[Sidenote: 1813.]
Nothing could be more complicated than the political state of
Portugal with reference to the situation of the English general.
His object, as I have repeatedly shown, was to bring the whole
resources of the country to bear on the war, but to effect this he
had to run counter to the habits and customs, both of the people
and of the government; to detect the intrigues of the subordinate
authorities as well as those of the higher powers; to oppose the
violence of factious men in the local government, and what was still
more difficult, to stimulate the sluggish apathy and to combat the
often honest obstinacy of those who were not factious. These things
he was to effect without the power of recompensing or chastising,
and even while forced to support those who merited rebuke, against
the still more formidable intriguers of the court of Brazil; for the
best men of Portugal actually formed the local government, and he was
not foiled so much by the men as by the sluggish system which was
national, and although dull for good purposes, vivacious enough for
mischief. The dread of ultimate personal consequences attached, not
to neglect of the war but to any vigorous exertions in support of it.
The proceedings of the court of Rio Janeiro were not less
mischievous, for there the personal intrigues fostered by the
peculiar disposition of the English envoy, by the weak yet dogged
habits of the prince, and by the meddling nature and violent
passions of the princess Carlotta, stifled all great national views.
There also the power of the Souza’s, a family deficient neither
in activity nor in talent, was predominant, and the object of all
was to stimulate the government in Portugal against the English
general’s military policy. To this he could, and had opposed, as we
have seen, the power of the English government, with some effect at
different times, but that resource was a dangerous one and only to
be resorted to in extreme circumstances. Hence when to all these
things is added a continual struggle with the knavery of merchants
of all nations, his difficulties must be admitted, his indomitable
vigour, his patience and his extraordinary mental resources admired,
and the whole scene must be considered as one of the most curious and
instructive lessons in the study of nations.
Wellington was not simply a general who with greater or less means,
was to plan his military operations leaving to others the care of
settling the political difficulties which might arise. He had,
coincident with his military duties, to regenerate a whole people,
to force them against the current of their prejudices and usages
on a dangerous and painful course; he had to teach at once the
populace and the government, to infuse spirit and order without the
aid of rewards or punishments, to excite enthusiasm through the
medium of corrupt oppressive institutions, and far from making any
revolutionary appeal to suppress all tendency towards that resource
of great minds on the like occasions. Thus only could he maintain an
army at all, and as it was beyond the power of man to continue such
a struggle for any length of time he was more than ever anxious to
gather strength for a decisive blow, which the enemy’s situation now
rendered possible, that he might free himself from the critical and
anomalous relation in which he stood towards Portugal.
It may indeed be wondered that he so long bore up against the
encreasing pressure of these distracting affairs, and certain it is
that more than once he was like to yield, and would have yielded
if fortune had not offered him certain happy military chances, and
yet such as few but himself could have profited from. In 1810, on
the ridge of Busaco, and in the lines, the military success was
rather over the Portuguese government than the enemy. At Santarem
in 1811 the glory of arms scarcely compensated for the destitution
of the troops. At Fuentes Onoro and on the Caya, after the second
unsuccessful siege of Badajos, the Portuguese army had nearly
dissolved; and the astonishing sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos
in 1812, were necessary to save the cause from dying of inanition
and despair. Even then the early deliverance of Andalusia was
frustrated, and time, more valuable than gold or life, in war, was
lost, the enemy became the strongest in the field, and in despite of
the victory of Salamanca, the bad effects of the English general’s
political situation were felt in the repulse from Burgos, and in the
double retreat from that place and from Madrid. Accumulated mischiefs
were now to be encountered in Portugal.
