I suggested that if he owed the money he was clearly “entitled” to pay.

“Well,” he continued, “I thowt as I should ’ave a summons first.”

“But you must have had a summons,” I said, “or how did you get here?”

“’E towd me case wor on,” he said, pointing to the Plaintiff, “so I coom.”

I looked up matters and discovered that service of the summons was duly

reported, and informed the Defendant, who seemed much relieved.

“You see,” he said, “I’m no scholard, and we got a paaper left at our

’ouse, and I took it up to Bill Thomas in our street, a mon as con read,

an’ ’e looks at it, an’ says as ’ow may be it’s a coolvert paaper. ‘I’m

not certain,’ ’e says, ‘but I think it’s a coolvert paaper.’ So I asks

him what to do wi’ it, and he says, ‘Put a cross on it, and put it in a

pillar box,’ and that wor done. But if you say it wor a summons, Bill

must a bin wrong.”

One can gather something from this poor fellow’s difficulties of the

trouble that a summons of any kind must cause in a domestic household,

and one can only hope for the day when England will follow the example of

other civilised countries and at least do away with the judgment summons

and imprisonment for debt.

The hundred judgment summonses will have taken us until about eleven

o’clock, and meanwhile in an adjoining Court the Registrar has been

dealing with a list of about four hundred cases. The bulk of these are

undefended, and the Registrar enters up judgment and makes orders

against the Defendant to pay the debt by instalments at so much a month.

A small percentage—say from five to ten per cent. of the cases—are sent

across to the Judge’s Court for trial, and small knots of folk come into

Court to take the seats vacated by the judgment debtors and wait for the

trials to come on.

The trial of a County Court action on a black-letter day, where Plaintiff

and Defendant appear in person, where neither understands law, evidence,

or procedure, and where the main object of each party is to overwhelm

his opponent by a reckless fire of irrelevant statements, is not easy

to conduct with suavity and dignity. The chief object of a County Court

Judge, as it seems to me—I speak from many years’ experience—should be

to suffer fools gladly without betraying any suspicion that he considers

himself wise. Ninety-nine per cent. of the cases are like recurring

decimals. They have happened, and will happen again and again. The same

defence is raised under the same circumstances. To the shallow-witted

Defendant it is an inspiration of mendacity, to the Judge it is a

commonplace and expected deceit. All prisoners in a Police Court who

are found with stolen goods upon them tell you that they have bought

them from a man whose name they do not know. There is no copyright in

such a defence, and it sounds satisfactory to each succeeding publisher

of it. No doubt it is disappointing to find that the judge and jury

have heard it before and are not disposed to believe it. In the same

way in the County Court there are certain lines of defence that I feel

sure students of folk-lore could tell us were put forward beneath the

oak trees when the Druids sat in County Courts in prehistoric times.

The serious difficulty lies in continuing to believe that a Defendant

may arise who actually has a defence, and in discovering and rescuing a

specimen of a properly defended action from a crowded museum of antique

mendacities. Counter-claims, for instance, which of course are only filed

in the bigger cases, are very largely imaginative. The betting against

a valid counter-claim must be at least ten to one. It is, of course, in

finding the one that there is scope for ingenuity. It is the necessity

for constant alertness that makes the work interesting.

The women are the best advocates. Here, for instance, is a case in point.

A woman Plaintiff with a shawl over her head comes into the box, and an

elderly collier, the Defendant, is opposite to her. The action is brought

for nine shillings. I ask her to state her case.

“I lent yon mon’s missus my mon’s Sunday trousers to pay ’is rent, an’ I

want ’em back.”

That seems to me, as a matter of pleading, as crisp and sound as can be.

If the trousers had been worth five hundred pounds, a barrister would

have printed several pages of statement of claim over them, but could

not have stated his case better. My sympathies are with the lady. I know

well the kindness of the poor to each other, and, won by the businesslike

statement of the case, I turn round to the Defendant and ask him why the

trousers are not returned and what his defence may be.

