Official History of the Conquest of Manila.
The Pith of the Official Reports of the Capture of Manila, by
Major-General Wesley Merritt, Commanding the Philippine Expedition;
General Frank V. Greene, General Arthur McArthur, and General
Thomas Anderson, With the Articles of Capitulation, Showing How
8,000 Americans Carried an Intrenched City With a Garrison of 13,000
Spaniards, and Kept Out 14,000 Insurgents--The Difficulties of American
Generals With Philippine Troops.
One of the most interesting events in the records of the fall of
cities, that carried with them decisive factors affecting nations,
is that of the conquest of Manila, by the army and navy of the United
States in the memorable year of 1898. The victory of Admiral George
Dewey May 1st, in the bay of Manila, nigh Cavite, has been celebrated
in every clime and in all languages, and the great story if related
in this book as one of universal fame, and given in outline and
also in pen pictures meant to show the local coloring, and these are
incidents most illustrative that are not familiar. The names of the
ships and the officers of the victorious fleet, and the force of the
contending squadrons in men and guns are herewith presented as an
indisputable record.
Admiral Dewey held on to his command of the bay and city of Manila,
braving all dangers--and they were many--and as fast as the army could
be organized and equipped, reinforcements were forwarded. General
Wesley Merritt was appointed the Commander in Chief of the expedition
to the Philippines, and arrived at Cavite, July 25th. The official
history of the operations that forced the surrender of the old Spanish
capital in the East Indies has not received the public attention its
unusual and instructive character demands, because the reports were
not received in the States and given to the public until the Paris
peace commission was assembling, and this singularly suggestive
detail has been almost neglected. It is here for the first time
consecutively arranged, annotated and adjusted, so as to tell the
whole story. The part played by the insurgents is one that has not
been stated by authority and with precision combining narrative form
with the internal evidence of authenticity.
The first expeditionary force of the United States to arrive was
that of General Thomas Anderson, on June 30, sixty days after Dewey's
victory. The second expeditionary force, under General Frank V. Greene,
arrived July 17, and the third, under General McArthur, July 30th,
five days later than General Merritt, who found Rear Admiral George
Dewey's war ships "anchored in line off Cavite, and just outside of the
transports and supply vessels engaged in the military service." He was
"in full control of the navigation of the bay, and his vessels passed
and repassed within range of the water batteries of the town of Manila
without drawing the fire of the enemy." This immunity of protected
cruisers from the fire of nine-inch Krupp guns with an abundance of
ammunition that was, and some that was not serviceable, was due to
the terrible prestige of the American Admiral and the consequent power
of his word that if fired upon he would destroy the city. Anderson's
Americans were, General Merritt reports, disposed as follows:
The Second Oregon, detachments of California Heavy Artillery,
Twenty-third Infantry, and Fourteenth Infantry occupied the town of
Cavite; while Brigadier General F.V. Greene, United States Volunteers,
was encamped with his brigade, consisting of the Eighteenth Infantry,
Third United States Artillery, Company A, Engineer Battalion, First
Colorado, First California, First Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania, and
Batteries A and B of the Utah Artillery, along the line of the bay
shore near the village of Paranaque, about five miles by water and
twenty-five miles by the roads from Cavite.
The Major General commanding visited General Greene's camp and made
a reconnaissance of the position held by the Spanish, and also the
opposing lines of the insurgent forces, finding General Greene's
command encamped on a strip of sandy land running parallel to the shore
of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the great
difficulties of landing supplies "the greater portion of the force had
shelter tents only, and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being
in a low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical
sun or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so
frequent at this season." The General commanding was at once struck
"by the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown
by the officers and men under such circumstances, and this feeling of
admiration for the manner in which the American soldier, volunteer
and regular alike, accept the necessary hardships of the work they
have undertaken to do, has grown and increased with every phase of
the difficult and trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine
expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion."
The left or north flanks of General Green's camp extended to a point
on the "Calle Real," about 3,200 yards from the outer line of Spanish
defenses of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at the powder
magazine, or old fort San Antonio, within a hundred yards of the
beach and just south of the Malate suburb of Manila, and stretched
away to the Spanish left in more or less detached works, eastward,
through swamps and rice fields, covering all the avenues of approach
to the town and encircling the city completely."