It has been shown how obstinately the regency opposed Wellington’s
plans of financial reform, how they disputed and complained upon
every circumstance, whether serious or trivial on which a complaint
could be founded; for thinking Portugal no longer in danger they
were tired of their British allies, and had no desire to aid nor
indeed any wish to see Spain delivered from her difficulties. They
designed therefore to harass the English general, hoping either to
drive him away altogether, or to force him, and, through him, his
government, to grant them loans or new subsidies. But Wellington knew
that Portugal could, and he was resolved it should find resources
within itself, wherefore, after the battle of Salamanca, when they
demanded a fresh subsidy he would not listen to them; and when they
adopted that scheme which I have already exposed, of feeding, or
rather starving their troops, through the medium of a treaty with
the Spanish government, he checked the shameful and absurd plan, by
applying a part of the money in the chest of aids intended for the
civil service to the relief of the Portuguese troops. Yet the regency
did not entirely fail in their object inasmuch as many persons
dependent upon the subsidy were thus deprived of their payments, and
their complaints hurt the British credit, and reduced the British
influence with the people whose faithful attachment to the alliance
no intrigues had hitherto been able to shake.
Into every branch of government, however minute, the regency now
infused their own captious and discontented spirit. They complained
falsely that general Campbell had insulted the nation by turning
some Portuguese residents publicly out of Gibraltar in company with
Jews and Moors; they refused the wheat which was delivered to them
by lord Wellington in lieu of their subsidy, saying it was not fit
for food notwithstanding that the English troops were then living
upon parcels of the same grain, that their own troops were glad to
get it, and that no other was to be had. When a wooden jetty was to
be thrown in the Tagus for the convenience of landing stores, they
supported one Caldas, a rich proprietor, in his refusal to permit the
trees, wanted for the purpose, to be felled, alledging the rights
of property, although he was to be paid largely, and although they
had themselves then, and always, disregarded the rights of property,
especially when poor men were concerned, seizing upon whatever was
required either for the public service, or for the support of their
own irregularities, without any payment at all and in shameful
violation both of law and humanity.
The commercial treaty, and the proceedings of the Oporto wine
company, an oppressive corporation unfair in all its dealings,
irresponsible, established in violation of that treaty, and supported
without regard either to the interests of the prince regent or his
British allies, furnished them with continual subjects for disputes,
and nothing was too absurd or too gross for their interference. Under
the management of Mr. Stuart who had vigorously enforced Wellington’s
plans, their paper money had obtained a reasonable and encreasing
circulation, and their custom-house resources had encreased, the
expenses of their navy and of their arsenal had in some degree been
reduced; and it was made evident that an extensive and vigorous
application of the same principles would enable them to overcome
all their financial difficulties; but there were too many personal
interests, too much shameful profit made under the abuses to permit
such a reform. The naval establishment instead of being entirely
transferred, as Wellington desired, to the Brazils, was continued
in the Tagus, and with it the arsenal as its natural appendage. The
infamous Junta de Viveres had been suppressed by the prince regent,
yet the government under the false pretext of paying its debts still
disbursed above ten thousand pounds a month in salaries to men whose
offices had been formally abolished.
About this time also the opening of the Spanish ports in those
provinces from whence the enemy had been driven, deprived Lisbon of a
monopoly of trade enjoyed for the last three years, and the regency
observing the consequent diminution of revenue, with inexpressible
effrontery insisted that the grain, imported by Wellington, by which
their army and their nation had been saved from famine, and by
which their own subsidy had been provided, should enter the public
warehouses under specific regulations and pay duty for so doing. So
tenaciously did they hold to this point that Wellington was forced to
menace a formal appeal to the English cabinet, for he knew that the
subordinate officers of the government, knavish in the extreme, would
have sold the secrets of the army magazines to the speculators; and
the latter, in whose hands the furnishing of the army would under the
new plan of the English ministers be placed, being thus accurately
instructed of its resources would have regulated their supplies with
great nicety so as to have famished the soldiers, and paralyzed the
operations at the greatest possible expense.
