Why We Hold the Philippines.
The Responsibility of Admiral Dewey--We Owe It to Ourselves to Hold
the Philippines--Prosperity Assured by Our Permanent Possession--The
Aguinaldo Question--Character Study of the Insurgent Leader--How
Affairs Would Adjust Themselves for Us--Congress Must Be Trusted to
Represent the People and Firmly Establish International Policy.
If Admiral Dewey, after obeying the order of the President to destroy
the Spanish fleet at Manila, had steamed away and sought a station
to get coal to drive him somewhere else, there would have been no
Philippine question on the other side of the world from Washington
City. The Admiral desired to keep open telegraphic communication,
and made a proposition to that effect, but the Spanish authorities
curtly refused. Then the cable was cut by order of the Admiral, a
section removed, and both ends marked by buoys. Reflection caused the
Spaniards to regret that they had not consented to keep open the cable,
that it might be used under restrictions by both belligerents. They
mentioned their change of mind, and were told they were too late. The
American Admiral may have been apprehensive, and he had reason to be,
that the Spaniards, knowing they would be crushed in the West Indies
if they risked a decisive naval engagement there, might send all their
available ships of war to the Philippines, and secure a superiority
of force, possibly to destroy their enemies at Manila. It is clear
now that this is what the Spaniards ought to have tried to do. The
Americans were committed to the blockade of Cuba, occupying all
the vessels of war they had at hand, and the whole fleet of Spain
could have been in the Suez Canal, on the way to Manila when the
movement was known to our navy department. Then Admiral Dewey would,
of course, have been warned by way of Hong Kong and a dispatch boat,
that he should put to sea and take care of his men and ships. The
result might have been the temporary restoration of the Philippines to
Spain. Our Admiral, six hundred miles from Hongkong, the closest cable
connection, could not afford to leave Manila in direct communication
with Madrid. It was for this reason and not that he desired to keep
out of way or orders, as some able publicists have kindly promulgated,
that the Admiral cut the cable.
The gravest of his responsibilities came upon him after his victory
freed the harbor of declared enemies, and placed the great city at
his mercy. If the Spaniards used their big Krupp guns against his
ships, he could bombard the city and burn it. He held the keys to the
Philippines, with Manila under his guns, and the question before him
then was the same before the country now. The question that incessantly
presses is, whether the Dewey policy is to be confirmed, and the logic
of the stay in the harbor, and the dispatch of troops to take the town
made good. We hold the keys of the Philippines. Shall we continue to
do so? This question transcends in immediate importance--inevitable
consequence--remote as well as near, all the war with Spain has
raised. So broad a matter should not be rested on narrow grounds, nor
decided with haste. It ought to be scrutinized in all its bearings,
and all susceptibilities and material affairs regarded, for it will
affect all the people for all time.
What are the Philippines? They are the richest prize of soil and
climate that has been at hazard in the world for many years--one that
would be seized, if it could be done without war, by any of the great
nations other than our own without hesitation. The only scruple we need
entertain, the sole reason for deliberation, is because it is a duty of
the government to be sure when there are imperial considerations to be
weighed, that the people should be consulted. It was on this account
distinctly, that the President knew the issue of the permanency of
the possession of the Philippines was one of peculiar novelty and
magnitude, that he permitted it to exist. Spain must have been as
acquiescent in this as in yielding the independence of Cuba, and the
concession to us without any intermediate formality of Porto Rico. It
is not inconsistent with the policy of magnanimity that is generally
anticipated after the victory of a great power over a lesser one,
that we should hold the Philippines. We have only to keep the power
we have in peace, and let it work as a wholesome medicine, and all
the islands of the group of which Manila is the central point, will
be ours without conflict. In our system there is healing for wounds,
and attraction for the oppressed. The holding of the islands by Spain
would signify the continued shedding of blood, and drainage of the
vital resources of the peninsula. As against Spain the Philippines
will be united and desperate unto death, while they would without
coercion walk hand in hand with us, and become the greatest of our
dependencies--not states, but territories.
It would be an act of mercy to Spain to send her soldiers and priests
from the Philippines, home. Even if we consent that she may keep
her South Sea possession, she will lose it as she has all the rest,
for the story of the Philippines is that of Spanish South and Central
America, and the modern story of Cuba is the old one of all countries
South and West of the Gulf of Mexico and around by way of the Oceans
to Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Chili, and the rest had the
same bloody stream of history to trace, and sooner or later the
tale must all be told. Since Spain has already surrendered Cuba and
Porto Rico, the record of the Philippines is the last chapter of her
colonial experiences, by which she has dazzled and disgusted the world,
attaining from the plunder of dependencies wealth that she invested
in oppressive warfare to sustain a depraved despotism and display
a grandeur that was unsound, sapping her own strength in colonial
enterprises that could not be other than without profit, because the
colonies were the property of the crown, and the prey of caste.
