PROGRESS OF THE REBELLION
Before Gordon captured Taitsan, it will be remembered, he was on his
way to attack the city of Quinsan. Having accomplished his purpose of
assisting his allies, the Imperial troops, he reverted to his original
object. He wanted to leave Taitsan to be held by the Imperialists, and
at once to march on Quinsan; but owing to the want of discipline in his
army, he was unable to do this. His men had taken a large amount of
loot from Taitsan, and were anxious to dispose of it, and their young
General, much against his will, had to accept the inevitable. With an
army such as that which Gordon had under his control, it does not do to
draw tight the reins of discipline too suddenly. It had for a long time
been in a lax condition, and Gordon saw that he must gain the men's
confidence before sharply asserting his authority. With an army well in
hand, the right thing would have been to follow up his victories
immediately, so that the enemy should not have time to recover
themselves. But instead of being able to go on at once from Taitsan to
Quinsan, he had to return to headquarters, and there wait till the end
of May, reorganising and making preparations. So bad was the discipline
among his officers, that just before he started for Quinsan, all the
majors commanding regiments resigned, simply because he promoted his
commissary-general, an English officer named Cooksby, to the rank of
colonel. This step was taken because Gordon found that disputes were
always occurring about rations and quarters between the
commissary-general and the regimental commanders. As the latter had,
and the former had not, military rank, the commissary was in an awkward
position. Gordon therefore decided that, the commissary being one of
his most important staff officers, he ought not only to have military
rank, but that his rank should be of a superior kind. It is worthy of
note that in this respect Gordon was just twenty years ahead of the War
Office authorities, for it was not till the year 1884 that commissariat
officers in the English army were accorded military rank. The amusing
part of the outbreak of insubordination amongst Gordon's majors was,
that though they resigned their commissions, they asked that they might
be allowed for the sake of loot to accompany the expedition to Quinsan.
Gordon accepted the resignations, but declined to let the majors take
part in his expedition. But he had to yield this point; for on the
following day, when the "fall in" sounded, the men supported their
commanding officers, and refused to obey. The majors, however, seeing
that there was only one General, and that he might be killed, in which
event the command would probably devolve on one of themselves, thought
better of the matter, and fell in with their men as usual. The only
wonder is that, with such an army and such disorganised material, the
young commander should have been able to accomplish so much against
overwhelming numbers.
When Gordon reached Quinsan, he found the Imperial troops under
Governor Li and General Ching in a most unfortunate position. They were
supposed to be besieging the city, but the enemy were practically
besieging them. Gordon quickly drove off the enemy that were seeking to
encompass the Imperialists, and then he found that General Ching was
anxious to attack the eastern gate of the city, a proceeding that did
not at all commend itself to him. He saw at a glance that the western
gate would probably be the better one to attack, as the enemy would be
less prepared there. Quinsan was an important place, and was strongly
defended; it was held by at least 15,000 men, and the moat round the
fortification was forty feet wide. Before coming to a definite
decision, Gordon made a reconnaissance in a steamer, taking the
Governor and General Ching with him. Being convinced by personal
observation that he was right in the step he intended to take, he
informed the Chinese General to that effect, and in a letter written
some little time after the event he says, "General Ching was as sulky
as a bear when he was informed that I thought it advisable to take
these stockades the next day, and to attack on this side of the city."
At dawn on the 30th May, having surrounded the city with his own and
the Imperialist troops, he took a small force by water to a point on
the main line of communication between Quinsan and Soo-chow, only
defended by a weak stockade, which was easily taken. Gordon then took
the celebrated little steamer the _Hyson_, and went towards Soo-chow.
Meeting a large force of the enemy on the way to reinforce Quinsan, he
opened fire upon them. Little anticipating an attack in this direction,
they got into confusion and fled, the steamer following them. Having
inflicted heavy loss on the retreating army and steamed right up to
Soo-chow, he turned round and went at full speed till he got back to
Chunye, where he had that morning left a small detachment of riflemen.
It was 10.30 P.M. and a rather dark night. His intention was to wait
till the next morning and renew the conflict by attacking the city. But
the rebels within the walls had been seized with panic, and knowing
that the city was invested on three sides, they made a rush for
Soo-chow. In doing so they met Gordon's steamer returning. Again she
opened fire and blew her whistle, the sound of the latter doing much
damage by adding to the noise and increasing the panic among the
rebels. The men were in dense masses, and each shell mowed them down in
large numbers. Gordon says, "The mass wavered, yelled and turned back."
The city had fallen, and by 4 A.M. on May 31st everything was quiet,
and it was reckoned that from three to four thousand of the enemy must
have been killed, drowned, or taken prisoners. The little steamer had
won the day, having fired some eighty or ninety rounds; the troops had
done little or nothing. Only two men on Gordon's side were killed and
five were drowned.