But the supply of the army under any system was now becoming
extremely precarious, for besides the activity of the American
privateers English ships of war used, at times, to capture the
vessels secretly employed in bringing provision under licenses from
Mr. Stuart and Mr. Forster. Nay the captain of a Scotch merchant
vessel engaged in the same trade and having no letter of marque, had
the piratical insolence to seize in the very mouth of the Tagus,
and under the Portuguese batteries, an American vessel sailing
under a license from Mr. Forster, and to carry her into Greenock,
thus violating at once the license of the English minister, the
independence of Portugal, and the general law of nations. Alarm
immediately spread far and wide amongst the American traders, the
indignation of the Portuguese government was strongly and justly
excited, and the matter became extremely embarrassing, because no
measure of punishment could be inflicted without exposing the secret
of a system which had been the principal support of the army. However
the Congress soon passed an act forbidding neutrals to ship flour in
the American ports, and this blow, chiefly aimed at the Portuguese
ships, following upon the non-importation act, and being combined
with the illegal violence of the English vessels, nearly dried up
this source of supply, and threw the army principally upon the Brazil
trade, which by the negligence of the Admiralty was, as I have before
noticed, exposed to the enterprize of the United States’ privateers.
During Wellington’s absence in Spain the military administration of
Portugal was necessarily in the hands of the regency and all the
ancient abuses were fast reviving. The army in the field received no
succours, the field-artillery had entirely disappeared, the cavalry
was in the worst condition, the infantry was reduced in numbers, the
equipments of those who remained were scarcely fit for service, and
the spirit of the men had waned from enthusiasm to despondency. There
was no money in the military chest, no recruits in the dépôts, and
the transport service was neglected altogether. Beresford’s severity
had failed to check desertion, because want, the parent of crimes,
had proved too strong for fear; the country swarmed with robbers,
and as no fault civil or military was punished by the regency, every
where knaves triumphed over the welfare of the nation.
Meanwhile all persons whose indolence or timidity led them to fly
from the active defence of their country to the Brazils, were there
received and cherished as martyrs to their personal affections for
the prince; they were lauded for their opposition to the regency,
and were called victims to the injustice of Beresford, and to the
encroachments of the English officers. This mischief was accompanied
by another of greater moment, for the prince continually permitted
officers possessing family interest to retire from active service
retaining their pay and rank, thus offering a premium for bad men to
enter the army with the intent of quitting it in this disgraceful
manner. Multitudes did so, promotion became rapid, the nobility whose
influence over the poor classes was very great, and might have been
beneficially employed in keeping up the zeal of the men, disappeared
rapidly from the regiments, and the foul stream of knaves and cowards
thus continually pouring through the military ranks destroyed all
cohesion and tainted every thing as it passed.
Interests of the same nature, prevailing with the regency, polluted
the civil administration. The rich and powerful inhabitants,
especially those of the great cities, were suffered to evade the
taxes and to disobey the regulations for drawing forth the resources
of the country in the military service; and during Wellington’s
absence in Spain, the English under-commissaries, and that retinue
of villains which invariably gather on the rear of armies, being in
some measure freed from the immediate dread of his vigilance and
vigour, violated all the regulations in the most daring manner. The
poor husbandmen were cruelly oppressed, their farming animals were
constantly carried off to supply food for the army, and agriculture
was thus stricken at the root; the breed of horned cattle and of
horses had rapidly and alarmingly decreased, and butcher’s meat was
scarcely to be procured even for the troops who remained in Portugal.
These irregularities, joined to the gross misconduct of the
military detachments and convoys of sick men, on all the lines of
communication, not only produced great irritation in the country but
offered the means for malevolent and factious persons to assail the
character and intentions of the English general; every where writings
and stories were circulated against the troops, the real outrages
were exaggerated, others were invented and the drift of all was to
render Wellington, and the English, odious to the nation at large.
