Any investigation of the phenomenon of moral conduct, and of its
interpretation, brings us face to face with two sets of conflicting
theories. These may, for convenience, be roughly divided into the two
principal schools of thought which have been termed respectively the
"Moral Sense" or "Intuitive" schools and the "Rationalistic schools of
ethics." Certain writers in their search for the springs of moral
conduct have attempted to place the issue between Naturalism or
Determinism (by no means synonymous or necessarily connected) on the one
side, and Theism on the other[13]; and, in their eagerness to discredit
the former to the advantage of the latter, imagine they demolish
Determinism (at any rate in the ethical sphere) by "pushing it to its
logical conclusion" and by showing that it "has connected completely and
indissolubly, as far as observation can carry us, mind with matter; it
has established a functional relation to exist between every fact of
thinking, willing or feeling, on the one side, and some molecular
change in the body on the other side, and man, with all his ways and
works, is simply a part of nature, and can, by no device of thought, be
detached from or set above it."[14]
What, after all, is involved in the acceptance of such a conclusion?
What is there to fear? To concede this, it is thought, would mean to
relegate man to the position of a mere "automaton," freed from
"accountability to God, responsibility to man, and the fears of
conscience."
So far from ridding man of responsibility, the clear recognition by him
of the true nature of his environment and antecedents, the laws by which
they influence him, and his inherent capacity of resistance--in other
words, the two processes observable in the world, action contrary to,
and action along, the line of least resistance[15]--does, on the
contrary, greatly increase his responsibility of action and his power to
know himself.
Is not mind and matter subject to the same law? Do they not react to the
same God? What matter, then, if we adopt the formula of Pampsychism and
assert that "all individual things are animated albeit in divers
degrees"? or endorse the conclusion of Professor James Ward, who "finds
no ground for separating organic life from psychical life"? and
continues: "All life is experience. We cannot therefore assume that
experience has no part in the building up of the organism, and only
begins when viable organism is already there."[16]
The belief that there can be no life without mind does not necessarily
imply that there can be no mind without body. As John Stuart Mill
pointed out, Determinism does not imply Materialism, a man may be a
spiritual being but yet subject to the law of causation. Neither does it
deny the dynamic character of will, but allows that not only our conduct
but our character is in part amenable to our will. The causality
involved in human actions would, however, enable any one who knew
perfectly our character and our circumstances to predict our actions.
Such considerations, however, although contributory, do not, of
themselves, decide the question with which we are here concerned,
namely, What is the real meaning and what the authority of "conscience,"
or of that mental act which takes place in our minds when we call
certain conduct "right" and certain conduct "wrong"?
Apart from the question of the ultimate sanction of moral conduct, there
have always been two explanations of the mental act variously known as
"ethical judgment," "moral faculty," "moral sense" or conscience. On the
one side there have been those who considered that moral judgment was an
emotion, an intuition, or instinctive recognition of right or wrong,
which implied no rational or intellectual process beyond that which is
involved in registering or perceiving the fact. And on the other side
there have been those who treat moral approbation as essentially an act
of judgment--the result of the reasoning and intellectual function of
the mind.
The earliest exponents of a morality that in no way depended upon the
work of Reason were the ancient Epicureans and Cyrenaics; since for them
good was pleasure and evil was pain, the sources and tests of all
ethical truth were necessarily, in consequence, the feelings and
emotions.
In the eighteenth century there arose a school, associated with the
names of the third Lord Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, the Scotch
philosopher, which became known as the "moral sense" school, widely
different from the old hedonistic philosophers, since they were the
first to assert the existence of a distinctively ethical, as opposed to
a merely pleasurable, feeling.
The philosophers of the "moral sense" school attempted to prove that
there existed a distinct moral "faculty" which differed from all other
perceptions or ideas, in that it was a separate medium by which men
could recognize ethical truth, which was rather a matter of the heart
than of the head.
As a result of the attacks of the various rationalist schools this idea
of a "moral faculty" has been for the most part abandoned by those who
approach ethics from the Religious or Theistic standpoint, for they are
far more concerned to establish the "Divine authority" and sacrosanct
character of conscience than influenced by psychological or metaphysical
distinctions. For the most part such writers are content to assume that
"conscience" is the knowledge of one's own soul with regard to questions
of right and wrong, but insist on that element of Divine Guidance which
alone, they think, can give it the necessary authority and sanctity.
The Rev. G. H. Richardson[17] defines conscience as "the whole
personality acting ethically; or, more precisely, conscience is the
reaction, pleasurable or painful, of the whole personality in response
to a human or Divine standard."
