HOOD'S DEFENCE OF ATLANTA--RESULTS OF ITS CAPTURE
Lines of supply by field trains--Canvas pontoons--Why replaced by
bridges--Wheeling toward Atlanta--Battle of Peachtree Creek--Battle
of Atlanta--Battle of Ezra Church--Aggressive spirit of Confederates
exhausted--Sherman turns Atlanta by the south--Pivot position of
Twenty-third Corps--Hood's illusions--Rapidity of our troops in
intrenching--Movements of 31st August--Affair at Jonesboro--Atlanta
won--_Morale_ of Hood's army--Exaggerating difference in
numbers--Examination of returns--Efforts to bring back
absentees--The sweeping conscription--Sherman's candid
estimates--Unwise use of cavalry--Forrest's work--Confederate
estimate of Sherman's campaign.
In advancing from the Chattahoochee, the arrangements Sherman made
for the supply of his army provided separate lines for the trains of
the three columns. McPherson' s wagons would reach him from Marietta
by way of Roswell and the bridge which General Dodge built there.
Schofield's had their depot at Smyrna and came by the wooden bridge
which we built at the mouth of Soap Creek to replace the pontoons.
The latter were of canvas, and whilst unequalled for field use, were
unfit for a bridge of any permanence, because the canvas would be
destroyed by long continuance in the water. As soon as they could be
replaced by a pier or trestle-bridge of timber, they were taken up,
cleaned and dried, and then packed on their special wagons for
transport. This train was in charge of a permanent detachment of
troops who became experts in the handling and care of the material
and in laying the bridge. The brigade of dismounted cavalry in my
division was left at the river as a guard for the wooden bridge
which was kept up till the railway bridge was built and opened for
use. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 163.]
Thomas's troops, who were more than half the army, drew their
supplies from Vining's Station byway of bridges at Power's Ferry
(mouth of Rottenwood Creek) and Pace's Ferry, a mile below.
Grant sent warning of rumors afloat that reinforcements would be
sent Johnston from the east, and in advancing from the Chattahoochee
by a great wheel to the right, Sherman extended his left so that
McPherson should move to the east of Decatur and break the Georgia
Railroad there, whilst Garrard with his division of cavalry should
continue the destruction toward Stone Mountain and make the gap as
wide as possible. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 158.]
This movement made the distance travelled by McPherson and Schofield
a long one, and extended their front largely, whilst Thomas was much
more compact. But when once the railway should be so broken that
Johnston's direct communication with the east would be interrupted,
McPherson and Schofield would both move toward their right, and in
closing in upon Atlanta, come into close touch with Thomas.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 167.]
It was whilst this movement was progressing, on the 20th of July,
and was near its completion, that Hood made the attack already
planned by Johnston, upon Thomas's columns, crossing Peachtree Creek
by several roads converging at Atlanta. It involved the right of
Howard's corps, the whole of Hooker's, and the left of Palmer's. It
was a fierce and bloody combat, in which the Confederates lost about
6000 men in killed and wounded, whilst the casualty lists of
Thomas's divisions amounted to 2000. Again, on the 22d, the second
part of Johnston's plan was tried, and Hardee's corps, moving by
night through Atlanta and far out to the southward of Decatur,
advanced upon the flank of McPherson's army, whilst Cheatham at the
head of Hood's own corps advanced from the Atlanta lines and
continued the attack upon the centre and left of McPherson and upon
the right of Schofield. A great battle raged along five miles of
front and rear, but at evening the worsted Confederates retired
within the fortifications of the city, a terrible list of 10,000
casualties showing the cost of the aggressive tactics. The losses on
the National side were 3500, heavy enough, in truth, but with very
different results on the relative strength of the armies and their
_morale_. But the end was not yet. On the 28th McPherson's army, now
under the command of Howard, was marching from the left wing to the
right, to extend our lines southward on the west side of Atlanta,
when once more Hood struck fiercely at the moving flank at Ezra
Church, but again found that breastworks grew as if by magic as soon
as Howard's men were deployed in position, and again the gray
columns were beaten back with a list of 5000 added to the killed and
disabled. Howard had less than 600 casualties in the action. It was
only a week since Johnston had been relieved, and matters had come
to such a pass in his army that the men stolidly refused to continue
the assaults. From our skirmish line their officers were seen to
advance to the front with waving swords calling upon the troops to
follow them, but the men remained motionless and silent, refusing to
budge. [Footnote: For details of these engagements, see "Atlanta,"
chaps, xii.-xiv.]
