when such persons are at a man to forswear himself, or to give a wrong
sentence, or to vote for an unjust bill, or lastly to be bound for one
that will never be able to pay the debt.
12. All passions of the mind have repentance still pursuing them
closely, but it overtakes this of bashfulness in the very act. For
we give with regret, and we are in confusion while we bear false
witness; our reputation is questioned when we engage for others, and
when we fail we are condemned by all men. From this imperfection also
it proceeds, that many things are imposed upon us not in our power to
perform, as to recommend such a man to court, or to carry up an address
to the governor, because we dare not, or at least we will not, confess
that we are unknown to the prince or that another has more of his ear.
Lysander, on the other hand, when he was in disgrace at court, but yet
for his great services was thought to preserve something of his former
esteem with Agesilaus, made no scruple to dismiss suitors, directing
them to such as were more powerful with the king. For it is no disgrace
not to be able to do every thing; but to undertake or pretend to what
you are not made for is not only shameful, but extremely troublesome
and vexatious.
13. But to proceed to another head, we must perform all reasonable and
good offices to those that deserve them, not forced thereto by fear of
shame, but cheerfully and readily. But where any thing prejudicial or
unhandsome is required of us, we ought to remember the story that is
related of Zeno. Meeting a young man of his acquaintance that slunk
away under a wall, as if he would not be seen, and having learned from
him that he withdrew from a friend that importuned him to perjure
himself, What, replied he, you novice! is that fellow not afraid
or ashamed to require of thee what is unreasonable and unjust, and
darest thou not stand against him in that which is just and honest?
For he that first started that doctrine, that knavery is the best
defence against a knave, was but an ill teacher, advising us to keep
off wickedness by imitating it. But for such as presume upon our
modesty, to keep them off with their own weapons, and not gratify their
unreasonable impudence with an easy compliance, is but just and good,
and the duty of every wise man.
14. Neither is it a hard matter to put off some mean and ordinary
people, which will be apt to prove troublesome to you in that nature.
Some shift them off with a jest or a smart repartee; as Theocritus,
being asked in the bath to lend his flesh-brush by two persons, whereof
one was a stranger to him, and the other a notorious thief, made
answer: You, sir, I know not well enough, and you I know too well.
And Lysimache, the priestess of Minerva Polias in Athens, when the
muleteers that brought the provision for the festival desired her to
let them drink, replied, No; for I fear it may grow into a custom.
So again, when a captain’s son, a young fluttering bully but a great
coward, petitioned Antigonus for promotion, the latter answered Sir, it
is my way to reward my soldiers for their valor, not their parentage.
15. But if he that is importunate with us prove a man of great honor
or interest (and such persons are not easily answered with excuses,
when they come for our vote in the senate or judicial cases), at such a
time perhaps it will be neither easy nor necessary to behave ourselves
to them as Cato did towards Catulus. Catulus, a person of the highest
rank among the Romans, and at that time censor, once waited on Cato,
who was then quaestor and still a young man, on behalf of a friend whom
Cato had fined; and when he had used a great deal of importunity to no
purpose, yet would not be denied, Cato grew out of patience, and told
him, It would be an unseemly sight to have the censor dragged hence by
my officers. Catulus at this went away, out of countenance and very
angry. But consider whether the answers of Agesilaus and Themistocles
have not in them much more of candor and equity. Agesilaus, being
bidden by his own father to give sentence contrary to law, replied: I
have been always taught by you to be observant of the laws, and I shall
endeavor to obey you at this time, by doing nothing contrary to them.
And Themistocles, when Simonides tempted him to commit a piece of
injustice, said: You would be no good poet, should you break the laws
of verse; and should I judge against the law, I should make no better
magistrate.
16. For it is not because of blunders in metre in lyric songs, as Plato
observes, that cities and friends are set at variance to their utter
ruin and destruction, but because of their blunders with regard to law
and justice. Yet there are a sort of men that can be very curious and
critical in their verses and letters and lyric measures, and yet would
persuade others to neglect that justice and honesty which all men ought
to observe in offices, in passing judgments, and in all actions. But
these men are to be dealt with after the following manner. An orator
perhaps presses you to show him favor in a cause to be heard before
you, or a demagogue importunes you when you are a senator: tell him you
are ready to please him, on condition that he make a solecism in the
beginning of his oration, or be guilty of some barbarous expression
in his narration. These terms, for shame, he will not accept; for
some we see so superstitiously accurate as not to allow of two vowels
meeting one another. Again, you are moved by a person of quality to
something of ill reputation: bid him come over the market-place at full
noon dancing, or making buffoon-like grimaces; if he refuse, question
him once more, whether he think it a more heinous offence to make a
solecism or a grimace, than to break a law or to perjure one’s self,
or to show more favor to a rascal than to an honest man. Nicostratus
the Argive, when Archidamus promised him a vast sum of money and his
choice of the Spartan ladies in marriage, if he would deliver up the
town Cromnum into his hands, returned him this answer: He could no
longer believe him descended from Hercules, he said, because Hercules
traversed the world to destroy wicked men, but Archidamus made it his
business to debauch those that were good. In like manner, if one
that stands upon his quality or reputation presses us to do any thing
dishonorable, we must tell him freely, he acts not as becomes a person
of his character in the world.