General Merritt defines with firmness and perspicuity his position
regarding the Filipinos in these terms:
"The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain, had, prior
to the arrival of the American land forces, been waging desultory
warfare with the Spaniards for several months, and were at the time
of my arrival in considerable force, variously estimated and never
accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men. These
troops, well supplied with small arms, with plenty of ammunition and
several field guns, had obtained positions of investment opposite to
the Spanish line of detached works throughout their entire extent; and
on the particular road called the "Calle Real," passing along the front
of General Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila,
the insurgents had established an earthwork or trench within 800 yards
of the powder-magazine fort. They also occupied as well the road to
the right, leading from the village of Passay, and the approach by the
beach was also in their possession. This anomalous state of affairs,
namely, having a line of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces
and the Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it
was difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar condition of our
relations with the insurgents, which may be briefly stated as follows:
"Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay, the principal leader of
the insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, came to Cavite from Hongkong,
and, with the consent of our naval authorities, began active work in
raising troops and pushing the Spaniards in the direction of the city
of Manila. Having met with some success, and the natives flocking to
his assistance, he proclaimed an independent government of republican
form, with himself as president, and at the time of my arrival in the
islands the entire edifice of executive and legislative departments
and subdivision of territory for administration purposes had been
accomplished, at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military
possession of many points in the islands other than those in the
vicinity of Manila.
"As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival, nor offer his
services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from
the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the
American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the military
occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the
political condition of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to
hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should
be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until
then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority,
in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.
"For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were
pressed, and military operations conducted without reference to the
situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was
subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops of
my command carried the Spanish intrenchments, extending from the
sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under
no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to
the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents,
but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs."
General Anderson was the first officer of the American army to arrive,
and says Admiral Dewey gave him "every possible assistance," and
favored him "with a clear statement of the situation." On the second
day after he appeared at Cavite, which was one day after General
Merritt's departure from San Francisco, he had "an interview with
the insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, and learned from him that the Spanish
forces had withdrawn, driven back by his army as he claimed, to a line
of defense immediately around the city and its suburbs. He estimated
the Spanish forces at about 14,000 men, and his own at about the same
number. He did not seem pleased at the incoming of our land forces,
hoping, as I believe, that he could take the city with his own army,
with the co-operation of the American fleet.
"Believing that however successful the insurgents may have been in
guerilla warfare against the Spaniards, that they could not carry their
lines by assault or reduce the city by siege, and suspecting, further,
that a hearty and effective co-operation could not be expected, I
had at once a series of reconnaissances made to exactly locate the
enemy's lines of defense and to ascertain their strength."
The date of the impression made on General Anderson's mind as to
the displeasure of Aguinaldo is important. The insurgent chief would
have preferred the military distinctions to have been reserved for
himself. General Anderson says of the Spanish attacks on General
Greene's lines:
"These conflicts began on the night of July 31, as soon as the
enemy had realized that we had taken the places of the Filipinos,
and began a system of earthworks to the front of their old line. It
may have been merely coincident, but these attacks and sorties began
at the time the Captain General of Manila was relieved by his second
in command. For more than six weeks the insurgents had kept up a
bickering infantry fire on the Spanish trenches, firing occasionally
some old siege pieces captured by Admiral Dewey at Cavite and given
to Aguinaldo. These combats were never serious, and the Spaniards,
so far as I know, made no sorties upon them. But there is no doubt
of the fact that the Spaniards attacked our lines with force and
vindictiveness, until they were informed that the bringing on of a
general engagement would lead to a bombardment of the city. After
this there was for several days a tacit suspension of hostilities."
As to the situation of General Greene, Brigadier General Merritt says:
"The difficulty in gaining an avenue of approach to the Spanish line
lay in the fact of my disinclination to ask General Aguinaldo to
withdraw from the beach and the 'Calle Real,' so that Greene could
move forward. This was overcome by instructions to General Greene
to arrange, if possible, with the insurgent brigade commander in
his immediate vicinity to move to the right and allow the American
forces unobstructed control of the roads in their immediate front. No
objection was made, and accordingly General Greene's brigade threw
forward a heavy outpost line on the "Calle Real" and the beach and
constructed a trench, in which a portion of the guns of the Utah
batteries was placed.
"The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very sharp
attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31. The
behavior of our troops during this night attack was all that could
be desired, and I have, in cablegrams to the War Department, taken
occasion to commend by name those, who deserve special mention for
good conduct in the affair. Our position was extended and strengthened
after this and resisted successfully repeated night attacks, our forces
suffering, however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the
losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be ascertained.
