Assistance, etc. £2,726 6 11
Pay, Allowances, Messengers, etc. 319,980 4 3
Rations, Men and Horses 107,946 14 5
Remounts 50,159 2 4
Transport 108,737 4 6
Equipment of men and horses 89,466 0 9
Medical Supplies, Hospital and other Expenses 4,176 19 10
Compensation--
Injuries 222 19 9
Horses 7,790 1 10
Property 5,822 17 0
Rebellion Losses Claims 42,611 7 9
Veterinary 2,827 9 1
Stationery, Printing, etc. 3,282 3 9
Arms and Ammunition 51,482 8 3
Lagers 1,787 6 11
Miscellaneous 3,129 1 10
Prisons 1,972 6 1
Uniform Allowance 11,309 18 0
Upkeep of Rebel Prisoners 85,524 17 1
Construction of Rebel Prisons 7,456 7 2
--------------
£908,411 17 6
_Less_ Revenue Received for Hire of Rebel
Prisoners 23,196 15 8
--------------
£885,215 1 10
_Add_ Outstanding Liabilities 122 17 10
--------------
£885,337 19 8
_Deduct_ Transport and Remounts utilized by
transfer to Transport Service 1,761 12 6
--------------
£883,576 7 2
==============
In addition to lump sum gratuities paid in respect of injuries
received, annual allowances amounting to £5,912 4s. are paid from
ordinary revenue to disabled militiamen and to widows and children of
militiamen who died or were killed during the Rebellion.
Revenue benefited to the extent of approximately £38,000 on account
of fines imposed on certain rebels and sale of stock captured by the
troops during the operations.
IX. ZULU SONGS SUNG AT USUTU KRAAL BEFORE THE REBELLION.
I.
Ubani o za ukufel' esilungwini?
Mana, Nkosi!
U ngezwa be bubula,
Ba ya sola.
II.
Si kulu les' isizwe, e si twal' imiqiqingo,
Si hamba ne mpahla, si teng' izinkomo ngo lembu.
Ngi ya ku yi raya bo!
I za ku li qed' izwe.
I lu zwambuzwambu,
I suka pansi, ya qond' izulu.
I njenge nyoka e yadhl' isixabu sa ba mhlope.
Ba yi cupa, ya bajwa.
Ba yi dons' amalang' amabili, 'matatu;
Ba yi nquma ngo mese.
Kwa gqabuk' ilangab' esizibeni,
La ba rangula.
Kwa gqabuk' izintutu,
Za qond' izwe lonke, la vuta!
Na seMbilane,
Lapa kade beti i ya puma,
Beti i gcwel' iziziba zonke, nya!
Translations of the above appear on p. 116.
X. THE CAUSES, SUPERSTITIONS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MATABELE
REBELLION, 1896.
The Matabele War of 1893 came to an end owing to the King, Lobengula,
fleeing from the country after his capital, Bulawayo, had been seized
and burnt by the British South Africa Company's forces. He died in
January, 1894. No one, of course, was appointed to succeed him. As
many of the Natives desired to continue the war--a number of the
regiments not having fought at all--it is not surprising that, although
a settlement was arrived at, the people did not regard themselves as
having been really conquered. Still less did they look on the Company
as entitled to appropriate their cattle as they proceeded to do.
These, indeed, all belonged to the King in theory. The Company held
that, having conquered the country and expelled the King, right of
possession had reverted to themselves. The cattle thereupon began to
be confiscated by way of indemnity. A large number was taken, whilst
the remainder, about 90,000, were branded with the Company's brand
and allowed to remain with the Natives for the time being. Seizure
of smaller lots took place periodically during 1894 and 1895. Had
confiscation been made immediately and universally on the conclusion
of the War, far less irritation would have been caused than actually
occurred. As it was, it was believed the Company intended to so
impoverish the people as to reduce them to a position of slaves and
paupers.
There was in Matabeleland another class of Natives known as amaHole.
These were found living there by the Matabele on arrival from the south
with Mzilikazi (Moselekatze) about 1836. After conquering them, the
latter proceeded to make slaves of them, and this was the position
when the Chartered Company, taking advantage of concessions previously
acquired, entered the country in considerable numbers in 1890 to
prospect and mine for gold, etc. After the war, the Company recruited
some 400 Natives, chiefly from the amaHole, and formed them into a
police force. The latter, remembering their former subjection, were not
slow to avenge themselves on the Matabele as opportunity offered. "In
days gone by you had your turn," they jeeringly said to the Matabele,
"it is ours now." And opportunities presented themselves in two
principal ways. First in regard to the cattle question, by the police
hunting about in all directions to see who possessed any. On secretly
obtaining information, they conveyed it to the authorities, showing
cause why the stock should be seized. Confiscation usually followed.
