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THE HISTORY
OF THE
FIRST WEST INDIA REGIMENT.
THE HISTORY
OF THE
FIRST WEST INDIA
REGIMENT.
BY
A.B. ELLIS,
_Major, First West India Regiment._
AUTHOR OF "WEST AFRICAN ISLANDS" AND "THE LAND OF FETISH".
London:
CHAPMAN AND HALL, LIMITED,
HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
1885.
CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS,
CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS.
I beg to return my best thanks to A.E. HAVELOCK, Esq., C.M.G.
Administrator-in-Chief of the West African Settlements;
Lieutenant-Colonel F.B.P. WHITE, of the 1st West India Regiment; V.S.
GOULDSBURY, Esq., Administrator of the Gambia Settlements; A. YOUNG,
Esq., Lieutenant-Governor of Demerara; F. EVANS, Esq., C.M.G., Assistant
Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast Colony; ALFRED KINGSTON, Esq., of
the Record Office; and RICHARD GARNETT, Esq., of the British Museum, for
the very valuable assistance which they have rendered me in the
collection of materials for this Work.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 1
CHAPTER I.
THE ACTION AT BRIAR CREEK, 1779--THE ACTION AT STONO
FERRY, 1779 26
CHAPTER II.
THE SIEGE OF SAVANNAH, 1779--THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTOWN,
1780--THE BATTLE OF HOBKERK'S HILL, 1781 33
CHAPTER III.
THE RELIEF OF NINETY-SIX, 1781--THE BATTLE OF EUTAW
SPRINGS, 1781--REMOVAL TO THE WEST INDIES 43
CHAPTER IV.
THE EXPEDITION TO MARTINIQUE, 1793--THE CAPTURE OF
MARTINIQUE, ST. LUCIA, AND GUADALOUPE, 1794--THE
DEFENCE OF FORT MATILDA, 1794 53
CHAPTER V.
MALCOLM'S ROYAL RANGERS--THE EVACUATION OF ST. LUCIA,
1795 63
CHAPTER VI.
THE CARIB WAR IN ST. VINCENT, 1795 69
CHAPTER VII.
MAJOR-GENERAL WHYTE'S REGIMENT OF FOOT, 1795 77
CHAPTER VIII.
THE CAPTURE OF ST. LUCIA, 1796 85
CHAPTER IX.
THE RELIEF OF GRENADA, 1796--THE REPULSE AT PORTO RICO,
1797 93
CHAPTER X.
THE DEFENCE OF DOMINICA, 1805 103
CHAPTER XI.
THE HURRICANE AT DOMINICA, 1806--THE REDUCTION OF ST.
THOMAS AND ST. CROIX, 1807--THE RELIEF OF MARIE-GALANTE,
1808 117
CHAPTER XII.
THE CAPTURE OF MARTINIQUE, 1809--THE CAPTURE OF GUADALOUPE,
1810 125
CHAPTER XIII.
THE EXPEDITION TO NEW ORLEANS, 1814-15 141
CHAPTER XIV.
THE OCCUPATION OF GUADALOUPE, 1815--THE BARBADOS INSURRECTION,
1816--THE HURRICANE OF 1817 160
CHAPTER XV.
THE DEMERARA REBELLION, 1823 170
CHAPTER XVI.
THE BARRA WAR, 1831--THE HURRICANE OF 1831--THE COBOLO
EXPEDITION, 1832 178
CHAPTER XVII.
THE MUTINY OF THE RECRUITS AT TRINIDAD, 1837 188
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE PIRARA EXPEDITION, 1842--CHANGES IN THE WEST AFRICAN
GARRISONS--THE APPOLLONIA EXPEDITION, 1848 208
CHAPTER XIX.
INDIAN DISTURBANCES IN HONDURAS, 1848-49--THE ESCORT TO
COOMASSIE, 1848--THE SHERBRO EXPEDITION, 1849--THE
ESCORT TO RIO NUNEZ, 1850 218
CHAPTER XX.
THE STORMING OF SABBAJEE, 1853--THE RELIEF OF CHRISTIANSBORG,
1854 228
CHAPTER XXI.
THE TWO EXPEDITIONS TO MALAGEAH, 1854-55 236
CHAPTER XXII.
THE BATTLE OF BAKKOW, AND STORMING OF SABBAJEE, 1855 248
CHAPTER XXIII.
CHANGES IN THE WEST AFRICAN GARRISONS, 1856-57--THE
GREAT SCARCIES RIVER EXPEDITION, 1859--FIRE AT NASSAU,
1859 257
CHAPTER XXIV.
THE BADDIBOO WAR, 1860-61 265
CHAPTER XXV.
THE ASHANTI EXPEDITION, 1863-64 276
CHAPTER XXVI.
THE JAMAICA REBELLION, 1865 286
CHAPTER XXVII.
AFRICAN TOUR, 1866-70 298
CHAPTER XXVIII.
THE DEFENCE OF ORANGE WALK, 1872 304
CHAPTER XXIX.
THE ASHANTI WAR, 1873-74 317
CHAPTER XXX.
AFFAIRS IN HONDURAS, 1874--THE SHERBRO EXPEDITION, 1875--THE
ASHANTI EXPEDITION, 1881 333
APPENDIX 343
INDEX 361
MAPS.
