received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign. If
it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green while another
moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will be a
repetition of the same strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull
Run. To operate on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a central
position will fail, as it always has failed, in ninety-nine cases out of a
hundred. It is condemned by every military authority I have ever read.
General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the same
position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did the armies of
McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General
[Indorsement]
The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is
exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR ANDREW.
WASHINGTON, D. C., January 11, 1862
GOVERNOR JOHN A. ANDREW, Boston:
I will be greatly obliged if you will arrange; somehow with General Butler
to officer his two un-officered regiments.
A. LINCOLN
TO GENERAL D. C. BUELL.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 13, 1861
BRIGADIER-GENERAL BUELL.
MY DEAR SIR--Your despatch of yesterday is received, in which you say, "I
received your letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote my
efforts to your views and his." In the midst of my many cares I have not
seen, nor asked to see, General McClellan's letter to you. For my own
views, I have not offered and do not now offer them as orders; and while I
am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow
them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the
form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty
in regard to them better than I do.
With this preliminary I state my general idea of this war to be, that
we have the greater numbers and the enemy has the greater facility of
concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we
can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that
this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different
points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he
makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to
attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining
so much.
To illustrate: Suppose last summer, when Winchester ran away to reinforce
Manassas, we had forborne to attack Manassas, but had seized and held
Winchester. I mention this to illustrate and not to criticise. I did not
lose confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Patterson than
some others seem to.... Applying the principle to your case, my idea is
that Halleck shall menace Columbus and "down river" generally, while you
menace Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate
at Bowling Green, do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there
either, but seize Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both, left exposed
by the concentration at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety
to me, and which I am sure you will not overlook, that the East Tennessee
line is so long and over so bad a road.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
(Indorsement.)
Having to-day written General Buell a letter, it occurs to me to send
General Halleck a copy of it.
A. LINCOLN.
TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 1, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK.
MY DEAR SIR:--The Germans are true and patriotic and so far as they have
got cross in Missouri it is upon mistake and misunderstanding. Without a
knowledge of its contents, Governor Koerner, of Illinois, will hand you
this letter. He is an educated and talented German gentleman, as true a
man as lives. With his assistance you can set everything right with
the Germans.... My clear judgment is that, with reference to the German
element in your command, you should have Governor Koerner with you; and if
agreeable to you and him, I will make him a brigadier-general, so that
he can afford to give his time. He does not wish to command in the field,
though he has more military knowledge than some who do. If he goes
into the place, he will simply be an efficient, zealous, and unselfish
assistant to you. I say all this upon intimate personal acquaintance with
Governor Koerner.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.
WASHINGTON, January 17, 1862
TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
I transmit to Congress a translation of an instruction to the minister of
his Majesty the King of Prussia accredited to this government, and a copy
of a note to that minister from the Secretary of State relating to the
capture and detention of certain citizens of the United States, passengers
on board the British steamer Trent, by order of Captain Wilkes of the
United States Navy.
A. LINCOLN
TO GENERAL McCLELLAN.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
January 20, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Commanding Armies of the United States:
You or any officer you may designate will in your discretion suspend the
writ of habeas corpus so far as may relate to Major Chase, lately of the
Engineer Corps of the Army of the United States, now alleged to be guilty
of treasonable practices against this government.
A. LINCOLN.
By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER NO. 1
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 27, 1862.
Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general
movement of the land and the naval forces of the United States against the
insurgent forces.
That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army of
the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the army near Munfordville,
Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of
Mexico, be ready for a movement on that day.
That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective
commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey
additional orders when duly given.
That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and
of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-chief, with
all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will
severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt
execution of this order.
A. LINCOLN.
TO SECRETARY STANTON,
EXECUTIVE MANSION WASHINGTON, January 31, 1862
HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.
MY DEAR SIR:--It is my wish that the expedition commonly called the
"Lane Expedition" shall be, as much as has been promised at the
adjutant-general's office, under the supervision of General McClellan, and
not any more. I have not intended, and do not now intend, that it shall be
a great, exhausting affair, but a snug, sober column of 10,000 or 15,000.
