identical things, identical rights or identical wrongs, and the argument
which establishes one will establish the other. Try a thousand years for
a sound reason why Congress shall not hinder the people of Kansas from
having slaves, and, when you have found it, it will be an equally good one
why Congress should not hinder the people of Georgia from importing slaves
from Africa.
As to Governor Chase, I have a kind side for him. He was one of the few
distinguished men of the nation who gave us, in Illinois, their sympathy
last year. I never saw him, but suppose him to be able and right-minded;
but still he may not be the most suitable as a candidate for the
Presidency.
I must say I do not think myself fit for the Presidency. As you propose a
correspondence with me, I shall look for your letters anxiously.
I have not met Dr. Reynolds since receiving your letter; but when I shall,
I will present your respects as requested.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
IT IS BAD TO BE POOR.
TO HAWKINS TAYLOR
SPRINGFIELD, ILL. Sept. 6, 1859.
HAWKINS TAYLOR, Esq.
DEAR SIR:--Yours of the 3d is just received. There is some mistake about
my expected attendance of the U.S. Court in your city on the 3d Tuesday of
this month. I have had no thought of being there.
It is bad to be poor. I shall go to the wall for bread and meat if I
neglect my business this year as well as last. It would please me much
to see the city and good people of Keokuk, but for this year it is little
less than an impossibility. I am constantly receiving invitations which I
am compelled to decline. I was pressingly urged to go to Minnesota; and I
now have two invitations to go to Ohio. These last are prompted by Douglas
going there; and I am really tempted to make a flying trip to Columbus and
Cincinnati.
I do hope you will have no serious trouble in Iowa. What thinks Grimes
about it? I have not known him to be mistaken about an election in Iowa.
Present my respects to Col. Carter, and any other friends, and believe me
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
SPEECH AT COLUMBUS, OHIO.
SEPTEMBER 16, 1859.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF OHIO: I cannot fail to remember that I
appear for the first time before an audience in this now great State,--an
audience that is accustomed to hear such speakers as Corwin, and Chase,
and Wade, and many other renowned men; and, remembering this, I feel
that it will be well for you, as for me, that you should not raise your
expectations to that standard to which you would have been justified in
raising them had one of these distinguished men appeared before you. You
would perhaps be only preparing a disappointment for yourselves, and, as
a consequence of your disappointment, mortification to me. I hope,
therefore, that you will commence with very moderate expectations; and
perhaps, if you will give me your attention, I shall be able to interest
you to a moderate degree.
Appearing here for the first time in my life, I have been somewhat
embarrassed for a topic by way of introduction to my speech; but I have
been relieved from that embarrassment by an introduction which the Ohio
Statesman newspaper gave me this morning. In this paper I have read an
article, in which, among other statements, I find the following:
"In debating with Senator Douglas during the memorable contest of last
fall, Mr. Lincoln declared in favor of negro suffrage, and attempted to
defend that vile conception against the Little Giant."
I mention this now, at the opening of my remarks, for the purpose of
making three comments upon it. The first I have already announced,--it
furnishes me an introductory topic; the second is to show that the
gentleman is mistaken; thirdly, to give him an opportunity to correct it.
In the first place, in regard to this matter being a mistake. I have found
that it is not entirely safe, when one is misrepresented under his very
nose, to allow the misrepresentation to go uncontradicted. I
therefore propose, here at the outset, not only to say that this is a
misrepresentation, but to show conclusively that it is so; and you will
bear with me while I read a couple of extracts from that very "memorable"
debate with Judge Douglas last year, to which this newspaper refers. In
the first pitched battle which Senator Douglas and myself had, at the
town of Ottawa, I used the language which I will now read. Having been
previously reading an extract, I continued as follows:
"Now, gentlemen, I don't want to read at any greater length, but this is
the true complexion of all I have ever said in regard to the institution
of slavery and the black race. This is the whole of it; and anything that
argues me into his idea of perfect social and political equality with the
negro, is but a specious and fantastic arrangement of words, by which a
man can prove a horse-chestnut to be a chestnut horse. I will say here,
while upon this subject, that I have no purpose directly or indirectly to
interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists.
I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do
so. I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between
the white and the black races. There is a physical difference between the
two which, in my judgment, will probably forbid their ever living together
upon the footing of perfect equality; and inasmuch as it becomes a
necessity that there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas,
am in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position. I
have never said anything to the contrary, but I hold that, notwithstanding
all this, there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to
all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence,--the
right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. I hold that he is as
much entitled to these as the white man. I agree with judge Douglas, he
is not my equal in many respects,--certainly not in color, perhaps not
in moral or intellectual endowments. But in the right to eat the bread,
without leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal,
and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man."