During the first half of August Sherman extended his lines
southward, until my own division, which was the right flank of the
infantry lines, was advanced nearly a mile southeast of the crossing
of the Campbelltown and East Point roads on high ground covering the
headwaters of the Utoy and Camp creeks. We were here somewhat
detached and encamped accordingly in a boldly curved line ready for
action on the flanks as well as front. It was now the 18th of August
and Sherman devoted the next week to the accumulation of supplies,
the removal of sick and wounded to the rear, getting rid of
impedimenta, and general preparation for a fortnight's separation
from his base. My position had been selected with reference to this
plan, as a pivot upon which the whole of the army except the
Twentieth Corps should swing across the railways south of Atlanta.
[Illustration: Map of the Atlanta, GA area, showing the Federal and
Confederate lines.]
The movement began on the 25th, and we stood fast till the 28th,
when we began our flank movement on the inner curve of the march of
the army, taking very short steps, however, as we must keep between
the army trains and the enemy. On the 30th Schofield moved our corps
from Red Oak Station, on the West Point Railroad, a mile and a half
directly toward East Point, so as to cover roads going eastward
toward Rough-and-Ready Station on the Macon road. We were hardly in
position before our skirmishers were briskly engaged with an
advancing force of the enemy's cavalry, and we felt sure that it was
the precursor of an attack by Hood in force. It proved to be nothing
but a reconnoissance, and showed that Hood was strangely
misconceiving the situation. Its chief interest to me at the moment
was in the experiment it enabled me to make of the speed with which
my men could cover themselves in open ground in an emergency. The
division was astride the East Point road, the centre in open fields
where no timber could be got for revetment, and only fence rails to
give some support to the loose earth. Giving the order to make the
light trench of the rifle-pit class, where the earth is thrown
outward and the men stand in the ditch they dig, in fifteen minutes
by the watch the work was such that I reckoned it sufficient cover
to repel an infantry attack, if it came. It would be an
extraordinary occasion when we did not have more warning of an
impending attack; and the incident will illustrate the confidence we
had that in forcing the enemy to assume aggressive tactics, the
campaign was practically decided.
On the 31st, as Sherman's left wing, we held the Macon Railway at
Rough-and-Ready Station, Howard, as right wing, was across Flint
River, closing in on Jonesboro, whilst the centre under Thomas
filled the interval. Hood had sent Hardee with his own and Lee's
(late Hood's) corps to defeat what was supposed to be a detachment
of two corps of Sherman's army, and a sharp affair had occurred at
the Flint River crossing, where Howard succeeded in maintaining his
position on the east side. On hearing of our occupation of
Rough-and-Ready, Hood jumped to the conclusion that it was
preliminary to an attack on Atlanta from the south, and ordered
Lee's corps to march in the night and rejoin him at once. Getting a
better idea of the situation before morning, he stopped Lee and
prepared to evacuate Atlanta. On September 1st Sherman closed in on
Jonesboro, his latest information indicating that two corps of the
enemy were assembled there. Late in the day he learned of the
disappearance of Lee's corps, but assumed that Hood was assembling
somewhere near. He tried hard to concentrate his forces to prevent
Hardee's escape, but his scattered army could not be united till
nightfall.
In the night Hood blew up the ordnance stores at Atlanta, and
hastening to join Lee by roads east of Sherman's positions, he
marched on Lovejoy Station. Hardee evacuated Jonesboro also, and
before morning the Confederate army was assembled again upon the
railroad, five miles nearer to Macon. Atlanta was occupied by the
Twentieth Corps on the 2d, and Sherman ordered his army to return to
the vicinity of that city for a period of rest. Hood's conduct for
the past three days had been the result of complete misapprehension
of the facts; but its very eccentricity had been so incomprehensible
that no rule of military probabilities could be applied to it, and
before Sherman could learn what he was doing, the time had passed
when full advantage could be taken of his errors.
The condition of Hood's army at the close of the campaign was
anything but satisfactory to him. His theory was that his offensive
tactics would keep up the spirit and energy of his men and
constantly improve their _morale_. When he found that they were, on
the contrary, discouraged and despondent, and could not be induced
to repeat the assaults upon our positions which had followed each
other so rapidly in the last days of July, he querulously laid the
blame at the door of his subordinates. He called the attack upon
Howard's advance at Flint River "a disgraceful effort" because only
1485 were wounded, and asked to have Hardee relieved and sent
elsewhere. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v. pp.