Thus in a single day had fallen this important city, which was the key
to the position of Soo-chow. Indeed, the impetuous young commander was
anxious to dash on and seize Soo-chow itself, but he could not inspire
the Imperialist General with his spirit. He says, "I have no doubt of
my having been able to take Soo-chow the other day, if the Mandarins
had been able to take advantage of our success." The capture of Quinsan
was one of the most brilliant strokes of success Gordon had during the
whole of the campaign, and he attributed it to the fact that the lines
of communication between that city and Soo-chow were neglected, and
that he was permitted to get his steamer into the canal, which ran
parallel with the only road. Both the armies which he defeated were
compelled to march along the road, as on each side of the road there
was water. Through the men marching thus in dense masses, the shot and
shell from the steamer carried death and destruction, creating much
confusion. The Taiping rebels were evidently not prepared to fight such
an amphibious general as Gordon proved himself to be.
It may be well to remark here on the fertility of resource and the
initiative power which this young commander possessed. It mattered not
what difficulties arose, his fertile brain sooner or later devised a
method by which he could overcome them. It is said that the best doctor
is not necessarily the cleverest man, but the one who is most fertile
in resource. If disorders of the human frame refuse to yield to one
kind of treatment, another must be tried, and so on, until at last the
right method is discovered. There can be no question that this is also
true of the military and other callings in life. The man of a fertile
brain, ever ready to suggest new methods when old ones have failed, is
the most likely to succeed. It was to this cause, more than to any
other, that Napoleon at first owed his success. When he was a young
man, it was the custom in Europe to imitate blindly the tactics of
Frederick the Great of Prussia, and to rely on ponderous heavy squares
and a slow stiff method of moving. Napoleon was the first to see that,
however suitable such tactics had been during the time of the great
Prussian general, before the development of artillery, they were not
adapted to the changed circumstances under which battles were fought in
his own time; and so in 1806 at Jena he smashed to pieces the Prussian
force, which came against him in all the pride of inherited traditions,
handed down from one of the greatest generals of his age. While it is
almost a truism to say that what is appropriate to one age is not
suited to another, it is only men of the type of Napoleon and Gordon
who are quick enough to see the necessity for a change of method, and
sufficiently resourceful to adopt new plans. Ninety-nine generals out
of a hundred would never have thought of utilising a little steamer to
destroy a land force, but would have proceeded in the old-fashioned
methods of a siege, and perhaps have lost an enormous number of men in
the process. The enemy are always more or less prepared for
conventional methods of fighting, but it stands to reason that they are
unprepared for new ideas. Hence much of Gordon's success.
In addition to this fertility of resource, Gordon displayed wonderful
courage in carrying out his ideas. No sooner had Quinsan fallen than he
saw that it would be a good thing to make a change in his headquarters,
and to transfer them thence from Sung-kiang. With the old centre were
associated all sorts of traditions connected with the army before his
time, in the days when discipline was lax, and the one idea of the
soldiers was that the war was being carried on for the sake of
providing them with loot. There were loot agents and other means by
which the officers and soldiers could easily dispose of their booty.
All this was demoralising, so Gordon decided on an immediate change.
But the army looked at the matter from a different standpoint, and a
mutinous spirit arose. Mr. Wilson informs us that the artillery
threatened to blow the officers to pieces, and a written notification
to that effect was sent to the General. Gordon at once summoned the
non-commissioned officers, who he knew were at the bottom of the plot,
and threatened to shoot every fifth man if the name of the writer of
the notice were not revealed. Immediately they all commenced to groan,
one corporal making himself specially conspicuous by groaning very
loudly. Whether Gordon had any suspicions with regard to this
particular man, we are not informed, but he directed him to be seized,
and ordered a couple of infantry soldiers standing by to shoot him. He
then had the others confined, and again repeated his threat to the
effect that one in every five would be shot if the name of the writer
were not given up. Events proved that the corporal already shot was the
culprit. No doubt many in this country will judge Gordon harshly with
regard to this summary method of dealing out justice; but it must be
remembered that a civil war was going on in which thousands of lives
were annually sacrificed. Gordon knew perfectly well that he could
suppress it if he had a disciplined force under him. He also knew what
a frightful scourge an undisciplined army might become. According to
the tradition of all nations, each man in Gordon's army had forfeited
his life by disobedience in the presence of the enemy. What was the
life of one man compared with the thousands of women and children who
were suffering through the horrors of that war? We in England have been
for so long mercifully spared the misery of war in our own country,
that possibly public opinion has become a little too sentimental.