Secondly, in regard to the labour regulations. The Company required
each Chief to furnish periodically a certain number of labourers to
work on the mines, etc. The police were employed on this duty by the
Native Commissioners; the manner in which they dealt with the people
was frequently exasperating.
Although, towards the end of 1895, the Company waived all further
right to the cattle after receipt of two-fifths of the whole (70,000),
much strong dissatisfaction continued to prevail on account of the
tactics that had been employed. And this was accentuated by the disease
rinderpest breaking out in 1895 and sweeping off many of the cattle
still possessed by Natives. A plague of locusts and a long-continued
drought added still further to their troubles. Underlying the whole
was the deep resentment felt by men who, under their own regime,
had held high rank, but were now condemned to inferior status, with
corresponding loss of influence, material perquisites and opportunities
for advancement. The feeling, moreover, was still latent that the
nation had never been really conquered.
It being characteristic of all Bantu races, and particularly so of
those of Matabeleland, _e.g._ Makalanga and Matabele, to resort to
diviners (_izangoma_) to ascertain the causes of troubles as well as
the remedies, it is not surprising something of the kind should have
taken place at the present juncture. Perhaps the most famous of the
oracles was one reputed to inhabit a cave in the well-known Matoppo
Hills. To this cave many had repaired from time to time, in connection
with their private troubles, such as cases of illness or other
misfortune, mysterious loss of property, and so forth. So great was
the reputation that had been acquired by this particular oracle and,
under so weird circumstances and in so peculiar a manner did it impart
the knowledge obtained, as believed, direct from the departed spirits
(known by Matabeles as _amadhlozi_), that it was commonly referred to
as Umlimo, that is, the Deity himself. Such Umlimo--really the god of
the oldest residents of the country, the Makalangas--is said "to be
able to speak all languages, as well as to be possessed of a faculty
of roaring like a lion, crowing like a cock, barking like a dog, etc."
The truth of the matter, however, is that the oracle was an _isangoma_,
that is, an ordinary person who, whenever it was known anyone had come
to seek advice, would stealthily proceed to the cave and there, on
being consulted, communicate the reply to the inquirer. This reply was
given by means of ventriloquism and, as the speaker was inside the cave
and invisible, the voice appeared to the inquirer (who was outside) to
issue from the very bowels of the earth. The extreme ingenuity of the
device will be better appreciated when it is known that the spirits
of the departed are universally believed by Natives to dwell in an
underworld. For a ventriloquist to practise his calling as diviner in
the foregoing manner is probably not unworthy of that oracle which
Socrates himself felt it necessary to consult at Delphi.
On being appealed to by Mlugulu, one of the principal men in the
country, and others, as to the troubles that were afflicting the
people in general, the Umlimo directly attributed them to Europeans.
It was they who were the sorcerers that had caused the disasters. But
for their presence, neither locusts nor rinderpest would have invaded
the country. The aborigines were thereupon exhorted to rise and deliver
themselves from their thraldom. A recent total eclipse of the moon was
said to portend that the white man's blood was to be spilt; Lobengula
himself was not dead, but about to return from the north at the head
of a huge army, whilst other armies were advancing to his assistance
against the Europeans from the west and east. The tremendous potency of
such a 'voice' at such a time can hardly be over-estimated. The reason
why most obvious precautions, _e.g._ blocking the main road to Mangwe
(50 miles south-west of Bulawayo) were not adopted by the rebels was
said to be due to the Umlimo's explicit instruction "to give the white
man an opportunity of escaping from the country." Possibly this also
explains why the telegraph wire between Bulawayo and Mafeking was not
cut. "It certainly seems very strange," says Selous,[366] "that no
attempt has ever been made to stop waggons and coaches on this road,
... nor was Government House (less than three miles from the centre of
Bulawayo) burnt, the reason for this being, it is said, because the
Umlimo told the people that when Bulawayo had been destroyed, and all
the white men in the country killed, they would find Lobengula sitting
there, ready to rule them once more; for, be it said, Government House
has been built in the centre of the old kraal of Bulawayo, just where
the King's house once stood."
