upright and fearless judge in the cause of truth, that it may be said of
thee as it is written in the 8th chapter of the 3d book of
kings,—‘Judicabit servos suos, justificans quod justum est, attribuens
eis secundum justitiam.’ He will judge his servants, justifying them
that are upright, and giving to each according to his deserts. From
this, as well as from the preceding arguments, it plainly appears, that
thou art bounden to do the justice required by my lady of Orleans.
‘I shall now demonstrate the crime of our adversary, and how he
perpetrated such an unpardonable deed, to which I shall add six
arguments to prove the fealty and loyalty of my lord of Orleans, taking
for my theme the words of the advocate of our opponent,—namely, ‘Radix
omnium malorum cupiditas.’
‘It seems to me, that covetousness has been the original cause of this
murder,—not covetousness of wealth alone, but likewise covetousness of
honours and ambition.—Covetousness has then been the original cause, as
shall more plainly be shown hereafter.
‘To prove the greatness and abomination of this crime, I shall use six
arguments. The first is founded on our adversary having not the power or
authority of a judge over the deceased.
‘Secondly, Supposing he may have had any authority over him, he
proceeded in his own way, contrary to every maxim of law and of justice.
‘My third argument is grounded on the strict alliance that had been
formed between my late lord of Orleans and our adversary.
‘Fourthly, That this is a damnable murder, and cannot any way be
defended or explained.
‘Fifthly, That our opponent caused my lord of Orleans to be slain with a
wicked intention.
‘Sixthly, That, not satisfied with having caused the duke of Orleans to
be deprived of his life, he has exerted himself to disgrace his fame, by
defamatory libels,—thus, as it were, slaying him a second time.
‘As to my first argument, it plainly appears, that the malice of our
adversary is incorrigible, seeing that he had not any authority over the
deceased; for, according to the laws and decrees, as well as to reason
and the holy Scriptures, no one can put another to death without
authority from the judge or judicial. Otherwise, any one may slay
another at his pleasure, and tumults and confusion would reign without
any chief or head, and every one would alternately, when strongest, make
himself king.
‘So far was our adversary from having any power or authority over my
lord of Orleans that he was bound to do him honour and reverence as son
to a king, and to call him his lord, and respect him in his words and
actions, for such are the privileges and prerogatives belonging to the
sons of kings. This usurpation, therefore, of authority is apparent in
our adversary, and consequently his wickedness has been unjustly
perpetrated.
‘That authority is required as essential to enable any one to put
another to death appears clearly in many parts of the holy Scriptures:
and in fact, St Austin, when discussing the saying of our Lord, in the
26th chapter of the gospel of St Matthew,‘Omnis qui gladium acceperit,
gladio peribit;’ that is, Whosoever useth the sword shall perish by the
sword; adds, ‘All who shall, without lawful authority, make use of the
sword, or shall arm himself against another, is bold in his wickedness.’
He afterwards asserts, that even a malefactor cannot be put to death
without lawful authority; for in his Civitas Dei, ‘Qui, inquit, sine
publica administratione maleficum interfecerit, velut homicida
judicabitur.’ That is, Whoever shall slay a malefactor without the forms
of public administration of justice shall be judged guilty of murder.
This the law confirms, ‘Vigor, inquit, publicus tutela in medio
constituta est, ne quis de aliquo, etiam sceleribus implicato sumere
valeat ultionem:’—which is, That the public strength is as a defence
constituted and ordained to prevent any one from taking vengeance, even
upon him who is involved in great and abominable crimes.
‘In truth, the advocate for our adversary may say, that the laws should
only take cognizance of such as act contrary to law; and that as a
tyrant proceeds directly in opposition to them, he will affirm that this
murder is no way contrary to the law. Alas! and does the advocate of our
opponent know that my late lord of Orleans was a tyrant? Who is the
judge that declares him such?
‘The fallacy of this assertion must be strictly examined, for on this
deception is founded the supposition of my lord being a tyrant; and as
our adversary groundlessly asserts, that the late duke of Orleans was a
tyrant in the eye of reason, he concludes that it was lawful to put him
to death. Let us, however, consider the properties of tyranny, and who
should be accounted tyrants.
