CHAPTER XXXI

THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE (1903)

OF all the travels made by man since the voyages of Dante, this

new exploration along the shores of Multiplicity and Complexity

promised to be the longest, though as yet it had barely touched two

familiar regions--race and sex. Even within these narrow seas the

navigator lost his bearings and followed the winds as they blew. By

chance it happened that Raphael Pumpelly helped the winds; for, being

in Washington on his way to Central Asia he fell to talking with Adams

about these matters, and said that Willard Gibbs thought he got most

help from a book called the "Grammar of Science," by Karl Pearson. To

Adams's vision, Willard Gibbs stood on the same plane with the three or

four greatest minds of his century, and the idea that a man so

incomparably superior should find help anywhere filled him with wonder.

He sent for the volume and read it. From the time he sailed for Europe

and reached his den on the Avenue du Bois until he took his return

steamer at Cherbourg on December 26, he did little but try to find out

what Karl Pearson could have taught Willard Gibbs.

Here came in, more than ever, the fatal handicap of ignorance

in mathematics. Not so much the actual tool was needed, as the right to

judge the product of the tool. Ignorant as one was of the finer values

of French or German, and often deceived by the intricacies of thought

hidden in the muddiness of the medium, one could sometimes catch a

tendency to intelligible meaning even in Kant or Hegel; but one had not

the right to a suspicion of error where the tool of thought was

algebra. Adams could see in such parts of the "Grammar" as he could

understand, little more than an enlargement of Stallo's book already

twenty years old. He never found out what it could have taught a master

like Willard Gibbs. Yet the book had a historical value out of all

proportion to its science. No such stride had any Englishman before

taken in the lines of English thought. The progress of science was

measured by the success of the "Grammar," when, for twenty years past,

Stallo had been deliberately ignored under the usual conspiracy of

silence inevitable to all thought which demands new thought-machinery.

Science needs time to reconstruct its instruments, to follow a

revolution in space; a certain lag is inevitable; the most active mind

cannot instantly swerve from its path; but such revolutions are

portentous, and the fall or rise of half-a-dozen empires interested a

student of history less than the rise of the "Grammar of Science," the

more pressingly because, under the silent influence of Langley, he was

prepared to expect it.

For a number of years Langley had published in his Smithsonian

Reports the revolutionary papers that foretold the overthrow of

nineteenth-century dogma, and among the first was the famous address of

Sir William Crookes on psychical research, followed by a series of

papers on Roentgen and Curie, which had steadily driven the scientific

lawgivers of Unity into the open; but Karl Pearson was the first to pen

them up for slaughter in the schools. The phrase is not stronger than

that with which the "Grammar of Science" challenged the fight:

"Anything more hopelessly illogical than the statements with regard to

Force and Matter current in elementary textbooks of science, it is

difficult to imagine," opened Mr. Pearson, and the responsible author

of the "elementary textbook," as he went on to explain, was Lord Kelvin

himself. Pearson shut out of science everything which the nineteenth

century had brought into it. He told his scholars that they must put up

with a fraction of the universe, and a very small fraction at that--the

circle reached by the senses, where sequence could be taken for

granted--much as the deep-sea fish takes for granted the circle of

light which he generates. "Order and reason, beauty and benevolence,

are characteristics and conceptions which we find solely associated

with the mind of man." The assertion, as a broad truth, left one's mind

in some doubt of its bearing, for order and beauty seemed to be

associated also in the mind of a crystal, if one's senses were to be

admitted as judge; but the historian had no interest in the universal

truth of Pearson's or Kelvin's or Newton's laws; he sought only their

relative drift or direction, and Pearson went on to say that these

conceptions must stop: "Into the chaos beyond sense-impressions we

cannot scientifically project them." We cannot even infer them: "In the

chaos behind sensations, in the 'beyond' of sense-impressions, we

cannot infer necessity, order or routine, for these are concepts formed

by the mind of man on this side of sense-impressions"; but we must

infer chaos: "Briefly chaos is all that science can logically assert of

the supersensuous." The kinetic theory of gas is an assertion of

ultimate chaos. In plain words, Chaos was the law of nature; Order was

the dream of man.