"The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for outpost
duty made it imperative to re-enforce General Greene's troops with
General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived in transports on
the 31st of July. The difficulties of this operation can hardly be
overestimated. The transports were at anchor off Cavite, five miles
from a point on the beach where it was desired to disembark the
men. Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged day after
day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies ashore was to
load them from the ship's side into native lighters (called 'cascos')
or small steamboats, move them to a point opposite the camp, and then
disembark them through the surf in small boats, or by running the
lighters head on to the beach. The landing was finally accomplished,
after days of hard work and hardship; and I desire here to express
again my admiration for the fortitude and cheerful willingness of
the men of all commands engaged in this operation.
"Upon the assembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's,
I had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time
had come for final action. During the time of the night attacks I
had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he would allow his
ships to open fire on the right of the Spanish line of intrenchments,
believing that such action would stop the night firing and loss of
life, but the Admiral had declined to order it unless we were in danger
of losing our position by the assaults of the Spanish, for the reason
that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for
which he was not ready. Now, however, the brigade of General MacArthur
was in position and the Monterey had arrived, and under date of August
6 Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint
letter to the Captain General notifying him that he should remove
from the city all non-combatants within forty-eight hours."
The joint note of General Merritt and Admiral Dewey was as follows:
_Headquarters U.S. Land and Naval Forces_,
Manila Bay,
Philippine Islands,
August 7, 1898.
The General in Chief Commanding Spanish Forces in Manila.
Sir: We have the honor to notify your excellency that operations of
the land and naval forces of the United States against the defenses
of Manila may begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eight
hours from the hour of receipt by you of this communication, or sooner
if made necessary by an attack on your part.
This notice is given in order to afford you an opportunity to remove
all non-combatants from the city.
Very respectfully,
_Wesley Merritt_, Major-General, United States Army, Commanding Land
Forces of the United States.
_George Dewey_, Rear-Admiral, United States Navy, Commanding United
States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station.
The notable words in this are those "against the defenses of Manila,"
instead of against the city itself--the usual way--the city was to
be spared if possible.
Manila, August 7, 1898.
The Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines to the
Major-General of the Army and the Rear Admiral of the Navy, commanding,
respectively, the Military and Naval Forces of the United States.
Gentlemen: I have the honor to inform your excellencies that at
half-past 12 to-day I received the notice with which you favor me,
that after forty-eight hours have elapsed you may begin operations
against this fortified city, or at an earlier hour if the forces
under your command are attacked by mine.
As your notice is sent for the purpose of providing for the safety
of non-combatants, I give thanks to your excellencies for the humane
sentiment you have shown, and state that, finding myself surrounded
by insurrectionary forces, I am without places of refuge for the
increased numbers of wounded, sick, women, and children who are now
lodged within the walls.
Very respectfully, and kissing the hands of your excellencies,
_Formire Jaudenes_, Governor-General and Captain-General of the
Philippines.
The second paragraph of the Governor-General and Captain-General's
letter indicates a sense of helplessness, and credits the insurgents
with surrounding the city so that there was no refuge. August 9th
there was a second joint note from Major-General Merritt and Rear
Admiral Dewey, in the terms following:
"The Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines.
"Sir: The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded, sick, women,
and children, in the event that it becomes our duty to reduce the
defenses of the walled town in which they are gathered, will, we feel
assured, appeal successfully to the sympathies of a general capable of
making the determined and prolonged resistance which your excellency
has exhibited after the loss of your naval forces and without hope
of succor.
"We therefore, submit, without prejudice to the high sentiments of
honor and duty which your excellency entertains, that surrounded on
every side as you are by a constantly increasing force, with a powerful
fleet in your front and deprived of all prospect of reinforcement and
assistance, a most useless sacrifice of life would result in the event
of an attack, and therefore every consideration of humanity makes it
imperative that you should not subject your city to the horrors of
a bombardment. Accordingly, we demand the surrender of the city of
Manila and the Spanish forces under your command."
The Captain-General wanted time to hear from Madrid, and was refused.
The language of General Greene, in stating the fact that he took
possession of the intrenchments of the insurgents, is in these words:
"On the morning of July 29, in compliance with verbal instructions
received the previous day from the Adjutant-General of the Eighth
Army Corps, I occupied the insurgent trenches, from the beach to the
Calle Real, with one battalion Eighteenth United States Infantry,
one battalion First Colorado Infantry, and four guns--two from each
of the Utah batteries--these trenches being vacated at my request
by the insurgent forces under Brigadier-General Noriel. As these
trenches were badly located and insufficient in size and strength,
I ordered another line constructed about 100 yards in advance of
them, and this work was completed, mainly by the First Colorado,
during the night of July 29-30. The length of this line was only
270 yards, and on its right were a few barricades, not continuous,
occupied by the insurgents, extending over to the large rice swamp,
just east of the road from Pasay to Paco (shown on the accompanying
map). Facing these was a strong Spanish line, consisting of a stone
fort, San Antonio de Abad, near the beach, intrenchments of sandbags
and earth about seven feet high and 10 feet thick, extending in a
curved direction for about 1,200 yards and terminating in a fortified
blockhouse, known as No 14, beyond our right on the Pasay road. It
faced our front and enveloped our right flank."