‘The philosopher says, in his 4th chapter on morals, ‘Tyrannus est, cum
aliquis princeps, vi et violentia potestatis, sine titulo terram usurpat
alienam, et de facto aliquam occupat civitatem vel patriam et qui
incorrigibilis est, et nulli obediens.’ Now let us see whether my lord
of Orleans had these properties. Certainly not; for he never took
possession of another’s land: if any one know the contrary, let him say
so.
‘Our opponent, therefore, ought not to have called the duke of Orleans a
tyrant, for he never usurped any dominion, excepting over such places as
were given him as appanages by the king, or what he had himself justly
acquired. The duke of Burgundy, on the contrary, withholds three castles
and their dependencies, without any just title, from the inheritance and
domain of the king, namely, Lille, Douay and Orchies, notwithstanding
his oaths on the holy sacrament to the king, that he would restore them
to the crown, according to the conditions and agreements then made.
‘My lord of Orleans was never incorrigible; for I firmly believe that
never did so great a prince pay more respect and honour to the laws.
‘Let our opponent say what acts or opposition the duke of Orleans ever
committed or made against the laws. There are many noble persons now
living, who can testify that no lord ever supported or maintained the
dignity of justice more than the duke of Orleans during his whole life.
‘If we consider the properties of a tyrant according to the
philosophers, they declare that a tyrant bends his whole mind to slay
and destroy the prudent and wise: he seeks the ruin of churches and
colleges of learning, and is solely occupied with destruction. He is
much to be feared for his wickedness, whilst he studies to preserve his
personal safety by strong guards. Such were not the qualities of my late
lord, for his were the direct opposite.
‘In the first place, he never caused either wise men or fools to be put
to death, but was particularly fond of the learned, and desirous of
seeing any new improvements. In regard to churches, so far from
destroying them, he repaired many, and founded some new ones, to which
he gave large estates, as is well known. As for guarding his personal
safety, he felt himself so innocent and pure toward all mankind, that he
suspected no one of attempting to hurt him, and took no precautions, as
you have seen, against his murderers. In fact, had he been of a
suspicious temper, he would not have been thus treacherously slain.
‘It is therefore wonderfully astonishing how our adversary should have
dared to have called the duke of Orleans a tyrant, by way of excusing
his abominable act, when it is apparent that his qualities were directly
the reverse to those of a tyrant. This I think a sufficient answer to
the damnable proposition of our opponent.
‘But the advocate for our adversary says, That whatever he may have done
contrary to the letter of the law was not, however, contrary to the
intention of the maker of the law, nor contrary to its spirit, but
through love of God. Who is he that has thus revealed to him the
intention of the Maker of the law, and that it is the object of laws to
cause men to be put to death without authority or sentence of the law?
The consequence would be, that any prince may be made away with, under
pretence that he was a tyrant; for every one would interpret the law
according to his fancy, which would create the greatest misfortunes.
‘Cujus est leges condere ejus est interpretari.’ It is therefore clear,
that our opponent could not establish laws binding on the duke of
Orleans, who was not his subject, or interpret the law in respect to
him. For although his advocate styles him dean of the peers, it does not
follow that he had any authority over the defunct; for if so, he would
have authority over the whole kingdom, and be equal to the king. What
though he be a peer? he has no power but over his own lands; and in so
much as he attributes to himself the power of another over the realm, he
appropriates to himself kingly domination.
‘His advocate has indeed alledged twelve reasons to prove that his lord
might lawfully put to death the duke of Orleans without orders from any
one whatever. The three first are founded on the declarations of three
doctors in theology, and three others on the writings of three moral
philosophers,—three on the civil law, and the three last on examples
drawn from the holy Scriptures.
‘With regard to the first, taken from the writings of St Thomas Aquinas,
who says,—‘Quando aliquis aliquod dominium sibi per violentiam suscipit
nolentibus subditis, vel sine consensu communitatis et non est recursus
ad superiorem per quem de tali invasore judicium posset fieri, tunc qui
ad liberationem patriæ talem tyrannum occidit laudatur et præmium
accipit.’ To this I reply, that it is no way applicable to the case; for
my lord of Orleans never intruded on any other’s domination by violence,
nor did he attempt to usurp the power and authority of the king. I say,
he never even thought of such a thing, as will more amply be shown in
the third part of my defence of him.
