THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE.
[Sidenote: Lord Cornwallis.]
While these things were going on at Philadelphia, the coast of South
Carolina, as well as the harbour of New York, was threatened by the
British fleet. When the delegates from South Carolina gave their votes
on the question of independence, they did not know but the revolutionary
government in Charleston might already have been taken captive or
scattered in flight. After a stormy voyage Sir Peter Parker's squadron
at length arrived off Cape Fear early in May, and joined Sir Henry
Clinton. Along with Sir Peter came an officer worthy of especial
mention. Charles, Earl Cornwallis, was then thirty-eight years old. He
had long served with distinction in the British army, and had lately
reached the grade of lieutenant-general. In politics he was a New Whig,
and had on several occasions signified his disapproval of the king's
policy toward America. As a commander his promptness and vigour
contrasted strongly with the slothfulness of General Howe. Cornwallis
was the ablest of the British generals engaged in the Revolutionary War,
and among the public men of his time there were few, if any, more
high-minded, disinterested, faithful, and pure. After the war was over,
he won great fame as governor-general of India from 1786 to 1794. He was
afterward raised to the rank of marquis and appointed lord-lieutenant of
Ireland. In 1805 he was sent out again to govern India, and died there.
[Sidenote: Battle of Fort Moultrie, June 28, 1776.]
[Sidenote: Lord Howe's effort toward conciliation.]
On the arrival of the fleet it was decided to attack and capture
Charleston, and overthrow the new government there. General Charles Lee
was sent down by Congress to defend the city, but the South Carolina
patriots proved quite able to take care of themselves. On Sullivan's
Island in Charleston harbour Colonel William Moultrie built a low
elastic fortress of palmetto logs supported by banks of sand and
mounting several heavy guns. In the cannonade which took place on the
28th of June this rude structure escaped with little injury, while its
guns inflicted such serious damage upon the fleet that the British were
obliged to abandon for the present all thought of taking Charleston. In
the course of July they sailed for New York harbour to reinforce General
Howe. On the 12th of that month the general's brother, Richard, Lord
Howe, arrived at Staten Island to take the chief command of the fleet.
He was one of the ablest seamen of his time, and was a favourite with
his sailors, by whom, on account of his swarthy complexion, he was
familiarly known as "Black Dick." Lord Howe and his brother were
authorized to offer terms to the Americans and endeavour to restore
peace by negotiation. It was not easy, however, to find any one in
America with whom to negotiate. Lord Howe was sincerely desirous of
making peace and doing something to heal the troubles which had brought
on the war; and he seems to have supposed that some good might be
effected by private interviews with leading Americans. To send a message
to Congress was, of course, not to be thought of; for that would be
equivalent to recognizing Congress as a body entitled to speak for the
American people. He brought with him an assurance of amnesty and pardon
for all such rebels as would lay down their arms, and decided that it
would be best to send it to the American commander; but as it was not
proper to recognize the military rank which had been conferred upon
Washington by a revolutionary body, he addressed his message to "George
Washington, Esq.," as to a private citizen. When Washington refused to
receive such a message, his lordship could think of no one else to
approach except the royal governors. But they had all fled, except
Governor Franklin of New Jersey, who was under close confinement in East
Windsor, Connecticut. All British authority in the United States had
disappeared, and there was no one for Lord Howe to negotiate with,
unless he should bethink himself of some way of laying his case before
Congress.
[Sidenote: Change in the British military plan, due to the union of
the colonies in the Declaration of Independence.]
Military operations were now taken up in earnest by the British, and
were briskly carried on for nearly six months. They were for the most
part concentrated upon the state of New York. Before 1776 it was
Massachusetts that was the chief object of military measures on the part
of the British. That was the colony that since the summer of 1774 had
defied the king's troops and set at naught the authority of Parliament;
and the first object of the British was to make an example of that
colony, to suppress the rebellion there, and to reinstate the royal
government. The king believed that it would not take long to do this,
and there is some reason for supposing that if he had succeeded in
humbling Massachusetts, he would have been ready to listen to
Hutchinson's request that the vindictive acts of April, 1774, should be
repealed and the charter restored. At all events, he seems to have felt
confident that things could soon be made so quiet that Hutchinson could
return and resume the office of governor. If the king and his friends
had not entertained such ill-founded hopes, they would not have been so
ready to resort to violent measures. They made the fatal mistake of
supposing that such a man as Samuel Adams represented only a small
party and not the majority of the people. They had also supposed that
the other colonies would not make common cause with Massachusetts. But
now, before they had accomplished any of their objects, and while their
troops had even been driven from Boston, they found that the rebellion
had spread through the whole country. They had a belligerent government
to confront, and must now enter upon the task of conquering the United
States.
[Sidenote: Why the British concentrated their attack upon the state
of New York.]
The first and most obvious method of attempting this was to strike at
New York as the military centre. In such a plan everything seemed to
favour the British. The state was comparatively weak in population and
resources; a large proportion of the people were Tories; and close at
hand on the frontier, which was then in the Mohawk valley, were the most
formidable Indians on the continent. These Iroquois had long been under
the influence of the famous Sir William Johnson, of Johnson Hall, near
Schenectady, and his son Sir John Johnson. Their principal sachem,
Joseph Brant, or Thayendanegea, was connected by the closest bonds of
friendship with the Johnsons, and the latter were staunch Tories. It
might reasonably be expected that the entire force of these Indians
could be enlisted on the British side. The work for the regular army
seemed thus to be reduced to the single problem of capturing the city
of New York and obtaining full control of the Hudson river.