General Greene, reporting the fighting on his front, says of the
Spanish position and first attack.
Mounted in and near the stone fort were seven guns in all, viz.,
three bronze field guns of 3.6 inches caliber, four bronze mountain
guns of 3.2 inches caliber, and in the vicinity of Blockhouse No. 14
were two steel mountain guns of 3.2 inches caliber. The line was
manned throughout its length by infantry, with strong reserves at
Malate and at the walled city in its rear.
Shortly before midnight of July 31-August 1 the Spaniards opened
a heavy and continuous fire with both artillery and infantry from
their entire line. Our trenches were occupied that day by the two
battalions of the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, one foot battery (H),
nearly 200 strong, of the Third Artillery, and four guns, two of
Battery A and two of Battery B, Utah Artillery. For about an hour
and a half the firing on both sides, with artillery and infantry,
was very heavy and continuous, our expenditure of ammunition being
160 rounds of artillery and about 60,000 rounds of infantry. That of
the Spaniards was nearly twice as much.
The American loss was ten killed and forty-three wounded.
General Greene says: "Major Cuthbertson, Tenth Pennsylvania, reports
that the Spaniards left their trenches in force and attempted to
turn our right flank, coming within 200 yards of his position. But as
the night was intensely dark, with incessant and heavy rain, and as
no dead or wounded were found in front of his position at daylight,
it is possible that he was mistaken and that the heavy fire to which
he was subjected came from the trenches near Block House 14, beyond
his right flank, at a distance of about 700 yards. The Spaniards
used smokeless powder, the thickets obscured the flash of their guns,
and the sound of the Mauser bullets penetrating a bamboo pole is very
similar to the crack of the rifle itself.
"This attack demonstrated the immediate necessity of extending our
intrenchments to the right and, although not covered by my instructions
(which were to occupy the trenches from the bay to Calle Real, and to
avoid precipitating an engagement), I ordered the First Colorado and
one battalion of the First California, which occupied the trenches at 9
a. m., August 1, to extend the line of trenches to the Pasay road. The
work was begun by these troops, and continued every day by the troops
occupying the trenches in turn, until a strong line was completed by
August 12, about 1,200 yards in length, extending from the bay to the
east side of the Pasay road. Its left rested on the bay and its right
on an extensive rice swamp, practically impassible. The right flank was
refused, because the only way to cross a smaller rice swamp, crossing
the line about 700 yards from the beach, was along a cross-road in
rear of the general line. As finally completed the works were very
strong in profile, being five to six feet in height and eight to ten
feet in thickness at the base, strengthened by bags filled with earth.
"The only material available was black soil saturated with water,
and without the bags this was washed down and ruined in a day by the
heavy and almost incessant rains. The construction of these trenches
was constantly interrupted by the enemy's fire. They were occupied
by the troops in succession, four battalions being usually sent out
for a service of twenty-four hours, and posted with three battalions
in the trenches, and one battalion in reserve along the crossroad
to Pasay; Cossack posts being sent out from the latter to guard the
camp against any possible surprise from the northeast and east. The
service in the trenches was of the most arduous character, the rain
being almost incessant, and the men having no protection against it;
they were wet during the entire twenty-four hours, and the mud was
so deep that the shoes were ruined and a considerable number of men
rendered barefooted. Until the notice of bombardment was given on
August 7, any exposure above or behind the trenches promptly brought
the enemy's fire, so that the men had to sit in the mud under cover
and keep awake, prepared to resist an attack, during the entire tour
of twenty-four hours.
"After one particularly heavy rain a portion of the trench contained
two feet of water, in which the men had to remain. It could not be
drained, as it was lower than an adjoining rice swamp, in which the
water had risen nearly two feet, the rainfall being more than four
inches in twenty-four hours. These hardships were all endured by
the men of the different regiments in turn, with the finest possible
spirit and without a murmur of complaint."
This is a vivid picture of hard service. General Greene continues:
"August 7 the notice of bombardment after forty-eight hours, or sooner
if the Spanish fire continued, was served, and after that date not
a shot was fired on either side until the assault was made on August
13. It was with great difficulty, and in some cases not without force,
that the insurgents were restrained from opening fire and thus drawing
the fire of the Spaniards during this period.