Another man, who claimed to be a prophet of the Umlimo, so influenced
people through swallowing stones, dancing on ashes, putting burning
coals into his mouth, etc., as to induce an _impi_ to take up their
quarters where they were subsequently found by the troops "and there
wait for the white men to attack them. They were on no account to
endeavour to prevent their enemies from crossing the Umguza [a river
some twelve miles north of Bulawayo] but were to offer them every
encouragement to do so, 'for,' said the stone-swallower, 'once they
have crossed to the east of the river, the Umlimo will strike them all
blind; you will then be able to kill them without trouble, and go on
and murder all the women and children in Bulawayo.'"
The rising in Mashonaland, which began in the middle of June, 1896, was
probably "brought about by the leaders of the Matabele insurrection
through the instrumentality of the Umlimos or prophets ... North-west
of Salisbury there lives a prophetess," between whom and the leaders
of the Matabele or agents of the Umlimo messages passed during the
Rebellion.
In these circumstances, one can understand the observation commonly
made as to the inscrutability of the Native mind. That it is a closed
book to the vast majority of Europeans is proved by the fact that no
adequate preparation was made by the Government to meet a possible
rising, and that only one of the colonists had predicted that a
rebellion would occur.
When, with the country seething with discontent, the people learned
that the great majority of the European police had been withdrawn to
assist Dr. Jameson in his raid from Mafeking towards Johannesburg, and
that Dr. Jameson himself, who claimed to have conquered them in 1893,
as well as his entire force, had been captured by the Boers, they felt
that a unique occasion had arisen, and one of which immediate advantage
should be taken.
* * * * *
The population of Matabeleland in 1896 was: Europeans, about 4,000;
Natives, about 120,000. About nineteen-twentieths of the latter
rebelled, their fighting strength (independently of Mashonaland) being
nearly 20,000.
The Rebellion started on the 20th March with the murder of a Native
policeman. This, though evidently premature, became the signal for a
simultaneous rising. European men, women and children were forthwith
murdered in many outlying parts. A number of Native servants took
part in the murders. It is computed that 205 persons were massacred
during the rising, the great majority being killed before the end of
March. Of this number, six were women and twenty children. In addition,
ninety-nine were murdered in Mashonaland, chiefly about the middle of
June; of these, four were women and three children. There seems to have
been little or no mutilation of bodies by way of obtaining medicines,
for warding off danger, obtaining ascendancy, etc.
The rebels had no settled plan, consequently community of action
between the various groups was wanting. They seemed to be obsessed with
the idea that supernatural aid would be derived by them in some way
from the Umlimo.
A large number of Native police, especially such as had been less than
a year in the force, joined the rebels, carrying off with them the
Winchester repeaters with which they had been supplied. The older hands
remained loyal, but were disarmed. On the other hand, the Makalanga
people refrained from participating in the Rebellion. Such, indeed, was
but in accordance with the neutral attitude observed by them during the
War of 1893.
Hostilities did not terminate until the end of November, that is,
after a campaign of about eight months. The combined forces employed
in suppressing the Rebellion were 3,000 in Matabeleland and 2,200 in
Mashonaland, including 1,200 Imperial troops.
The casualties among the troops were: Matabeleland--34 killed, 100
wounded; Mashonaland--7 killed, 18 wounded. The number of rebels killed
is believed to have considerably exceeded that of the War, viz. 3,000.
On the conclusion of hostilities, the rebels were directed to hand
in their guns and assegais. They were known to be in possession of
several thousands of firearms--about 2,000 breech-loading rifles and
many muzzle-loading guns. "The Matabele kept on evading [the order],
promising to give up rifles one day, the next saying that in their own
particular tribe there were none, and making all sorts of excuses. They
were repeatedly told that, unless they came to a decision shortly and
surrendered to our satisfaction, hostilities would be recommenced and
they would be blockaded in the hills.... In [certain] districts they
came to surrender, ... bringing in 200 or 300 rifles." As to the rest,
only another hundred or so guns, with some 4,000 assegais, were given
up, "each Chief professing he did not know where his men had put their
[guns], and promising to bring all he could. Needless to say these
promises were never fulfilled."[367]
"It is worthy of remark that whilst, in the first war, the Matabele
attacked strong positions defended by artillery and Maxim guns, thereby
suffering very heavy loss themselves but killing very few white men,
in the present [rebellion] all the fighting has been amongst broken
ground, and in country more or less covered with bush, and all the
killing has been done with rifles; for, in the first war, the Natives
learnt the futility of attacking fortified positions, and now only
fight in the bush in skirmishing order, giving but little opportunity
for the effective use of machine guns; so that, although a good many
rounds have been fired from Maxims at long ranges, only a very small
amount of execution has been done by them."[368]