Nor was this scheme confined to Portugal alone, agents were also
busy to the same purpose in London, and when the enthusiasm, which
Wellington’s presence at Lisbon had created amongst the people, was
known at Cadiz, the press there teemed with abuse. Divers agents of
the democratic party in Spain came to Lisbon to aid the Portuguese
malcontents, writings were circulated accusing Wellington of an
intention to subjugate the Peninsula for his own ambitious views,
and, as consistency is never regarded on such occasions, it was
diligently insinuated that he encouraged the excesses of his troops
out of personal hatred to the Portuguese people; the old baseness
of sending virulent anonymous letters to the English general was
also revived. In fine the republican spirit was extending beyond
the bounds of Spain, and the Portuguese regency, terrified at its
approach, appealed to Mr. Stuart for the assistance of England
to check its formidable progress. Neither were they wanting to
themselves. They forbade the Portuguese newspapers to admit any
observations on the political events in Spain, they checked the
introduction of Spanish democratic publications, they ordered their
diplomatists at Cadiz to encourage writings of an opposite tendency,
and to support the election of deputies who were known for their
love of despotism. This last measure was however baffled by the
motion of Arguelles, already mentioned, which rendered the old Cortez
permanent; and Mr. Stuart, judging the time unfavourable, advised the
Portuguese government to reserve the exertion of its power against
the democrats, until the military success which the state of the
continent, and the weakness of the French troops in Spain, promised,
should enable the victors to put down such doctrines with effect;
advice which was not unmeaning as I shall have occasion hereafter to
show.
All these malignant efforts Wellington viewed with indifference.
“Every leading man,” he said, “was sure to be accused of criminal
personal ambition, and, if he was conscious of the charge being
false, the accusation did no harm.” Nevertheless his position
was thereby rendered more difficult, and these intrigues were
accompanied by other mischiefs of long standing and springing from
a different source, but even of a more serious character, for the
spirit of captious discontent had reached the inferior magistracy,
who endeavoured to excite the people against the military generally.
Complaints came in from all quarters of outrages on the part of the
troops, some too true, but many of them false, or frivolous; and
when the English general ordered courts-martial for the trial of the
accused, the magistrates refused to attend as witnesses, because
Portuguese custom rendered such an attendance degrading, and by
Portuguese law a magistrate’s written testimony was efficient in
courts-martial. Wellington in vain assured them that English law
would not suffer him to punish men upon such testimony; in vain he
pointed out the mischief which must infallibly overwhelm the country
if the soldiers discovered they might thus do evil with impunity. He
offered to send in each case, lists of Portuguese witnesses required
that they might be summoned by the native authorities, but nothing
could overcome the obstinacy of the magistrates; they answered that
his method was insolent; and with a sullen malignity they continued
to accumulate charges against the troops, to refuse attendance in the
courts, and to call the soldiers, their own as well as the British,
“licensed spoliators of the community.”
For a time the generous nature of the poor people, resisted all
these combining causes of discontent; neither real injuries nor
the exaggerations, nor the falsehoods of those who attempted to
stir up wrath, produced any visible effect upon the great bulk of
the population; yet by degrees affection for the British cooled,
and Wellington expressed his fears that a civil war would commence
between the Portuguese people on the one hand, and the troops of both
nations on the other. Wherefore his activity was redoubled to draw,
while he could still controul affairs, all the military strength to a
head, and to make such an irruption into Spain as would establish a
new base of operations beyond the power of such fatal dissensions.
[Sidenote: March.]
These matters were sufficiently vexatious and alarming, but what made
him tremble, was, the course, which the misconduct of the Portuguese
government, and the incapacity of the English cabinet, had forced
upon the native furnishers of the supplies. Those persons, coming
in the winter to Lisbon to have their bills on the military chest
paid, could get no money, and in their distress had sold the bills to
speculators, the Portuguese holders, at a discount of fifteen, the
Spanish holders at a discount of forty in the hundred. The credit
of the chest immediately fell, prices rose in proportion, and as no
military enterprize could carry the army beyond the flight of this
harpy, and no revenues could satisfy its craving, the contest must
have ceased, if Mr. Stuart had not found a momentary and partial
remedy, by publicly guaranteeing the payment of the bills and
granting interest until they could be taken up. The expense was thus
augmented, but the increase fell far short of the enhanced cost of
the supplies which had already resulted even from this restricted
practice of the bill-holders, and of two evils the least was chosen.
