you kindly sent one. Thanks to both him and you. Please assemble the
Cabinet at twelve to-day to look over the message and reports.
And now, suppose you step over at once and let us see General Scott (and)
General Cameron about assigning a position to General Fremont.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS IN SPECIAL SESSION,
JULY 4, 1861.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:--Having been
convened on an extraordinary occasion, as authorized by the Constitution,
your attention is not called to any ordinary subject of legislation.
At the beginning of the present Presidential term, four months ago, the
functions of the Federal Government were found to be generally
suspended within the several States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, excepting only those of the
Post-Office Department.
Within these States all the forts, arsenals, dockyards, custom-houses, and
the like, including the movable and stationary property in and about
them, had been seized, and were held in open hostility to this government,
excepting only Forts Pickens, Taylor, and Jefferson, on and near the
Florida coast, and Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. The
forts thus seized had been put in improved condition, new ones had been
built, and armed forces had been organized and were organizing, all
avowedly with the same hostile purpose.
The forts remaining in the possession of the Federal Government in and
near these States were either besieged or menaced by warlike preparations,
and especially Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded by well-protected
hostile batteries, with guns equal in quality to the best of its own, and
outnumbering the latter as perhaps ten to one. A disproportionate share
of the Federal muskets and rifles had somehow found their way into
these States, and had been seized to be used against the government.
Accumulations of the public revenue lying within them had been seized for
the same object. The navy was scattered in distant seas, leaving but
a very small part of it within the immediate reach of the government.
Officers of the Federal army and navy had resigned in great numbers;
and of those resigning a large proportion had taken up arms against the
government. Simultaneously, and in connection with all this, the purpose
to sever the Federal Union was openly avowed. In accordance with this
purpose, an ordinance had been adopted in each of these States, declaring
the States respectively to be separated from the national Union. A
formula for instituting a combined government of these States had
been promulgated; and this illegal organization, in the character
of confederate States, was already invoking recognition, aid, and
intervention from foreign powers.
Finding this condition of things, and believing it to be an imperative
duty upon the incoming executive to prevent, if possible, the consummation
of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union, a choice of means to that
end became indispensable. This choice was made and was declared in the
inaugural address. The policy chosen looked to the exhaustion of all
peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger ones. It sought only
to hold the public places and property not already wrested from the
government, and to collect the revenue, relying for the rest on time,
discussion, and the ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the mails, at
government expense, to the very people who were resisting the government;
and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to any of the
people, or any of their rights. Of all that which a President might
constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, everything was
forborne without which it was believed possible to keep the government on
foot.
On the 5th of March (the present incumbent's first full day in office), a
letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th
of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was
by that department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the
professional opinion of the writer that reinforcements could not be thrown
into that fort within the time for his relief, rendered necessary by the
limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the
same, with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well-disciplined
men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and
their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures of Major Anderson's
letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott,
who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection,
however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of
the army and the navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly but
decidedly to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at the
same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the
government, or could be raised and brought to the ground within the time
when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted. In a purely military
point of view, this reduced the duty of the administration in the case to
the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort.
It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the
circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which
it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would
be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would
discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far
to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that in fact, it would
be our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed.
Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be reached
Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last would be a clear indication
of policy, and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation of
Fort Sumter as a military necessity. An order was at once directed to be
sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort
Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and
slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was received
just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was that
the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been
transferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of
the late administration (and of the existence of which the present
administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too
vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the
troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached
at Fort Sumter was impossible--rendered so by the near exhaustion
of provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against such a
conjuncture, the government had, a few days before, commenced preparing
an expedition as well adapted as might be to relieve Fort Sumter, which
expedition was intended to be ultimately used, or not, according to
circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using it was now
presented, and it was resolved to send it forward. As had been intended
in this contingency, it was also resolved to notify the governor of South
Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made to provision the
fort; and that, if the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no
effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or
in case of an attack upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given;
whereupon the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even
awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition.