1. ST. VINCENT _facing page 69_
2. GRENADA " 93
3. DOMINICA " 103
4. MARTINIQUE " 125
5. GUADALOUPE " 133
6. THE GAMBIA SETTLEMENTS " 178
7. THE GOLD COAST " 215
8. BRITISH HONDURAS " 219
9. THE MELLICOURIE RIVER " 236
10. SWARRA CUNDA CREEK " 265
11. THE COUNTY OF SURREY, JAMAICA " 287
12. ORANGE WALK " 305
13. THE ROUTE TO COOMASSIE " 319
14. BRITISH SHERBRO " 337
THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST WEST INDIA REGIMENT.
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.
At the present day, when our Continental neighbours are outvying each
other in the completeness of their military organisations and the size
of their armies, while in the United Kingdom complaints are daily heard
that the supply of recruits for the British Army is not equal to the
demand, it may not be out of place to draw the attention of the public
to a source from which the army may be most economically reinforced.
The principal difficulty experienced by military reformers in their
endeavours to remodel the British Army on the Continental system, is
that caused by the necessity of providing troops for the defence of our
vast and scattered Colonial Empire. Without taking into consideration
India, our European and North American possessions, a considerable
portion of the army has to be employed in furnishing garrisons for the
Cape Colony, Natal, Mauritius, St. Helena, the Bermudas, the West
Indies, Burmah, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, etc.; which
garrisons, though creating a constant drain on the Home Establishment,
are notoriously inadequate for the defence of the various colonies in
which they are placed; and the result is that, whenever a colonial war
breaks out, fresh battalions have to be hurriedly sent out from the
United Kingdom at immense expense, and the entire military machine is
temporarily disarranged.
In size, and in diversity of subject races, the British Empire may be
not inaptly compared with that of Rome in its palmiest days; and we
have, in a measure, adopted a Roman scheme for the defence of a portion
of our dominions. The Romans were accustomed, as each new territory was
conquered, to raise levies of troops from the subject race, and then,
most politicly, to send them to serve in distant parts of the Empire,
where they could have no sympathies with the inhabitants. In India we,
like the Romans, raise troops from the conquered peoples, but, unlike
them, we retain those troops for service in their own country. The
result of this attempt to modify the scheme was the Indian mutiny.
The plan of a local colonial army was, however, first tried in the West
Indies. At the close of the last century, when the West India Islands,
or the Plantations, as they were then called, were of as much importance
to, and held the same position in, the British Empire as India does
now, there was in existence a West India Army, consisting of twelve
battalions of negro troops, raised exclusively for service in the West
Indies.
As India was gradually conquered, and the West India trade declined
(from the abolition of the slave trade and other causes), the West India
Colonies, by a regular process, fell from their former pre-eminent
position. Each step in the descent was marked by the disbandment of a
West India regiment, until, at the present day, two only remain in
existence; and it is a matter of common notoriety that those two are
principally preserved to garrison Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast Colony,
British Honduras, and British Guiana--colonies the climates of which,
experience has shown, are fatal to European soldiers, who are
necessarily in time of peace, from the nature of their duties, more
exposed to climatic influence than are officers. Economy was, of course,
the cause of this continued process of reduction, for, until recently,
such gigantic military establishments as those of Germany, Russia, and
France were unheard of; and Great Britain was satisfied, and felt
secure, with a miniature army, a paper militia, and no reserve. All this
is now changed, and the necessity of an increase in our defensive power
is admitted.
These negro West India troops won the highest encomiums from every
British commander under whom they served. Sir Ralph Abercromby in 1796,
Sir John Moore in 1797, Lieutenant-General Trigge in 1801, Sir George
Provost in 1805, Lieutenant-General Beckwith and Major-General Maitland
in 1809 and 1810, all testified to the gallantry, steadiness, and
discipline of the negro soldiers. Sir John Moore, speaking of the new
corps in 1796, said "they are invaluable," and "the very best troops for
the climate." To come to more recent times, in 1873 the 2nd West India
Regiment bore for six months the entire brunt of the Ashanti attack, and
had actually forced the invading army to retire across the Prah before
the men of a single line battalion were landed. In fact, the efficiency
of West India troops was, and is, unquestioned.
This being so, it may be asked, why should not the present number of
regiments composed of negro soldiers be increased for the purpose of
garrisoning the colonies, especially those of which the climate is most
prejudicial to English soldiers? This would not be a return to the
former state of affairs, for when we had twelve negro regiments they
were all stationed in the West Indies, whereas the essence of the
present scheme is to send them on service in other colonies. Such an
augmentation of our West India, or Zouave, regiments certainly appears
politic and easy. I will also endeavour to show that it would be
economical.
Each West India battalion would take the place of a Territorial
battalion now serving abroad. The latter would return to the United
Kingdom, be reduced to the Home Establishment, and have from 300 to 400
men passed into the Reserve. Repeat this process seven or eight times,
and the services with the colours of between 2000 and 3000 European
soldiers are dispensed with, the Reserve being increased by that number.
In addition, negro soldiers being enlisted for twelve years' service
with the colours, negro regiments on foreign service would not require
those large drafts sent to white battalions to replace time-expired men,
transport for which so swells the army estimates; while the negro being
a native of the tropics, invaliding home would be reduced to a minimum.
The pay of the black soldier is ninepence per diem, against a shilling
per diem to the white, so that there would be some saving effected in
that way. In fact, it has been calculated that for an annual addition to
the army estimates of some L27,000, six new negro battalions, each 800
strong, could be maintained; giving, on the one hand, an addition of
4800 to our present military force, and on the other, an increased
Reserve, and six more Territorial battalions in the United Kingdom,
ready to hand on a European emergency. To this may be added the lives of
scores of Englishmen yearly saved to their country.