It may seem strange that such transactions should belong to the
history of the military operations in the Peninsula, that it should
be the general’s instead of the minister’s task, to encounter such
evils, and to find the remedy. Such however was the nature of the
war, and no adequate notion of lord Wellington’s vigorous capacity
and Herculean labours can be formed, without an intimate knowledge of
the financial and political difficulties which oppressed him, and of
which this work has necessarily only given an outline.
The disorders of the Portuguese military system had brought Beresford
back to Lisbon while the siege of Burgos was still in progress, and
now, under Wellington’s direction, he strained every nerve to restore
the army to its former efficient state. To recruit the regiments of
the line he disbanded all the militia men fit for service, replacing
them with fathers of families; to restore the field-artillery, he
embodied all the garrison artillery-men, calling out the ordenança
gunners to man the fortresses and coast-batteries; the worst
cavalry regiments he reduced to render the best more efficient,
but several circumstances prevented this arm from attaining any
excellence in Portugal. Meanwhile Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart
strenuously grappled with the disorders of the civil administration
and their efforts produced an immediate and considerable increase
of revenue. But though the regency could not deny this beneficial
effect, though they could not deny the existence of the evils which
they were urged to remedy, though they admitted that the reform of
their custom-house system was still incomplete, that their useless
navy consumed large sums which were wanted for the army, and that
the taxes especially the “_Decima_,” were partially collected, and
unproductive, because the rich people in the great towns, who had
benefited largely by the war, escaped the imposts which the poor
people in the country, who had suffered most from the war, paid;
though they acknowledged that while the soldiers’ hire was in
arrears, the transport service neglected, and all persons, having
just claims upon the government, suffering severe privations, the
tax-gatherers were allowed to keep a month’s tribute in their hands
even in the districts close to the enemy; though all these things
were admitted, the regency would not alter their system, and Borba,
the minister of finance, combatted Wellington’s plans in detail
with such unusual obstinacy, that it became evident nothing could
be obtained save by external pressure. Wherefore as the season
for military operations approached, Mr. Stuart called upon lord
Castlereagh to bring the power of England to bear at once upon the
court of Rio Janeiro; and Wellington, driven to extremity, sent
the Portuguese prince-regent one of those clear, powerful, and
nervous statements, which left those to whom they were addressed,
no alternative but submission, or an acknowledgement that sense and
justice were to be disregarded.
[Sidenote: April.]
“I call your highness’s attention,” he said, “to the state of your
troops and of all your establishments; the army of operations has
been unpaid since September, the garrisons since June, the militia
since February 1812. The transport service has never been regularly
paid, and has received nothing since June. To these evils I have in
vain called the attention of the local government, and I am now going
to open a new campaign, with troops to whom greater arrears of pay
are due than when the last campaign terminated, although the subsidy
from Great Britain, granted especially for the maintenance of those
troops, has been regularly and exactly furnished; and although it has
been proved that the revenue for the last three months has exceeded,
by a third, any former quarter. The honour of your highness’s arms,
the cause of your allies, is thus seriously affected, and the uniform
refusal of the governors of the kingdom to attend to any one of the
measures which I have recommended, either for permanent or temporal
relief, has at last obliged me to go as a complainant into your royal
highness’s presence, for here I cannot prevail against the influence
of the chief of the treasury.