General Lane has been told by me many times that he is under the command
of General Hunter, and assented to it as often as told. It was the
distinct agreement between him and me, when I appointed him, that he was
to be under Hunter.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL WAR ORDER NO. 1.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 31, 1862.
Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac,
after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an
expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon
the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all
details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the
expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.
A. LINCOLN.
OPPOSITION TO McCLELLAN'S PLANS
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN,
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, February 3, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN.
DEAR SIR--You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement
of the Army of the Potomac--yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the
Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on
the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest
of Manassas.
If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I
shall gladly yield my plan to yours.
First. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and
money than mine?
Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?
Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?
Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would
break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?
Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your
plan than mine?
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
Memorandum accompanying Letter of President Lincoln to General McClellan,
dated February 3,1862.
First. Suppose the enemy should attack us in force before we reach the
Occoquan, what?
Second. Suppose the enemy in force shall dispute the crossing of the
Occoquan, what? In view of this, might it not be safest for us to cross
the Occoquan at Coichester, rather than at the village of Occoquan? This
would cost the enemy two miles of travel to meet us, but would, on the
contrary, leave us two miles farther from our ultimate destination.
Third. Suppose we reach Maple Valley without an attack, will we not be
attacked there in force by the enemy marching by the several roads from
Manassas; and if so, what?
TO WM. H. HERNDON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, February 3, 1862.
DEAR WILLIAM:--Yours of January 30th just received. Do just as you say
about the money matter.
As you well know, I have not time to write a letter of respectable length.
God bless you, says
Your friend,
A. LINCOLN.
RESPITE FOR NATHANIEL GORDON
February 4, 1862
A. LINCOLN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting:
Whereas it appears that at a term of the Circuit Court of the United
States of America for the Southern District of New York held in the month
of November, A.D. 1861, Nathaniel Gordon was indicted and convicted for
being engaged in the slave trade, and was by the said court sentenced to
be put to death by hanging by the neck, on Friday the 7th day of February,
AD. 1862:
And whereas a large number of respectable citizens have earnestly besought
me to commute the said sentence of the said Nathaniel Gordon to a term of
imprisonment for life, which application I have felt it to be my duty to
refuse:
And whereas it has seemed to me probable that the unsuccessful application
made for the commutation of his sentence may have prevented the said
Nathaniel Gordon from making the necessary preparation for the awful
change which awaits him;
Now, therefore, be it known, that I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the
United States of America, have granted and do hereby grant unto him, the
said Nathaniel Gordon, a respite of the above recited sentence, until
Friday the twenty-first day of February, A.D. 1862, between the hours of
twelve o'clock at noon and three o'clock in the afternoon of the said day,
when the said sentence shall be executed.
In granting this respite, it becomes my painful duty to admonish the
prisoner that, relinquishing all expectation of pardon by human authority,
he refer himself alone to the mercy of the common God and Father of all
men.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto signed my name and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this fourth day of February, A.D. 1862,
and of the independence of the United States the eighty-sixth.
A. LINCOLN.
By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
MESSAGE TO THE SENATE.
WASHINGTON CITY, February 4. 1862
To THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:
The third section of the "Act further to promote the efficiency of the
Navy," approved December 21, 1862, provides:
"That the President of the United States, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall have the authority to detail from the retired
list of the navy for the command of squadrons and single ships such
officers as he may believe that the good of the service requires to be
thus placed in command; and such officers may, if upon the recommendation
of the President of the United States they shall receive a vote of thanks
of Congress for their services and gallantry in action against an enemy,
be restored to the active list, and not otherwise."
In conformity with this law, Captain Samuel F. Du Pont, of the navy, was
nominated to the Senate for continuance as the flag-officer in command of
the squadron which recently rendered such important service to the Union
in the expedition to the coast of South Carolina.
Believing that no occasion could arise which would more fully correspond
with the intention of the law, or be more pregnant with happy influence as
an example, I cordially recommend that Captain Samuel F. Du Pont receive a
vote of thanks of Congress for his services and gallantry displayed in the
capture of Forts Walker and Beauregard, commanding the entrance of Port
Royal Harbor, on the 7th of November, 1861.
A. LINCOLN.
TO GENERALS D. HUNTER AND J. H. LANE.