"Owing to the heavy storm and high surf it was impossible to
communicate promptly with the division commander at Cavite, and I
received my instructions direct from the major-general commanding,
or his staff officers, one of whom visited my camp every day, and I
reported direct to him in the same manner. My instructions were to
occupy the insurgent trenches near the beach, so as to be in a good
position to advance on Manila when ordered, but meanwhile to avoid
precipitating an engagement, not to waste ammunition, and (after August
1) not to return the enemy's fire unless convinced that he had left
his trenches and was making an attack in force. These instructions
were given daily in the most positive terms to the officer commanding
in the trenches, and in the main they were faithfully carried out.
"More ammunition than necessary was expended on the nights of August
2 and 5, but in both cases the trenches were occupied by troops under
fire for the first time, and in the darkness and rain there was ground
to believe that the heavy fire indicated a real attack from outside
the enemy's trenches. The total expenditure of ammunition on our side
in the four engagements was about 150,000 rounds, and by the enemy
very much more.
"After the attack of July 31-August I, I communicated by signal
with the captain of the U. S. S. Raleigh, anchored about 3,000 yards
southwest of my camp, asking if he had received orders in regard to the
action of his ship in case of another attack on my troops. He replied:
"Both Admiral Dewey and General Merritt desire to avoid general action
at present. If attack too strong for you, we will assist you, and
another vessel will come and offer help. "In repeating this message,
Lieutenant Tappan, commanding U. S. S. Callao, anchored nearer the
beach, sent me a box of blue lights, and it was agreed that if I
burned one of these on the beach the Raleigh would at once open fire
on the Spanish fort."
General Merritt speaks of the Colorado skirmishers leaving their
breastworks when the navy ceased firing on the 13th of August, and
advancing swiftly, finding the Spanish trenches deserted, "but as
they passed over the Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from
a second line, situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number
of men were killed and wounded, among others the soldier who pulled
down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own."
General Greene is complimentary to the officers and who conducted
the reconnaissances while he was at Camp Dewey twenty-five days,
and states:
"Captain Grove and Lieutenant Means, of the First Colorado, had been
particularly active in this work and fearless in penetrating beyond
our lines and close to those of the enemy. As the time for attack
approached, these officers made a careful examination of the ground
between our trenches and Fort San Antonio de Abad, and, finally,
on August 11, Major J. F. Bell, United States Volunteer Engineers,
tested the creek in front of this fort and ascertained not only that
it was fordable, but the exact width of the ford at the beach, and
actually swam in the bay to a point from which he could examine the
Spanish line from the rear. With the information thus obtained it was
possible to plan the attack intelligently. The position assigned to
my brigade extended from the beach to the small rice swamp, a front
of about 700 yards.
"After the sharp skirmish on the second line of defense of the
Spaniards, and after Greene's brigade moved through Malate, meeting
a shuffling foe, the open space at the luneta, just south of the
walled city, was reached about 1 p. m. A white flag was flying at the
southwest bastion, and I rode forward to meet it under a heavy fire
from our right and rear on the Paco road. At the bastion I was informed
that officers representing General Merritt and Admiral Dewey were on
their way ashore to receive the surrender, and I therefore turned east
to the Paco road. The firing ceased at this time, and on reaching this
road I found nearly 1,000 Spanish troops who had retreated from Santa
Ana through Paco, and coming up the Paco road had been firing on our
flank. I held the commanding officers, but ordered these troops to
march into the walled city. At this point, the California regiment
a short time before had met some insurgents who had fired at the
Spaniards on the walls, and the latter in returning the fire had
caused a loss in the California regiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded.
"My instructions were to march past the walled city on its surrender,
cross the bridge, occupy the city on the north side of the Pasig,
and protect lives and property there. While the white flag was flying
on the walls yet, very sharp firing had just taken place outside,
and there were from 5,000 to 6,000 men on the walls, with arms in
their hands, only a few yards from us. I did not feel justified
in leaving this force in my rear until the surrender was clearly
established, and I therefore halted and assembled my force, prepared
to force the gates if there was any more firing. The Eighteenth
Infantry and First California were sent forward to hold the bridges
a few yards ahead, but the second battalion, Third Artillery, First
Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania, and First Colorado were all assembled
at this point. While this was being done I received a note from
Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier, of General Merritt's staff, written from
the Captain-General's office within the walls, asking me to stop the
firing outside, as negotiations for surrender were in progress."