‘I am therefore right in saying, that Saint Thomas speaks of him who may
be proved a tyrant,—but my lord of Orleans was not one. On this subject
St Austin proposes a question, whether it be lawful for a pilgrim to
kill a robber, who is on the watch on the highway? and from his
conclusion it is apparent, that he does not think it lawful for any man
to put another to death without sentence of the law, as Henry de Gand
afterward determined.
‘I shall add, that supposing my lord of Orleans was such a person as our
opponent describes him, but which I deny, he had a safe resort to the
king, when he was in good health and cheerful with the queen and the
princes of his blood,—none of whom would have hesitated to have
personally exposed himself in bringing to punishment the duke of
Orleans, had he been proven guilty of usurping the king’s authority.
Most certainly, my late lord had too good an understanding to imagine he
could ever succeed to the crown, when so many obstacles were against him
and the king assured of successors.
‘The second reason is founded on the authority of St Peter, who says,
‘Subditi, estote regi quasi præcellenti sive ducibus tanquam ab eo
missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum quia hæc est
voluntas Dei.’ These words appear to me of no weight in the present
case; for it would seem that the Apostle would not that any duke should
have dominion over a whole kingdom, but solely in his own country:
otherwise it would follow that Brittany, Berry, and the other duchies
within the realm, should obey the duke of Burgundy.—The advocate has,
therefore, wrongfully perverted the holy Scripture to his purpose.
‘His third reason is drawn from what Sabellicus says, in the fifteenth
chapter of his third book, ‘Tyranno licet adulari quem licet occidere.’
That is to say, It is lawful to flatter and deceive a tyrant who may
legally be put to death; but Sabellicus here speaks of such as have been
proven and known for tyrants.
‘The fourth reason is founded on what Aristotle says, in his book on the
government of cities, That it is lawful, and even praiseworthy, to slay
a tyrant. But Aristotle alludes to a public tyrant; and such was not my
lord of Orleans, as I have before shown.
‘The fifth reason is grounded on the praise Tully, in his book ‘de
Officiis,’ gives to those who killed Cæsar. To this I reply, that
although Tully was a man of great ability, he here speaks as an
ill-wisher to Cæsar; for he was always of the party, and supported the
cause of Pompey the rival and adversary to Cæsar,—and Cæsar perpetrated
many deeds which my lord of Orleans never thought of.
‘The sixth reason is grounded on what is said in the sixth chapter of
the second book of the Misfortunes of great Men: ‘Res est valde
meritoria occidere tyrannum.’ To this I answer, That it must apply only
in cases where no other remedy can be had; and the conduct of our
opponent has been illegal and wicked.
‘The seventh and two following reasons are founded on the civil laws,
which declare there are three sorts of men who may lawfully be put to
death,—namely, such as disgrace their knighthood, highway robbers, and
housebreakers found during the night within any dwelling. Now my lord of
Orleans cannot be included with any one of the above three classes. He
was ever attended by a noble body of chivalry, and was fond of it beyond
measure. And in regard to the two other cases, I maintain that the law
does not command such to be slain except when the danger is most
inevitable. They can in no wise be applicable to my lord of Orleans,
who, thank God, was no waylayer on the high roads, nor a housebreaker;
and there is no law in the world that can excuse our adversary.
‘The example of Moses, who slew an Egyptian without any authority, is
produced to support the tenth reason. To this I say, according to the
opinion of St Austin and many other doctors, that Moses sinned in
killing the Egyptian; and although Moses and St Peter both acted
contrary to the rules of justice, their cases are not similar,—for Moses
was a Hebrew, and noticing an unbeliever moving towards his brother, to
slay him, put him to death to prevent him from so doing.
‘The eleventh reason is grounded on the instance of Phineas, who slew
Zambry without orders, and not only remained unpunished, but was
remunerated for it. Thomas Aquinas says, in exculpation of this act,
that he did it as a teacher of the law, for he was the son of the high
priest, and, on this account, had power and public authority. This is
also inapplicable to the question before us, as history will show.
