1861—February and March.
TROOPS AT THE CAPITAL—INAUGURATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN—IMPORTANT
AND ALARMING DESPATCHES FROM MAJOR ANDERSON—MR. HOLT’S
COMMUNICATION TO PRESIDENT LINCOLN—ATTITUDE IN WHICH MR.
BUCHANAN LEFT THE GOVERNMENT TO HIS SUCCESSOR—HIS DEPARTURE FOR
WHEATLAND.
As the administration was drawing to its end, great uneasiness was
felt by many persons in Washington for the safety of the capital and
the Government. Rumors of a conspiracy to seize the city and to
prevent the inauguration of the President-elect filled the air.
Among those who were affected by these rumors was the Secretary of
State, Judge Black. With characteristic energy, on the 22d of
January, being prevented by illness from attending the cabinet
meeting of that day, he addressed to the President a long and
earnest private letter, setting forth the grounds of his belief that
the existence of such a conspiracy was highly probable, and that at
all events, even if it were doubtful, the Government ought to be
prepared for the worst. The President, although at first he did not
share these apprehensions, was not the less vigilant in the
discharge of his executive duties, or the less disposed to give due
weight to Judge Black’s impressive arguments. He would have had
everything needful done in a manner not to excite public
observation, if the matter had not been broached in Congress. His
message of the 8th of January had been referred on the 10th, in the
House of Representatives, to a select committee of five members,
consisting of Messrs. Howard, of Michigan, Branch, of North
Carolina, Dawes, of Massachusetts, John Cochrane, of New York, and
Hickman, of Pennsylvania. On the 25th this committee were
instructed, by a resolution offered by Mr. Grow, of Pennsylvania,
“to inquire whether any secret organization hostile to the
Government of the United States exists in the District of Columbia;
and if so, whether any official or employé of the city of
Washington, or any employées or officers of the Federal Government,
in the Executive or Judicial Departments, are members of it.” Before
this committee had reported, steps had been taken by the Executive
to assemble quietly at Washington a small body of the regular
troops. This at once aroused the jealousy of certain members from
the border States. On the 11th of February, a resolution, offered by
Mr. Burnett, of Kentucky, was adopted in the House, calling upon the
President to furnish to the House, if not incompatible with the
public service, “the reasons that have induced him to assemble a
large number of troops in this city, why they are kept here, and
whether he has any information of a conspiracy on the part of any
portion of the citizens of the country to seize the capital and
prevent the inauguration of the President-elect.”
On the 14th of February the select committee reported all the
testimony they had taken, and expressed their unanimous opinion that
the evidence produced before them did not prove the existence of a
secret organization at Washington, or elsewhere, for purposes
hostile to the Government.
Thereupon Mr. Branch, of North Carolina, introduced another
resolution, condemning the quartering of troops at the capital.
In the meantime, the Secretary of War, Mr. Holt, on the 18th of
February, made a full report to the President, in response to Mr.
Burnett’s resolution of the 11th, setting forth the reasons for the
assembling of the troops, and officially declaring that their
presence “is the result of the conclusion arrived at by yourself and
cabinet, on the proposition submitted to you by this department.” On
the 20th, Mr. Holt addressed to the President the following private
note:
[MR. HOLT TO THE PRESIDENT.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, Feb. 20, 1861.
DEAR SIR:—
I inclose a copy of the resolution referred to in the paper which
I had the honor to address to you on yesterday, and trust I shall
be pardoned for saying that I shall be very unhappy, if this
defence—truthful and tempered as it is—is not permitted to reach
the country. The act of assembling troops at the capital, and
providing for the inauguration of your successor under the shelter
of their guns, is one of the gravest and most responsible of your
administration. It constitutes, indeed, an epoch in the history of
our institutions, and as the circumstances surrounding you fully
justify the measure, they should be frankly and fearlessly set
forth to the world. For this step your administration has been,
and still continues to be, mercilessly denounced, and of this
denunciation, as you are aware, a large part has fallen to my
share. I have been defamed in my own State, and in the towns of my
nearest relatives and friends, and I confess that I have not yet
attained to the Christian philosophy of bearing such things as an
ox led to the slaughter, without opening my mouth. Congress is now
engaged in spreading broadcast over the country, through the
efforts of your enemies and mine, a report intended to show that
the safety of the capital has never been menaced, and of course
that all your preparations here have been prompted by cowardice,
or the spirit of despotism. _Now_ is the time to meet this
calumny. A few weeks hence the memory of the measure assailed will
be swallowed up by the heady current of events, and nothing will
remain but the wounds to the reputation and sensibilities of your
friends who gave to that measure their honest and zealous support.