It is neither wholly emotional nor wholly rational, but "is sensitive to
motives of which the pure reason would take no account; it is more akin
to instinct than intelligence." Yet "without reason, conscience would be
blind impulse, though it might feel the consciousness of
obligation."[18]
Clearly, then, conscience can derive little validity from intelligence;
the concession to the Rationalists does not amount to much; it might
almost get on without reason altogether. It is the Divine authority of
conscience which, for the Theistic writer, is the factor of prime
importance.
"As we are bound to trust reason in the intellectual sphere, so we are
bound to trust conscience in the moral sphere. To deny the authority of
the one or the other is to distrust the Power in whom physical and
moral law have their source. The authority of conscience is thus
paramount for the individual; it will be better for me to do what is
objectively wrong, but what I conscientiously believe to be right, than
do what is in fact right, but what my conscience disapproves."[19]
Here the writer appears to abandon his Rationalistic friends altogether;
the fanatic is given free rein, his ravings are sacred.
Dr. H. Rashdall, who by many is considered representative of
rationalistic ethics, insists on the "objectivity of moral judgment.
Feelings or emotions possess no objectivity; and 'without objectivity,'
in the words of Eduard von Hartmann, 'ethic has no meaning'."[20]
The all-important task for the Theistic writer is to establish the
factor of Divine impulse. "Therefore we say that conscience is a
fundamental form of man's personal consciousness of eternity; that
ineffaceable certainty that the relation of Duty, with Responsibility
and Judgment, is not a relation which stands and falls with our
relations to the world and to men, but in its essence is a relation to
the holy and Almighty God.... Additional force seems to be given to this
way of regarding the Authority of conscience if we consider that its
activity is set in motion by an impulse from the Divine
Personality."[21]
Bishop Butler refers to conscience as the "voice of God," and as
"supreme among human faculties"; and this is endorsed by Richardson, who
finds that Theism is essential to any doctrine of conscience, because
the alternative is "destructive of its authority."
Let us now summarize the Theistic conscience, variously described in
different passages, in the author's own words: "Its activity is set in
motion by an impulse from the Divine Personality, and does not originate
in the individual nor the world," yet it "reacts to public opinion," is
"often unreasonable and inconsistent," is "subject to evolutionary
growth" and is "not infallible," is "capable of _infinite_ variety of
interpretation" and "reacts to a human standard," which, however,
"trails some clouds of glory from its Divine original"; and in
conclusion, "If we regard conscience not as a phosphorescent gleam
playing upon the surface of consciousness, but as a vital impulse,
partly rational, partly instinctive, welling up from the depths of
Personality, we shall not run the risk of denying its authority."[22] It
would be well, however, not to underestimate the risk, although it
undoubtedly caters for a great variety of tastes.
Allied to the Emotional school for the purpose of proving conscience are
those Rationalists, of whom we have taken Dr. Rashdall as an example,
who have for an object the establishment of the "objective" validity of
moral judgment. The real contention becomes clearer; the chief point at
issue is the question of authority.
We see, then, that there are two points to be decided: (1) the ultimate
validity, with which is connected the question of the Divine Authority,
of moral judgments; and (2) the mode of recognition, with which is
connected the cause or propellent which induces moral action.
Rashdall summarily dismisses the dual character of the problem in a
phrase. "The question at issue between Rationalists and Emotionalists is
not what impels me to do a virtuous act, but how I know it to be
virtuous."[23] The connexion between motive and judgment is too closely
related to be thus calmly ignored. It is agreed that the motive does not
affect the intrinsic character or "rightness" of an action, but at the
same time it most certainly does affect a man's _estimation_ of his
action; and this, in order to arrive at the value of moral judgments, is
most obviously relevant.
For Dr. Rashdall the distinction between how I know my action to be
right or virtuous, and how it is virtuous, does not exist. Both imply
recognition or statement of indisputable fact; for him there can be no
ultimate doubt as to the character of moral "good," which can in no way
be a matter of opinion, for good is _sui generis_: it is good and
nothing else; happiness may be good, honesty may be good, but good is
good for no other reason than because such an abstraction is supposed
to exist as a transcendental fact. "Therefore good can be recognized
just as any axiomatic truth can be recognized; as, for instance, the
fact that 2 + 2 = 4, or two straight lines cannot enclose a space." How
is it then that people even of the highest intelligence do not
invariably agree about what _is_ good or morally right?
There are no two opinions about whether 2 + 2 does, or does not, equal
4, yet there is no such general agreement about what is right. If asked
why a thing is right or good most people would reply either by giving a
reason to show that it is _desirable_ or else by quoting the authority
of some one else's _ipse dixit_ (in which case it is inferred that the
authority quoted had some reason for supposing it desirable). The reason
that 2 + 2 = 4 is, on the other hand, that there can be _no_ possible
alternative. Yet is it true to say that there can be no possible
alternative to what the consensus of opinion in any one country
considers morally right? Some things that are considered immoral in
England are considered moral in Japan, and _vice versa_.