If this could be done, the United States would be cut in two. As the
Americans had no ships of war, they could not dispute the British
command of the water. There was no way in which the New England states
could hold communication with the South except across the southern part
of the state of New York. To gain this central position would thus be to
deal a fatal blow to the American cause, and it seemed to the British
government that, with the forces now in the field, this ought easily to
be accomplished. General Carleton was ready to come down from the north
by way of Lake Champlain, with 12,000 men, and General Schuyler could
scarcely muster half as many to oppose him. On Staten Island there were
more than 25,000 British troops ready to attack New York, while
Washington's utmost exertions had succeeded in getting together only
about 18,000 men for the defence of the city. The American army was as
yet very poor in organization and discipline, badly equipped, and
scantily fed; and it seemed very doubtful whether it could long keep the
field in the presence of superior forces.
[Sidenote: Washington's military genius.]
But in spite of all these circumstances, so favourable to the British,
there was one obstacle to their success upon which at first they did not
sufficiently reckon. That obstacle was furnished by the genius and
character of the wonderful man who commanded the American army. In
Washington were combined all the highest qualities of a general,--dogged
tenacity of purpose, endless fertility in resource, sleepless vigilance,
and unfailing courage. No enemy ever caught him unawares, and he never
let slip an opportunity of striking back. He had a rare geographical
instinct, always knew where the strongest position was, and how to reach
it. He was a master of the art of concealing his own plan and detecting
his adversary's. He knew better than to hazard everything upon the
result of a single contest, and because of the enemy's superior force he
was so often obliged to refuse battle that some of his impatient critics
called him slow; but no general was ever quicker in dealing heavy blows
when the proper moment arrived. He was neither unduly elated by victory
nor discouraged by defeat. When all others lost heart he was bravest;
and at the very moment when ruin seemed to stare him in the face, he was
craftily preparing disaster and confusion for the enemy.
To the highest qualities of a military commander there were united in
Washington those of a political leader. From early youth he possessed
the art of winning men's confidence. He was simple without awkwardness,
honest without bluntness, and endowed with rare discretion and tact. His
temper was fiery and on occasion he could use pretty strong language,
but anger or disappointment was never allowed to disturb the justice and
kindness of his judgment. Men felt themselves safe in putting entire
trust in his head and his heart, and they were never deceived. Thus he
soon obtained such a hold upon the people as few statesmen have ever
possessed. It was this grand character that, with his clear intelligence
and unflagging industry, enabled him to lead the nation triumphantly
through the perils of the Revolutionary War. He had almost every
imaginable hardship to contend with,--envious rivals, treachery and
mutiny in the camp, interference on the part of Congress, jealousies
between the states, want of men and money; yet all these difficulties he
vanquished. Whether victorious or defeated on the field, he baffled the
enemy in the first year's great campaign and in the second year's, and
then for four years more upheld the cause until heart-sickening delay
was ended in glorious triumph. It is very doubtful if without Washington
the struggle for independence would have succeeded as it did. Other men
were important, he was indispensable.
[Sidenote: Battle of Long Island, Aug. 27, 1776.]
The first great campaign began, as might have been expected, with defeat
on the field. In order to keep possession of the city of New York it was
necessary to hold Brooklyn Heights. That was a dangerous position for an
American force, because it was entirely separated from New York by deep
water, and could thus be cut off from the rest of the American army by
the enemy's fleet. It was necessary, however, for Washington either to
occupy Brooklyn Heights or to give up the city of New York without a
struggle. But the latter course was out of the question. It would never
do to abandon the Whigs in New York to the tender mercies of the Tories,
without at least one good fight. So the position in Brooklyn must be
fortified, and there was perhaps one chance in a hundred that, through
some blunder of the enemy, we might succeed in holding it. Accordingly
9000 men were stationed on Brooklyn Heights under Putnam, who threw
forward about half of this force, under Sullivan and Stirling, to defend
the southern approaches through the rugged country between Gowanus bay
and Bedford. On the 22d of August General Howe crossed from Staten
Island to Gravesend bay with 20,000 men, and on the 27th he defeated
Sullivan and Stirling in what has ever since been known as the battle of
Long Island. About 400 men were killed and wounded on each side, and
1000 Americans, including both generals, were taken captive. A more
favourable result for the Americans was not to be expected, as the
British outnumbered them four to one, and could therefore march where
they pleased and turn the American flank without incurring the slightest
risk. The wonder is, not that 5000 half-trained soldiers were defeated
by 20,000 veterans, but that they should have given General Howe a good
day's work in defeating them.
[Sidenote: Washington's skilful retreat.]
The American forces were now withdrawn into their works on Brooklyn
Heights, and Howe advanced to besiege them. During the next two days
Washington collected boats and on the night of the 29th conveyed the
army across the East River to New York. With the enemy's fleet
patrolling the harbour and their army watching the works, this was a
most remarkable performance. To this day one cannot understand, unless
on the supposition that the British were completely dazed and
moonstruck, how Washington could have done it.
[Sidenote: Howe takes New York, Sept. 15, 1776.]
People were much disheartened by the defeat on Long Island and the
immediate prospect of losing New York. Lord Howe turned his thoughts
once more to negotiation, and at length, on September 11, succeeded in
obtaining an informal interview with Franklin, John Adams, and Edward
Rutledge. But nothing was accomplished, and seventeen eventful months
elapsed before the British again seriously tried negotiation. General
Howe had extended his lines northward, and on the 15th his army crossed
the East River in boats, and landed near the site of Thirty-Fourth
street. On the same day Washington completed the work of evacuating the
city. His army was drawn up across the island from the mouth of Harlem
river to Fort Washington, and over on the Jersey side of the Hudson,
opposite Fort Washington, a detachment occupied Fort Lee. It was hoped
that these two forts would be able to prevent British ships from going
up the Hudson river, but this hope soon proved to be delusive.