It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in
no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants. They
well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit
aggression upon them. They knew--they were expressly notified--that the
giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all
which would on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting
so much, should provoke more. They knew that this government desired to
keep the garrison in the fort, not to assail them, but merely to maintain
visible possession, and thus to preserve the Union from actual and
immediate dissolution--trusting, as hereinbefore stated, to time,
discussion, and the ballot-box for final adjustment; and they assailed
and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object--to drive out the
visible authority of the Federal Union, and thus force it to immediate
dissolution. That this was their object the executive well understood; and
having said to them in the inaugural address, "You can have no conflict
without being yourselves the aggressors," he took pains not only to keep
this declaration good, but also to keep the case so free from the power of
ingenious sophistry that the world should not be able to misunderstand
it. By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its surrounding circumstances, that
point was reached. Then and thereby the assailants of the government began
the conflict of arms, without a gun in sight or in expectancy to return
their fire, save only the few in the fort sent to that harbor years before
for their own protection, and still ready to give that protection in
whatever was lawful. In this act, discarding all else, they have forced
upon the country the distinct issue, "immediate dissolution or blood."
And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It
presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional
republic or democracy--a government of the people by the same people--can
or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic
foes. It presents the question whether discontented individuals, too few
in numbers to control administration according to organic law in any
case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or on any other
pretenses, or arbitrarily without any pretense, break up their government,
and thus practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It
forces us to ask: Is there in all republics this inherent and fatal
weakness? Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties
of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?
So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power
of the government, and so to resist force employed for its destruction by
force for its preservation.
The call was made, and the response of the country was most gratifying,
surpassing in unanimity and spirit the most sanguine expectation. Yet
none of the States commonly called slave States, except Delaware, gave
a regiment through regular State organization. A few regiments have been
organized within some others of those States by individual enterprise,
and received into the government service. Of course the seceded States,
so called (and to which Texas had been joined about the time of the
inauguration), gave no troops to the cause of the Union.
The border States, so called, were not uniform in their action, some
of them being almost for the Union, while in others--as Virginia,
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas--the Union sentiment was nearly
repressed and silenced. The course taken in Virginia was the most
remarkable--perhaps the most important. A convention elected by the people
of that State to consider this very question of disrupting the Federal
Union was in session at the capital of Virginia when Fort Sumter fell. To
this body the people had chosen a large majority of professed Union men.
Almost immediately after the fall of Sumter, many members of that majority
went over to the original disunion minority, and with them adopted an
ordinance for withdrawing the State from the Union. Whether this change
was wrought by their great approval of the assault upon Sumter, or their
great resentment at the government's resistance to that assault, is not
definitely known. Although they submitted the ordinance for ratification
to a vote of the people, to be taken on a day then somewhat more than
a month distant, the convention and the Legislature (which was also in
session at the same time and place), with leading men of the State not
members of either, immediately commenced acting as if the State were
already out of the Union. They pushed military preparations vigorously
forward all over the State. They seized the United States armory at
Harper's Ferry, and the navy-yard at Gosport, near Norfolk. They received
perhaps invited--into their State large bodies of troops, with their
warlike appointments, from the so-called seceded States. They formally
entered into a treaty of temporary alliance and co-operation with the
so-called "Confederate States," and sent members to their congress at
Montgomery. And finally, they permitted the insurrectionary government to
be transferred to their capital at Richmond.
The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant insurrection to make
its nest within her borders; and this government has no choice left but
to deal with it where it finds it. And it has the less regret as the loyal
citizens have, in due form, claimed its protection. Those loyal citizens
this government is bound to recognize and protect, as being Virginia.
In the border States, so called,--in fact, the middle States,--there are
those who favor a policy which they call "armed neutrality"; that is, an
arming of those States to prevent the Union forces passing one way, or
the disunion the other, over their soil. This would be disunion completed.
Figuratively speaking, it would be the building of an impassable wall
along the line of separation--and yet not quite an impassable one, for
under the guise of neutrality it would tie the hands of Union men and
freely pass supplies from among them to the insurrectionists, which it
could not do as an open enemy. At a stroke it would take all the trouble
off the hands of secession, except only what proceeds from the external
blockade. It would do for the disunionists that which, of all things, they
most desire--feed them well and give them disunion without a struggle of
their own. It recognizes no fidelity to the Constitution, no obligation to
maintain the Union; and while very many who have favored it are doubtless
loyal citizens, it is, nevertheless, very injurious in effect.
Recurring to the action of the government, it may be stated that at
first a call was made for 75,000 militia; and, rapidly following this,
a proclamation was issued for closing the ports of the insurrectionary
districts by proceedings in the nature of blockade. So far all was
believed to be strictly legal. At this point the insurrectionists
announced their purpose to enter upon the practice of privateering.