1021, 1023, 1030. Hardee had before asked to be relieved. (_Id_.,
pp. 987, 988.) For Hood's final, urgent request and the result, see
vol. xxxix. pt. ii. pp. 832, 880, 881.] True, he had telegraphed
Hardee that the necessity was imperative that the National troops
should be driven into and across the river, and that the men must go
at them with bayonets fixed; but it was his own old corps, now under
Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee, that made the principal attack and was
repulsed. Lee was not one of the officers who might be presumed to
be discontented with Johnston's removal, but had been brought from
the Department of Mississippi, at Hood's suggestion, to take the
corps when the latter was promoted, and had won Davis's admiration
by his zeal. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 892, and vol. lii. pt. ii. p.
713.] It would be hard to find better proof that the trouble lay in
the consciousness of the men in the line that they were asked to lay
down their lives without a reasonable hope of benefit to their
cause. The discouragement pervaded the whole army, and is seen in
Hood's own dispatches hardly less than in others. [Footnote: Hood to
Davis, September 3, two dispatches, _Id_., vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p.
1016. In another, p. 1017, he repeated an earlier suggestion to
remove the prisoners from Andersonville. When Johnston had done
this, it was made one of the charges against him. See Davis to Lee,
_Id_., vol. lii. pt. ii. p. 692. For Hardee's opinion of the
situation, see _Id_., vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 1018.] In a labored
letter to Bragg on September 4th, he unconsciously shows how his own
total misunderstanding of Sherman's movements was the prime cause of
his disaster, whilst the shame at the result leads him to charge it
upon others. As to the spirit of the army, nobody has given more
telling testimony, for he says, "I am officially informed that there
is a tacit if not expressed determination among the men of this
army, extending to officers as high in some instances as colonel,
that they will not attack breastworks." [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. lii. pt. ii. p. 730. This letter seems to have come to light
since the first publication of the records of the campaign, and is
found in the supplemental volume.]
In the correspondence between Johnston and the Confederate
government regarding the numerical force of his army, he naturally
emphasized his inferiority to Sherman in numbers as an explanation
of his cautious defensive tactics and his retreating movements. The
introduction into the Southern returns of a column of "effectives"
as distinguished from the number of officers and men "present for
duty," [Footnote: _Ante_, vol. i. p. 482.] led to a habitual
underestimate by their commanding officers. On several occasions
Johnston defended his conduct of the campaign by asserting that his
army was less than half the size of Sherman's, [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 795.] and this necessarily led to
an examination of his returns. These regular numerical reports are
of course the ultimate authority in all disputes, and we find the
Richmond government doing just what the historian has to
do,--comparing the estimates of the general with his official
returns. Officers of all grades and of the highest character fall
into the error of memory which modifies facts according to one's
wish and feeling. Thus at the beginning of this campaign we find
General Bragg, speaking for the President, saying that General
Polk's "estimates and his official returns vary materially."
[Footnote: _Id._, vol. lii. pt. ii. p. 659.] Nobody could be freer
from intentional misstatement than the good bishop-general. We find
the same discrepancies at the East as well as the West. Lee,
Jackson, Longstreet, and their subordinates fall into the same
error. It is therefore the canon of all criticism on this subject,
that nothing but the statistical returns in the adjutant-general's
office shall be received as proofs of numbers, though, of course,
the returns must be read intelligently.
Conscious of straining every nerve to reinforce the great armies in
the field, Mr. Davis naturally asked what it meant when the army in
Georgia was said to be so weak. General Bragg assisted him with an
analysis of Johnston's last returns. Writing on June 29th, he refers
to the last regular return, that of June 10th, which is the same now
published in the Official Records. In using it, therefore, we agree
with the Confederate government at the time in making it conclusive.
It shows that Johnston's army had present for duty 6538 officers and
63,408 enlisted men, or, in round numbers, was 70,000 strong.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 805; _Id_.,
pt. iii. p. 677.] The "effectives" are given as 60,564; but this, as
we know, is the result of subtracting the number of the officers and
non-commissioned staff from the aggregate present for duty. But in
addition to the troops named, Bragg very properly adds that Johnston
"has at Atlanta a supporting force of reserves and militia,
estimated at from 7000 to 10,000 effective men, half of whom were
actually with Johnston near Marietta." We thus have from Confederate
authorities the proof that the army was nearly 80,000 strong on June
10th, after the first month of the campaign had closed, including
the engagements at Dalton, Resaca, New Hope Church, Dallas, and
Pickett's Mill.