By the Territorial scheme now in force in Great Britain, an attempt has
been made to localise corps on the German system, irrespective of the
fact that Germany has no colonies, while those of Great Britain are most
numerous. In Germany, in time of peace, each army corps is located in a
district, from which it never moves, and in which the Reserve men,
destined to complete the regiments to war strength, are compelled to
live. Thus, when a general mobilisation takes place, the men are on the
spot, and join the regiments in which they have already served. France
has adopted this system, with the exception that army corps are not
permanently located in districts, and the army thus localised is the one
for European service only. For her colonies an entirely distinct army is
maintained, composed of men specially enlisted for foreign service. In
Great Britain we have neither adopted the German system nor the French
modification of that system; but a scheme of localisation, with the
main-spring of localisation removed, has been endeavoured to be grafted
upon our old system, under which the regular army is sent on service in
time of peace to distant portions of the globe. Should the mobilisation
of an army corps be necessary in England, the Reserve men would, in a
large number of cases, find the regiments in which they had formerly
served, on foreign service. It would then be necessary to draft them
into regiments to which they were strangers, in which they would take no
interest, and where they would be unknown to their officers. On the
other hand, should it be necessary to despatch suddenly six or seven
battalions to India or the Cape, they have to be made up to a war
strength from other corps, for they have been reduced to a skeleton
establishment in order that men may be provided for the Reserve.
Localisation, to be effectual, must be thorough; but it and the demands
of foreign service are so incompatible that they cannot be efficiently
combined. At the present time, neither is said to be in a satisfactory
condition, and the Reserve, which was expected to have risen to a total
of 80,000 men, consists of 32,000 only.
Military reformers have long since arrived at the conclusion that if the
British Army is to be maintained at such a footing as to give weight to
the voice of Great Britain in the councils of Europe, we must have two
distinct armies; namely, one for home service, ready for a European
imbroglio, and a second to which the defence of the colonies can be
entrusted. The objection to this has been, hitherto, the great expense,
for it has always been taken for granted that this Colonial Army would
consist of white soldiers; and the question of increased pay, supply of
recruits, and periodical removal of men to the United Kingdom, over and
above the cost of the Territorial Army, had to be considered. With negro
troops, however, for the Colonial Army, this objection, if it does not
entirely disappear, is reduced at least by three-quarters. Should it be
tried on a small scale and found successful, there need be no reason why
in time almost the whole of the Territorial battalions should not be
withdrawn from foreign service. In this way localisation could be made a
reality; and with such vast untouched recruiting grounds as our colonies
offer, there can be no doubt as to the practicability of raising the
negro regiments required. Such regiments might also partly compose the
garrisons of Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Aden, and Ceylon. There is,
indeed, no reason, except the hatred of the Hindoo for the negro, why
such regiments might not serve in India. As the negro would never
coalesce with the natives of India, a new and entirely reliable force,
indifferent to tropical heat, and not requiring a vast retinue of
camp-followers, would be always at hand. Of course, negro battalions
could never be employed in cold latitudes, for the negro suffers from
cold in a manner which is incomprehensible even to Europeans who have
passed the best part of their lives in the tropics. Instead of being
braced by and deriving activity from the cold, he becomes languid and
inert; and nothing but the rays of the sun can arouse him to any
exertion. Even in West Africa, during the Harmattan season, natives may
be observed in the early morning, hugging their scanty clothing around
them and shivering with cold; while the ill-fated expedition to New
Orleans showed what deadly havoc an inclement climate will play with
negro troops.
Next, as to the men of whom these negro regiments would be composed. It
is too much the custom in Great Britain, in describing a man of colour,
to consider that all has been said that is necessary when he is called a
negro; yet there are as many nationalities, and as many types of the
African race, as there are of the Caucasian. No one would imagine that a
European was sufficiently described by the title of "white man." It
would be asked if the individual in question were an Englishman,
German, Frenchman, and so on; and the same kind of classification is
necessary for the negro. On the western coast of Africa, the portion of
the African continent from which North and South America and the West
Indies obtained their negro population, there are at least twenty
different varieties of the African race, distinct from each other in
features and even in colour; and these are again subdivided into several
hundred nations or tribes, each of which possesses a language, manners,
and customs of its own.
In the days of the slave-trade, the slave-dealers adopted certain
arbitrary designations to denote from what portion of the coast their
wares were obtained. For instance, slaves shipped from Sierra Leone and
the rivers to the north and east of that peninsula, and who were
principally Timmanees, Kossus, Acoos, Mendis, Foulahs, and Jolloffs,
were called Mandingoes, from the dominant tribe of that name which
supplied the slave-market. Negroes from the Gold Coast kingdoms of
Ashanti, Fanti, Assin, Akim, Wassaw, Aquapim, Ahanta, and Accra were
denominated Koromantyns, or Coromantees, a corruption of Cormantine, the
name of a fort some sixteen miles to the east of Cape Coast Castle, and
which was the earliest British slave-station on the Gold Coast.
Similarly, slaves from the tribes inhabiting the Slave Coast, that is to
say, Awoonahs, Agbosomehs, Flohows, Popos, Dahomans, Egbas, and Yorubas,
were all termed Papaws; while those from the numerous petty states of
the Niger delta, where the lowest type of the negro is to be found, were
known as Eboes.