I do not ask you to adopt my report as your own, but to submit it
simply as the views entertained by the War Department, and for
which its head should alone be held responsible.
The helplessness of my position for all purposes of self-defence,
without your kind cooperation, must be my apology for the
solicitude expressed.
Very sincerely your friend,
J. HOLT.
The President did not at once concur in Mr. Holt’s views of the
necessity for making public the reasons which had governed the
Executive in ordering the troops to Washington. In a memorandum
which now lies before me in his handwriting, he says:
After the Committee of Five had reported all the testimony which
could be collected in the case, with their opinion upon the result
of it, the President did not deem it necessary to answer Mr.
Burnett’s resolution. Understanding, however, that he and other
members considered it disrespectful to the Union, not to return an
answer, he [on the 2d of March] sent a message to the House, in
response to the resolution.
This was in ample season to inform everybody that the troops were in
Washington to secure a peaceful inauguration of his successor
against all possibility of danger; the imputations cast upon his
administration in the meantime were of less immediate consequence.
The table given below shows the number of troops present in the city
on the 27th of February, and until after the 4th of March.[161]
Footnote 161:
Regular troops present in the City of Washington, February 27,
1861.
_Officers._ _Enlisted
men._
Field and Staff 4 4
1st Artillery, Light Battery, I 4 81
2d Artillery, Light Battery, A 4 78
West Point, Light Battery 4 12 70 229
1st Artillery, Foot Company, D 3 50
2d Artillery, Foot Company, E 2 72
2d Artillery, Foot Company, H 2 65
2d Artillery, Foot Company, K 3 52
Engineer, Sappers, and Miners 3 13 81 320
Det. Mtd. Recruits 3 81
Recruits attached 23
Total 32 653
Respectfully submitted for the information of the
President,
ADJ. GENL,. OFFICE, S. COOPER,
February 28, 1861. Adj. Genl.
The following is the material part of the special message of March
2, 1861:
These troops were ordered here to act as a _posse comitatus_ in
strict subordination to the civil authority, for the purpose of
preserving peace and order in the City of Washington, should this
be necessary before or at the period of the inauguration of the
President-elect. I was convinced that I ought to act. The safety
of the immense amount of public property in this city, and that of
the archives of the Government, in which all the States, and
especially the new States in which the public lands are situated,
have a deep interest; the peace and order of the city itself and
the security of the inauguration of the President-elect, were
objects of such vast importance to the whole country, that I could
not hesitate to adopt precautionary measures. At the present
moment, when all is quiet, it is difficult to realize the state of
alarm which prevailed when the troops were first ordered to this
city. This almost instantly subsided after the arrival of the
first company, and a feeling of comparative peace and security has
since existed, both in Washington and throughout the country. Had
I refused to adopt this precautionary measure, and evil
consequences, which good men at the time apprehended, had
followed, I should never have forgiven myself.
Some of these troops were in Washington on the 22d of February. It
appears that ex-President Tyler was disturbed by learning that they
were to form part of the customary parade on Washington’s Birthday.
President Buchanan made the following reply to his remonstrance:
[THE PRESIDENT TO MR. TYLER.]
WASHINGTON, February 22, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR:—
I find it impossible to prevent two or three companies of the
Federal troops here from joining in the procession to-day with the
volunteers of the District, without giving serious offence to the
tens of thousands of the people who have assembled to witness the
parade. The day is the anniversary of Washington’s birth—a festive
occasion throughout the land—and it has been particularly marked
by the House of Representatives. These troops everywhere else join
such processions, in honor of the birthday of the Father of his
country, and it would be hard to assign a good reason why they
should be excluded from this privilege in the capital founded by
himself. They are here simply as a _posse comitatus_ to aid the
civil authority, in case of need. Besides, the programme was
published in the _National Intelligencer_ of this morning without
my knowledge.[162]
From your friend, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
Footnote 162:
The War Department having considered the celebration of this
national anniversary by the military arm of the Government as a
matter of course.