The Spanish nation was forbidden by their government, not of the
people or for the people, to profit by the colonies, and the viceroys,
the captain-generals, and the whole official class were corrupted,
and inefficient in all things, except methods of tyranny to procure
a harvest of gold and silver not from the mines of the metals alone,
but from the industries, whatever they were. The people at large were
allowed no share in their own earnings, beyond a subsistence so scanty
that deep humiliation and grievous hardship were the fateful rewards
of labor.
It was because the colonial policy of Spain impoverished and degraded
the Spaniards at home, through the injustice, greed and profligacy
of those abroad, that the huge structure, once so great an imposition
upon mankind, a rotten fabric so gilt that the inherent weakness was
disguised, has finally fallen into universal and irretrievable ruin.
It is well Spain should retain the Canaries and the Balearic group,
for they are as Spanish as any peninsular province, and legitimately
belong therefore to the kingdom. The application of this principle
excludes Spain from the Philippines, and their des- [NOTE: gap in
original] been committed by the failure of war to our hands. There
is no nation that will dispute our peaceable possession of the
Philippines. Any other nation's proprietorship will be challenged.
Our authoritative presence in the islands will be a guarantee of peace.
Any other assertion of supremacy will be the signal for war. Our
assumption of sovereignty over the islands would quickly establish
tranquility. Any other disposition of the burning questions now
smoldering will cause an outburst of the flames of warfare. The
Spaniards in Manila have been transient. They are not rooted in the
soil. They all come and go like Captain-Generals, a mere official
class, with the orders of the Church participating actively in secular
concerns, more active as politicians than as teachers of religion. In
the view of the native population it is as indispensable that the
priests of Spain shall return to their native land as that the soldiers
should go. The deportation of these people would remove classes of
consumers and not affect unfavorably a productive industry, or the
prosperity of a self-sustaining community, and there would be but
rare instances of the severance of family ties.
It will be said of the affirmation that, the avowal of the possession
of the Philippines as a responsibility without end would be a peace
measure, and anything else make for war, does not take into account
the attitude of the Philippine Dictator, by proclamation, General
Aguinaldo, and his followers. We desire to speak with respect of the
General, for he has shown in trying times, under strong temptations,
the presence in his character of personal integrity in public matters,
and reference is made to his refusal to consent to the division among
insurgents alleged to be leaders, of the money paid by the Spaniards
for the disarmament of the rebels, when two years ago there was an
agreement upon the terms of a truce. This money transaction has
been referred to as the sale of their cause by Aguinaldo and his
associates, as if they, as individuals, had pocketed the usufruct
of the bargain. The money was paid by Spain as an earnest of her
sincerity, the Captain-General representing the force and good faith
of the kingdom, in granting reforms to the Philippines. On condition
of insurgent disarmament the people of the island were to be allowed
representation in the Spanish Cortes, the orders of the Church were
to be removed from relations to the Government that were offensive
to the people. There was a long list of articles of specification
of the reforms that were to be granted, the usual liberality of
words of promise always bestowed by Spain upon her colonists. The
representatives of Spain denied nothing that was asked; and to
give weight to the program of concessions, there was paid in hand to
Aguinaldo, through a transaction between banks in Manila and Hongkong,
four hundred thousand dollars, the first installment of eight hundred
thousand dollars agreed upon. [1] The Spaniards probably understood
that they were bribing the insurgents and paying a moderate sum to
cheaply end the war; and it did not cost the authorities of Spain
anything, for they exacted the money from the Manila Bank of Spain,
and still owe the bank. Aguinaldo's understanding, acted upon,
was different. He accepted the money as a war fund, and has held and
defended it for the purchase of arms, and resumed hostilities when all
promises of reform were broken, and nothing whatever done beyond the
robbery of the bank to bribe the rebel chiefs, which was the Spanish
translation. Of course, it was claimed by the enemies of Aguinaldo
that he was bought and paid for, but he has maintained the fund,
though there were those professors of rebellion, who made claims
to a share of the money. The second installment of the money that
the rebels were to have been paid is yet an obligation not lifted,
and the hostilities were revived as soon as the craft of the Spanish
negotiators in promising everything because they meant to do nothing,
became obvious. The actual proceedings in this case can be summed up
in a sentence: The Spaniards took four hundred thousand dollars out
of the Bank of Spain and gave it to the insurgents, for a temporary
armistice. General Aguinaldo, though he appears very well in refusing
to employ the money paid by Spain as a bribe for himself, has not
the elements of enduring strength as the leader of the insurgents. As
against the Spaniards he can keep the field, and carry on a destructive
guerilla warfare, hopeless on both sides, like that going on in Cuba,
when that island was invaded by the American army. But as against
American rule the Philippines would cease to be insurgents. The
islanders will not be controlled by sentimentalism. Government by the
United States would differ from that by Spain, as the two nations are