“I have recommended the entire reform of the customs system, but it
has only been partially carried into effect. I have advised a method
of actually and really collecting the taxes, and of making the rich
merchants, and capitalists, pay the tenth of their annual profits
as an extraordinary contribution for the war. I declare that no
person knows better than I do, the sacrifices and the sufferings of
your people, for there is no one for the last four years has lived
so much amongst those people; but it is a fact, sir, that the great
cities, and even some of the smallest places, have gained by the
war and the mercantile class has enriched itself; there are divers
persons in Lisbon and Oporto who have amassed immense sums. Now your
government is, both from remote and recent circumstances, unable to
draw resources from the capitalists by loans; it can only draw upon
them by taxes. It is not denied that the regular tributes nor the
extraordinary imposts on the mercantile profits are evaded; it is not
denied that the measures I have proposed, vigorously carried into
execution, would furnish the government with pecuniary resources,
and it remains for that government to inform your highness, why they
have neither enforced my plans, nor any others which the necessity
of the times calls for. They fear to become unpopular, but such is
the knowledge I have of the people’s good sense and loyalty, such my
zeal for the cause, that I have offered to become responsible for the
happy issue, and to take upon myself all the odium of enforcing my
own measures. I have offered in vain!
“Never was a sovereign in the world so ill served as your highness
has been by the ‘_Junta de Viveres_,’ and I zealously forwarded your
interests when I obtained its abolition; and yet, under a false
pretext of debt, the government still disburse fifty millions of reis
monthly on account of that board. It has left a debt undoubtedly,
and it is of importance to pay it, although not at this moment; but
let the government state in detail how these fifty millions, granted
monthly, have been applied; let them say if all the accounts have
been called in and liquidated? who has enforced the operation? to
what does the debt amount? has it been classified? how much is really
still due to those who have received instalments? finally, have these
millions been applied to the payment of salaries instead of debt?
But were it convenient now to pay the debt, it cannot be denied that
to pay the army which is to defend the country, to protect it from
the sweeping destructive hand of the enemy, is of more pressing
importance; the troops will be neither able nor willing to fight if
they are not paid.”
Then touching upon the abuse of permitting the tax-gatherers to hold
a month’s taxes in their hands, and upon the opposition he met with
from the regency, he continued,
“I assure your royal highness that I give my advice to the governor
of the kingdom actuated solely by an earnest zeal for your service
without any personal interest. I can have none relative to Portugal,
and none with regard to individuals, for I have no private relation
with, and scarcely am acquainted with those who direct, or would wish
to direct your affairs. Those reforms recommended by me, and which
have at last been partially effected in the custom-house, in the
arsenal, in the navy, in the payment of the interest of the national
debt, in the formation of a military chest, have succeeded, and I may
therefore say that the other measures I propose would have similar
results. I am ready to allow that I may deceive myself on this point,
but certainly they are suggested by a desire for the good of your
service; hence in the most earnest and decided manner, I express my
ardent wish, and it is common to all your faithful servants, that
you will return to the kingdom, and take charge yourself of the
government.”
These vigorous measures to bring the regency to terms succeeded only
partially. In May they promulgated a new system for the collection
of taxes which relieved the financial pressure on the army for the
moment, but which did not at all content Wellington, because it was
made to square with old habits and prejudices, and thus left the
roots of all the evils alive and vigorous. Every moment furnished
new proofs of the hopelessness of regenerating a nation through the
medium of a corrupted government; and a variety of circumstances,
more or less serious, continued to embarrass the march of public
affairs.
[Sidenote: May.]
In the Madeiras the authorities vexatiously prevented the English
money agents from exporting specie, and their conduct was approved
of at Rio Janeiro. At Bisao, in Africa, the troops had mutinied for
want of pay, and in the Cape de Verde Islands disturbances arose
from the over-exaction of taxes; for when the people were weak, the
regency were vigorous; pliant only to the powerful. These commotions
were trifling and soon ended of themselves, yet expeditions were
sent against the offenders in both places, and the troops thus
employed immediately committed far worse excesses, and did more
mischief than that which they were sent to suppress. At the same
time several French frigates finding the coast of Africa unguarded,
cruized successfully against the Brazil trade, and aided the American
privateers to contract the already too straitened resources of the
army.
Amidst all these difficulties however the extraordinary exertions of
the British officers had restored the numbers, discipline, and spirit
of the Portuguese army. Twenty-seven thousand excellent soldiers were
again under arms and ready to commence the campaign, although the
national discontent was daily increasing; and indeed the very feeling
of security created by the appearance of such an army rendered the
citizens at large less willing to bear the inconveniences of the war.