On the 16th General Howe tried to break through the centre of
Washington's position at Harlem Heights, but after losing 300 men he
gave up the attempt, and spent the next three weeks in studying the
situation. A sad incident came now to remind the people of the sternness
of military law. Nathan Hale, a young graduate of Yale College, captain
of a company of Connecticut rangers, had been for several days within
the British lines gathering information. Just as he had accomplished his
purpose, and was on the point of departing with his memoranda, he was
arrested as a spy and hanged next morning, lamenting on the gallows that
he had but one life to lose for his country.
[Sidenote: Battle of White Plains, Oct. 28, 1776.]
As Howe deemed it prudent not to attack Washington in front, he tried to
get around into his rear, and began on October 12 by landing a large
force at Throg's Neck, in the Sound. But Washington baffled him by
changing front, swinging his left wing northward as far as White Plains.
After further reflection Howe decided to try a front attack once more;
on the 28th he assaulted the position at White Plains, and carried one
of the outposts, losing twice as many men as the Americans. Not wishing
to continue the fight at such a disadvantage he paused again, and
Washington improved the occasion by retiring to a still stronger
position at Northcastle. These movements had separated Washington's main
body from his right wing at Forts Washington and Lee, and Howe now
changed his plan. Desisting from the attempt against the American main
body, he moved southward against this exposed wing.
A sad catastrophe now followed, which showed how many obstacles
Washington had to contend with. It was known that Carleton's army was on
the way from Canada. Congress was nervously afraid of losing its hold
upon the Hudson river, and Washington accordingly selected West Point as
the strongest position upon the river, to be fortified and defended at
all hazards. He sent Heath, with 3000 men, to hold the Highland passes,
and went up himself to inspect the situation and give directions about
the new fortifications. He left 7000 of his main body at Northcastle, in
charge of Lee, who had just returned from South Carolina. He sent 5000,
under Putnam, across the river to Hackensack; and ordered Greene, who
had some 5000 men at Forts Washington and Lee, to prepare to evacuate
both those strongholds and join his forces to Putnam's.
If these orders had been carried out, Howe's movement against Fort
Washington would have accomplished but little, for on reaching that
place, he would have found nothing but empty works, as at Brooklyn. The
American right wing would have been drawn together at Hackensack, and
the whole army could have been concentrated on either bank of the great
river, as the occasion might seem to require. If Howe should aim at the
Highlands, it could be kept close to the river and cover all the passes.
If, on the other hand, Howe should threaten the Congress at
Philadelphia, the whole army could be collected in New Jersey to hold
him in check.
[Sidenote: Howe takes Fort Washington, Nov. 16, 1776.]
But Washington's orders were not obeyed. Congress was so uneasy that it
sent word to Greene to hold both his forts as long as he could.
Accordingly he strengthened the garrison at Fort Washington, just in
time for Howe to overwhelm and capture it, on the 16th of November,
after an obstinate resistance. In killed and wounded the British loss
was three times as great as that of the garrison, but the Americans were
in no condition to afford the loss of 8000 men taken prisoners. It was a
terrible blow. On the 19th Greene barely succeeded in escaping from Fort
Lee, with his remaining 2000 men, but without his cannon and stores.
[Sidenote: Treachery of Charles Lee.]
Bad as the situation was, however, it did not become really alarming
until it was complicated with the misconduct of General Lee. Washington
had returned from West Point on the 14th, too late to prevent the
catastrophe; but after all it was only necessary for Lee's wing of the
army to cross the river, and there would be a solid force of 14,000 men
on the Jersey side, able to confront the enemy on something like equal
terms, for Howe had to keep a good many of his troops in New York. On
the 17th Washington ordered Lee to come over and join him; but Lee
disobeyed, and in spite of repeated orders from Washington he stayed at
Northcastle till the 2d of December. General Ward had some time since
resigned, so that Lee now ranked next to Washington. A good many people
were finding fault with the latter for losing the 3000 men at Fort
Washington, although, as we have seen, that was not his fault but the
fault of Congress. Lee now felt that if Washington were ruined, he would
surely become his successor in the command of the army, and so, instead
of obeying his orders, he spent his time in writing letters calculated
to injure him.
[Sidenote: Washington's retreat through New Jersey.]
Lee's disobedience thus broke the army in two, and did more for the
British than they had been able to do for themselves since they started
from Staten Island. It was the cause of Washington's flight through New
Jersey, ending on the 8th of December, when he put himself behind the
Delaware river, with scarcely 3000 men. Here was another difficulty. The
American soldiers were enlisted for short terms, and when they were
discouraged, as at present, they were apt to insist upon going home as
soon as their time had expired. It was generally believed that
Washington's army would thus fall to pieces within a few days. Howe did
not think it worth while to be at the trouble of collecting boats
wherewith to follow him across the Delaware. Congress fled to Baltimore.
People in New Jersey began taking the oath of allegiance to the crown.
Howe received the news that he had been knighted for his victory on Long
Island, and he returned to New York to celebrate the occasion.
[Sidenote: Arnold's naval battle at Valcour Island, Oct. 11, 1776.]
While the case looked so desperate for Washington, events at the north
had taken a less unfavourable turn. Carleton had embarked on Lake
Champlain early in the autumn with his fine army and fleet. Arnold had
fitted up a small fleet to oppose his advance, and on the 11th of
October there had been a fierce naval battle between the two near
Valcour Island, in which Arnold was defeated, while Carleton suffered
serious damage. The British general then advanced upon Ticonderoga, but
suddenly made up his mind that the season was too late for operations in
that latitude. The resistance he had encountered seems to have made him
despair of achieving any speedy success in that quarter, and on the 3d
of November he started back for Canada. This retreat relieved General
Schuyler at Albany of immediate cause for anxiety, and presently he
detached seven regiments to go southward to Washington's assistance.
[Sidenote: Charles Lee is captured by British dragoons,
Dec. 13, 1776.]