To complete the examination of the same return, it is necessary to
notice that the "aggregate present" is given at 82,413, or 12,500
more than the "present for duty." This includes "extra-duty men,"
such as clerks at headquarters of the organizations from Johnston's
own down to brigades and regiments, men permanently detailed for any
special service, men in arrest, etc. [Footnote: Hood's dispatch of
September 5, _Id_., pt. v. p. 1021; and his Order No. 19, vol.
xxxix. pt. ii. p. 835.] It is here that good administration in an
army seeks to reduce the number of those who are withdrawn from the
fighting ranks, and to make the "aggregate present" agree as closely
as possible with the "present for duty." I shall presently note the
result of such an effort.
Sherman's return of "present for duty" on May 31st, just after Blair
had joined him with the Seventeenth Corps, was the largest of the
campaign, being 112,819. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii.
pt. i. p. 117.] By the end of June it was reduced to 106,070, when
Johnston's was 59,196 without the reserves and militia. [Footnote:
_Id._, pt. iii. p. 679.]
When Hood assumed the command, Bragg visited the army a second time,
and gave new impulse to the effort to increase its effective force.
On July 27th, in a very full report to Mr. Davis, he says, "the
increase by the arrival of extra-duty men and convalescents, etc.,
is about 5000, and more are coming in daily. The return of the 1st
of August will show a gratifying state of affairs." [Footnote:
_Id._, vol. lii. pt. ii. p. 714.] This promise was fulfilled when
that return showed a diminution in the "present for duty," since the
10th of the month, of only 7403, [Footnote: _Id._, vol. xxxviii. pt.
iii. p. 680.] although the period included the bloody engagements of
Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, and Ezra Church.
The Confederate conscription included the whole able-bodied
population, and details as for extra duty were the means by which
physicians, clergymen, civilian office-holders, etc., were exempted
from service in the army. These lists were rigidly scrutinized, and
the laxity which had grown was corrected as far as possible. The
aggregate of Hood's army, "present and absent," on August 1st, was
135,000, though his "aggregate present" was only 65,000. [Footnote:
_Ibid._] It included, of course, prisoners of war, deserters, and
men otherwise missing, besides the class last mentioned. The extent
to which the efforts to bring back absentees succeeded, is shown by
the return for September 20th, when the aggregate of the "present
and absent" falls to 123,000, [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxviii. pt. iii. p. 637.] though the "present for duty" are almost
as numerous as at the end of July. The difference of 12,000 shows
how many were added to the army in this way, and these are in
addition to the thousands which Bragg spoke of as gained by
transferring non-combatants present with the army to the list of
those present for duty.
It is only by examining Hood's returns in this way that they become
intelligible, for his rolls of those present for duty hardly
diminish at all during the whole month of August, being 51,793 on
the 1st, 51,946 on the 10th, and 51,141 on the 31st. [Footnote:
_Id_., pp. 680-683.] On September 10th he reports 46,149, and on the
20th 47,431, the first of these returns including his losses in the
final combats of the campaign and the fall of Atlanta, and the
latter indicating a gain by the exchange of prisoners with General
Sherman. [Footnote: _Id_., vol. xxxix. pt. ii. pp. 828, 850.] By
ignoring all the additions to his fighting force from the sources
which I have enumerated, Hood was able to claim that his total
losses while in command of the army were 5247. [Footnote: _Id_.,
vol. xxxviii. pt. iii. p. 636.] The absurdity was indicated by
Hardee, who replied in his official report that the losses in his
own corps, which was only one third of the army, "considerably
exceeded 7000" during the same period. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 702.]
Sherman's returns show a steady diminution of his available numbers
during July and August, though, as he himself has said, it was not
altogether from casualties on the battlefield and the diseases of
the camp. [Footnote: Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 134.] The term of service
of all the troops enlisted in the spring and summer of 1861 for
three years was now ended, and an interval occurred in which the new
levies under the law to enforce the draft had not yet reached the
field, and the army was depleted by the return home of the regiments
which had not "veteranized" in the last winter. He had present for
duty, on July 31st, 91,675 officers and men; on August 31st, 81,758.
Sherman's statement of his losses in battle and his comparison of
them with his opponents is a model of candor and fairness. With the
light we now have, he might properly have increased considerably his
estimate of Johnston's casualties. [Footnote: Memoirs, vol. ii. pp.
131-136.]