Thousands of men of these tribes, and others too numerous to mention,
were carried across the Atlantic and scattered at hap-hazard all over
the West India Islands. At first tribal distinctions were maintained,
but in the course of years, in each island they gradually disappeared
and were forgotten; until at the present day a West India negro does not
describe himself as a Kossu or a Koromantyn, but as a Jamaican, a
Barbadian, an Antiguan, etc. It would naturally be supposed that as the
West India Islands all received their slave population in the same
manner, and that as in each there was the same original diversity of
nationalities, subsequently blended together by intermarriages and
community of wants and language, a West India negro of the present
generation from any one island would be hardly distinguishable from one
from any other. Nothing, however, would be further from the truth. Since
the abolition of slavery, the conditions of life in the various islands
have been so different--in some the dense population necessitating daily
labour for an existence, while in others large uncultivated stretches of
wood and mountain have afforded squatting grounds for the majority of
the black population--that, in conjunction with diversity of climate,
each group of islands is now populated with a race of negroes morally
distinct _per se_. The difference between a negro born and bred in
Barbados and one born and bred in Jamaica is as great as between an
American and an Englishman, and the clannish spirit of the negro tends
to increase that difference. At the present time the negro of Jamaica
does not care to enlist in the 2nd West India Regiment, which is largely
recruited in Barbados; and, in the same way, the Barbadian declines to
serve in the 1st West India Regiment, because it is almost entirely
composed of Jamaicans.
While the negroes of the West Indies have thus lost all their tribal
peculiarities in the natural course of progress and civilisation, those
of West Africa have remained at a standstill; and there is to-day as
much difference between the hideous and debased Eboe and the stately and
dignified Mandingo, between the docile Fanti and the bloodthirsty
Ashanti, as there was one hundred and fifty years ago. Civilising
influences have made this contrast between the Africans and their West
India descendants still more striking. The latter have, since the
abolition of slavery, been living independent lives, in close contact
with civilisation, and enjoying all the rights of manhood under British
laws. From their earliest infancy they have known no language but the
English, and no religion but Christianity; while the former are still
barbarians, grovelling in fetishism, cursed with slavery, ignorant,
debased, and wantonly cruel. The West India negro has so much contempt
for his African cousin, that he invariably speaks of him by the
ignominious title of "bushman." In fact, the former considers himself in
every respect an Englishman, and the anecdote of the West India negro,
who, being rather roughly jolted by a Frenchman on board a mail steamer,
turned round to him and ejaculated, "I think you forget that we beat you
at Waterloo," is no exaggeration.
Just as the negro races of West Africa are distinct from one another,
and the West India negro from all, so are the coloured inhabitants of
both those parts of the world entirely distinct from the Kaffir tribes
of South Africa; and a coalition between Galeka or Zulu inhabitants and
West India troops would be as impossible as the fraternisation of a
Territorial battalion with the natives of India. Apart, however, from
the fact that negro troops could always be safely employed alone outside
the colony in which they were bred, history has shown that the fidelity
of West India soldiers is beyond question. Indeed it would be difficult
to say what stronger ties there could be than those of sentiment,
language, and religion, and the association from childhood with British
manners, customs, laws, and modes of thought. When to these are added
discipline, the habit of obedience, and that well-known affection for
their officers and their regiment which is so particularly an attribute
of the West India soldier, it must be acknowledged that the guarantees
of fidelity are, with the single exception of race, at least as good as
those of the linesmen.
In India, the native army consists of men hostile to us by tradition,
creed, and race, who consider their food defiled if even the shadow of a
British officer should chance to fall across it, and assuredly it would
be as safe a proceeding to garrison our colonies with English negroes as
to garrison India with such men. Yet that is done at the present day,
and excites no remark.
The English-speaking negro of the West Indies is most excellent material
for a soldier. He is docile, patient, brave, and faithful, and for an
officer who knows how to gain his affection--an easy matter, requiring
only justness, good temper, and an ear ready to listen patiently to any
tale of real or imaginary grievance--he will do anything. Of course they
are not perfect; they have their faults, like all soldiers, and when
they chance to be commanded by an officer who is unnecessarily harsh, or
who speaks roughly to them, they manifest their displeasure by passive
obedience and a stubborn sullenness. English soldiers, on the other
hand, under such circumstances, proceed to acts of insubordination, and
it is for military judges to say which mode of expression they prefer.
The West African negro does not appear to such advantage as a soldier.
Although all the specimens, with the exception of the Sierra Leone
negro, possess the first necessary qualification of personal courage,
they are dull and stupid, and cannot be transformed into intelligent
soldiers. It may be wondered why the Sierra Leonean, who alone among the
West Africans is an English-speaking negro, should be worse than his
more barbarian neighbours; but I believe the solution may be found in
the fact that the large proportion of slaves landed in former days at
Sierra Leone from captured slavers were so-called Eboes, from the tribes
of the Niger delta; which tribes all ethnologists are agreed in
describing as among the lowest of the African races, and which, it may
be remarked, are even at the present day addicted to cannibalism. The
West African soldier is a mere machine, who mechanically obeys orders,
and never ventures, under any circumstances, to act or think for
himself. Should an African be placed on sentry, he fulfils to the letter
the orders read to him by the non-commissioned officer who posts him,
but frequently entirely ignores their spirit. Sometimes this is
productive of amusing incidents. For instance, some years ago, among the
orders for the sentry posted at Government House, Sierra Leone, was one
to the effect that no one was to be permitted to leave the premises
after dark carrying a parcel. This order had been issued at the request
of the Governor, to prevent pilfering on the part of his servants. One
evening the Governor was coming out of his house with a small
despatch-box, when, to his surprise, he was stopped by the sentry, an
old African.