XI. NATIVE CORPS.
(i) _Natal Native Horse._
Reference was made in a note in the Introduction to the Natal Native
Police organized in 1848. Since their disbandment in 1854, no other
Native corps has been permanently established in Natal. In times
of trouble, however, apart from the ordinary Native levies and
contingents, settlements of Native Christians, such as Edendale and
Driefontein, invariably offered their services to the Government. The
fact that these men, a number of whom were Basutos, were mounted,
added greatly to their usefulness. The first occasion of importance
on which they volunteered was the Bushman Expedition of 1866. During
the Langalibalele Rebellion, 1873, they again took part, under Col.
A.W. Durnford,[369] several being killed in the action at Bushman's
River Pass. By that time, Durnford, who arrived in Natal in June, 1873,
had already begun to take an exceptional interest in the training of
Natives for military purposes. Under his sympathetic control, the
people evinced the keenest desire to assist the Government. The same
spirit was shown by the large contingents of uneducated Natives,
recruited and organized to a great extent by Durnford at the beginning
of the Zulu War, not to refer to those called out on other occasions
under other officers. The men of Edendale and Driefontein under Jabez
Molife and Simeon Kambule[370] respectively, as well as Basutos under
Chief Hlubi, served throughout the 1879 campaign, and rendered very
valuable assistance. They took part in the battles of Isandhlwana,
Kambule, Hlobane and Ulundi, and suffered considerable losses.
The same communities, with Hlubi's Basutos, again volunteered during
the Boer War, 1899-1901. To these communities should be added that at
Nyanyadu, as well as members of Chief Ncwadi's tribe. Although, in a
"white man's war," allowed to serve only as scouts, drivers and leaders
and in limited numbers, some 150 came from Driefontein alone, and 200
from Chief Ncwadi. Under Capt. R.C. Samuelson, N.C., a considerable
section of the Drakensberg Mountains was thoroughly patrolled. A
portion of the men went through the siege of Ladysmith, whilst
conspicuous gallantry was displayed by individual members of the corps
on several other occasions during the same war.
By 1906, the great majority of those who had served in the earlier
campaigns were, of course, no longer able to turn out. They, however,
strongly influenced their sons to do so in their stead, with the result
that the Natal Native Horse, under Major G. Moe, U.M.R., with Samuelson
as adjutant and second in command, was raised with surprising rapidity.
On instructions from the Government, Samuelson, by the 2nd April,
succeeded in enrolling nearly 1,000 picked men, including Chiefs and
Chiefs' sons. This number was, however, reduced by the Government to
326. As only about half the men had horses, the principal difficulty
experienced was in obtaining mounts for the remainder.
The corps did not take the field until the middle of May, largely owing
to its having to be equipped and trained; it was consequently unable
to take part, like the Nongqai, in some of the main operations and
engagements.
It was found necessary, during the campaign, considerably to the
disappointment of the members, to break the corps up and distribute
sections about the country. To whatever command, however, they
happened to be attached, the men proved to be thoroughly reliable and
serviceable, and their conduct exemplary. With better training, which
in common fairness should have been available in some way _before_ the
necessity for recruiting arose, they would have been even more valuable
than they were.
(ii) _Zululand Native Police_ (_Nongqai_).
This corps was originally formed in April, 1883, under the authority of
the Imperial Government, by Colonel G. Mansel (late Chief Commissioner
of Police, Natal). The 50 non-commissioned officers and men of whom
the corps consisted, half of them recruited in Natal,[371] were under
the command of two European officers, and were originally enrolled as
bodyguard to the Resident Commissioner (the late Sir Melmoth Osborn,
K.C.M.G.). They served with distinction during the disturbances of
1884. Although attacked at Maqonga, near Nkandhla, by about 2,500
Zulus--the Resident Commissioner being with them--they held their
ground and drove off the enemy with considerable loss, and this in
spite of warning as to their probable untrustworthiness from John
Dunn, a man intimately acquainted with the country. The force was
augmented in succeeding years and became almost entirely an infantry
one. During the Zululand disturbances of 1888, the men again greatly
distinguished themselves, notably at Ceza, Lower Umfolozi magistracy
and Hlopekulu. On every occasion, though pitted against overwhelming
odds, they fought steadily, effectively and with the utmost courage,
without betraying at any time the least sign of breach of faith or
disloyalty.