On the 2d of December Lee crossed the Hudson with 4000 men, and
proceeded slowly to Morristown. Just what he designed to do was never
known, but clearly he had no intention of going beyond the Delaware to
assist Washington, whom he believed to be ruined. Perhaps he thought
Morristown a desirable position to hold, as it certainly was. Whatever
his plans may have been, they were nipped in the bud. For some unknown
reason he passed the night of the 12th at an unguarded tavern, about
four miles from his army; and there he was captured next morning by a
party of British dragoons, who carried him off to their camp at
Princeton. The dragoons were very gleeful over this unexpected exploit,
but really they could not have done the Americans a greater service than
to rid them of such a worthless creature. The capture of Lee came in the
nick of time, for it set free his men to go to the aid of Washington.
Even after this force and that sent by Schuyler had reached the
commander-in-chief, he found he had only 6000 men fit for duty.
[Sidenote: Battle of Trenton, Dec. 26, 1776.]
[Illustration: Washington's Campaigns IN NEW JERSEY & PENNSYLVANIA.]
With this little force Washington instantly took the offensive. It was
the turning-point in his career and in the history of the Revolutionary
War. On Christmas, 1776, and the following nine days, all Washington's
most brilliant powers were displayed. The British centre, 10,000 strong,
lay at Princeton. The principal generals, thinking the serious business
of the war ended, had gone to New York. An advanced party of Hessians,
1000 strong, was posted on the bank of the Delaware at Trenton, and
another one lower down, at Burlington. Washington decided to attack both
these outposts, and arranged his troops accordingly, but when Christmas
night arrived, the river was filled with great blocks of floating ice,
and the only division which succeeded in crossing was the one that
Washington led in person. It was less than 2500 in number, but the
moment had come when the boldest course was the safest. By daybreak
Washington had surprised the Hessians at Trenton and captured them all.
The outpost at Burlington, on hearing the news, retreated to Princeton.
By the 31st Washington had got all his available force across to
Trenton. Some of them were raw recruits just come in to replace others
who had just gone home. At this critical moment the army was nearly
helpless for want of money, and on New Year's morning Robert Morris was
knocking at door after door in Philadelphia, waking up his friends to
borrow the fifty thousand dollars which he sent off to Trenton before
noon. The next day Cornwallis arrived at Princeton, and taking with him
all the army, except a rear-guard of 2000 men left to protect his
communications, came on toward Trenton.
When he reached that town, late in the afternoon, he found Washington
entrenched behind a small creek just south of the town, with his back
toward the Delaware river. "Oho!" said Cornwallis, "at last we have run
down the old fox, and we will bag him in the morning." He sent back to
Princeton, and ordered the rear-guard to come up. He expected next
morning to cross the creek above Washington's right, and then press him
back against the broad and deep river, and compel him to surrender.
Cornwallis was by no means a careless general, but he seems to have gone
to bed on that memorable night and slept the sleep of the just.
[Sidenote: Battle of Princeton, Jan. 3, 1777.]
Washington meanwhile was wide awake. He kept his front line noisily at
work digging and entrenching, and made a fine show with his campfires.
Then he marched his army to the right and across the creek, and got
around Cornwallis's left wing and into his rear, and so went on gayly
toward Princeton. At daybreak he encountered the British rear-guard,
fought a sharp battle with it and sent it flying, with the loss of
one-fourth of its number. The booming guns aroused Cornwallis too late.
To preserve his communications with New York, he was obliged to retreat
with all haste upon New Brunswick, while Washington's victorious army
pushed on and occupied the strong position at Morristown.
There was small hope of dislodging such a general from such a position.
But to leave Washington in possession of Morristown was to resign to him
the laurels of this half-year's work. For that position guarded the
Highlands of the Hudson on the one hand, and the roads to Philadelphia
on the other. Except that the British had taken the city of New
York--which from the start was almost a foregone conclusion--they were
no better off than in July when Lord Howe had landed on Staten Island.
In nine days the tables had been completely turned. The attack upon an
outpost had developed into a campaign which quite retrieved the
situation. The ill-timed interference of Congress, which had begun the
series of disasters, was remedied; the treachery of Lee was checkmated;
and the cause of American Independence, which on Christmas Eve had
seemed hopeless, was now fairly set on its feet. Earlier successes had
been local; this was continental. Seldom has so much been done with such
slender means.
[Sidenote: Effects of the campaign, in Europe.]
The American war had begun to awaken interest in Europe, especially in
France, whither Franklin, with Silas Deane and Arthur Lee, had been
sent to seek for military aid. The French government was not yet ready
to make an alliance with the United States, but money and arms were
secretly sent over to Congress. Several young French nobles had asked
the king's permission to go to America, but it was refused, and for the
sake of keeping up appearances the refusal had something of the air of a
reprimand. The king did not wish to offend Great Britain prematurely.
One of these nobles was Lafayette, then eighteen years of age, who
fitted up a ship at his own expense, and sailed from Bordeaux in April,
1777, in spite of the royal prohibition, taking with him Kalb and other
officers. Lafayette and Kalb, with the Poles, Kosciuszko and Pulaski,
who had come some time before, and the German Steuben, who came in the
following December, were the five most eminent foreigners who received
commissions in the Continental army.
[Sidenote: Difficulty in raising an army.]
During the winter season at Morristown the efforts of Washington were
directed toward the establishment of a regular army to be kept together
for three years or so long as the war should last. Hitherto the military
preparations of Congress had been absurdly weak. Squads of militia had
been enlisted for terms of three or six months, as if there were any
likelihood of the war being ended within such a period. While the men
thus kept coming and going, it was difficult either to maintain
discipline or to carry out any series of military operations.