"But I'm the Governor," said the astonished administrator, "and I had
that order made myself. You mustn't stop me."
"Me no care if you be Gubnor or not," replied the imperturbable African.
"The corporal gib de order, and you no can pass." And Her Majesty's
representative had to turn back and leave his despatch-box at home.
The greatest objection to the African, however, is the strange fact that
no amount of care or attention on the part of his instructors can ever
make him a good or even a fair shot. In the 1st West India Regiment
there are still a few Africans remaining, most of whom have from twelve
to eighteen years' service; and who have annually expended their rounds
without hitting the target more than once or twice during the whole
musketry course. Give these men a rifle rested on a tripod, and tell
them to align the sights upon some given mark, and they cannot do it.
They will frequently aim a foot or two to the right or left of an object
only a few yards distant. Every possible plan has been tried to make
them improve, but all have equally failed; and, in consequence, Africans
are not now enlisted. Still, although on account of this failing,
African troops could never, in these days of long-range firing, meet
Europeans in the field, a battalion of Africans would be quite good
enough for bush fighting against an enemy like the Ashanti, a still
worse marksman, and worse armed; or against tribes armed with the spear
or assegai.
Of course one reason of the African's dulness is that until he enlists,
that is until he is from twenty-four to thirty years of age, he has
never exercised his mind in any way; and the long years of mental
idleness have produced a sluggishness which makes it extremely difficult
for him to acquire anything new that requires thought. After enlisting,
he picks up a species of unintelligible English, but that is the most
that he can do. It is pitiful to see these men, some of them now old,
struggling day after day, according to regulation, in the regimental
school, to learn their letters. It is to them the greatest punishment
that could be inflicted, and though they attend school for years, they
rarely succeed in doing more than master the alphabet.
In former days, whenever the cargo of a captured slaver was landed at
Sierra Leone, a party from the garrison used to be admitted to the
Liberated African Yard for the purpose of seeking recruits amongst the
slaves. Many of the latter, pleased with the brilliant uniform, and
talked over by the recruiting party, who were men specially selected for
this duty on account of their knowledge of African languages, offered
themselves as recruits. If medically fit, they were invariably accepted,
though it must have been well known that they could not possibly have
had any idea of the nature of the engagement into which they were
entering. Some fifteen or twenty recruits being thus obtained, they were
given high-sounding names, such as Mark Antony, Scipio Africanus, etc.,
their own barbaric appellations being too unpronounceable, and then
marched down in a body to the cathedral to be baptised. Some might be
Mohammedans, and the majority certainly believers in fetish, but the
form of requiring their assent to a change in their religion was never
gone through; and the following Sunday they were marched into church as
a matter of course, along with their Christian comrades. Although thus
nominally christianised, they still remained at heart believers in
fetish, for it is a remarkable fact that no adult West African has ever
become a bona-fide convert, and the missionaries have long since given
up attempting to proselytise grown persons, reserving all their efforts
for children. Holding, as they did, in great dread all fetish, or obeah,
practices; usually someone amongst them, more cunning than the rest,
professed an acquaintance with the supposed diabolical ritual; and
gained influence with, and extorted money from, his more timid comrades.
Officers now in the 1st West India Regiment can remember the time when,
there being many Africans in the regiment, the feathers of parrots or
scraps of rags might be found in the neighbourhood of the orderly room.
Whenever this was the case, it was known that an African was about to be
brought before his commanding officer for some neglect of duty or breach
of discipline; and these fetishes had been placed there to induce the
colonel to deal leniently with the offender. Ridiculous as this practice
must seem to every educated person, it sometimes produced the most
serious effects upon the credulous Africans; and I have heard old
officers speak of instances, which came within their own knowledge, of
soldiers who, having found old bones, broken pieces of calabashes, or
glass, placed on their beds, immediately resigned themselves to death,
saying that "fetish was thrown upon them," and in nine cases out of
twelve, so certain were they that it was impossible to escape the coming
doom, they positively frightened or worried themselves to death. The
professors of fetishism likewise drove a good trade in amulets which
rendered the wearer invulnerable. On one occasion at Sierra Leone, a
young African who had been recently enlisted displayed with much pride a
gri-gri or amulet which he wore on his wrist, and which, he asserted,
rendered him invulnerable. His West India comrades laughed at him; and
the African, indignant at the doubt thrown upon the efficacy of his
charm, drew his knife, and, before he could be stopped, plunged it into
his thigh to prove that he spoke the truth. His eyes were opened,
unfortunately, too late; for though he was at once removed to the
hospital, he died from the effects of this self-inflicted wound. In West
India regiments the practice of fetish was made a military crime, and
was severely punished. Sufferers or imaginary sufferers from fetishism,
however, rarely complained to their officers, for they believed that the
occult art practised by the professor was superior to any power held by
man, and consequently, culprits were but seldom detected. With the
disappearance of Africans from West India regiments, the offence of
fetishism has, however, also disappeared.