Other calls were made for volunteers to serve for three years, unless
sooner discharged, and also for large additions to the regular army and
navy. These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured
upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity;
trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is
believed that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency
of Congress.
Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty to
authorize the commanding general in proper cases, according to his
discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or,
in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary
processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous
to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but very
sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done
under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has been called
to the proposition that one who has sworn to "take care that the laws
be faithfully executed" should not himself violate them. Of course some
consideration was given to the questions of power and propriety before
this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to
be faithfully executed were being resisted and failing of execution in
nearly one third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of
execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the
means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme
tenderness of the citizen's liberty that, practically, it relieves more
of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very limited extent be
violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one
to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces lest that one be
violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken if
the government should be overthrown when it was believed that disregarding
the single law would tend to preserve it? But it was not believed
that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was
violated. The provision of the Constitution that "the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," is equivalent to
a provision--is a provision--that such privilege may be suspended when, in
case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. It was
decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does
require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was
authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the
executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is
silent as to which or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision
was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the
framers of the instrument intended that in every case the danger
should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very
assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by
the rebellion.
No more extended argument is now offered, as an opinion at some length
will probably be presented by the attorney-general. Whether there shall be
any legislation upon the subject, and if any, what, is submitted entirely
to the better judgment of Congress.
The forbearance of this government had been so extraordinary and so long
continued as to lead some foreign nations to shape their action as if they
supposed the early destruction of our national Union was probable. While
this, on discovery, gave the executive some concern, he is now happy
to say that the sovereignty and rights of the United States are now
everywhere practically respected by foreign powers; and a general sympathy
with the country is manifested throughout the world.
The reports of the Secretaries of the Treasury, War, and the Navy will
give the information in detail deemed necessary and convenient for your
deliberation and action; while the executive and all the departments will
stand ready to supply omissions, or to communicate new facts considered
important for you to know.
It is now recommended that you give the legal means for making this
contest a short and decisive one: that you place at the control of
the government for the work at least four hundred thousand men and
$400,000,000. That number of men is about one-tenth of those of proper
ages within the regions where, apparently, all are willing to engage; and
the sum is less than a twenty-third part of the money value owned by the
men who seem ready to devote the whole. A debt of $600,000,000 now is a
less sum per head than was the debt of our Revolution when we came out of
that struggle; and the money value in the country now bears even a greater
proportion to what it was then than does the population. Surely each man
has as strong a motive now to preserve our liberties as each had then to
establish them.
A right result at this time will be worth more to the world than ten times
the men and ten times the money. The evidence reaching us from the country
leaves no doubt that the material for the work is abundant, and that it
needs only the hand of legislation to give it legal sanction, and the hand
of the executive to give it practical shape and efficiency. One of the
greatest perplexities of the government is to avoid receiving troops
faster than it can provide for them. In a word, the people will save their
government if the government itself will do its part only indifferently
well.
It might seem, at first thought, to be of little difference whether the
present movement at the South be called "secession" or "rebellion." The
movers, however, well understand the difference. At the beginning they
knew they could never raise their treason to any respectable magnitude by
any name which implies violation of law. They knew their people possessed
as much of moral sense, as much of devotion to law and order, and as much
pride in and reverence for the history and government of their common
country as any other civilized and patriotic people. They knew they
could make no advancement directly in the teeth of these strong and noble
sentiments. Accordingly, they commenced by an insidious debauching of the
public mind. They invented an ingenious sophism which, if conceded, was
followed by perfectly logical steps, through all the incidents, to the
complete destruction of the Union. The sophism itself is that any State of
the Union may consistently with the national Constitution, and therefore
lawfully and peacefully, withdraw from the Union without the consent of
the Union or of any other State. The little disguise that the supposed
right is to be exercised only for just cause, themselves to be the sole
judges of its justice, is too thin to merit any notice.
With rebellion thus sugar-coated they have been drugging the public mind
of their section for more than thirty years, and until at length they
have brought many good men to a willingness to take up arms against the
government the day after some assemblage of men have enacted the farcical
pretense of taking their State out of the Union, who could have been
brought to no such thing the day before.