Accordingly Congress now proceeded to call upon the states for an army
of 80,000 men to serve during the war. The enlisting was to be done by
the states, but the money was to be furnished by Congress. Not half that
number of men were actually obtained. The Continental army was larger in
1777 than in any other year, but the highest number it reached was only
34,820. In addition to these about 34,000 militia turned out in the
course of the year. An army of 80,000 would have taken about the same
proportion of all the fighting men in the country as an army of
1,000,000 in our great Civil War. Now in our Civil War the Union army
grew with the occasion until it numbered more than 1,000,000. But in the
Revolutionary War the Continental army was not only never equal to the
occasion, but it kept diminishing till in 1781 it numbered only 13,292.
This was because the Continental Congress had no power to enforce its
decrees. It could only _ask_ for troops and it could only _ask_ for
money. It found just the same difficulty in getting anything that the
British ministry and the royal governors used to find,--the very same
difficulty that led Grenville to devise the Stamp Act. Everything had to
be talked over in thirteen different legislatures, one state would wait
to see what another was going to do, and meanwhile Washington was
expected to fight battles before his army was fit to take the field.
Something was gained, no doubt, by Congress furnishing the money. But as
Congress could not tax anybody, it had no means of raising a revenue,
except to beg, borrow, or issue its promissory notes, the so-called
Continental paper currency.
[Sidenote: The British plan for conquering New York in 1777.]
While Congress was trying to raise an adequate army, the British
ministry laid its plans for the summer campaign. The conquest of the
state of New York must be completed at all hazards; and to this end a
threefold system of movements was devised:--
_First_, the army in Canada was to advance upon Ticonderoga, capture it,
and descend the Hudson as far as Albany. This work was now entrusted to
General Burgoyne.
_Secondly_, in order to make sure of efficient support from the Six
Nations and the Tories of the frontier, a small force under Colonel
Barry St. Leger was to go up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario, land at
Oswego, and march down the Mohawk valley to reinforce Burgoyne on the
Hudson.
_Thirdly_, after leaving a sufficient force to hold the city of New
York, the main army, under Sir William Howe, was to ascend the Hudson,
capture the forts in the Highlands, and keep on to Albany, so as to
effect a junction with Burgoyne and St. Leger.
It was thought that such an imposing display of military force would
make the Tory party supreme in New York, put an end to all resistance
there, and effectually cut the United States in two. Then if the
southern states on the one hand and the New England states on the other
did not hasten to submit, they might afterward be attacked separately
and subdued.
In this plan the ministry made the fatal mistake of underrating the
strength of the feeling which, from one end of the United States to the
other, was setting itself every day more and more decidedly against the
Tories and in favour of independence. This feeling grew as fast as the
anti-slavery feeling grew among the northern people during our Civil
War. In 1861 President Lincoln thought it necessary to rebuke his
generals who were too forward in setting free the slaves of persons
engaged in rebellion against the United States. In 1862 he announced his
purpose to emancipate all such slaves; and then it took less than three
years to put an end to slavery forever. It was just so with the
sentiment in favour of separation from Great Britain. In July, 1775,
Thomas Jefferson expressly declared that the Americans had not raised
armies with any intention of declaring their independence of the
mother-country. In July, 1776, the Declaration of Independence, written
by Jefferson, was proclaimed to the world, though the consent of the
middle colonies and of South Carolina seemed somewhat reluctant. By the
summer of 1777 the Tories were almost everywhere in a hopeless minority.
Every day of warfare, showing Great Britain more and more clearly as an
enemy to be got rid of, diminished their strength; so that, even in New
York and South Carolina, where they were strongest, it would not do for
the British ministry to count too much upon any support they might give.
It was natural enough that King George and his ministers should fail to
understand all this, but their mistake was their ruin. If they had
understood that Burgoyne's march from Lake Champlain to the Hudson river
was to be a march through a country thoroughly hostile, perhaps they
would not have been so ready to send him on such a dangerous expedition.
It would have been much easier and safer to have sent his army by sea to
New York, to reinforce Sir William Howe. Threatening movements might
have been made by some of the Canada forces against Ticonderoga, so as
to keep Schuyler busy in that quarter; and then the army at New York,
thus increased to nearly 40,000 men, might have had a fair chance of
overwhelming Washington by sheer weight of numbers. Such a plan might
have failed, but it is not likely that it would have led to the
surrender of the British army. And if they could have disposed of
Washington, the British might have succeeded. It was more necessary for
them to get rid of him than to march up and down the valley of the
Hudson. But it was not strange that they did not see this as we do. It
is always easy enough to be wise after things have happened.
Even as it was, if their plan had really been followed, they might have
succeeded. If Howe's army had gone up to meet Burgoyne, the history of
the year 1777 would have been very different from what it was. We shall
presently see why it did not do so. Let us now recount the fortunes of
Burgoyne and St. Leger.
[Sidenote: Burgoyne takes Ticonderoga, July 5, 1777.]
Burgoyne came up Lake Champlain in June, and easily won Ticonderoga,
because the Americans had failed to secure a neighbouring position which
commanded the fortress. Burgoyne took Ticonderoga from Mount Defiance,
just as the Americans would have taken Boston from Bunker Hill, if they
had been able to stay there, just as they afterward did take it from
Dorchester Heights, and just as Howe took New York after he had won
Brooklyn Heights. When you have secured a position from which you can
kill the enemy twice as fast as he can kill you, he must of course
retire from the situation; and the sooner he goes, the better chance he
has of living to fight another day. The same principle worked in all
these cases, and it worked with General Howe at Harlem Heights and at
White Plains.
[Sidenote: Schuyler and Gates.]