Military crime in West India regiments is of comparatively rare
occurrence. Even when the 3rd West India Regiment was in existence,
there was less in the three negro regiments than in one of the Line;
while drunkenness is confined to the few black sheep who will be found
in every body of men. Riots or disturbances between West India soldiers
and the inhabitants of the towns in which they are quartered are unheard
of, and in every garrison they receive the highest praise for their
unvarying good and quiet behaviour. In fact they are merry,
good-tempered, and orderly men, who do not wish to interfere with
anyone; and, owing to their temperate habits, they are not led into the
commission of offences by the influence of drink. Of course, the popular
idea in Great Britain of the negro is that he is a person who commonly
wears a dilapidated tall hat, cotton garments of brilliant hue, carries
a banjo or concertina, and indulges in extraordinary cachinnations at
the smallest pretext; but this is as far from the truth as the creature
of imagination in the opposite extreme, evoked by the vivid fancy of
Mrs. Beecher Stowe.
The bravery of the West India soldier in action has often been tested,
and as long as an officer remains alive to lead not a man will flinch.
His favourite weapon is the bayonet; and the principal difficulty with
him in action is to hold him back, so anxious is he to close with his
enemy. It is unnecessary here to refer to individual acts of gallantry
performed by soldiers of the 1st West India Regiment, they being fully
set forth in the following history; but of such performed by soldiers of
other West India regiments the two following now occur to me.
Private Samuel Hodge, a pioneer of the 3rd West India Regiment, was
awarded the Victoria Cross for conspicuous bravery at the storming of
the Mohammedan stockade at Tubarcolong (the White Man's Well), on the
River Gambia, on the 30th of May, 1866. Under a heavy fire from the
concealed enemy, by which one officer was killed and an officer and
thirteen men severely wounded, Hodge, and another pioneer named Boswell,
chopped and tore away with their hands the logs of wood forming the
stockade, Boswell falling nobly just as an opening was effected. Again,
in 1873, during the Ashanti War--when it was reported, on the 5th of
December, by natives at Yancoomassie Assin that the Ashanti army had
retired across the Prah--two soldiers of the 2nd West India Regiment
volunteered to go on alone to the river and ascertain if the report were
true. On their return they reported all clear to the Prah; and said they
had written their names on a piece of paper and posted it up. Six days
later, when the advanced party of the expeditionary force marched into
Prahsu, this paper was found fastened to a tree on the banks of the
river. At the time that this voluntary act was performed it must be
remembered that, on the 27th of November, the British and their allies
had met with a serious repulse at Faisowah, through pressing too closely
upon the retiring Ashantis; that this repulse was considered both by the
Ashantis and by our native allies as a set-off against the failure of
the attack on Abracampa; that the Houssa levy was in a state of panic,
and no reliable information as to the position of the enemy was
obtainable. It was under such circumstances that these two men advanced
nearly sixteen miles into an (to them) unknown tract of solitary
forest, to follow up an enemy that never spared life, and whose
whereabouts was doubtful.
Other qualifications apart, however, West India troops have proved
themselves of the very greatest value on active service in tropical
climates from the very fact that, being natives of the tropics, they can
undergo fatigue and exposure that would be fatal to European soldiers.
In campaigns in which both the West India and the European soldier are
employed, all the hard and unpleasant work is thrown upon the former,
and the publication in general orders of the thanks of the officer in
command of the force is the only acknowledgment he receives; for
newspaper correspondents, naturally anxious to swell the circulation of
the journals they represent, while giving the most minute details of the
doings of the white soldier, leave out in the cold his black comrade,
who has few friends among the reading public of Great Britain.
Occasionally, facts are even misrepresented. For instance, the defence
of Fommanah, on the 2nd of February, 1874, which was really effected by
a detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, was, in an account
telegraphed to one London daily paper, attributed to the 23rd Regiment,
of which corps there were only six or seven men in the place, and those
in hospital.
On the last occasion on which West India troops served with Line
battalions, namely in the Ashanti War of 1873-74, West India soldiers
daily marched twice and even three times the distance traversed by the
white troops; and, south of the Prah, searched the country for miles on
both sides of the line of advance, in search of carriers. It is not too
much to say, that if the two West India regiments had not been on the
Gold Coast, no advance on Coomassie would, that year, have been
possible. In December, 1873, the transport broke down; there was a
deadlock along the road; each half-battalion of the European troops was
detained in the camp it occupied, and the 23rd Regiment had to be
re-embarked for want of carriers. The fate of the expedition was
trembling in the balance, and the control officers were unanimous in
declaring that a further advance was impossible, and that the troops in
front would have to return by forced marches. Prior to this, the want of
transport had been felt to such an extent that the West India soldiers
had been placed on half rations; a step, however, which was not followed
by any diminution of work, which remained as hard as ever. In this
emergency the two West India regiments, with the 42nd--to whom all
honour be due--volunteered to carry supplies, in addition to their arms,
accoutrements, and ammunition. They acted as carriers for several days,
and moved such quantities of provisions to the front that the pressure
was removed and a further advance made possible. Even if more carriers
had been obtained from the already ransacked native villages, they could
not have arrived in time, for the rainy season was fast approaching and
the delay of a fortnight would have been fatal.
There was a peculiar irony of fate in the expedition being thus relieved
of its most pressing difficulties through the exertions of the West
India regiments. It had been Sir Garnet Wolseley's original intention to
take into Ashanti territory only the Rifle Brigade, the 23rd, and the
1st and 2nd West India Regiments; and, on the arrival of the hired
transport, _Sarmatian_, he wrote, on the 15th of December, that he did
not propose landing the 42nd. In the course of the next three days,
however, he changed his views, and, in his letter of the 18th December,
gave as his reason: "I find that the one great obstacle to the
employment of a third battalion of English troops, viz., the difficulty
of transport, is as great in the case of a West India regiment. The West
India soldier has the same rations as the European soldier, and a West
India regiment requires, man for man, exactly the same amount of
transport as a European regiment." The 42nd, therefore, was to be landed
and taken to the front, while the 1st West India Regiment was to remain
at Cape Coast Castle and Elmina as a reserve. Afterwards, when the
transport failed, it was found that the West India soldier could do the
work of the European on half rations, and carry his own supplies as
well.