And General Greene continues: "I then returned to the troops outside
the walls and sent Captain Birkhimer's battalion of the Third Artillery
down the Paco road to prevent any insurgents from entering. Feeling
satisfied that there would be no attack from the Spanish troops
lining the walls, I put the regiments in motion toward the bridges,
brushing aside a considerable force of insurgents who had penetrated
the city from the direction of Paco, and were in the main street
with their flag expecting to march into the walled city and plant
it on the walls. After crossing the bridges the Eighteenth United
States Infantry was posted to patrol the principal streets near the
bridge, the First California was sent up the Pasig to occupy Quiapo,
San Miguel, and Malacanan, and with the First Nebraska I marched down
the river to the Captain of the Port's office, where I ordered the
Spanish flag hauled down and the American flag raised in its place."
The insurgents were disposed to disregard the white flag and the
process of the capitulation, but "a considerable force" of them
was "brushed aside." General Greene's losses before Manila were 16
killed and 66 wounded: his force 5,100. He remarks: "The resistance
encountered on the 13th was much less than anticipated and planned for,
but had the resistance been greater the result would have been the
same, only the loss would have been greater. Fortunately, the great
result of capturing this city, the seat of Spanish power in the East
for more than three hundred years, was accomplished with a loss of
life comparatively insignificant."
Captain T.B. Mott, detached from General Merritt's temporarily,
served on General Greene's staff, and received this mention:
"In posting troops in the trenches, in making reconnaissances,
in transmitting orders under fire, and in making reports, he has
uniformly exhibited courage, military ability, and sound judgment,
the qualities, in short, which are most valuable in a staff officer."
Captain Bates, Lieutenant Schieflie, and Captain D.F. Millet, artist
and author, are praised for activity, intelligence and valuable
service. Millet was with Greene before Plevna, during the Russo-Turkish
campaign. Greene was appointed the senior member of the committee to
arrange the terms of the capitulation.
General Anderson had instructions to extend his line to crowd
the insurgents out of their trenches with their consent, but this
was not attempted, for that would have brought on an engagement
prematurely. Anderson had purchased wire-cutters with insulated handles
in San Francisco, and they were useful! Anderson had his trenches with
the insurgents. McArthur's division was before a "circulated line of
earthworks faced with sand bags," and the problem of the advance was
made difficult because "we could not be sure whether our first attack
was to be tentative or serious, this depending on action of the navy;
second, from our orders not to displace the insurgents without their
consent from their position to the right of their guns on the Pasay
road. This to the very last the insurgent leaders positively refused
to give. Yet, if we could not go far enough to the right to silence
their field guns and carry that part of their line, they would have
a fatal cross fire on troops attacking blockhouse No. 14. I therefore
directed General MacArthur to put the three 2.10 inch guns of Battery
B, Utah Volunteer Artillery, in the emplacement of the insurgent gun
and to place the Astor Battery behind a high garden wall to the right
of the Pasay road, to be held there subject to orders.
"I assumed that when the action became hot at this point, as I knew
it would be, that the insurgents would voluntarily fall back from
their advanced position, and that the Astor Battery and its supports
could take position without opposition."
General Anderson got a message from General MacArthur. "I knew from
this that he wished to push the insurgents aside and put in the
Astor Battery. I then authorized him to attack, which he did, and,
soon after, the Twenty-third Infantry and the Thirteenth Minnesota
carried the advance line of the enemy in the most gallant manner,
the one gun of the Utah Battery and the Astor Battery lending most
effective assistance."
It was General Anderson's opinion that MacArthur should counter march
and go to Malate by the beach, but he had gone too far, for "the guns
of the Astor Battery had been dragged to the front only after the
utmost exertions, and were about being put into battery. At the same
time I received a telegram stating that the insurgents were threatening
to cross the bamboo bridge on our right; and to prevent this and guard
our ammunition at Pasay, I ordered an Idaho battalion to that point."
Again the insurgents were making mischief, and General Anderson,
as well as General Greene had the experience of the continuance of
fire when the white flag was flying. The loss of General Anderson in
the taking of the city was nineteen men killed and one hundred and
three wounded. He concludes by saying:
"The opposition we met in battle was not sufficient to test the
bravery of our soldiers, but all showed bravery and dash. The losses
show that the leading regiments of the First Brigade--Thirteenth
Minnesota, Twenty-third Infantry, and the Astor Battery--met the most
serious opposition and deserve credit for their success. The Colorado,
California, and Oregon regiments, the Regulars, and all the batteries
of the Second Brigade showed such zeal that it seems a pity that they
did not meet foemen worthy of their steel."