He smiles and shakes his head. He is a rough, stupid fellow, and

something amuses him. I ask him to stop chuckling and tell me his defence.

“There’s nowt in it all,” is his answer.

I point out that this is vague and unsatisfactory, and that the words do

not embody any defence to an action of detinue known to the law.

He is not disturbed. The lady gazes at him triumphantly. He is a slow

man, and casually mentions “The ’ole street knows about them trousers.”

I point out to him that I have never lived in the street, and know

nothing about it. He seems to disbelieve this and says with a chuckle,

“Everyone knows about them trousers.”

I press him to tell me the story, but he can scarcely believe that I do

not know all about it. At length he satisfies my curiosity.

“Why yon woman an’ my missus drank them trousers.”

The woman vociferates, desires to be struck dead and continues to live,

but bit by bit the story is got at. Two ladies pawn the husband’s

trousers, and quench an afternoon’s thirst with the proceeds. The owner

of the Sunday trousers is told by his wife a story of destitution and

want of rent, and the generous loan of garments. Every one in the street

but the husband enjoys the joke. The indignant husband, believing in

his wife, sues for the trousers and sends his wife to Court. The street

comes down to see the fun, and when I decide for the Defendant there is

an uprising of men, women, and babies, and the parties and their friends

disappear while we call the next case. These are the little matters where

it is easy to make a blunder, and where patience and attention and a

knowledge of the ways and customs of the “’ole street” are worth much

legal learning.

One must learn to sympathise with domestic frailties. I was rebuking

a man, the other day, for backing up his wife in what was not only an

absurd story, but one in which I could see he had no belief.

“You should really be more careful,” I said, “and I tell you candidly I

don’t believe a word of your wife’s story.”

“You may do as yer like,” he said, mournfully, “but I’ve got to.”

The sigh of envy at the comparative freedom of my position as compared

with his own was full of pathos.

A case of a workman who was being sued for lodging money gave me a new

insight into the point of view of the clever but dissipated workman. His

late landlady was suing for arrears run up when, as she said, he was “out

of work.”

The phrase made him very angry.

“Look ’ere,” he said, “can that wumman kiss the book agen? She’s swearin’

false. I’ve never been out o’ wark i’ my life. Never.”

“Tummas,” says the old lady, in a soothingly irritating voice. “Think,

Tummas.”

“Never been out o’ wark i’ my life,” he shouts.

“Oh, Tummas,” says the old lady, more in sorrow than in anger. “You

remember Queen’s funeral. You were on the spree a whole fortneet.”

“Oh, ay!” says Thomas unabashed; “but you said out o’ wark. If you’re

sayin’ on the spree I’m with yer, but I’ve never been out o’ wark i’ my

life.”

It was a sad distinction for a clever working man to make, but a true one

and to him an important one, and I rather fancy the nice old lady knew

well what she was doing in her choice of phrase and hoped to score off

Thomas by irritating him into an unseemly exhibition by the use of it.

A class of case that becomes very familiar arises out of the sale of

a small business. A fried-fish shop is regarded by an enterprising

widow who does not possess one as a mine of untold gold. She purchases

one at a price above its value, fails from want of knowledge to

conduct it successfully, and then brings an action for fraudulent

misrepresentation against the seller. Of course, there are cases of fraud

and misrepresentation; but, as a rule, there is nothing more than the

natural optimistic statements of a seller followed by incompetence of the

purchaser and the disgust of old customers. In a case of this sort, in

which up to a point it was difficult to know where the truth lay, owing

to the vague nature of the evidence, a graphic butcher gave a convincing

account of the reason of the failure of the new management. He had come

down to the Court in the interests of justice, leaving the abattoir—or as

he called it “habbitoyre”—on his busiest morning.