No one means all he says, and yet very few say all they mean,

for words are slippery and thought is viscous; but since Bacon and

Newton, English thought had gone on impatiently protesting that no one

must try to know the unknowable at the same time that every one went on

thinking about it. The result was as chaotic as kinetic gas; but with

the thought a historian had nothing to do. He sought only its

direction. For himself he knew, that, in spite of all the Englishmen

that ever lived, he would be forced to enter supersensual chaos if he

meant to find out what became of British science--or indeed of any

other science. From Pythagoras to Herbert Spencer, every one had done

it, although commonly science had explored an ocean which it preferred

to regard as Unity or a Universe, and called Order. Even Hegel, who

taught that every notion included its own negation, used the negation

only to reach a "larger synthesis," till he reached the universal which

thinks itself, contradiction and all. The Church alone had constantly

protested that anarchy was not order, that Satan was not God, that

pantheism was worse than atheism, and that Unity could not be proved as

a contradiction. Karl Pearson seemed to agree with the Church, but

every one else, including Newton, Darwin and Clerk Maxwell, had sailed

gaily into the supersensual, calling it:--

"One God, one Law, one Element,

And one far-off, divine event,

To which the whole creation moves."

Suddenly, in 1900, science raised its head and denied.

Yet, perhaps, after all, the change had not been so sudden as

it seemed. Real and actual, it certainly was, and every newspaper

betrayed it, but sequence could scarcely be denied by one who had

watched its steady approach, thinking the change far more interesting

to history than the thought. When he reflected about it, he recalled

that the flow of tide had shown itself at least twenty years before;

that it had become marked as early as 1893; and that the man of science

must have been sleepy indeed who did not jump from his chair like a

scared dog when, in 1898, Mme. Curie threw on his desk the metaphysical

bomb she called radium. There remained no hole to hide in. Even

metaphysics swept back over science with the green water of the

deep-sea ocean and no one could longer hope to bar out the unknowable,

for the unknowable was known.

The fact was admitted that the uniformitarians of one's youth

had wound about their universe a tangle of contradictions meant only

for temporary support to be merged in "larger synthesis," and had

waited for the larger synthesis in silence and in vain. They had

refused to hear Stallo. They had betrayed little interest in Crookes.

At last their universe had been wrecked by rays, and Karl Pearson

undertook to cut the wreck loose with an axe, leaving science adrift on

a sensual raft in the midst of a supersensual chaos. The confusion

seemed, to a mere passenger, worse than that of 1600 when the

astronomers upset the world; it resembled rather the convulsion of 310

when the Civitas Dei cut itself loose from the Civitas Romae, and the

Cross took the place of the legions; but the historian accepted it all

alike; he knew that his opinion was worthless; only, in this case, he

found himself on the raft, personally and economically concerned in its

drift.

English thought had always been chaos and multiplicity itself,

in which the new step of Karl Pearson marked only a consistent

progress; but German thought had affected system, unity, and abstract

truth, to a point that fretted the most patient foreigner, and to

Germany the voyager in strange seas of thought alone might resort with

confident hope of renewing his youth. Turning his back on Karl Pearson

and England, he plunged into Germany, and had scarcely crossed the

Rhine when he fell into libraries of new works bearing the names of

Ostwald, Ernst Mach, Ernst Haeckel, and others less familiar, among

whom Haeckel was easiest to approach, not only because of being the

oldest and clearest and steadiest spokesman of nineteenth-century

mechanical convictions, but also because in 1902 he had published a

vehement renewal of his faith. The volume contained only one paragraph

that concerned a historian; it was that in which Haeckel sank his voice

almost to a religious whisper in avowing with evident effort, that the

"proper essence of substance appeared to him more and more marvellous

and enigmatic as he penetrated further into the knowledge of its

attributes--matter and energy--and as he learned to know their

innumerable phenomena and their evolution." Since Haeckel seemed to

have begun the voyage into multiplicity that Pearson had forbidden to

Englishmen, he should have been a safe pilot to the point, at least, of

a "proper essence of substance" in its attributes of matter and energy:

but Ernst Mach seemed to go yet one step further, for he rejected

matter altogether, and admitted but two processes in nature--change of

place and interconversion of forms. Matter was Motion--Motion was

Matter--the thing moved.