Upon a subsequent occasion, when the reason for making a statement like
this occurred, I said:
"While I was at the hotel to-day an elderly gentleman called upon me to
know whether I was really in favor of producing perfect equality between
the negroes and white people. While I had not proposed to myself on this
occasion to say much on that subject, yet, as the question was asked me, I
thought I would occupy perhaps five minutes in saying something in regard
to it. I will say, then, that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of
bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white
and black races; that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of making
voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, or
intermarry with the white people; and I will say in addition to this that
there is a physical difference between the white and black races which
I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of
social and political equality. And inasmuch as they can not so live,
while they do remain together there must be the position of superior
and inferior, and I, as much as any other man, am in favor of having the
superior position assigned to the white race. I say upon this occasion
I do not perceive that because the white man is to have the superior
position, the negro should be denied everything. I do not understand that
because I do not want a negro woman for a slave, I must necessarily want
her for a wife. My understanding is that I can just let her alone. I am
now in my fiftieth year, and I certainly never have had a black woman for
either a slave or a wife. So it seems to me quite possible for us to get
along without making either slaves or wives of negroes. I will add to this
that I have never seen, to my knowledge, a man, woman, or child, who was
in favor of producing perfect equality, social and political, between
negroes and white men. I recollect of but one distinguished instance that
I ever heard of so frequently as to be satisfied of its correctness, and
that is the case of Judge Douglas's old friend Colonel Richard M. Johnson.
I will also add to the remarks I have made (for I am not going to enter
at large upon this subject), that I have never had the least apprehension
that I or my friends would marry negroes, if there was no law to keep
them from it; but as judge Douglas and his friends seem to be in great
apprehension that they might, if there were no law to keep them from it, I
give him the most solemn pledge that I will to the very last stand by the
law of the State which forbids the marrying of white people with negroes."
There, my friends, you have briefly what I have, upon former occasions,
said upon this subject to which this newspaper, to the extent of its
ability, has drawn the public attention. In it you not only perceive, as a
probability, that in that contest I did not at any time say I was in favor
of negro suffrage, but the absolute proof that twice--once substantially,
and once expressly--I declared against it. Having shown you this, there
remains but a word of comment upon that newspaper article. It is this,
that I presume the editor of that paper is an honest and truth-loving man,
and that he will be greatly obliged to me for furnishing him thus early
an opportunity to correct the misrepresentation he has made, before it has
run so long that malicious people can call him a liar.
The Giant himself has been here recently. I have seen a brief report of
his speech. If it were otherwise unpleasant to me to introduce the subject
of the negro as a topic for discussion, I might be somewhat relieved by
the fact that he dealt exclusively in that subject while he was here. I
shall, therefore, without much hesitation or diffidence, enter upon this
subject.
The American people, on the first day of January, 1854, found the African
slave trade prohibited by a law of Congress. In a majority of the States
of this Union, they found African slavery, or any other sort of slavery,
prohibited by State constitutions. They also found a law existing,
supposed to be valid, by which slavery was excluded from almost all the
territory the United States then owned. This was the condition of the
country, with reference to the institution of slavery, on the first of
January, 1854. A few days after that, a bill was introduced into Congress,
which ran through its regular course in the two branches of the national
legislature, and finally passed into a law in the month of May, by which
the Act of Congress prohibiting slavery from going into the Territories of
the United States was repealed. In connection with the law itself, and, in
fact, in the terms of the law, the then existing prohibition was not only
repealed, but there was a declaration of a purpose on the part of Congress
never thereafter to exercise any power that they might have, real or
supposed, to prohibit the extension or spread of slavery. This was a very
great change; for the law thus repealed was of more than thirty years'
standing. Following rapidly upon the heels of this action of Congress,
a decision of the Supreme Court is made, by which it is declared that
Congress, if it desires to prohibit the spread of slavery into the
Territories, has no constitutional power to do so. Not only so, but
that decision lays down principles which, if pushed to their logical
conclusion,--I say pushed to their logical conclusion,--would decide
that the constitutions of free States, forbidding slavery, are themselves
unconstitutional. Mark me, I do not say the judges said this, and let
no man say I affirm the judges used these words; but I only say it is my
opinion that what they did say, if pressed to its logical conclusion, will
inevitably result thus.