Dr. Rashdall, however, conceives of but two alternatives in estimating
moral values, the first of which he dismisses, because on this view "our
moral judgments could possess no objective validity." He says: "... I
examined the question whether our moral judgments are in ultimate
analysis merely statements asserting the existence of a particular kind
of feeling in particular minds, or whether they are intellectual
judgments of universal validity--judgments, of course, of a very
peculiar and distinctive kind, but just as much intellectual and
universal judgments about the nature of Reality as the judgments 2 + 2 =
4, or 'this is a good inference and that is a bad one'."[24]
It is difficult to know whether this arbitrary elimination of the
subjective element from ethical judgments, and the attempt to translate
moral values into terms of mathematical formulæ, is intended to denote
the infusion of a mystic factor into the "exact sciences," or an attempt
to reduce metaphysics and morality to rule of thumb! The following
thesis, however, which will be elaborated in the course of this
discussion, is based on a synchronous realization of rational principles
and psychological processes.
Thus, what an individual conceives to be morally right and good, when he
is conscious of having acted so according to his own standard, may be
either:
(1) Wholly irrational, illogical, anti-social and undesirable (from
every point of view except his own), even though arrived at solely by an
intellectual and reasoning process; or
(2) An entirely instinctive, blindly impulsive or emotional action,
afterwards endorsed by the intellect (i.e. subsequently rationalized);
or
(3) The result of thoughtful deliberation, carefully and logically
designed to bring about certain preconceived "moral" ends such as
social happiness, justice, fulfilment of duty; all of which are
artificial and conventional standards, and good _only_ because they are
_desirable_, not because they are universally valid--irrespective of
time, locality and circumstances; or
(4) Any combination of these three.
The foregoing applies as much to the aggregate moral consciousness of a
community in different stages of civilization, or in varying states of
emotional abnormality, as to the individual conscience.
It can also be shown that the "communal conscience" reacts upon the
"individual conscience" in inverse ratio to the latter's emotional or
intellectual capacity for resistance; and that the "communal conscience"
(identified at a later stage of this inquiry with "Cosmic Suggestion")
is the integral product of the numerical and dynamic strength of the
convictions of the members of the community, and operates upon the
"individual conscience," either consciously or subconsciously, in the
same way that "Suggestion," according to the law discovered by Liébeault
and employed by the Nancy School, operates in hypnotic phenomena.
It will then (if this view can be established) be shown that the factors
of conscience are: (1) emotional, (2) intellectual, (3) internal
(including hereditary and organic elements), and (4) external
(environment--material and psychic); and that its validity, in ultimate
analysis, can but rest on codes, which may be not only Conventional and
Artificial, but also Rational or Intellectual, Social and Utilitarian;
and in any case variable, in the same way that the soundest and most
logical policies must, to a certain extent, be variable, or capable of
adjustment as circumstances change; the only elements which should be
constant and invariable in any policy (which is not a misnomer) being
logic and truth. So it is with rules of conduct.
As regards the purely internal sanction of our actions and thoughts,
that is to say, our relationship with Ultimate Reality, which is God or
the Law of Existence, there is only one conception of the latter which
seems to comprehend the infinite with the finite, and that is Force,
because it is the continuity of Existence, or after the manner of
Leibnitz: "Substance, the ultimate reality, can only be conceived as
force." Any moral law which may be said to be fundamental in itself and
independent of circumstances will be in relation to force. But such
"laws" will also be independent of the moral imperatives and written
codes, for they are independent of volition--of the will to obey them.
Can a man be possessed of love, greatness, nobility, courage, honour, at
a word of command? Therefore if it can be truly said that "love is the
greatest thing in the world," it is because it is the most powerful
force. Hate is disruptive, disintegrating and annihilating; love is
integrating and strengthening.
But there is yet one "good," one fundamental imperative which needs no
proof, and that is Truth--ultimate truth, because it is the statement of
what Is; without which logic, or, indeed, intelligible language, would
be impossible. But truth is not opinion, or assertion, or hope, or
faith, or in the words of Huxley "those idols built up of books and
traditions and fine-spun ecclesiastical cobwebs." Truth and all its
derivatives--honesty, integrity, truthfulness and sincerity--have an
intrinsic value of their own, for their negation implies the negation of
the principles of Existence.
But men require more than this, they require a "moral code" or standard
to give coherence to their relationships; this code, then, is that which
is desired, or imposed, and this want is most efficiently supplied by
the principle of "Utility."