A student of history had no need to understand these scientific

ideas of very great men; he sought only the relation with the ideas of

their grandfathers, and their common direction towards the ideas of

their grandsons. He had long ago reached, with Hegel, the limits of

contradiction; and Ernst Mach scarcely added a shade of variety to the

identity of opposites; but both of them seemed to be in agreement with

Karl Pearson on the facts of the supersensual universe which could be

known only as unknowable.

With a deep sigh of relief, the traveller turned back to

France. There he felt safe. No Frenchman except Rabelais and Montaigne

had ever taught anarchy other than as path to order. Chaos would be

unity in Paris even if child of the guillotine. To make this assurance

mathematically sure, the highest scientific authority in France was a

great mathematician, M. Poincare of the Institut, who published in 1902

a small volume called "La Science et l'Hypothese," which purported to

be relatively readable. Trusting to its external appearance, the

traveller timidly bought it, and greedily devoured it, without

understanding a single consecutive page, but catching here and there a

period that startled him to the depths of his ignorance, for they

seemed to show that M. Poincare was troubled by the same historical

landmarks which guided or deluded Adams himself: "[In science] we are

led," said M. Poincare, "to act as though a simple law, when other

things were equal, must be more probable than a complicated law. Half a

century ago one frankly confessed it, and proclaimed that nature loves

simplicity. She has since given us too often the lie. To-day this

tendency is no longer avowed, and only as much of it is preserved as is

indispensable so that science shall not become impossible."

Here at last was a fixed point beyond the chance of confusion

with self-suggestion. History and mathematics agreed. Had M. Poincare

shown anarchistic tastes, his evidence would have weighed less heavily;

but he seemed to be the only authority in science who felt what a

historian felt so strongly--the need of unity in a universe.

"Considering everything we have made some approach towards unity. We

have not gone as fast as we hoped fifty years ago; we have not always

taken the intended road; but definitely we have gained much ground."

This was the most clear and convincing evidence of progress yet offered

to the navigator of ignorance; but suddenly he fell on another view

which seemed to him quite irreconcilable with the first: "Doubtless if

our means of investigation should become more and more penetrating, we

should discover the simple under the complex; then the complex under

the simple; then anew the simple under the complex; and so on without

ever being able to foresee the last term."

A mathematical paradise of endless displacement promised

eternal bliss to the mathematician, but turned the historian green with

horror. Made miserable by the thought that he knew no mathematics, he

burned to ask whether M. Poincare knew any history, since he began by

begging the historical question altogether, and assuming that the past

showed alternating phases of simple and complex--the precise point that

Adams, after fifty years of effort, found himself forced to surrender;

and then going on to assume alternating phases for the future which,

for the weary Titan of Unity, differed in nothing essential from the

kinetic theory of a perfect gas.

Since monkeys first began to chatter in trees, neither man nor

beast had ever denied or doubted Multiplicity, Diversity, Complexity,

Anarchy, Chaos. Always and everywhere the Complex had been true and the

Contradiction had been certain. Thought started by it. Mathematics

itself began by counting one--two--three; then imagining their

continuity, which M. Poincare was still exhausting his wits to explain

or defend; and this was his explanation: "In short, the mind has the

faculty of creating symbols, and it is thus that it has constructed

mathematical continuity which is only a particular system of symbols."

With the same light touch, more destructive in its artistic measure

than the heaviest-handed brutality of Englishmen or Germans, he went on

to upset relative truth itself: "How should I answer the question

whether Euclidian Geometry is true? It has no sense!... Euclidian

Geometry is, and will remain, the most convenient."

Chaos was a primary fact even in Paris--especially in Paris--as it was

in the Book of Genesis; but every thinking being in Paris or out of it

had exhausted thought in the effort to prove Unity, Continuity,

Purpose, Order, Law, Truth, the Universe, God, after having begun by

taking it for granted, and discovering, to their profound dismay, that

some minds denied it. The direction of mind, as a single force of

nature, had been constant since history began. Its own unity had

created a universe the essence of which was abstract Truth; the

Absolute; God! To Thomas Aquinas, the universe was still a person; to

Spinoza, a substance; to Kant, Truth was the essence of the "I"; an

innate conviction; a categorical imperative; to Poincare, it was a

convenience; and to Karl Pearson, a medium of exchange.