different in character, in the nature of their political institutions,
in their progressive movement. America is all active and free, and her
freedom would be extended to the islanders. The transformation would
be one from the paralysis of despotism to the life of liberty. The
words despotism and freedom would instantly have a distinct business
meaning. Make known in the city of Manila that the Americans will
abandon it, and the reviving hopes of the men of affairs would be
instantly clouded, and the depression deepen into despondency and
despair. Let it be the news of the day that the Americans will stay,
and the intelligence of the city would regard its redemption as
assured, every drooping interest revive, and an era of prosperity
unknown under the dismal incompetency of Spain, open at once. It is
legitimate that there should be freedom of speech as to the details
of the proceedings. If our Government should do what Admiral Dewey
did when he was the master of Manila, because he had annihilated the
Spanish fleet and had the power to destroy the city--cast anchor and
stay where we are already in command--the task is neither so complex
nor costly as its opponents claim. Our territorial system is one easy
of application to colonies. We have had experience of it from the
first days of our Government. There is no commandment that a Territory
shall become a State in any given time, or ever. We can hold back a
Territory, as we have Arizona and New Mexico, or hasten the change
to Statehood according to the conditions, and the perfect movement of
the machinery requires only the presence in Congress of dominant good
sense. Congress is easily denounced, but no one has found a substitute
for it, and it is fairly representative of the country. Congress will
never gamble away the inheritance of the people. It will probably,
in spite of all shortcomings, have its average of ability and utility
kept up. Congress may go wrong, but will not betray. Our outlying
possessions must be Territories until they are Americanized, and we
take it Americans know what that word means. If a specification is
wanted as a definition, we have to say the meaning is just what has
happened in California since our flag was there. In the case of the
Philippines, if we stick, and we do not see how we can help doing so,
the President will, in regular course, appoint a Territorial Governor,
and as a strong Government capable of quick and final decisions must
be made, the Governor should be a military man, and have a liberal
grant, by special Act of Congress, of military authority. He should
be a prompt, and all around competent administrator. He will not have
to carry on war offensive or defensive. He need not be in a hurry
to go far from Manila. He will not be molested there. The country
will gravitate to him. The opponents of the Republican form of
Government, as it is in the United States and the Territories of the
Nation will become insignificant in the Philippines. They will have
no grievances, except some of them may not be called at once to put
on the trappings of personal potentiality. General Aguinaldo would
find all the reforms the Spanish promised when they paid him four
hundred thousand dollars to prove their good intentions, free as the
air. He could not make war against the benignancy of a Government,
Republican in its form and its nature, which simply needs a little
time, some years maybe, before erasing the wrongs that have had a
growth of centuries. The American Governor-General need not send out
troops to conquer districts, coercing the people. The people will soon
be glad to see the soldiers of the United States, the representatives
of the downfall and departure of the instruments of Spain. Aguinaldo
and his party have a Congress. It might be an approved beginning of
a Territorial Legislature, and the insurgent General might be the
presiding officer. There would be abundant reason for the auspicious
exercise of all his rights in the public service. As for the cost
of the Philippines under our Government, that would fall upon the
treasury of the United States. There can be no doubt that it would be
for several years a considerable sum, but the public men who favored
peace for the liberation of Cuba, did not make counting the cost
the most prominent feature of the war they advocated, but accepted
the fact that the national honor and fame, the glory of heroism and
deeds of daring and sacrifice, are priceless, and their achievement
beyond price. There is to be said under this head, that the Philippine
Islands are of natural riches almost without parallel. The great isle
of Luzon teems with productions that have markets the world over,
and it is commonplace for the savages in the mountains to come out
of their fastnesses with nuggets of gold to make purchases. Cotton,
sugar, rice, hemp, coffee and tobacco, all tropical fruits and woods,
are of the products. There is profusion of the riches that await the
freedom of labor and the security of capital, and the happiness of the
people. Under American government the Philippines would prosper, and it
would be one of our tasks to frame legislation. The laws of Congress
would be the higher code of law, and the Philippines would desire,
and be invited, of course, to send their ablest men to be Territorial
representatives in the Congress of the United States. In the name
of peace, therefore, and in behalf of the dignity and authority of
this Nation--in mercy to the Spaniards, in justice to the Filipinos,
it is due ourselves, and should have the favor of all who would see
our country expand with the ages, and walking in the footsteps of
Washington and Jefferson, finding the path of empire that of freedom
and taking our place as a great Power, accepting the logic of our
history, and the discharge of the duties of destiny--we should hold
on to the Philippines--and when the great distance of those islands
from this continent is mentioned, remember that the Pacific may now
be crossed in as few days as was the Atlantic forty years ago.