EXECUTIVE MANSION WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 4, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HUNTER AND BRIGADIER-GENERAL LANE, Leavenworth, Kansas:
My wish has been and is to avail the government of the services of both
General Hunter and General Lane, and, so far as possible, to personally
oblige both. General Hunter is the senior officer, and must command when
they serve together; though in so far as he can consistently with the
public service and his own honor oblige General Lane, he will also oblige
me. If they cannot come to an amicable understanding, General Lane must
report to General Hunter for duty, according to the rules, or decline the
service.
A. LINCOLN.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1, RELATING TO POLITICAL PRISONERS.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, February 14,1862.
The breaking out of a formidable insurrection based on a conflict of
political ideas, being an event without precedent in the United States,
was necessarily attended by great confusion and perplexity of the public
mind. Disloyalty before unsuspected suddenly became bold, and treason
astonished the world by bringing at once into the field military forces
superior in number to the standing army of the United States.
Every department of the government was paralyzed by treason. Defection
appeared in the Senate, in the House of Representatives, in the Cabinet,
in the Federal courts; ministers and consuls returned from foreign
countries to enter the insurrectionary councils of land or naval forces;
commanding and other officers of the army and in the navy betrayed our
councils or deserted their posts for commands in the insurgent forces.
Treason was flagrant in the revenue and in the post-office service, as
well as in the Territorial governments and in the Indian reserves.
Not only governors, judges, legislators, and ministerial officers in
the States, but even whole States rushed one after another with apparent
unanimity into rebellion. The capital was besieged and its connection with
all the States cut off. Even in the portions of the country which were
most loyal, political combinations and secret societies were formed
furthering the work of disunion, while, from motives of disloyalty or
cupidity or from excited passions or perverted sympathies, individuals
were found furnishing men, money, and materials of war and supplies to the
insurgents' military and naval forces. Armies, ships, fortifications,
navy yards, arsenals, military posts, and garrisons one after another were
betrayed or abandoned to the insurgents.
Congress had not anticipated, and so had not provided for, the emergency.
The municipal authorities were powerless and inactive. The judicial
machinery seemed as if it had been designed, not to sustain the
government, but to embarrass and betray it.
Foreign intervention, openly invited and industriously instigated by the
abettors of the insurrection, became imminent, and has only been prevented
by the practice of strict and impartial justice, with the most perfect
moderation, in our intercourse with nations.
The public mind was alarmed and apprehensive, though fortunately not
distracted or disheartened. It seemed to be doubtful whether the Federal
Government, which one year before had been thought a model worthy of
universal acceptance, had indeed the ability to defend and maintain
itself.
Some reverses, which, perhaps, were unavoidable, suffered by newly levied
and inefficient forces, discouraged the loyal and gave new hopes to the
insurgents. Voluntary enlistments seemed about to cease and desertions
commenced. Parties speculated upon the question whether conscription had
not become necessary to fill up the armies of the United States.
In this emergency the President felt it his duty to employ with energy the
extraordinary powers which the Constitution confides to him in cases of
insurrection. He called into the field such military and naval forces,
unauthorized by the existing laws, as seemed necessary. He directed
measures to prevent the use of the post-office for treasonable
correspondence. He subjected passengers to and from foreign countries to
new passport regulations, and he instituted a blockade, suspended the
writ of habeas corpus in various places, and caused persons who were
represented to him as being or about to engage in disloyal and treasonable
practices to be arrested by special civil as well as military agencies
and detained in military custody when necessary to prevent them and deter
others from such practices. Examinations of such cases were instituted,
and some of the persons so arrested have been discharged from time to time
under circumstances or upon conditions compatible, as was thought, with
the public safety.
Meantime a favorable change of public opinion has occurred. The line
between loyalty and disloyalty is plainly defined. The whole structure
of the government is firm and stable. Apprehension of public danger and
facilities for treasonable practices have diminished with the passions
which prompted heedless persons to adopt them. The insurrection is
believed to have culminated and to be declining.
The President, in view of these facts, and anxious to favor a return to
the normal course of the administration as far as regard for the public
welfare will allow, directs that all political prisoners or state
prisoners now held in military custody be released on their subscribing
to a parole engaging them to render no aid or comfort to the enemies in
hostility to the United States.