General Hood was quite right in arguing, in his memoirs, that the
wounded in a campaign are not all a permanent loss to an army,
"since almost all the slightly wounded, proud of their scars, soon
return to the ranks." [Footnote: Advance and Retreat, p. 217.] But
what I have said above shows that he was entirely astray when he
concluded that the difference in the returns of his effective force
at the beginning and end of the campaign would show the number of
killed and permanently disabled. The absence of data as to the
additions to his field force through the means which I have
analyzed, shows how absurd a result was drawn from his premises. The
reports of casualties are not unfrequently faulty, but with all
their faults they would be much more valuable if a complete series
existed which could be compared and tested. It would require a
minute examination of all returns, from companies to divisions, to
determine accurately how many men returned to duty after being
wounded or captured. The imperfect state of the Confederate archives
would prevent this, if it were otherwise practicable. The
statistical returns are conclusive for what they actually give, but
inferences from them must be drawn with care. As an illustration (in
addition to those already given) it may be noted that the
Confederate cavalry made no returns of casualties or losses, and
they do not appear at all in the Medical Director's report which
General Hood makes the basis of his own assertions. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iii. p. 687.] How grave an
omission this is will be partly seen from the fact that Wheeler's
corps, which reported 8000 men present for duty on August 1st (the
last return made), was in such condition when he reached Tuscumbia
after the raid in the rear of Sherman's army, that its
adjutant-general doubted if more than 1000 men could be got
together. [Footnote: Letter of General Forrest to General Taylor,
Sept. 20, 1864, Official Records, vol. xxxix. pt. ii. p. 859.]
The use of the cavalry in "raids," which were the fashion, was an
amusement that was very costly to both sides. Since Stuart's ride
round McClellan's army in 1862, every cavalry commander, National
and Confederate, burned to distinguish himself by some such
excursion deep into the enemy's country, and chafed at the
comparatively obscured but useful work of learning the detailed
positions and movements of the opposing army by incessant outpost
and patrol work in the more restricted theatre of operations of the
campaign.
From Chattanooga to the Chattahoochee, good work was done by
Stoneman and McCook in scouting upon the front and flanks of the
army, and by Colonel Lowe in vigilant guard of the railway close in
rear of Sherman's movements; but the use of mounted troops in mass
was not satisfactory, and as to the raids on both sides, the game
was never worth the candle. Men and horses were used up, wholesale,
without doing any permanent damage to the enemy, and never reached
that training of horse and man which might have been secured by
steady and systematic attention to their proper duties. Forrest, of
the Confederates, was the only cavalry officer whom Sherman thought
at all formidable, and he showed his high estimate of him by
offering, in his sweeping way, to secure the promotion of the
officer who should defeat and kill him. In another form he expressed
the same idea, by saying he would swap all the cavalry officers he
had for Forrest. [Footnote: The matter took an odd turn, when on the
report that General Mower had defeated Forrest in West Tennessee and
that the brilliant cavalry leader had fallen in the action, Mower
got his promotion, but it turned out that it was Forrest's brother,
a colonel, who was killed--"a horse of another color." Mower,
however, was worthy of promotion "on general principles." See
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 471; vol. xxxix. pt. i. p.
228; _Id_., pt. ii. pp. 130, 142, 219, 233.]
High as was the National estimate of the importance of Sherman's
campaign, Southern men rated it and its consequences quite as high
as we did. In the conferences at Richmond, at which Mr. Hill had
represented the strong desire of Governor Brown and General Johnston
for reinforcements, Mr. Davis had made his apprehension of the
disastrous results which would follow the loss of Atlanta the reason
of his urgency for a more aggressive campaign. In closing the
interviews, Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War, and Mr. Hill showed
their sense of the importance of the crisis by exchanging letters
which were diplomatic memoranda of the conversations. Mr. Hill
repeated his conviction that the fate of the Confederacy hung upon
the campaign. He said that the failure of Johnston's army involved
that of Lee; that not only Atlanta but Richmond must fall; not only
Georgia but all the States would be overrun; that all hopes of
possible foreign recognition would be destroyed; in short, that "all
is lost by Sherman's success, and all is gained by Sherman's
defeat." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. lii. pt. ii. p. 706.]
Governor Brown had accompanied Mr. Hill's effort by a dispatch in
which he declared that Atlanta was to the Confederacy "almost as
important as the heart is to the human body." [Footnote: _Id_., p.
680.] So far from taking exception to these strong expressions, Mr.
Davis based his action in regard to General Johnston upon the
absolute necessity of a military policy in Georgia, which would hold
Atlanta at all hazards. When the city fell, the whole South as well
as the North knew that a decisive step had been taken toward the
defeat of the rebellion.