Among the interesting occurrences of that day, as part of the
history of the time, it is now proper to quote a private
correspondence between General Dix and Major Anderson.[163]
Footnote 163:
A copy of this correspondence was sent by General Dix to Mr.
Buchanan, after the latter had retired to Wheatland. See _post_.
[GENERAL DIX TO MAJOR ANDERSON.]
WASHINGTON, March 4, 1861.
MY DEAR MAJOR:—
I have just come from the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, and in a
day or two more I expect to be relieved from my duties as
Secretary of the Treasury and return to my family after my short,
but laborious and responsible term of official service. I shall
send you, by the same mail which takes this note, my answer to a
call made upon me by the House of Representatives for instruction
in regard to certain transactions in the extreme Southern States.
It discloses a demoralization in all that concerns the faithful
discharge of official duty, which, if it had pleased God, I could
have wished never to have lived to see. The cowardice and
treachery of General Twiggs is more disheartening than all that
has transpired since this disgraceful career of disloyalty to the
Government commenced. No man can help feeling that he is himself
stained in reputation by this national degradation. I can hardly
realize that I am living in the age in which I was born and
educated.
In the midst of these evidences of degeneracy—in the face of the
humiliating spectacle of base intrigues to overthrow the
Government by those who are living upon its bounty, and of a
pusillanimous or perfidious surrender of the trusts confided to
them, the country turns with a feeling of relief, which you cannot
understand, to the noble example of fidelity and courage presented
by you and your gallant associates. God knows how ardently I wish
you a safe deliverance! But let the issue be what it may, you will
connect with your name the fame of historical recollections, with
which life itself can enter into no comparison. One of the most
grateful of my remembrances will be that I was once your
commanding officer. I write in haste, but from the heart, and can
only add, may God preserve you and carry you in triumph through
the perils of your position! I have never doubted if you were
assailed that the honor of the country would be gloriously
vindicated, and the disgrace cast upon it by others would be
signally rebuked by your courage and constancy.
I am, my dear Major, faithfully your friend,
JOHN A. DIX.
P.S.—It is gratifying to know that your State remains faithful to
the Union. My kind regards to Lieutenant Hall.
[MAJOR ANDERSON TO GENERAL DIX.]
FORT SUMTER, S. C., March 7, 1861.
MY DEAR GENERAL:—
Thank you. Many thanks to you for your whole-souled letter of
March 4th. One such letter is enough to make amends for a life of
trial and of discomfort.
My position is not a very enviable one, but still, when I consider
how God has blessed me in every step I have taken here, I have not
the least fear of the result. I have written to the Department
very fully, and the administration now know my opinion, and the
opinion of each individual officer of this command, of the
strength of the force necessary for forcing an entrance into this
harbor.
You speak of the disgraceful incidents developed in your report to
Congress. I had already read some of your correspondence, and was
shocked at the developments they made. The faithful historian of
the present period will have to present a record which will sadden
and surprise. It would seem that a Sirocco charged with treachery,
cunning, dishonesty, and bad faith, had tainted the atmosphere of
portions of our land; and alas! how many have been prostrated by
its blast! I hope that ere long we shall see symptoms of
restoration, and that a healthier wind will recover some of those
who have given way to the blast. A long life of honest devotion to
every duty, moral and social, may cause their course to be
forgiven, but it cannot be forgotten. The South Carolinians are on
the _qui vive_ to-night; why, we know not. They have four guard
boats in the stream, instead of the usual number of late, _two_. I
cannot believe, though, that General Beauregard, lately of the
Engineer Corps, would make an attack without having given formal
notice of his intention to do so. My rule is, though, always to
keep a bright lookout. With many thanks, my dear General, for your
most kind and welcome letter, I am, as ever, your sincere friend,
ROBERT ANDERSON.