The historian never stopped repeating to himself that he knew

nothing about it; that he was a mere instrument of measure, a

barometer, pedometer, radiometer; and that his whole share in the

matter was restricted to the measurement of thought-motion as marked by

the accepted thinkers. He took their facts for granted. He knew no more

than a firefly about rays--or about race--or sex--or ennui--or a bar of

music--or a pang of love--or a grain of musk--or of phosphorus--or

conscience--or duty--or the force of Euclidian geometry--or

non-Euclidian--or heat--or light--or osmosis--or electrolysis--or the

magnet--or ether--or vis inertiae--or gravitation--or cohesion--or

elasticity--or surface tension--or capillary attraction--or Brownian

motion--or of some scores, or thousands, or millions of chemical

attractions, repulsions or indifferences which were busy within and

without him; or, in brief, of Force itself, which, he was credibly

informed, bore some dozen definitions in the textbooks, mostly

contradictory, and all, as he was assured, beyond his intelligence; but

summed up in the dictum of the last and highest science, that Motion

seems to be Matter and Matter seems to be Motion, yet "we are probably

incapable of discovering" what either is. History had no need to ask

what either might be; all it needed to know was the admission of

ignorance; the mere fact of multiplicity baffling science. Even as to

the fact, science disputed, but radium happened to radiate something

that seemed to explode the scientific magazine, bringing thought, for

the time, to a standstill; though, in the line of thought-movement in

history, radium was merely the next position, familiar and inexplicable

since Zeno and his arrow: continuous from the beginning of time, and

discontinuous at each successive point. History set it down on the

record--pricked its position on the chart--and waited to be led, or

misled, once more.

The historian must not try to know what is truth, if he values

his honesty; for, if he cares for his truths, he is certain to falsify

his facts. The laws of history only repeat the lines of force or

thought. Yet though his will be iron, he cannot help now and then

resuming his humanity or simianity in face of a fear. The motion of

thought had the same value as the motion of a cannon-ball seen

approaching the observer on a direct line through the air. One could

watch its curve for five thousand years. Its first violent acceleration

in historical times had ended in the catastrophe of 310. The next

swerve of direction occurred towards 1500. Galileo and Bacon gave a

still newer curve to it, which altered its values; but all these

changes had never altered the continuity. Only in 1900, the continuity

snapped.

Vaguely conscious of the cataclysm, the world sometimes dated

it from 1893, by the Roentgen rays, or from 1898, by the Curie's

radium; but in 1904, Arthur Balfour announced on the part of British

science that the human race without exception had lived and died in a

world of illusion until the last year of the century. The date was

convenient, and convenience was truth.

The child born in 1900 would, then, be born into a new world

which would not be a unity but a multiple. Adams tried to imagine it,

and an education that would fit it. He found himself in a land where no

one had ever penetrated before; where order was an accidental relation

obnoxious to nature; artificial compulsion imposed on motion; against

which every free energy of the universe revolted; and which, being

merely occasional, resolved itself back into anarchy at last. He could

not deny that the law of the new multiverse explained much that had

been most obscure, especially the persistently fiendish treatment of

man by man; the perpetual effort of society to establish law, and the

perpetual revolt of society against the law it had established; the

perpetual building up of authority by force, and the perpetual appeal

to force to overthrow it; the perpetual symbolism of a higher law, and

the perpetual relapse to a lower one; the perpetual victory of the

principles of freedom, and their perpetual conversion into principles

of power; but the staggering problem was the outlook ahead into the

despotism of artificial order which nature abhorred. The physicists had

a phrase for it, unintelligible to the vulgar: "All that we win is a

battle--lost in advance--with the irreversible phenomena in the

background of nature."

All that a historian won was a vehement wish to escape. He saw

his education complete; and was sorry he ever began it. As a matter of

taste, he greatly preferred his eighteenth-century education when God

was a father and nature a mother, and all was for the best in a

scientific universe. He repudiated all share in the world as it was to

be, and yet he could not detect the point where his responsibility

began or ended.

