For Defence of Submarine Mines, Fort Warren.
]
The War Department should not have been in ignorance of the existence of
this regiment, or of its condition of comparative efficiency. Yearly,
from 1892 to 1897, reports upon its progress had been compiled by
Colonel Miller, of the Third United States Artillery, and by Colonel
Kline, of the Twenty-first United States Infantry—both of whom, to the
satisfaction of those in the Massachusetts service, since have become
general officers—and these reports had shown uniform commendation of the
conscientious work that was being done. In 1896 Colonel Kline reported:
"With this year's work, Massachusetts has a corps (the First Regiment)
for coast-defence. Should an emergency arise necessitating the immediate
reënforcement of Fort Warren, the whole of this fine regiment could in
twenty-four hours be sent to the post, and would _now_ be of _invaluable
service_." And in his report for 1897, submitted at a time when war was
almost in sight, he repeated with added emphasis his comment of the
preceding year: "The Legislature of the State of Massachusetts,
recognizing the advisability of a coast-defence reserve, promptly
legislated the transfer of one of the infantry regiments (First) for
this duty. The wisdom of this legislation cannot be questioned. Under
adverse conditions the regiment has labored; without the means of
receiving proper instruction, save such as could be given by officers
when released from their duties, given freely and unstintedly, yet they
have succeeded in fitting the organization as a reserve force that could
_now_ be of invaluable service." In both these extracts the italics are
those found in the original report, as printed by the Military
Information Division at Washington.
Apparently the emergency requiring the immediate reënforcement of Fort
Warren had arrived; in less than _twenty_ hours from the time orders
reached the men, the regiment had reported at the post, armed,
uniformed, rationed, and equipped; officers and men stood ready to
render the invaluable services for which an inspecting officer of the
Government had declared them fit—and yet now, at a time when hastily
raised and untrained infantry was to be thrown headlong into artillery
posts, there came word from Washington that the First Massachusetts
Heavy Artillery, as an organization, would receive no consideration as a
part of the volunteer army of the United States.
It was small wonder that this verdict was received with something very
like consternation. If it could not be reversed, the destruction of the
regiment was certain. For years the men had been schooled in the belief
that they were in fact, if not in name, essentially a part of the army
of the United States; every enlistment had been made on the
understanding that in time of peace faithful service was to be rendered
to Massachusetts, in time of war, to the United States. The splendid
_esprit de corps_ of the command had been carefully built up upon this
supposition, and the men had been taught to believe that the hard
training to which they were subjected was intended to fit them for
something more than mere parade and ceremony, for something beyond
possible riot duty—in short, for something no less serious than the
defence of their country in the hour of need.
All this was at once made known to Governor Wolcott, who instantly
appreciated the disastrous effect of the proposed action, and set
himself to the task of finding a remedy. By his direction, Colonel
Sohier, A.D.C., of his staff, hurried on to Washington, where by
personal effort he succeeded in securing a reversal of the decision
first made by General Corbin, who not only accepted the regiment as then
organized, but even further directed that its term of service should
date from April 26th—thus officially recognizing the command as first in
the field for the war. The regimental pay-rolls subsequently were made
up from this date, and officers and men were paid accordingly.
But though Colonel Sohier was successful in his mission so far as
concerned saving the regiment for the national service, it was found
impossible to secure permission to recruit the command to war strength,
for the absurd reason that to do so would exceed the quota of volunteers
allotted to Massachusetts. From a purely technical point of view, this
decision seems inexplicable. There was crying need, at the time, for
garrison artillery, while it was not expected that any serious demands
would be made upon the infantry of the army before autumn; why, then,
the proportion was not maintained by recruiting the First, and accepting
one of the regiments of Massachusetts infantry temporarily on its peace
strength, must always remain beyond the comprehension of those
unfortunate enough to have had a professional knowledge of the
coast-defence conditions prevailing at the opening of the late war.