During the Trafalgar Square riots in 1887, it was suggested by some
that the Fire Brigade should pump cold water on to the rioters in order
to disperse them; and one writer seriously deprecated such a step, on
the ground that possibly the poor fellows who got the ducking might
catch cold! It is possible to go from one extreme to another, and,
while wishing to avoid harshness and cruelty in any form, to become too
sentimental, and thus do harm in an opposite direction. Sentimental
people too often forget the sufferings of the many innocent victims
when contemplating those of a few culprits. War is too stern a thing
for us to trifle with, and those whose duty it is to be engaged in it
must be prepared to suppress with a strong hand anything in the form of
incipient mutiny.
With regard to the threat which Gordon held out of shooting one man in
five, such a form of punishment is by no means uncommon in countries
more civilised than China. It has been frequently resorted to in
Russia, and as recently as 1876, during the Russo-Turkish war, on
symptoms of a mutiny exhibiting themselves among the Russian troops,
the commander-in-chief threatened to shoot one in every ten of the men,
and thus quelled the manifestation. There can be no question that
Gordon's acting as he did was far more plucky than all the personal
exposure to danger through which he went. Many men who would be willing
to sacrifice their own lives in the path of duty would have shrunk from
taking such a step.
But though Gordon was quite prepared to fight as long as he could
benefit his fellow-creatures by so doing, he was essentially a man of
peace, and he loathed the horrors of war. On the 29th June he says:
"The rebels remain very quiet, and we are engaged in organising another
attack upon them. I have, however, sent a letter to the rebel chiefs,
offering my good services towards any arrangements they may be inclined
to enter into with the Imperialists, by which more fighting may be
avoided. I am most anxious to have as little fighting as possible, and
shall do my best to bring about a pacific solution of the question."
This was the more magnanimous when we consider that he was perfectly
confident in the ultimate result of the conflict, and that in the way
of glory acquired by brilliant victories he had everything to gain in
terminating the war by force of arms instead of by diplomacy.
The rebels at this time had received a great addition of strength by
Burgevine going over to them, together with upwards of 300 English,
American, and other adventurers. On this subject Gordon says:--
"The fact that Burgevine has joined the rebels will no doubt very
much prolong the rebellion, which, humanly speaking, would almost
have been put down this year, or at the latest next spring; but the
force at my command is too small to do everything, and one has to
act with great caution. I feel that I have so many lives intrusted
to me, that these are, as it were, at my disposal, and I will not
risk them in an enterprise I consider rash. Burgevine is a very
foolish fellow, and little thinks of the immense misery he will
cause this unhappy country, for of the ultimate suppression of the
rebellion I have little doubt."
In another letter he says, "I think the rebels will soon get very tired
of their auxiliaries, and the latter of the rebels."
The worst thing, however, that Gordon had to fear was treachery on the
part of his own officers and men. Burgevine knew most of them well, and
had managed very skilfully to associate his own dismissal from the
command of the Ever-Victorious Army with the fact that he was striving
for the interests of the men and officers. Consequently he was to a
certain extent a martyr in their eyes, and he made the most of this
fact in endeavouring to corrupt some of Gordon's officers. For
Burgevine was not more successful in alluring Gordon's army from its
allegiance than in defeating it in open conflict. Having made one or
two unsuccessful attempts, and discovered that the brilliant young
commander was more than a match for him, he asked Gordon to meet him at
an appointed place, where he told him that he had determined to desert
the rebel cause. This did not surprise Gordon. What did astonish him
was that Burgevine went on to propose that Gordon and he should
together capture Soo-chow, throw off all allegiance to either
Imperialists or rebels, organise an army 20,000 strong, and set up an
independent kingdom of their own. Being a mere adventurer himself, he
little understood the man of honour with whom he had to deal. Gordon at
once cut short further communications. Burgevine and his men, however,
being so disgusted with their masters, decided to leave them at all
costs, and sent to inform Gordon that at a signal-rocket being fired by
him they would rush out under pretence of a sortie and join him. The
signal was given, the sortie was made, and a good many got away, but
Burgevine and a few others had been suspected, and detained. When
Gordon discovered this, he generously wrote to the rebel chiefs,
explained to them that it was against their interests to compel men to
fight against their will, and asked for their release. The messenger
who bore the letter was interrogated as to whether he thought it
possible for Gordon to be bought over, and his reply was of course in
the negative. Strange to say, Gordon's request was granted, and
Burgevine was released and handed over to the British Consul. Dr.
Wilson informs us that:--
"At the very time Burgevine was negotiating with Gordon in regard
to his relief, he had proposed to Jones, his lieutenant, a plan for
entrapping the man whose efforts were being directed toward the
succour of him and his followers. Jones revolted against treachery
so base, and he and Burgevine had a 'difficulty.' Jones told the
story thus: Burgevine drew out his revolver, which he cocked and
discharged at my head from a distance of about nine inches. The
bullet entered my cheek and passed upward; it has not yet been
extracted. I exclaimed, 'You have shot your best friend!' His
answer was, 'I know I have, and I wish to God I had killed you.'"