17. But if it be a man of no quality that shall importune you, you may
enquire of the covetous man, whether he would lend you a considerable
sum without any other security than your word; desire the proud man to
give you the higher seat; or the ambitious, to quit his pretensions
to some honor that lies fair for him. For, to deal plainly, it is a
shameful thing that these men should continue so stiff, so resolute,
and so unmoved in their vicious habits, while we, who profess ourselves
lovers of justice and honesty, have too little command of ourselves not
to give up and betray basely the cause of virtue. If they that would
practise upon our modesty do this out of desire of glory or power,
why should we contract disgrace or infamy to ourselves, to advance
the authority or set off the reputation of others?—like those who
bestow the reward wrongfully in public games, or betray their trust in
collecting the poll, who confer indeed garlands and honors upon other
men, but at the same time forfeit their own reputation and good word.
But suppose it be matter of interest only that puts them upon it; why
should it not appear an unreasonable piece of service for us to forego
our reputation and conscience to no other purpose than to satisfy
another man’s avarice or make his coffers the heavier? After all, these
I am afraid are the grand motives with most men in such cases, and they
are even conscious that they are guilty; as men that are challenged and
compelled to take too large a glass raise an hundred scruples and make
as many grimaces before they drink.
18. This weakness of the mind may be compared to a constitution of body
that can endure neither heat nor cold. For let them be praised by those
that thus impudently set upon them, and they are at once mollified and
broken by the flattery; but let them be blamed or so much as suspected
by the same men after their suit has been refused, and they are ready
to die for woe and fear. We ought therefore to prepare and fortify
ourselves against both extremes, so as to be made a prey neither to
such as pretend to frighten, nor to such as would cajole us. Thucydides
is of opinion, since there is a necessary connection between envy and
great undertakings, that he takes the wisest counsel who incurs envy
by aiming the highest.[41] But we who esteem it less difficult to
avoid the envy of all men than to escape the censure of those we live
among, ought to order things so as rather to grapple with the unjust
hatred of evil men, than to deserve their just accusation after we have
served their base ends. We ought to go armed against that false and
counterfeit praise such men are apt to fling upon us, not suffering
ourselves like swine to be scratched and tickled by them, till, having
got the advantage of us, they use us after their own pleasure. For they
that reach out their ears to flatterers differ very little from such as
stand fair and quiet to be tripped up, excepting that the former catch
the more disgraceful fall. These put up with the affronts and forbear
the correction of wicked men, to get the reputation of good-natured or
merciful; or else are drawn into needless and perilous quarrels at the
instance of flatterers, who bear them in hand all the while for the
only men of judgment, the only men not to be caught with flattery, and
call them the only men who have mouths and voices. Bion used to compare
these men to pitchers: Take them, said he, by the ears, and you may
move them as you please. Thus Alexinus, the sophist, was reporting many
scandalous things in the lyceum of Stilpo the Megarian; but when one
present informed him that Stilpo always spake very honorably of him,
Why truly, says he, he is one of the most obliging and best of men.
But now Menedemus, when it was told him that Alexinus often praised
him, replied: That may be, but I always talk against him; for he must
be bad who either praises a bad man or is blamed by an honest one. So
wary was he of being caught by such baits, agreeably to that precept of
Hercules in Antisthenes,[42] who cautioned his sons not to be thankful
to such as were used to praise them,—thereby meaning no more than that
they should be so far from being wheedled thereby as not even to return
their flatteries. That of Pindar was very apposite, and enough to be
said in such a case: when one told him, I cry you up among all men, and
speak to your advantage on all occasions; and I, replied he, am always
very thankful, in that I take care you shall not tell a lie.
19. I shall conclude with one general rule, of sovereign use against
all the passions and diseases of the mind, but particularly beneficial
to such as labor under the present distemper, bashfulness. And it is
this: whenever they have given way to this weakness, let them store
up carefully such failings in their memory, and taking therein deep
and lively impressions of what remorse and disquiet they occasioned,
bestow much time in reflecting upon them and keeping them fresh. For
as travellers that have got a dangerous fall against such a stone,
or sailors shipwrecked upon a particular promontory, keeping the
image of their misfortune continually before them, appear fearful
and apprehensive not only of the same but even the like dangers; so
they that keep in mind the disgraceful and prejudicial effects of
bashfulness will soon be enabled to restrain themselves in like cases,
and will not easily slip again on any occasion.