The labor questions and the silver questions even come into the
Philippines problem to be scanned and weighed. In Eastern Asia,
which we have invaded, and a part of which we have appropriated for
a time, the people use silver for the measure of value, and in the
islands that interest us, as they do not deal in the mysteries of
rupees, but in dollars, the facts in the case are plainly within the
common understanding. In Manila the Mexican dollar goes in ordinary
small exchanges, payment of wages and settlement of bills, for fifty
cents; but the banks sell the Mexicans twenty-one of them for ten gold
dollars--an American eagle! So far as the native people go, labor and
produce are counted in silver, and the purchaser, or employer gets
as much for a silver dollar as for a gold dollar. The native will
take ten dollars in gold for ten dollars only in all settlements
of accounts, and would just as willingly--even more so, accept ten
Mexican dollars as ten American dollars in gold coin. Salaries are
paid and goods delivered according to the silver standard. Of course,
in due time this state of things will pass away, if we hold to the
gold standard, but as the case stands the soldiers and sailors of
our army and fleet, paid under the home standard, receive double pay,
and get double value received for clothing, tobacco and whatever they
find they want--indeed, for the necessaries and luxuries of life. The
double standard in this shape is not distasteful to the boys.
We have both theories and conditions confronting us in these aspects
of the silver and labor questions. The Oriental people are obdurate
in their partiality for silver. It is the cheaper labor that adheres
to the silver standard, partially, it is held, because silver is the
more convenient money for the payment of small sums. But labor cannot
be expected, at its own expense, to sustain silver for the profit of
capital, or rather of the middle man between labor and capital. Labor,
so far as it is in politics in this country, should not, without
most careful study and deliberation, conclude that its force in
public affairs would be abated, and its policy of advancing wages
antagonized by the absorption of the Philippines in our country. On
the contrary, the statesmanship that is representative of labor may
discover that it is a great fact, one of the greatest of facts,
that the various countries and continents of the globe are being
from year to year more and more closely associated, and that to
those intelligently interested, without regard to the application
of their views of justice or expediency, in the labor and silver
questions--the convictions, the fanaticisms, of the vast silver
nations--and enormous multitudes of the people of Asia, touching the
silver standard--and the possible progress of labor, as a guiding as
well as plodding ability increases incessantly in interest, and must
grow in inheritance. As the conditions of progressive civilization are
developed our interests cannot be wholly dissevered from those of the
Asiatics. We would be unwise to contemplate the situation of to-day
as one that can or should perpetuate itself. Suppose we accept, the
governing responsibility in the Philippines. It is not beyond the range
of reasonable conjecture that American labor can educate the laborers
of the Philippines out of their state of servitude as cheap laborers,
and lead them to co-operate rather than compete with us, and not to
go into the silver question further than to consent that it exists,
and is in the simplest form of statement, whether the change in the
market value of the two money metals is natural or artificial. It is
necessary in common candor to state that the most complete solution
of the money metal embarrassments would be through the co-operation
of Asia and America. Europe is for gold, Asia for silver, and the
Americas divided. Japan is an object lesson, her approximation to
the gold standard has caused in the Empire an augmentation of the
compensation of labor. This is not wholly due to the change in the
standard. The war with China, the increase in the army and navy, and
the absorption of laborers in Formosa, the new country of Japan, have
combined with the higher standard of value, to elevate wages. All facts
are of primary excellence in the formation of the policies of nations.