We hear no more of Burgevine in connection with Gordon, so we here part
company with him. According to Mr. Wilson, he had subsequently a very
chequered career, and finally was reported to have been drowned by
accident when a prisoner in the hands of the Imperialists. This writer
says, "I have no reason to suppose that the account of his death given
by the Chinese authorities was untrue; and if they did drown him
purposely, they saved themselves and the American authorities a good
deal of trouble." The only wonder is that a scoundrel who so thoroughly
deserved to be hanged should ever have found a watery grave.
After the Taipings had got rid of Burgevine and his followers, they
began to lose heart, for they felt that the principal reason why these
men had deserted their cause was that it was a losing one. They thought
that their chances of holding Soo-chow against the ubiquitous Gordon
were slight, and, as is often the case under such circumstances, they
underrated their own resources, and overrated those of their opponents.
They made sure that Gordon would soon assault the city, but this he had
no intention of doing. "With the small force at one's command," said
he, "I am not at all anxious to pit myself against a town garrisoned by
seven, or even ten times our number, if it can be avoided." Instead of
attempting an open assault, which must have resulted in a desperate
loss of life, Gordon gradually surrounded the city with his own and the
Imperial troops, capturing all the smaller places around it, so that it
might be completely invested. Here again he exhibited his quick
perception of the weak points in his opponents' character. Even the
greatest coward amongst our own countrymen would fight desperately if
he felt that all his means of retreat were cut off; but, strange as it
may seem, this is not a characteristic of all nations. Once let a
Chinaman feel that his means of retreat are destroyed, and he is filled
with panic. Gordon says, "The great thing in taking stockades from the
rebels is to cut off their retreat, and the chances are they will go
without trouble; but attack them in front, and leave their rear open,
and they will fight most desperately."
Interesting as it would be to many, space does not permit us to follow
the details of the siege, and the severe struggles Gordon had in
different places, when capturing strongholds of the enemy in order to
cut off their supplies. There are, however, a few personal incidents
that occurred at this time which deserve mention, in order to show what
marvellous escapes he had, and what great personal danger he was often
in. Once when sitting on the Patachow Bridge, a somewhat celebrated
structure of fifty-three arches and 300 yards long, which he had
captured from the enemy, a couple of shots from his own camp struck the
bridge close to him. He was alone, and he could not account for the
firing. Leaving his seat to ascertain the cause, he got into his boat
and started to row across the river, when suddenly an enormous mass of
masonry fell from the very spot where he had been sitting, and nearly
struck the boat. These two accidental--or shall we more correctly call
them providential?--shots saved his life. Again, on the assault of
Leeku, he discovered that one of his officers, Lieutenant Perry, had
been in communication with the enemy. When challenged, this officer
made an excuse which Gordon accepted, saying, "I shall pass over your
fault this time, on condition that, in order to show your loyalty, you
undertake to lead the next forlorn hope." But Gordon forgot his
decision, and was leading the forlorn hope himself, when suddenly an
officer next to him was struck down. That officer was Lieutenant Perry,
who fell into the arms of his commander. Many of Gordon's officers were
brave men, but not a few of them exhibited the white feather, and he
had, in order to set an example of personal courage, often to take the
lead. Sometimes he would take one of these timid ones by the arm, and,
in his quiet way, conduct him into the thick of the fight. His men used
to think he had a charmed life, and they termed the little cane which
he always carried in place of a sword "the magic wand of victory."
There is one incident which should be mentioned here, although the
public did not hear of it for many years after it occurred. When the
Ashantee expedition was contemplated, and speculation was rife as to
whom the command should be offered to, somebody wrote to the _Times_,
signing himself "Mandarin," and, among other things which he mentioned
about Gordon, said that during the month of September, before the
capture of Soo-chow, Gordon had decided to attack certain detached
forts around that place. For some reason his men again mutinied, and
refused to march off the parade-ground.
"At this juncture General Gordon arrived on the spot, with his
interpreter. He was on foot, in undress, apparently unarmed, and,
as usual, exceedingly cool, quiet, and undemonstrative. Directly he
approached the leading company, he ordered his interpreter to
direct every man who refused to embark to step to the front. One
man only advanced. General Gordon drew his revolver from an inside
breast-pocket, presented it at the soldier's head, and desired the
interpreter to direct the man to march straight to the barge and
embark. The order was immediately complied with, and then, General
Gordon giving the necessary word of command, the company followed
without hesitation. It was generally allowed by the officers, when
the event became known, that the success in this instance was
solely due to the awe and respect in which General Gordon was held
by the men; and that such was the spirit of the troops at the time,
that had any other but he attempted what he did, the company would
have broken into open mutiny, shot their officers, and committed
the wildest excesses. In less than a week the spirit of the troops
was as excellent as before, and gradually the whole garrison joined
in a series of movements which culminated in the fall of Soo-chow."