the Confederate
line of supply and perhaps cut Johnston off from all sources of help by
breaking the railroad.
Exact casualty figures for the battles of June 27 are not available.
However, the best estimates place Northern losses at about 3,000 men.
The Southerners lost at least 750 killed, wounded, or captured.
Sherman has been criticized for ordering the frontal attack on
Johnston’s lines, but it now seems that his decision was not unwise. Had
the assault succeeded, he would have won a great victory. As it was, he
did not continue the attacks when it was clear that they would fail, and
he had managed to secure a position from which he could easily pry
Johnston out of the Kennesaw line.
[Illustration: _Lt. Col. William H. Martin jumped from the trenches
waving a white handkerchief and shouting to the Northerners to come
and get the wounded men._]