General MacArthur says: "Several hours before the operations of the
day were intended to commence, there was considerable desultory firing
from the Spanish line, both of cannon and small arms, provoked no
doubt by Filipino soldiers, who insisted upon maintaining a general
fusilade along their lines."
General MacArthur's personal mention is remarkably spirited, and
makes stirring reading. We quote:
"The combat of Singalong can hardly be classified as a great military
event, but the involved terrain and the prolonged resistance created
a very trying situation, and afforded an unusual scope for the display
of military qualities by a large number of individuals.
"The invincible composure of Colonel Ovenshine, during an exposure
in dangerous space for more than an hour, was conspicuous and very
inspiring to the troops; and the efficient manner in which he took
advantage of opportunities as they arose during the varying aspects
of the fight was of great practical value in determining the result.
"The cool, determined, and sustained efforts of Colonel Reeve, of the
Thirteenth Minnesota, contributed very materially to the maintenance
of the discipline and marked efficiency of his regiment.
"The brilliant manner in which Lieutenant March accepted and discharged
the responsible and dangerous duties of the day, and the pertinacity
with which, assisted by his officers and men, he carried his guns over
all obstacles to the very front of the firing line, was an exceptional
display of warlike skill and good judgment, indicating the existence
of many of the best qualifications for high command in battle.
"The gallant manner in which Captain Sawtelle, brigade quartermaster,
volunteered to join the advance party in the rush; volunteered
to command a firing line, for a time without an officer, and again
volunteered to lead a scout to ascertain the presence or absence of the
enemy in the blockhouse, was a fine display of personal intrepidity.
"The efficient, fearless, and intelligent manner in which Lieutenant
Kernan, Twenty-first United States Infantry, acting assistant
adjutant-general of the brigade, and Second Lieutenant Whitworth,
Eighteenth United States Infantry, aid, executed a series of dangerous
and difficult orders, was a fine exemplification of staff work
under fire.
"The splendid bravery of Captains Bjornstad and Seebach, and Lieutenant
Lackore, of the Thirteenth Minnesota, all wounded, and, finally,
the work of the soldiers of the first firing line, too, all went to
make up a rapid succession of individual actions of unusual merit."
Major General Merritt's account of the capture of the city must be
given in full, for there are no words wasted, and he clears the field
of all confusion.
"The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined advance
of Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his brigade rapidly
through Malate and over the bridges to occupy Binondo and San Miguel,
as contemplated in his instructions. In the meantime the brigade
of General MacArthur, advancing simultaneously on the Pasay road,
encountered a very sharp fire, coming from the blockhouses, trenches,
and woods in his front, positions which it was very difficult to carry,
owing to the swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the roads,
and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. With much gallantry
and excellent judgment on the part of the brigade commander and the
troops engaged these difficulties were overcome with a minimum loss
(see report of brigade commander appended), and MacArthur advanced
and held the bridges and the town of Malate, as was contemplated in
his instructions.
"The city of Manila was now in our possession, excepting the walled
town, but shortly after the entry of our troops into Malate a white
flag was displayed on the walls, whereupon Lieutenant-Colonel C. A
Whittier, United States Volunteers, of my staff, and Lieutenant Brumby,
United States Navy, representing Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to
communicate with the Captain-General. I soon personally followed
these officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the
Governor-General, and there, after a conversation with the Spanish
authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of capitulation
was signed by the Captain-General and myself. This agreement was
subsequently incorporated into the formal terms of capitulation,
as arranged by the officers representing the two forces, a copy of
which is hereto appended and marked.
"Immediately after the surrender the Spanish colors on the sea front
were hauled down and the American flag displayed and saluted by the
guns of the navy. The Second Oregon Regiment, which had proceeded
by sea from Cavite, was disembarked and entered the walled town as
a provost guard, and the colonel was directed to receive the Spanish
arms and deposit them in places of security. The town was filled with
the troops of the enemy driven in from the intrenchments, regiments
formed and standing in line in the streets, but the work of disarming
proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred.
"In leaving the subject of the operations of the 13th, I desire here
to record my appreciation of the admirable manner in which the orders
for attack and the plan for occupation of the city were carried out
by the troops exactly as contemplated. I submit that for troops to
enter under fire a town covering a wide area, to rapidly deploy and
guard all principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the
insurgent forces pressing for admission, to quietly disarm an army
of Spaniards more than equal in numbers to the American troops,
and finally by all this to prevent entirely all rapine, pillage,
and disorder, and gain entire and complete possession of a city of
300,000 people filled with natives hostile to the European interests,
and stirred up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting
in the outside trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding,
temperate, resolute American soldier, well and skillfully handled by
his regimental and brigade commanders, could accomplish.