‘The twelfth reason is founded on Saint Michael having slain Lucifer
without the Divine command. For this he was rewarded with riches and
power, as our opponent says. To this I reply, That St Michael did not
slay Lucifer,—and the assertion that he did so is deserving only of
derision; for the slaying of Lucifer is nothing more than the
deprivation of the Divine grace, and of the sovereign glory of paradise,
whence he was cast out by God for his inordinate pride. O, my lords! in
what book has this advocate learned such theology? I am confounded at
the boldness of his assertions, for there is not certainly any book in
which it can be found. On the contrary, we see in the epistle of St
Jude, that St Michael dared not to rail against Lucifer, although he had
power over him, nor command him to do any thing; but he only said, ‘Our
Lord commands thee;’ and thus it clearly appears, that the arguments
which our adversary has produced are no way applicable to his case, nor
can they serve to justify his disloyal and treacherous act.
‘I repeat, that such murders as the above, which our opponent has
brought forward, are not of any consequence as examples; for many things
have been suffered, that are mentioned in the Old Testament, which are
now forbidden. As for instance, Samuel, as a churchman, put to death the
king Amalech,—but at this day it is not lawful for a churchman to commit
such crimes. To Moses was given the power of repudiation from the
marriage-vow, which is now forbidden. The doctrine, therefore, which is
here attempted, and the examples quoted to palliate and even justify
this atrocious crime, cannot be supported; and truly princes would be in
constant dread of death, if this deed go unpunished,—for should any evil
report be spread abroad of them, some one of their subjects might take
it into his head to punish them himself for it.
‘O, princes! consider well, that if such doctrines are supported, any
man may say, ‘I also may kill him as such a one did.’ You will therefore
be pleased to condemn this false doctrine as dangerous, seditious and
abominable. Our adversary, and all those of his party, may then say with
Jeremiah, in his twentieth chapter, ‘Confundantur vehementer qui non
intellexerunt opprobrium sempiternum quod nunquam delebitur.’
‘The second argument is founded upon this consideration, that the cruel
death of the duke of Orleans was not accomplished according to the way
of justice; and supposing our adversary had the right to inflict it, he
was, notwithstanding, bound to do so according to the forms of law, by
information, and on the testimony of irreproachable witnesses. But he no
way followed this course; for he first kills the duke of Orleans, and
then seeks for reasons to exculpate himself for so doing. O, God! what a
trial, and what a judge!! O, justice! do thy duty; and what thou owest
to thyself, defend thy own cause against one who seeks to reduce thee to
nothing. In truth, every law ordains that causes should be first tried,
and sentences examined, before they are put into execution; and to this
purpose Julius Cæsar, according to what Sallust relates, said, That when
judges shall put men to death before they be condemned, the greatest
evils may arise, and no man live in security. He brings, as an example,
the Lacedemonians, who, after their victory over the Athenians,
constituted thirty persons to govern the public state, who put to death
numbers without any previous trial, which caused great misfortunes.
‘The like will befal us, if such crimes are suffered to go unpunished.
Sallust tells us, that when Cataline and his associates were intending
to burn the city of Rome and murder its senators, Tully was then consul;
but although he was fully acquainted with the plot, he did not cause one
of the conspirators to be put to death until he had fully proved their
guilt. Now, my lords, as I have fully and clearly proved the heinousness
of the crime with which I have charged the duke of Burgundy; and as it
was done contrary to all law and justice, I trust it will not remain
unpunished, according to the words of our Lord by the prophet Isaiah, in
his 47th chap.: ‘Videbitur opprobrium tuum, ultionem capiam, et non
resistet mihi homo.’
‘My third argument is grounded on our adversary’s having entered into
the strongest possible alliance with the duke of Orleans, in the
presence of many of their dependants; and a twelvemonth prior to the
murder of the above duke this alliance was renewed before several
prelates, nobles, clergymen and counsellors of each side, when the two
dukes swore on the crucifix, with the holy evangelists in their hands,
to the due and faithful observance of it, promising, on the salvation of
their souls, and by their honour, that henceforward they would be to
each other as brothers and companions in arms, engaging to reveal
mutually any evil designs that might be plotted or meditated against
their persons or interests. They then agreed to wear each other’s badge,
which was done. And at the last feast at Compiègne, for the greater
confirmation of the above, my lord of Orleans and our adversary made
many of their knights and dependants alternately swear, that they would
loyally and truly abide by and support the bonds of friendship entered
into between them, through love and attachment to their persons,—and
would make known to each party any thing that should be imagined against
their persons or estate.