Looking at these things, the Republican party, as I understand its
principles and policy, believes that there is great danger of the
institution of slavery being spread out and extended until it is
ultimately made alike lawful in all the States of this Union; so
believing, to prevent that incidental and ultimate consummation is the
original and chief purpose of the Republican organization. I say "chief
purpose" of the Republican organization; for it is certainly true that if
the National House shall fall into the hands of the Republicans, they will
have to attend to all the other matters of national house-keeping, as well
as this. The chief and real purpose of the Republican party is eminently
conservative. It proposes nothing save and except to restore this
government to its original tone in regard to this element of slavery, and
there to maintain it, looking for no further change in reference to it
than that which the original framers of the Government themselves expected
and looked forward to.
The chief danger to this purpose of the Republican party is not just now
the revival of the African slave trade, or the passage of a Congressional
slave code, or the declaring of a second Dred Scott decision, making
slavery lawful in all the States. These are not pressing us just now. They
are not quite ready yet. The authors of these measures know that we are
too strong for them; but they will be upon us in due time, and we will be
grappling with them hand to hand, if they are not now headed off. They are
not now the chief danger to the purpose of the Republican organization;
but the most imminent danger that now threatens that purpose is that
insidious Douglas popular sovereignty. This is the miner and sapper. While
it does not propose to revive the African slave trade, nor to pass a slave
code, nor to make a second Dred Scott decision, it is preparing us for the
onslaught and charge of these ultimate enemies when they shall be ready to
come on, and the word of command for them to advance shall be given. I say
this "Douglas popular sovereignty"; for there is a broad distinction, as I
now understand it, between that article and a genuine popular sovereignty.
I believe there is a genuine popular sovereignty. I think a definition of
"genuine popular sovereignty," in the abstract, would be about this: That
each man shall do precisely as he pleases with himself, and with all
those things which exclusively concern him. Applied to government, this
principle would be, that a general government shall do all those things
which pertain to it, and all the local governments shall do precisely as
they please in respect to those matters which exclusively concern them. I
understand that this government of the United States, under which we live,
is based upon this principle; and I am misunderstood if it is supposed
that I have any war to make upon that principle.
Now, what is judge Douglas's popular sovereignty? It is, as a principle,
no other than that if one man chooses to make a slave of another man
neither that other man nor anybody else has a right to object. Applied in
government, as he seeks to apply it, it is this: If, in a new Territory
into which a few people are beginning to enter for the purpose of making
their homes, they choose to either exclude slavery from their limits or to
establish it there, however one or the other may affect the persons to be
enslaved, or the infinitely greater number of persons who are afterwards
to inhabit that Territory, or the other members of the families of
communities, of which they are but an incipient member, or the general
head of the family of States as parent of all, however their action may
affect one or the other of these, there is no power or right to interfere.
That is Douglas's popular sovereignty applied.
He has a good deal of trouble with popular sovereignty. His explanations
explanatory of explanations explained are interminable. The most lengthy,
and, as I suppose, the most maturely considered of this long series of
explanations is his great essay in Harper's Magazine. I will not attempt
to enter on any very thorough investigation of his argument as there made
and presented. I will nevertheless occupy a good portion of your time here
in drawing your attention to certain points in it. Such of you as may
have read this document will have perceived that the judge early in the
document quotes from two persons as belonging to the Republican party,
without naming them, but who can readily be recognized as being Governor
Seward of New York and myself. It is true that exactly fifteen months ago
this day, I believe, I for the first time expressed a sentiment upon this
subject, and in such a manner that it should get into print, that the
public might see it beyond the circle of my hearers; and my expression of
it at that time is the quotation that Judge Douglas makes. He has not made
the quotation with accuracy, but justice to him requires me to say that it
is sufficiently accurate not to change the sense.
The sense of that quotation condensed is this: that this slavery element
is a durable element of discord among us, and that we shall probably not
have perfect peace in this country with it until it either masters the
free principle in our government, or is so far mastered by the free
principle as for the public mind to rest in the belief that it is going to
its end. This sentiment, which I now express in this way, was, at no great
distance of time, perhaps in different language, and in connection with
some collateral ideas, expressed by Governor Seward. Judge Douglas has
been so much annoyed by the expression of that sentiment that he has
constantly, I believe, in almost all his speeches since it was uttered,
been referring to it. I find he alluded to it in his speech here, as well
as in the copyright essay. I do not now enter upon this for the purpose of
making an elaborate argument to show that we were right in the expression
of that sentiment. In other words, I shall not stop to say all that might
properly be said upon this point, but I only ask your attention to it for
the purpose of making one or two points upon it.