“Yer see,” he said, “I knew the old shop well. I was in the ’abit of

takin’ in a crowd of my pals on Saturday neet. So when the old Missus

gave it up, I promised to give it a try wi’ the new Missus. Well, I went

in twice, an’ there wor no sort o’ choice at all. There worn’t no penny

fish, what there wor, wor ’a-penny fish, and bad at that, an’ the chips

wor putty.”

It was obvious that the Plaintiff had started on a career for which

Nature did not intend her, and that the cause of the failure of

the business was not the fraud of the Defendant, but the culinary

incompetence of the Plaintiff.

It is amazing how, apart altogether from perjury, two witnesses will

give entirely different accounts of the same matter. No doubt there is a

great deal of reckless evidence given and some perjury committed, but a

great deal of the contradictory swearing arises from “natural causes,”

as it were. A man is very ready to take sides, and discusses the facts

of a case with his friend until he remembers more than he ever saw. In

“running down” cases, where the witnesses are often independent folk

and give their own evidence their own way, widely different testimony

is given about the same event. One curious circumstance I have noticed

in “running down” cases is that a large percentage of witnesses give

evidence against the vehicle coming towards them. That is to say, if a

man is walking along, and a brougham is in front of him and going the

same way as he is, and a cab coming in the opposite direction collides

with the brougham, I should expect that man to give evidence against

the cab. I suppose the reason of that is that to a man so situated the

brougham appears stationary and the cab aggressively dangerous, but

whatever the reason may be the fact is very noticeable.

On the whole the uneducated man in the street is a better witness of

outdoor facts than the clerk or warehouseman. The outdoor workers have,

I fancy, a more retentive memory for things seen, and are more observant

than the indoor workers. They do not want to refresh their memory with

notes.

A story is told of a blacksmith who came to the farriery classes held

by the Manchester Education authorities. The clerk in charge gave him a

notebook and a pencil.

“Wot’s this ’ere for?” asks the blacksmith.

“To take notes,” replied the clerk.

“Notes? Wot sort o’ notes?”

“Why, anything that the lecturer says which you think important and want

to remember, you make a note of it,” said the clerk.

“Oh,” was the scornful reply, “anything I want to remember I must make

a note of in this ’ere book, must I? Then wot do you think my blooming

yed’s for?”

It is the use and exercise of the “blooming yed” that makes the

Lancashire workman the strong character he is. May it be long before

the mother wit inside it is dulled by the undue use of the scholastic

notebook.

Witnesses are often discursive, and the greatest ingenuity is devoted

to keeping them to the point without breaking the thread of their

discourse. Only long practice and a certain instinct which comes from

having undergone many weary hours of listening can give you the knack of

getting the pith and marrow of a witness’s story without the domestic and

genealogical details with which he—and especially she—desires to garnish

it.

I remember soon after I took my seat on the bench having an amusing

dialogue with a collier. He had been sued for twelve shillings for three

weeks’ rent. One week he admitted, and the week in lieu of notice,

which leads to more friction between landlord and tenant than any other

incident in their contract, was duly wrangled over and decided upon. Then

came the third week, and the collier proudly handed in four years’ rent

books to show nothing else was owing. The landlord’s agent pointed out

that two years back a week’s rent was missing, and sure enough in the

rent book was the usual cross instead of a four, showing that no rent had

been paid for that week.

“How did that week come to be missed?” I asked the collier.

“I’ll never pay that week,” he said, shaking his head stubbornly. “Not

laikely.”

“But,” I said, “I’m afraid you’ll have to. You see you admit it’s owing.”

“Well, I’ll just tell yer ’ow it was. You see we wor ’aving rabbit for

supper, an’ my wife——”

He looked as if he was settling down for a long yarn, so I interposed:

“Never mind about the rabbit, tell me about the rent.”

“I’m telling yer. Yer see we wor ’aving rabbit for supper, an’ my wife

’ad got a noo kettle, an’ we don’t ’ave rabbit every——”

“Oh, come, come,” I said impatiently, “just tell me about the rent.”