‘Moreover, my lord of Orleans and our adversary entered into other
private engagements, promising and swearing on the true cross, that they
would mutually defend and guard each other’s person and honour against
all who should attack them. This agreement was signed with their own
hands and seals.
‘What now, O duke of Burgundy! canst thou say to these things? Who now
can put any confidence in thee? for thou canst not deny the above
alliance, as there are many witnesses to it now living: thou hast been
publicly seen by the whole city wearing the badge of the duke of
Orleans.
‘How did my late lord act? Certainly in no way hurtful to our opponent;
for from that time no reproachful or angry words passed between them,
that could any how be ill interpreted. It is plain, therefore, that our
adversary has wickedly and treacherously put to death him who had the
fullest confidence in his honour.
‘O duke! what reply canst thou make to this? Shouldst thou say, that
thou didst cause him to be put to death on account of the wickedness
which thou hast by thy command caused to be imputed to him,—say, then,
why thou enteredst into any alliance or bonds of friendship with such an
infamous traitor as thou hast had him painted. Thou knowest, that loyal
men will never form a friendship with traitors. Thou sayest, that the
duke of Orleans was a traitor to his king: thou therefore makest thyself
a traitor by the act of forming an alliance with him.
‘Thou hast accused my lord of Orleans of having made an alliance with
Henry of Lancaster: what wilt thou say to the alliances thou thyself
afterward enteredst into with the duke of Orleans. If these things had
happened after thy alliance with my late lord, thou wouldst have had
some colour to have broken with him, although even this would have been
barely sufficient; but thou knowest well that thou hast not alledged any
thing against him, in thy scandalous libel, posterior to these
alliances.
‘O, abominable treason! what can be offered in thy excuse? O ye knights,
who consider honour as your judge! God will never suffer you to approve
of such deeds.
‘O, duke of Burgundy! thou hast frequently visited the duke of Orleans,
when alive: thou hast eaten and drank with him: thou hast even taken
spices out of the same dish with him, in token of friendship. In short,
on the Tuesday preceding his death, he most kindly invited thee to dine
with him the Sunday following, which thou promisedst to do in the
presence of my lord of Berry, now here. Assuredly my lord of Orleans
might have quoted the words of JESUS CHRIST to the traitor Judas, ‘Qui
mittit manum mecum in paropside, hic me tradet.’
‘O, my lords! weigh well this treason, and apply a remedy to it.
Consider how strongly the faith and loyalty of chivalry should be
guarded and the words of Vegetius, when speaking of chivalry, ‘Milites
jurata sua omnia custodiant.’ To the observance of this, all princes are
bound,—for he who shall disgrace his loyalty or honour is unworthy of
being called a knight.
‘My fourth argument is founded on this consideration, that the death of
my late lord, the duke of Orleans, was damnable and disloyal,—and any
one who should maintain or assert the contrary would not be a good
Christian. We see that the secular justice allows to malefactors time
for repentance,—but thou, cruel adversary! thou hast caused my lord so
suddenly to be put to death that, inasmuch as in thee lay, he died
without repenting of his sins. It seems, therefore, that thou hast
exerted all thy influence to procure the eternal damnation of his soul
when thou destroyedst his body; and most assuredly thou wilt find great
difficulty to make thy peace with God,—for insomuch as thou believest
him the greater sinner, so much the more need had he, as thou mayst
suppose, of a fuller and longer repentance.—It follows, then, that thou
hast deprived him, to the utmost of thy power, of any possibility of
repentance,—and consequently thy sin becomes the more grievous and
inexcuseable, more especially as my lord was no way expecting to die
when he was thus suddenly and cruelly cut off.—Nevertheless, I trust
that our Lord may have granted that he died in his grace; and I the more
readily believe it, inasmuch as, a short time before this sad event, he
had most devoutly confessed himself.
‘I repeat, that it is the deed of a wicked Christian thus to put a man
to death; and whoever may say the contrary, or maintain that it is
meritorious, I tell him, that he speaks wickedly and erroneously,
according to the theologians.