If you will read the copyright essay, you will discover that judge
Douglas himself says a controversy between the American Colonies and the
Government of Great Britain began on the slavery question in 1699, and
continued from that time until the Revolution; and, while he did not say
so, we all know that it has continued with more or less violence ever
since the Revolution.
Then we need not appeal to history, to the declarations of the framers of
the government, but we know from judge Douglas himself that slavery began
to be an element of discord among the white people of this country as far
back as 1699, or one hundred and sixty years ago, or five generations of
men,--counting thirty years to a generation. Now, it would seem to me that
it might have occurred to Judge Douglas, or anybody who had turned his
attention to these facts, that there was something in the nature of that
thing, slavery, somewhat durable for mischief and discord.
There is another point I desire to make in regard to this matter, before
I leave it. From the adoption of the Constitution down to 1820 is the
precise period of our history when we had comparative peace upon this
question,--the precise period of time when we came nearer to having peace
about it than any other time of that entire one hundred and sixty years
in which he says it began, or of the eighty years of our own Constitution.
Then it would be worth our while to stop and examine into the probable
reason of our coming nearer to having peace then than at any other time.
This was the precise period of time in which our fathers adopted, and
during which they followed, a policy restricting the spread of slavery,
and the whole Union was acquiescing in it. The whole country looked
forward to the ultimate extinction of the institution. It was when a
policy had been adopted, and was prevailing, which led all just and
right-minded men to suppose that slavery was gradually coming to an end,
and that they might be quiet about it, watching it as it expired. I think
Judge Douglas might have perceived that too; and whether he did or not, it
is worth the attention of fair-minded men, here and elsewhere, to consider
whether that is not the truth of the case. If he had looked at these two
facts,--that this matter has been an element of discord for one hundred
and sixty years among this people, and that the only comparative peace we
have had about it was when that policy prevailed in this government which
he now wars upon, he might then, perhaps, have been brought to a more just
appreciation of what I said fifteen months ago,--that "a house divided
against itself cannot stand. I believe that this government cannot endure
permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the house to fall,
I do not expect the Union to dissolve; but I do expect it will cease to
be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the
opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it
where the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of
ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward until it shall
become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well
as South." That was my sentiment at that time. In connection with it, I
said: "We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was inaugurated
with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery
agitation. Under the operation of the policy that agitation has not only
not ceased, but has constantly augmented." I now say to you here that we
are advanced still farther into the sixth year since that policy of
Judge Douglas--that popular sovereignty of his--for quieting the slavery
question was made the national policy. Fifteen months more have been
added since I uttered that sentiment; and I call upon you and all other
right-minded men to say whether that fifteen months have belied or
corroborated my words.
While I am here upon this subject, I cannot but express gratitude that
this true view of this element of discord among us--as I believe it is--is
attracting more and more attention. I do not believe that Governor Seward
uttered that sentiment because I had done so before, but because he
reflected upon this subject and saw the truth of it. Nor do I believe
because Governor Seward or I uttered it that Mr. Hickman of Pennsylvania,
in, different language, since that time, has declared his belief in
the utter antagonism which exists between the principles of liberty and
slavery. You see we are multiplying. Now, while I am speaking of Hickman,
let me say, I know but little about him. I have never seen him, and know
scarcely anything about the man; but I will say this much of him: Of all
the anti-Lecompton Democracy that have been brought to my notice, he
alone has the true, genuine ring of the metal. And now, without indorsing
anything else he has said, I will ask this audience to give three cheers
for Hickman. [The audience responded with three rousing cheers for
Hickman.]
Another point in the copyright essay to which I would ask your attention
is rather a feature to be extracted from the whole thing, than from any
express declaration of it at any point. It is a general feature of that
document, and, indeed, of all of Judge Douglas's discussions of this
question, that the Territories of the United States and the States of this
Union are exactly alike; that there is no difference between them at all;
that the Constitution applies to the Territories precisely as it does to
the States; and that the United States Government, under the Constitution,
may not do in a State what it may not do in a Territory, and what it must
do in a State it must do in a Territory. Gentlemen, is that a true view of
the case? It is necessary for this squatter sovereignty, but is it true?