When it was known that Burgoyne had taken Ticonderoga, there was
dreadful dismay in America and keen disappointment among those Whigs in
England whose declared sympathies were with us. George III. was beside
himself with glee, and thought that the Americans were finally defeated
and disposed of. But they were all mistaken. The garrison of Ticonderoga
had taken the alarm and retreated, so that Burgoyne captured only an
empty fortress. He left 1000 men in charge of it, and then pressed on
into the wilderness between Lake Champlain and the upper waters of the
Hudson river. His real danger was now beginning to show itself, and
every day it could be seen more distinctly. He was plunging into a
forest, far away from all possible support from behind, and as he went
on he found that there were not Tories enough in that part of the
country to be of any use to him. As Burgoyne advanced, General Schuyler
prudently retreated, and used up the enemy's time by breaking down
bridges and putting every possible obstacle in his way. Schuyler was a
rare man, thoroughly disinterested and full of sound sense; but he had
many political enemies who were trying to pull him down. A large part of
his army was made up of New England men, who hated him partly for the
mere reason that he was a New Yorker, and partly because as such he had
taken part in the long quarrel between New York and New Hampshire over
the possession of the Green Mountains. The disaffection toward Schuyler
was fomented by General Horatio Gates, who had for some time held
command under him, but was now in Philadelphia currying favour with the
delegates in Congress, especially with those from New England, in the
hope of getting himself appointed to the command of the northern army in
Schuyler's place. Gates was an extremely weak man, but so vain that he
really believed himself equal to the highest command that Congress could
be persuaded to give him. On the battle-field he seems to have been
wanting even in personal courage, as he certainly was in power to handle
his troops; but in society he was quite a lion. He had a smooth
courteous manner and a plausible tongue which paid little heed to the
difference between truth and falsehood. His lies were not very
ingenious, and so they were often detected and pointed out. But while
many people were disgusted by his selfishness and trickery, there were
always some who insisted that he was a great genius. History can point
to a good many men like General Gates. Such men sometimes shine for a
while, but sooner or later they always come to be recognized as humbugs.
[Illustration: BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Hubbardton, July 7, 1777.]
While Gates was intriguing, Schuyler was doing all in his power to
impede the enemy's progress. It was on the night of July 5 that the
garrison of Ticonderoga, under General St. Clair, had abandoned the
fortress and retreated southward. On the 7th a battle was fought at
Hubbardton between St. Clair's rear, under Seth Warner, and a portion of
the British army under Fraser and Riedesel. Warner was defeated, but
only after such an obstinate resistance as to check the pursuit, so that
by the 12th St. Clair was able to bring his retreating troops in safety
to Fort Edward, where they were united with Schuyler's army. Schuyler
managed his obstructions so well that Burgoyne's utmost efforts were
required to push into the wilderness at the rate of one mile per day;
and meanwhile Schuyler was collecting a force of militia in the Green
Mountains, under General Lincoln, to threaten Burgoyne in the rear and
cut off his communications with Lake Champlain.
Burgoyne was accordingly marching into a trap, and Schuyler was doing
the best that could be done. But on the first of August the intrigue
against him triumphed in Congress, and Gates was appointed to supersede
him in the command of the northern army. Gates, however, did not arrive
upon the scene until the 19th of August, and by that time Burgoyne's
situation was evidently becoming desperate.
On the last day of July Burgoyne reached Fort Edward, which Schuyler
had evacuated just before. Schuyler crossed the Hudson river, and
continued his retreat to Stillwater, about thirty miles above Albany. It
was as far as the American retreat was to go. Burgoyne was already
getting short of provisions, and before he could advance much further he
needed a fresh supply of horses to drag the cannon and stores. He began
to realize, when too late, that he had come far into an enemy's country.
The hostile feelings of the people were roused to fury by the atrocities
committed by the Indians employed in Burgoyne's army. The British
supposed that the savages would prove very useful as scouts and guides,
and that by offers of reward and threats of punishment they might be
restrained from deeds of violence. They were very unruly, however, and
apt to use the tomahawk when they found a chance.
[Sidenote: Jane McCrea.]
The sad death of Miss Jane McCrea has been described in almost as many
ways as there have been people to describe it, but no one really knows
how it happened. What is really known is that, on the 27th of July,
while Miss McCrea was staying with her friend Mrs. McNeil, near Fort
Edward, a party of Indians burst into the house and carried off both
ladies. They were pursued by some American soldiers, and a few shots
were exchanged. In the course of the scrimmage the party got scattered,
and Mrs. McNeil was taken alone to the British camp. Next day an Indian
came into the camp with Miss McCrea's scalp, which her friend recognized
from its long silky hair. A search was made, and the body of the poor
girl was found lying near a spring, pierced with three bullet-wounds.
The Indian's story, that she was accidentally killed by a volley from
the American soldiers, may well enough have been true. It is also known
that she was betrothed to David Jones, a lieutenant in Burgoyne's army,
and, as her own home was in New Jersey, her visit to Mrs. McNeil may
very likely have been part of a plan for meeting her lover. These facts
were soon woven into a story, in which Jenny was said to have been
murdered while on her way to her wedding, escorted by a party of Indians
whom her imprudent lover had sent to take charge of her.
[Sidenote: Battle of Bennington, Aug. 16, 1777.]
The people of the neighbouring counties, in New York and Massachusetts,
enraged at the death of Miss McCrea and alarmed for the safety of their
own firesides, began rising in arms. Sturdy recruits began marching to
join Schuyler at Stillwater and Lincoln at Manchester in the Green
Mountains. Meanwhile Burgoyne had made up his mind to attack the village
of Bennington, which was Lincoln's centre of supplies. By seizing these
supplies, he could get for himself what he stood sorely in need of,
while at the same time the loss would cripple Lincoln and perhaps oblige
him to retire from the scene. Accordingly 1000 Germans were sent out,
in two detachments under colonels Baum and Breymann, to capture the
village. But instead they were captured themselves. Baum was first
outmanoeuvred, surrounded, and forced to surrender by John Stark,
after a hot fight, in which Baum was mortally wounded. Then Breymann was
put to flight and his troops dispersed by Seth Warner. Of the whole
German force, 207 were killed or wounded, and at least 700 captured. Not
more than 70 got back to the British camp. The American loss in killed
and wounded was 56.