The Secretary of War will, however, in his discretion, except from the
effect of this order any persons detained as spies in the service of the
insurgents, or others whose release at the present moment may be deemed
incompatible with the public safety.
To all persons who shall be so released, and who shall keep their parole,
the President grants an amnesty for any past offences of treason or
disloyalty which they may have comminuted.
Extraordinary arrests will hereafter be made under the direction of the
military authorities alone.
By order of the President EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS. WASHINGTON CITY, February 15, 1862
TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES:
The third section of the "Act further to promote the efficiency of the
Navy," approved December 21, 1861, provides
"That the President of the United States, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall have the authority to detail from the retired
list of the navy for the command of squadrons and single ships such
officers as he may believe that the good of the service requires to be
thus placed in command; and such officers may, if upon the recommendation
of the President of the United States they shall receive a vote of thanks
of Congress for their services and gallantry in action against an enemy,
be restored to the active list, and not otherwise."
In conformity with this law, Captain Louis M. Goldsborough, of the navy,
was nominated to the Senate for continuance as the flag-officer in command
of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, which recently rendered such
important service to the Union in the expedition to the coast of North
Carolina.
Believing that no occasion could arise which would more fully correspond
with the intention of the law or be more pregnant with happy influence
as an example, I cordially recommend that Captain Louis M. Goldsborough
receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his services and gallantry
displayed in the combined attack of the forces commanded by him and
Brigadier-General Burnside in the capture of Roanoke Island and the
destruction of rebel gunboats On the 7th, 8th, and 10th of February, 1862.
A. LINCOLN.
FIRST WRITTEN NOTICE OF GRANT
TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
February 16, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, St. Louis, Missouri:
You have Fort Donelson safe, unless Grant shall be overwhelmed from
outside; to prevent which latter will, I think, require all the vigilance,
energy, and skill of yourself and Buell, acting in full co-operation.
Columbus will not get at Grant, but the force from Bowling Green will.
They hold the railroad from Bowling Green to within a few miles of Fort
Donelson, with the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed. It is unsafe to
rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to Buell. A small part of
their force can retire slowly toward Nashville, breaking up the railroad
as they go, and keep Buell out of that city twenty days. Meanwhile
Nashville will be abundantly defended by forces from all South and perhaps
from hers at Manassas. Could not a cavalry force from General Thomas on
the upper Cumberland dash across, almost unresisted, and cut the railroad
at or near Knoxville, Tennessee? In the midst of a bombardment at Fort
Donelson, why could not a gunboat run up and destroy the bridge at
Clarksville? Our success or failure at Fort Donelson is vastly important,
and I beg you to put your soul in the effort. I send a copy of this to
Buell.
A. LINCOLN.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2.--IN RELATION TO STATE PRISONERS.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, FEBRUARY 27, 1862
It is ordered:
First. That a special commission of two persons, one of military rank and
the other in civil life, be appointed to examine the cases of the state
prisoners remaining in the military custody of the United States, and to
determine whether in view of the public Safety and the existing rebellion
they should be discharged, or remain in military custody, or be remitted
to the civil tribunals for trial.
Second. That Major-General John A. Dix, commanding in Baltimore, and the
HON. Edwards Pierrepont, of New York, be, and they are hereby, appointed
commissioners for the purpose above mentioned; and they are authorized to
examine, hear, and determine the cases aforesaid ex parte and in a summary
manner, at such times and places as in their discretion they may appoint,
and make full report to the War Department.
By order of the President EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
ORDER RELATING TO COMMERCIAL INTERCOURSE.
Considering that the existing circumstances of the country allow a partial
restoration of commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of those
parts of the United States heretofore declared to be in insurrection
and the citizens of the loyal States of the Union, and exercising the
authority and discretion confided to me by the act of Congress, approved
July 13, 1861, entitled "An act further to provide for the collection of
duties on imports, and for other purposes," I hereby license and permit
such commercial intercourse in all cases within the rules and regulations
which have been or may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury for
conducting and carrying on the same on the inland waters and ways of the
United States.
WASHINGTON, February 28, 1862.
A. LINCOLN.
SPEECH TO THE PERUVIAN MINISTER,
WASHINGTON, D. C., MARCH 4, 1862