As history unveiled itself in the new order, man's mind had

behaved like a young pearl oyster, secreting its universe to suit its

conditions until it had built up a shell of nacre that embodied all its

notions of the perfect. Man knew it was true because he made it, and he

loved it for the same reason. He sacrificed millions of lives to

acquire his unity, but he achieved it, and justly thought it a work of

art. The woman especially did great things, creating her deities on a

higher level than the male, and, in the end, compelling the man to

accept the Virgin as guardian of the man's God. The man's part in his

Universe was secondary, but the woman was at home there, and sacrificed

herself without limit to make it habitable, when man permitted it, as

sometimes happened for brief intervals of war and famine; but she could

not provide protection against forces of nature. She did not think of

her universe as a raft to which the limpets stuck for life in the surge

of a supersensual chaos; she conceived herself and her family as the

centre and flower of an ordered universe which she knew to be unity

because she had made it after the image of her own fecundity; and this

creation of hers was surrounded by beauties and perfections which she

knew to be real because she herself had imagined them.

Even the masculine philosopher admired and loved and celebrated

her triumph, and the greatest of them sang it in the noblest of his

verses:--

"Alma Venus, coeli subter labentia signa

Quae mare navigerum, quae terras frugiferenteis

Concelebras ...... .

Quae quondam rerum naturam sola gubernas,

Nec sine te quidquam dias in luminis oras

Exoritur, neque fit laetum neque amabile quidquam;

Te sociam studeo!"

Neither man nor woman ever wanted to quit this Eden of their

own invention, and could no more have done it of their own accord than

the pearl oyster could quit its shell; but although the oyster might

perhaps assimilate or embalm a grain of sand forced into its aperture,

it could only perish in face of the cyclonic hurricane or the volcanic

upheaval of its bed. Her supersensual chaos killed her.

Such seemed the theory of history to be imposed by science on

the generation born after 1900. For this theory, Adams felt himself in

no way responsible. Even as historian he had made it his duty always to

speak with respect of everything that had ever been thought

respectable--except an occasional statesman; but he had submitted to

force all his life, and he meant to accept it for the future as for the

past. All his efforts had been turned only to the search for its

channel. He never invented his facts; they were furnished him by the

only authorities he could find. As for himself, according to Helmholz,

Ernst Mach, and Arthur Balfour, he was henceforth to be a conscious

ball of vibrating motions, traversed in every direction by infinite

lines of rotation or vibration, rolling at the feet of the Virgin at

Chartres or of M. Poincare in an attic at Paris, a centre of

supersensual chaos. The discovery did not distress him. A solitary man

of sixty-five years or more, alone in a Gothic cathedral or a Paris

apartment, need fret himself little about a few illusions more or less.

He should have learned his lesson fifty years earlier; the times had

long passed when a student could stop before chaos or order; he had no

choice but to march with his world.

Nevertheless, he could not pretend that his mind felt flattered

by this scientific outlook. Every fabulist has told how the human mind

has always struggled like a frightened bird to escape the chaos which

caged it; how--appearing suddenly and inexplicably out of some unknown

and unimaginable void; passing half its known life in the mental chaos

of sleep; victim even when awake, to its own ill-adjustment, to

disease, to age, to external suggestion, to nature's compulsion;

doubting its sensations, and, in the last resort, trusting only to

instruments and averages--after sixty or seventy years of growing

astonishment, the mind wakes to find itself looking blankly into the

void of death. That it should profess itself pleased by this

performance was all that the highest rules of good breeding could ask;

but that it should actually be satisfied would prove that it existed

only as idiocy.

Satisfied, the future generation could scarcely think itself,

for even when the mind existed in a universe of its own creation, it

had never been quite at ease. As far as one ventured to interpret

actual science, the mind had thus far adjusted itself by an infinite

series of infinitely delicate adjustments forced on it by the infinite

motion of an infinite chaos of motion; dragged at one moment into the

unknowable and unthinkable, then trying to scramble back within its

senses and to bar the chaos out, but always assimilating bits of it,

until at last, in 1900, a new avalanche of unknown forces had fallen on

it, which required new mental powers to control. If this view was

correct, the mind could gain nothing by flight or by fight; it must

merge in its supersensual multiverse, or succumb to it.

The Education of Henry Adams · 第 31 / 35 章