This brilliant victory at Bennington had important consequences. It
checked Burgoyne's advance until he could get his supplies, and it
decided that Lincoln's militia could get in his rear and cut off his
communications with Ticonderoga. It furthermore inspired the Americans
with the exulting hope that Burgoyne's whole army could be surrounded
and forced to surrender.
[Sidenote: St. Leger in the Mohawk valley.]
If, however, the British had been successful in gaining the Mohawk
valley and ensuring the supremacy over that region for the Tories, the
fate of Burgoyne might have been averted. The Tories in that region,
under Sir John Johnson and Colonel John Butler, were really formidable.
As for the Indians of the Iroquois league, they had always been friendly
to the English and hostile to the French; but now, when it came to
making their choice between two kinds of English--the Americans and the
British, they hesitated and differed in opinion. The Mohawks took sides
with the British because of the friendship between Joseph Brant and the
Johnsons. The Cayugas and Senecas followed on the same side; but the
Onondagas, in the centre of the confederacy, remained neutral, and the
Oneidas and Tuscaroras, under the influence of Samuel Kirkland and other
missionaries, showed active sympathy with the Americans. It turned out,
too, that the Whigs were much stronger in the valley than had been
supposed.
[Sidenote: Battle of Oriskany, Aug. 6, 1777.]
After St. Leger had landed at Oswego and joined hands with his Tory and
Indian allies, his entire force amounted to about 1700 men. The
principal obstacle to his progress toward the Hudson river was Fort
Stanwix, which stood where the city of Rome now stands. On the 3d of
August St. Leger reached Fort Stanwix and laid siege to it. The place
was garrisoned by 600 men under Colonel Peter Gansevoort, and the Whig
yeomanry of the neighbourhood, under the heroic General Nicholas
Herkimer, were on the way to relieve it, to the number of at least 800.
Herkimer made an excellent plan for surprising St. Leger with an attack
in the rear, while the garrison should sally forth and attack him in
front. But St. Leger's Indian scouts were more nimble than Herkimer's
messengers, so that he obtained his information sooner than Gansevoort.
An ambush was skilfully prepared by Brant in a ravine near Oriskany, and
there, on the 6th of August, was fought the most desperate and murderous
battle of the Revolutionary War. It was a hand to hand fight, in which
about 800 men were engaged on each side, and each lost more than
one-third of its number. As the Tories and Indians were giving way,
their retreat was hastened by the sounds of battle from Fort Stanwix,
where the garrison was making its sally and driving back the besiegers.
Herkimer remained in possession of the field at Oriskany, but his plan
had been for the moment thwarted, and in the battle he had received a
wound from which he died.
[Sidenote: St. Leger's flight, Aug. 22, 1777.]
Benedict Arnold had lately been sent by Washington to be of such
assistance as he could to Schuyler. Arnold stood high in the confidence
of both these generals. He had shown himself one of the ablest officers
in the American army, he was especially skilful in getting good work out
of raw troops, and he was a great favourite with his men. On hearing of
the danger of Fort Stanwix, Schuyler sent him to the rescue, with 1200
men. When he was within twenty miles of that stronghold, he contrived,
with the aid of some friendly Oneidas and a Tory captive whose life he
spared for the purpose, to send on before him exaggerated reports of the
size of his army. The device accomplished far more than he could have
expected. The obstinate resistance at Oriskany had discouraged the
Tories and angered the Indians. Distrust and dissension were already
rife in St. Leger's camp, when such reports came in as to lead many to
believe that Burgoyne had been totally defeated, and that the whole of
Schuyler's army, or a great part of it, was coming up the Mohawk. This
news led to riot and panic among the troops, and on August 22 St. Leger
took to flight and made his way as best he could to his ships at Oswego,
with scarcely the shred of an army left. This catastrophe showed how
sadly mistaken the British had been in their reliance upon Tory help.
The battle of Bennington was fought on the 16th of August. Now by the
overthrow of St. Leger, six days later, Burgoyne's situation had become
very alarming. It was just in the midst of these events that Gates
arrived, on August 19, and took command of the army at Stillwater, which
was fast growing in numbers. Militia were flocking in, Arnold's force
was returning, and Daniel Morgan was at hand with 500 Virginian
sharpshooters. Unless Burgoyne could win a battle against overwhelming
odds, there was only one thing that could save him; and that was the
arrival of Howe's army at Albany, according to the ministry's programme.
But Burgoyne had not yet heard a word from Howe; and Howe never came.
[Sidenote: Why Howe failed to coöperate with Burgoyne.]
This failure of Howe to coöperate with Burgoyne was no doubt the most
fatal military blunder made by the British in the whole course of the
war. The failure was of course unintentional on Howe's part. He meant to
extend sufficient support to Burgoyne, but the trouble was that he
attempted too much. He had another plan in his mind at the same time,
and between the two he ended by accomplishing nothing. While he kept one
eye on Albany, he kept the other on Philadelphia. He had not relished
being driven back across New Jersey by Washington, and the hope of
defeating that general in battle, and then pushing on to the "rebel
capital" strongly tempted him. In such thoughts he was encouraged by the
advice of the captive General Lee. That unscrupulous busybody felt
himself in great danger, for he knew that the British regarded him in
the light of a deserter from their army. While his fate was in suspense,
he informed the brothers Howe that he had abandoned the American cause,
and he offered them his advice and counsel for the summer campaign. This
villainy of Lee's was not known till eighty years afterward, when a
paper of his was discovered that revealed it in all its blackness. The
Howes were sure to pay some heed to Lee's opinions, because he was
supposed to have acquired a thorough knowledge of American affairs. He
advised them to begin by taking Philadelphia, and supported this plan
by plausible arguments. Sir William Howe seems to have thought that he
could accomplish this early in the summer, and then have his hands free
for whatever might be needed on the Hudson river. Accordingly on the
12th of June he started to cross the state of New Jersey with 18,000
men.