West India regiments at the present day labour under many disadvantages.
Owing to the two battalions having to furnish garrisons for colonies
which really require three, they are alternately for one period of three
years divided into three detachments, and for the next period of three
years into six. No lieutenant-colonel of a West India regiment can ever
see the whole of his regiment together. The largest number that, under
present circumstances, he can ever have under him at any one station is
four companies; and the most he can have under his actual command at any
one time is six companies on board a troopship. Thus in a regiment there
are sometimes three, and sometimes six, officers vested with the power
of an officer commanding a detachment; and however conscientiously they
may endeavour to follow out a regimental system, every individual has
naturally a different manner of dealing with men, and a certain amount
of homogeneousness is lost to the regiment as a whole.
Endless correspondence is entailed, and sometimes questions have to
remain open for months, until answers can be received from distant
detachments. In small garrisons, also, drill becomes a mere farce; for,
after the clerks, employed men, and men on guard and in hospital are
deducted, there are perhaps only a dozen men or so left for parade. In
spite of all these drawbacks the regiments still maintain a wonderful
efficiency, and afford another proof of the soldierlike qualities of the
West India negro.
Another disadvantage is that a West India regiment is never seen in
England, the British public knows nothing of such regiments, has no
friends, relatives, or acquaintances in their ranks, and consequently
takes no interest in them. Yet they are a remarkably fine body of men,
and a picked battalion of the Guards would look small beside them if
brigaded with them in Hyde Park. So little is known, that I have
sometimes been asked if the officers of West India regiments are also
black, and it is with a view to making the regiment to which I have the
honour to belong better known to the public at large, that the following
history has been written. There has been no attempt at descriptive
writing, facts being merely collected from official documents, so that
the authenticity of the narrative may be unquestionable.
In order that the earlier chapters may be the more readily understood,
it may be as well to state that, with the 1st West India Regiment, which
was called into existence in the _London Gazette_ of the 2nd of May,
1795, were incorporated two other corps; of which one, the Carolina
Corps, had been in existence since 1779, while the other--Malcolm's, or
the Royal Rangers--had been raised in January or February, 1795. It is
from the Carolina Corps that the 1st West India Regiment derives the
Carolina laurel, borne on the crest of the regiment.
CHAPTER I.
THE ACTION AT BRIAR CREEK, 1779--THE ACTION AT STONO FERRY, 1779.
In the autumn of 1778, during the War of the American Independence, the
British commanders in North America determined to make another attempt
for the royal cause in the Southern States of Georgia and South
Carolina, which, since the failure of Lord Cornwallis at the siege of
Charlestown in July, 1776, had been allowed to remain unmolested. With
this view they despatched Colonel Campbell, in November, from New York,
with the 71st Regiment, two battalions of Hessians, three of Loyal
Provincials,[1] and a detachment of Artillery, the whole amounting to
about 3500, to make an attempt upon the town of Savannah, the capital of
Georgia. Arriving off the mouth of the Savannah River on the 23rd of
December, Colonel Campbell was so rapidly successful, that, by the
middle of January, not only was Savannah in his hands, but Georgia
itself was entirely cleared of American troops.
It was about this time that the South Carolina Regiment, the oldest
branch of the 1st West India Regiment, was raised. Numerous royalists
joined the British camp and were formed into various corps;[2] and the
South Carolina Regiment is first mentioned as taking part in the action
at Briar Creek on the 3rd of March, 1779,[3] the corps then being,
according to Major-General Prevost's despatch, about 100 strong. The
action at Briar Creek occurred as follows:
In the early part of 1779, General Prevost's[4] force was distributed in
posts along the frontier of Georgia; Hudson's Ferry, twenty-four miles
above Savannah, being the upper extremity of the chain. Watching these
posts was the American general, Lincoln, with the main body of the
American Army of the South, at Purrysburgh, about twenty miles above
Savannah, and General Ashe, who was posted with about 2000 of the
Militia of North and South Carolina and Georgia, at Briar Creek, near
the point where it falls into the Savannah River.
General Ashe's position appeared most secure, his left being covered by
the Savannah with its marshes, and his front by Briar Creek, which was
about twenty feet broad, and unfordable at that point and for several
miles above it; nevertheless, General Prevost determined to surprise
him. For the purpose of amusing General Lincoln, he made a show of an
intention to pass the river; and, in order to occupy the attention of
Ashe, he ordered a party to appear in his front, on the opposite side of
Briar Creek. Meanwhile General Prevost, with 900 chosen men, made an
extensive circuit, passed Briar Creek fifteen miles above the American
position, gained their rear unperceived, and was almost in their camp
before they discovered his approach. The surprise was as complete as
could be wished. Whole regiments fled without firing a shot, and numbers
without even attempting to seize their arms; they ran in their confusion
into the marsh, and swam across the river, in which numbers of them were
drowned. The Continental troops, under General Elbert, and a regiment of
North Carolina Militia, alone offered resistance; but they were not long
able to maintain the unequal conflict, and, being overpowered, were
compelled to surrender. The Americans lost from 300 to 400 men, and
seven pieces of cannon. The British lost five men killed, and one
officer and ten men wounded.