The trophies of Manila were nearly $900,000,000, of which $240,000,000
were copper coin, 13,000 prisoners and 22,000 arms.
Three days after the surrender, General Merritt received news of the
protocol, and soon was ordered to Paris. In parting he says of the
insurgent chief that he had written communication with him on various
occasions, and "he recognized my authority as military governor of the
town of Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness
to withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at
the same time asking certain favors for himself. The matters in this
connection had not been settled at the date of my departure. Doubtless
much dissatisfaction is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents
that they have not been permitted to enjoy the occupancy of Manila,
and there is some ground for trouble with them owing to that fact,
but notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion
that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as
they are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that for them
to antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only chance
of future political improvement.
The Commanding General's personal acknowledgments are very handsome,
as follows:
"Brigadier-General E.P. Hughes, my inspector-general at San Francisco,
was especially noticeable in accomplishing the instruction of the green
troops that came to the city, many of them without arms, clothing, or
equipment of any kind. His services will undoubtedly be duly recognized
by Major-General Otis, with whom I left him to continue the good work.
"I desire especially to express my acknowledgments to Brigadier-General
Babcock, my adjutant-general and chief of staff, for his most valuable
services from the inception of the campaign in San Francisco to the
close of the work at the present time. This officer is too well known
to require special mention of his services in any one direction. He
was my right arm, not only in the office but in the field, and
much of the success that has attended the expedition is due to his
individual efforts.
"I desire especially to mention Major McClure and Major Whipple,
of the pay department, who volunteered their services after they
had completed their legitimate duties, and performed excellent work
whenever called upon. Major McClure was especially important in his
services immediately after the surrender, taking long rides under
my orders to the Spanish lines, and bearing instructions to them
which resulted in effecting their withdrawal in such manner as to
prevent the incursion of the insurgents in the northern portions of
the city. Other officers have been named in my special reports and
have been recommended for brevets and promotion.
"I especially call attention to the services of Captain Mott,
as mentioned in the report of Brigadier-General Greene. He was
cheerful, willing, intelligent, and energetic in the discharge of the
multifarious duties imposed upon him in connection with our troops
and trenches during the rainy season, and in the final action showed
these rare characteristics which stamp him as a very superior soldier."
_The Terms of Capitulation_
The undersigned having been appointed a commission to determine the
details of the capitulation of the city and defenses of Manila and
its suburbs and the Spanish forces stationed therein, in accordance
with the agreement entered into the previous day by Major General
Wesley Merritt, United States Army, American commander in chief in the
Philippines, and His Excellency Don Fermin Jaudenes, acting General
in chief of the Spanish Army in the Philippines, have agreed upon
the following:
1. The Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate with the city
and its defenses, with all the honors of war, depositing their arms
in the places designated by the authorities of the United States, and
remaining in the quarters designated and under the orders of their
officers, and subject to the control of the aforesaid United States
authorities, until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the
two belligerent nations.
All persons included in the capitulation remain at liberty, the
officers remaining in their respective homes, which shall be respected
as long as they observe the regulations prescribed for their government
and the laws in force.
2. Officers shall retain their side arms, horses, and private property.
3. All public horses and public property of all kinds shall be turned
over to staff officers designated by the United States.
4. Complete returns in duplicate of men by organizations, and full
lists of public property and stores shall be rendered to the United
States within ten days from this date.
5. All questions relating to the repatriation of officers and men of
the Spanish forces and of their families, and of the expenses which
said repatriation may occasion, shall be referred to the Government
of the United States at Washington.
Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them.
The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take
place when they evacuate the city or when the American Army evacuates.
6. Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied by
the United States, according to their rank, with rations and necessary
aid as though they were prisoners of war, until the conclusion of a
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain.
All the funds in the Spanish treasury and all other public funds
shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States.
7. This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship,
its educational establishments, and its private property of all
descriptions are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and
honor of the American Army.
_F.V. Greene_, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, United States Army.
_B.P. Lamberton_, Captain, United States Navy.
_Charles A. Whittier_, Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General.
_E.H. Crowder_, Lieutenant-Colonel and Judge-Advocate.
_Nicholas de la Petra_, Auditor General Excmo.
_Carlos_, Coronel de Ingenieros.
_Jose_, Coronel de Estado Major.
The Spaniards wanted a long array of specifications as to what the
Americans might and should not do, but finally were struck with the
sufficiency of the shining simple words, "under the special safeguard
of the faith and honor of the American Army."