The personnel continued to increase from 250 in 1889 to 500 in 1899.
During the Boer War, the numbers were again raised to 600, with 8
European officers, Inspector C.E. Fairlie taking command. The corps was
then employed chiefly in and about Melmoth, in putting the place into
a state of defence and escorting convoys. In September, 1904, it was
suddenly disbanded by direction of the Natal Government.
During such time as the force existed, the men were disciplined,
drilled and equipped to a large extent on the same lines as European
troops; they were armed with Martini-Henry rifles, and lived in
barracks. Each man was obliged to serve for three years, with the right
of re-enlisting. Many took advantage of the right. It is estimated
that, between 1883 and 1904, some 3,000 to 4,000 served in the ranks.
When the 1906 Rebellion broke out, the Government re-established the
force under Fairlie. With Mansel's assistance, about 100 men were
recruited, but only with the greatest difficulty, owing to their
feeling sore at having been summarily disbanded in 1904. The reader
will find several references in this history to the conspicuous
services rendered by this really excellent body of men, notably at Bobe
and Mome. They were disbanded once more in November, 1906.
The following, from a report by Colonel Mansel, will be perused with
interest: "I wish to bear full testimony to the value of Zulus as
soldiers. Their instincts are wholly military. When you enlist a Zulu,
you have a ready-made soldier.... All you have to do is to teach
him how to handle a rifle. This you can do in about three or four
months. He is then as good as he will ever become. He is, as a rule,
the best-tempered, most easily-managed man in the world; understands
discipline by instinct; is docile, plucky, proud of himself and his
corps; kindly-disposed towards his officers; full of mettle, and
capable of enduring the extremes of marching and hunger.... Though
often fighting against his own kith and kin, not a single case of
treachery or breach of faith ever occurred."
(iii) _Proposed Creation of a Permanent Native Corps._
The oft-repeated experiment of forming corps of coloured people
inhabiting countries conquered by England, has apparently met with
success in the main. The problem is, however, by no means an easy one
to deal with, and it is generally owing to inability on the part of
the rulers to formulate sound and workable schemes that failure has
occasionally attended their efforts. Utilization of often excellent
fighting material, as, for instance, may be found in the Zulus, is
obviously a matter of importance, and any intention by a Government
to establish such corps is deserving of careful consideration. But
irresolution in a matter of this kind does more harm than good. Rather
not make any attempt than be half-hearted or lukewarm. It has been seen
that a Native police corps was formed as long ago as 1848, only to be
disbanded a few years later without any reasons being given. Similar
half-heartedness is observable in the foregoing account of the N.N.H.
and the Z.N.P.
Any reflecting person will, we venture to think, arrive at the
conclusion that a Native corps, established on a sound basis, is a wise
and necessary provision, and this from several points of view. It does
what nothing else can do so well, namely, proves to the people that
the Government has confidence in them (as it unquestionably ought to
have) and, by enabling them to share directly in the defence of the
State, powerfully induces them to take a deep and abiding interest
in the welfare, not only of themselves, but of the entire community,
white and black. Thus the primary object in establishing a corps is
not so much the intrinsic value of the fighting material recruited, as
that it is an outward and visible sign to Natives in general that the
rulers look on their interests as indissolubly connected with those of
Europeans, which is only another way of saying that a premium is set on
the promotion of patriotism, loyalty and contentment. As matters are at
present in South Africa, anyone can see with half an eye that, in the
absence of these corps, the respective Governments have neglected to
use material that lies near at hand. The splendid record of the N.N.H.
and Z.N.P., and the consistent loyalty of each in all vicissitudes, are
as sure a guarantee as could be desired, that they would be loyal. If a
permanently-established corps be but treated in a fair and reasonable
manner, it is impossible to see what object any of its members would
have for becoming mutinous or disloyal.