After this success, the British and American forces remained on opposite
sides of the River Savannah, until the end of April, when General
Lincoln, thinking the swollen state of the river and the inundation of
the marshes was sufficient protection for the lower districts, withdrew
his forces further inland, leaving General Moultrie with 1000 men at
Black Swamp. By this movement Lincoln left Charlestown exposed to the
British. General Prevost at once took advantage of this, and, on the
29th of April, suddenly crossed the river, near Purrysburgh, with 2500
men, among whom was the South Carolina Regiment, which had been
considerably increased by accessions of loyalists and freed negroes.
General Prevost advanced rapidly into the country, the militia under
Moultrie, who had considered the swamps impassable, offering but a
feeble resistance, and retiring hastily, destroying the bridges in their
rear. On the 11th of May, the British force crossed the Ashley River a
few miles above Charlestown, and, advancing along the neck formed by the
Ashley and Cooper Rivers, established itself at a little more than
cannon-shot from the city. A continued succession of skirmishes took
place on that day and the ensuing night, and on the following morning
Charlestown was summoned to surrender.
Negotiations were broken off in the evening, much to the disappointment
of the British general, who had been led to suppose that a large
proportion of the inhabitants were favourable to the royal cause, and
that the city would fall easily into his hands. He now found himself in
a dangerous predicament. He was without siege guns, before lines
defended by a considerable force of artillery, and flanked by shipping;
he was involved in a labyrinth of creeks and rivers, where a defeat
would have been fatal, and General Lincoln with a force equal, if not
superior to his own, was fast approaching for the relief of the city.
Taking all this into consideration, General Prevost prudently struck
camp that night, and, under cover of the darkness, the direct line of
retreat on Savannah being closed, returned to the south side of the
Ashley River. From thence the army passed to the islands of St. James
and St. John, lying to the southward of Charlestown harbour, and
commencing that succession of islands and creeks which extends along the
coast from Charlestown to Savannah.
In these islands the army awaited supplies from New York, of which it
was much in need; and, on the arrival of two frigates, it commenced to
move to the island of Port Royal, which at the same time would afford
good quarters for the troops during the intense heats, and, from its
vicinity to Savannah, and its excellent harbour, was the best position
that could be chosen for covering Georgia.
Directly General Lincoln discovered what was taking place, he advanced
to attack. St. John's Island is separated from the mainland by a narrow
inlet, called Stono River, and communication between the mainland and
the island was kept up by a ferry. On the mainland, at this ferry,
General Prevost had established a post, consisting of three redoubts,
joined by lines of communication; and, to cover the movement of the army
to Port Royal Island, he here posted Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland with
the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment, a weak battalion of Hessians,
the North Carolina Regiment, and the South Carolina Regiment, amounting
in the whole to about 800 men.
On the 20th of June, General Lincoln made a determined attempt to force
the passage, attacking with a force variously estimated at from 1200 to
5000 men and eight guns. Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland's advanced posts,
consisting of the South Carolina Regiment, were some distance in front
of his works; and a smart firing between them and the Americans gave him
the first warning of the approach of the enemy. He instantly sent out
two companies of the 71st from his right to ascertain the force of the
assailants. The Highlanders had proceeded only a quarter of a mile when
they met the outposts retiring before the enemy. A fierce conflict
ensued. Instead of retreating before superior numbers, the Highlanders
persisted in the unequal combat till all their officers were either
killed or wounded, of the two companies eleven men only returned to the
garrison; and the British force was sadly diminished, and its safety
consequently imperilled by this mistaken valour.
The whole American line now advanced to within three hundred yards of
the works, and a general engagement began, which was maintained with
much courage and steadiness on both sides. At length the regiment of
Hessians on the British left gave way, and the Americans, in spite of
the obstinate resistance of the two Carolina regiments, were on the
point of entering the works, when a judicious flank movement of the
remainder of the 71st checked the advance; and General Lincoln,
apprehensive of the arrival of British reinforcements from the island,
drew off his men, and retired in good order, taking his wounded with
him.
The battle lasted upwards of an hour. The British had 3 officers and 19
rank and file killed, and 4 officers and 85 rank and file wounded. The
South Carolina Regiment had Major William Campbell and 1 sergeant
killed, 1 captain, 1 sergeant, and 3 rank and file wounded.[5] The
Americans lost 5 officers and 35 men killed, 19 officers and 120 men
wounded.
Three days after the battle, the British troops evacuated the post at
Stono Ferry, and also the island of St. John, passing along the coast
from island to island till they reached Beaufort in the island of Port
Royal. Here General Prevost left a garrison under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, and proceeded with the remainder of his
force, with which was the South Carolina Regiment, to the town of
Savannah.
The heat had now become too intense for active service; and the care of
the officers was employed in preserving their men from the fevers of the
season, and keeping them in a condition for service next campaign, which
was expected to open in October.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: De Lancey's Corps, the New York Volunteers, and Skinner's
Corps.]
[Footnote 2: "Annual Register," 1779, Beatson's "Memoirs," Gordon's
"History of the American War," etc. etc.]
[Footnote 3: Beatson's "Naval and Military Memoirs," vol. iv. p. 492.]
[Footnote 4: Major-General Prevost had come from Florida and assumed
command in January.]
[Footnote 5: "Return of the killed, wounded, and missing at the repulse
of the Rebels at Stono Ferry, South Carolina, June 20th, 1779."]