Distant danger never affects the multitude, and the billetting of
troops, who, from long habits of war, little regarded the rights of
the citizens in comparison with their own necessities, being combined
with requisitions, and with a recruiting system becoming every year
more irksome, formed an aggregate of inconveniences intolerable to
men who desired ease and no longer dreaded to find an enemy on their
hearth-stones. The powerful classes were naturally more affected
than the poorer classes, because of their indolent habits; but their
impatience was aggravated because they had generally been debarred of
the highest situations, or supplanted, by the British interference in
the affairs of the country, and, unlike those of Spain, the nobles
of Portugal had lost little or none of their hereditary influence.
Discontent was thus extended widely, and moreover the old dread of
French power was entirely gone; unlimited confidence in the strength
and resources of England had succeeded; and this confidence, to use
the words of Mr. Stuart, “being opposed to the irregularities which
have been practised by individuals, and to the difference of manners,
and of religion, placed the British in the singular position of a
class whose exertions were necessary for the country, but who, for
the above reasons, were in every other respect as distinct from
the natives as persons with whom, from some criminal cause, it was
necessary to suspend communication.”—Hence he judged that the return
of the prince-regent would be a proper epoch for the British to
retire from all situations in Portugal not strictly military, for
if any thing should delay that event, the time was approaching when
the success of the army and the tranquillity of the country would
render it necessary to yield to the first manifestations of national
feeling. In fine, notwithstanding the great benefits conferred upon
the Portuguese by the British, the latter were, and it will always be
so on the like occasions, regarded by the upper classes as a captain
regards galley-slaves, their strength was required to speed the
vessel, but they were feared and hated.
The prince-regent did not return to Portugal according to
Wellington’s advice, but Carlotta immediately prepared to come
alone; orders were given to furnish her apartments in the different
palaces, and her valuable effects had actually arrived. Ill health
was the pretext for the voyage, but the real object was to be near
Spain to forward her views upon the government there; for intent
upon mischief, indefatigable and of a violence approaching insanity,
she had sold even her plate and jewels to raise money wherewith to
corrupt the leading members of the cortez, and was resolved, if that
should not promise success, to distribute the money amongst the
Spanish partidas, and so create a powerful military support for her
schemes. Fortunately the prince dreading the intriguing advisers of
his wife would not suffer her to quit Rio Janeiro until the wish
of the British cabinet upon the subject was known, and that was so
decidedly adverse, that it was thought better to do without the
prince himself than to have him accompanied by Carlotta; so they both
remained in the Brazils, and this formidable cloud passed away, yet
left no sunshine on the land.
It was at this period that the offer of a Russian auxiliary force,
before alluded to, being made to Wellington by admiral Grieg, was
accepted by him to the amount of fifteen thousand men, and yet was
not fulfilled because the Russian ambassador in London declared
that the emperor knew nothing of it! Alexander however proposed to
mediate in the dispute between Great Britain and America, but the
English ministers, while lauding him as a paragon of magnanimity
and justice, in regard to the war against Napoleon, remembered the
armed neutrality and quadruple alliance, and wisely declined trusting
England’s maritime pretensions to his faithless grasping policy.
Neither would they listen to Austria, who at this time, whether with
good faith or merely as a cloak I know not, desired to mediate a
general peace. However, amidst this political confusion the progress
of the military preparations was visible; and contemporary with
the Portuguese, the Spanish troops under Wellington’s influence
and providence acquired more consistence than they had ever before
possessed; a mighty power was in arms; but the flood of war with
which the English general finally poured into Spain, and the channels
by which he directed the overwhelming torrent, must be reserved for
another place. It is now time to treat of the political situation of
king Joseph, and to resume the narrative of that secondary warfare
which occupied the French armies while Wellington was uninterruptedly
as far as the enemy were concerned, reorganizing his power.