He looked at me rather contemptuously, and began again at the very

beginning.

“I’m telling yer, if yer’ll only listen. We wor ’aving rabbit for supper,

an’ my wife ’ad got a noo kettle, an’ we don’t ’ave rabbit every neet for

supper, an’ my wife ’ad just put the kettle, the noo kettle——”

“Oh, never mind about the kettle, do please get to the rent,” I said, and

was immediately sorry I had spoken.

“I’m getting to it, ain’t I?” he asked, rather angrily. “We wor ’aving

rabbit for supper”—I groaned inwardly and resolved to sit it out without

another word—“an’ my wife ’ad got a noo kettle, an’ we don’t ’ave rabbit

every neet for supper, an’ my wife ’ad just put the kettle—the noo kettle

with the rabbit—on to th’ fire, when down coom chimley an’ aw into middle

o’ room. Was I going to pay rent for that week? Not laikely!”

It turned out that I was wholly in the wrong, and that the destruction

of the rabbit was a kind of equitable plea in defence to the action for

rent. When I am tempted now to burst in too soon upon an irrelevant

story, I think of the rabbit and am patient. Of course all rabbit stories

are not even equitable defences, but the diagnosis of what is purely

domestic and dilatory and of what is apparently anecdotal but in reality

relevant gives a distinct charm to one’s daily work.

One day of my life every month is given up to the trial of Yiddish cases.

The Yiddisher is a litigious person, and his best friend would not

describe him as a very accurate witness. One ought to remember, however,

that he has not had generations of justice administered to him, that he

is a child and beginner in a court of law, and that the idea of a judge

listening to his story and deciding for him upon the evidence is, in

some cases from personal experience and in all cases from hereditary

instinct, an utterly unfamiliar thing. The fact, too, that he speaks

Yiddish, or very broken English, and never answers a question except

by asking another, always gives his evidence an indirect flavour. One

strong point about a Yiddisher is his family affection, and he swears in

tribes, so to speak. A Christian in a family dispute will too often swear

anything against his brother, and is often wickedly reckless in his sworn

aspersions. A Yiddisher, on the other hand, will swear anything for his

brother, and most Yiddish evidence could be discounted by an accurate

percentage according to the exact relationship by blood or marriage of

the witness to the Plaintiff or Defendant.

It is needless to say a foreign-speaking race such as this gives one some

anxiety and trouble in a small-debt court. One of my earliest Yiddish

experiences was a case in which two Yiddishers each brought his own

interpreter. A small scrap of paper cropped up in the case with some

Hebrew writing on it. One interpreter swore it was a receipt, the other

that it was an order for a new pair of boots. Without knowing anything of

Hebrew, it occurred to me that these divergent readings were improbable.

The case was adjourned. I applied to some of my friends on that excellent

body, the Jewish Board of Guardians, a respectable interpreter was

obtained, and the Hebrew document properly translated. There is now an

official interpreter attached to the Manchester Court, and I think I can

safely congratulate the Yiddish community on a distinct improvement in

their education in the proper use of English law courts.

That some of them have the very vaguest notions of the principles on

which we administer justice may be seen from the following story which

happened some years ago. A little flashy Yiddish jeweller who spoke very

bad English, had taken out a judgment summons against an old man who

appeared broken down in health and pocket. I asked the little man for

evidence of means which would justify me in committing the debtor to

prison.

“Vell,” he says, “I vill tell you. He ish in a very larsh vay of pizness

indeed. He has zree daughters vorking for him and several hands as vell,

and zare is a great deal of monish coming into ze house.”

The old man told a sad story of ill-health, loss of business, and said

that his daughters had to keep him. It turned out that there was a

Yiddish gentleman in Court, Mr. X., who knew him, and Mr. X. corroborated

the defendant’s story in every particular. He had had a good business,

but was now being kept by his daughters, having broken down in health.

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