[Sidenote: Washington's masterly campaign in New Jersey, June, 1777.]
But Sir William had reckoned without his host. In a campaign of eighteen
days, Washington, with only 8000 men, completely blocked the way for
him, and made him give up the game. The popular histories do not have
much to say about these eighteen days, because they were not marked by
battles. Washington won by his marvellous skill in choosing positions
where Howe could not attack him with any chance of success. Howe
understood this and did not attack. He could not entice Washington into
fighting at a disadvantage, and he could not march on and leave such an
enemy behind without sacrificing his own communications. Accordingly on
June 30 he gave up his plan and retreated to Staten Island. If there
ever was a general who understood the useful art of wasting his
adversary's time, Washington was that general.
Howe now decided to take his army to Philadelphia by sea. He waited a
while till the news from the north seemed to show that Burgoyne was
carrying everything before him; and then he thought it safe to start.
He left Sir Henry Clinton in command at New York, with 7000 men, telling
him to send a small force up the river to help Burgoyne, should there be
any need of it, which did not then seem likely. Then he put to sea with
his main force of 18,000 men, and went around to the Delaware river,
which he reached at the end of July, just as Burgoyne was reaching Fort
Edward.
[Sidenote: Howe's strange movement upon Philadelphia, by way of
Chesapeake bay.]
Howe's next move was very strange. He afterward said that he did not go
up the Delaware river, because he found that there were obstructions and
forts to be passed. But he might have gone up a little way and landed
his forces on the Delaware coast at a point where a single march would
have brought them to Elkton, at the head of Chesapeake bay, about fifty
miles southwest from Philadelphia. Instead of this, he put out to sea
again and sailed four hundred miles, to the mouth of Chesapeake bay and
up that bay to Elkton, where he landed his men on the 25th of August.
Why he took such a roundabout course cannot be understood, unless he may
have attached importance to Lee's advice that the presence of a British
squadron in Chesapeake bay would help to arouse the Tories in Maryland.
The British generals could not seem to make up their minds that America
was a hostile country. Small blame to them, brave fellows that they
were! They could not make war against America in such a fierce spirit as
that in which France would now make war against Germany if she could see
her way clear to do so. They were always counting on American sympathy,
and this was a will-o'-the-wisp that lured them to destruction.
On landing at Elkton, Howe received orders from London, telling him to
ascend the Hudson river and support Burgoyne, in any event. This order
had left London in May. It was well for the Americans that the telegraph
had not then been invented. Now it was the 25th of August; Burgoyne was
in imminent peril; and Howe was three hundred miles away from him!
[Sidenote: Battle of the Brandywine, Sept. 11, 1777.]
All these movements had been carefully watched by Washington; and as
Howe marched toward Philadelphia he found that general blocking the way
at the fords of the Brandywine creek. A battle ensued on the 11th of
September. It was a well-contested battle. With 11,000 men against
18,000, Washington could hardly have been expected to win a victory. He
was driven from the field, but not badly defeated. He kept his army well
in hand, and manoeuvred so skilfully that the British were employed
for two weeks in getting over the twenty-six miles to Philadelphia.
[Sidenote: Battle of Germantown, Oct. 4, 1777.]
Before Howe had reached that city, Congress had moved away to York in
Pennsylvania. When he had taken Philadelphia, he found that he could
not stay there without taking the forts on the Delaware river which
prevented the British ships from coming up; for by land Washington could
cut off his supplies, and he could only be sure of them by water. So
Howe detached part of his army to reduce these forts, leaving the rest
of it at Germantown, six miles from Philadelphia. On the 4th of October,
Washington attacked the force at Germantown in such a position that
defeat would have quite destroyed it. The attempt failed at the critical
moment because of a dense fog in which one American brigade fired into
another and caused a brief panic. The forts on the Delaware were
captured after hard fighting, and Washington went into winter quarters
at Valley Forge.
The result of the summer's work was that, because Howe had made several
mistakes and Washington had taken the utmost advantage of every one of
them, the whole British plan was spoiled. Howe had used up the whole
season in getting to Philadelphia, and Washington's activity had also
kept Sir Henry Clinton's attention so much occupied with what was going
on about the Delaware river as to prevent him from sending aid to the
northward until it was too late. Sir Henry was once actually obliged to
send reinforcements to Howe.
Thus Burgoyne was left to himself. He supposed that Howe was coming up
the Hudson river to meet him, and so on September 13 he crossed the
river and advanced to attack Gates's army, which was occupying a strong
position at Bemis Heights, between Stillwater and Saratoga. It was a
desperate move. While Burgoyne was making it, Lincoln's men cut his
communications with Ticonderoga, so that his only hope lay in help from
below; and such help never came. In this extremity he was obliged to
fight on ground chosen by the Americans, because he must either fight or
starve.
[Sidenote: Burgoyne is defeated by Arnold, and surrenders his army,
Oct. 17, 1777.]
Under these circumstances Burgoyne fought two battles with consummate
gallantry. The first was on September 19, the second on October 7. In
each battle the Americans were led by Arnold and Morgan, and Gates
deserves no credit for either. In both battles Arnold was the leading
spirit, and in the second he was severely wounded at the moment of
victory. In the first battle the British were simply repulsed, in the
second they were totally defeated. This settled the fate of Burgoyne,
and on the 17th of October he surrendered his whole army, now reduced to
less than 6000 men, as prisoners of war. Before the final catastrophe
Sir Henry Clinton had sent a small force up the river to relieve him,
but it was too late. The relieving force succeeded in capturing some of
the Highland forts, but turned back on hearing of Burgoyne's surrender.