The last day of the administration had now come. Mr. Buchanan was to
be relieved of the burthens of office, and they were to be devolved
on his successor. On that morning extraordinary despatches from
Major Anderson were delivered at the War Department. In Mr.
Buchanan’s handwriting I find, among his private papers, the
following account of what took place concerning this sudden
revelation of the position of affairs in the harbor of Charleston:—
Monday, March 4, 1861. The cabinet met at the President’s room in
the Capitol, to assist me in examining the bills which might be
presented to me for approval, between the hours of ten and twelve
of that day, when my own term and that of Congress would expire.
Mr. Holt did not attend until after eleven o’clock. At the first
opportunity, he informed us that on that morning he had received
extraordinary despatches from Major Anderson, saying that without
a force of some twenty or thirty thousand men to capture the
batteries which had been erected, he could not maintain himself at
Fort Sumter, and he [Mr. Holt] intended at once to communicate
these despatches to President, Lincoln. The cabinet had some
conversation on the subject that evening at Mr. Ould’s.
Tuesday morning, 5th March, we saw Mr. Holt at the War Department.
He there read us what he had written to President Lincoln in
communicating these despatches to Mr. Holt, giving his reasons for
his astonishment. He referred to his own letter to Major Anderson
after he had taken possession of Fort Sumter, offering him
reinforcements, and the repeated letters of the Major stating that
he felt secure, and finally a letter, after the affair of the Star
of the West, stating that he did not desire reinforcements. He
concluded by referring to the expedition which had been prepared
at New York under the direction of General Scott, to sail at once,
in case the Major should be attacked or ask for reinforcements.
This was small, consisting of two or three hundred men with
provisions.
On Tuesday afternoon, 5th March, Mr. Holt told me he had sent the
papers to President Lincoln.
This is the last I have heard of it, from any member of the
cabinet or any friend at Washington, up till this day (Saturday
morning), 9th March, at half-past ten A.M.
The following is Secretary Holt’s letter to President Lincoln:
WAR DEPARTMENT, March 5, 1861.
SIR:—
I have the honor to submit for your consideration several letters
with inclosures, received on yesterday from Major Anderson and
Captain Foster, of the Corps of Engineers, which are of a most
important and unexpected character. Why they were unexpected will
appear from the following brief statement:—
“After transferring his forces to Fort Sumter, he [Major Anderson]
addressed a letter to this Department, under date of the 31st
December, 1860, in which he says: ‘Thank God, we are now where the
Government may send us additional troops _at its leisure_. To be
sure, the uncivil and uncourteous action of the Governor [of South
Carolina], in preventing us from purchasing anything in the city,
will annoy and inconvenience us somewhat; _still we are safe_.‘
And after referring to some deficiency in his stores, in the
articles of soap and candles, he adds: ‘Still we can cheerfully
put up with the inconvenience of doing without them for the
satisfaction we feel in the knowledge that we can command this
harbor _as long as our Government wishes to keep it_.’ And again,
on the 6th January, he wrote: ‘My position will, should there be
no treachery among the workmen whom we are compelled to retain for
the present, enable me to hold this fort _against any force which
can be brought against me_; and it would enable me, in the event
of war, to annoy the South Carolinians by preventing them from
throwing in supplies into their new posts, except by the aid of
the Wash Channel through Stone River.’
“Before the receipt of this communication, the Government, being
without information as to his condition, had despatched the Star
of the West with troops and supplies for Fort Sumter; but the
vessel having been fired on from a battery at the entrance to the
harbor, returned without having reached her destination.
“On the 16th January, 1861, in replying to Major Anderson’s
letters of the 31st December and of 6th January, I said: ‘Your
late despatches, as well as the very intelligent statements of
Lieutenant Talbot, have relieved the Government of the
apprehensions previously entertained for your safety. In
consequence, it is not its purpose at present to reinforce you.
The attempt to do so would no doubt be attended by a collision of
arms and the effusion of blood—a national calamity, which the
President is most anxious to avoid. You will, therefore, report
frequently your condition, and the character and activity of the
preparations, if any, which may be being made for an attack upon
the fort, or for obstructing the Government in any endeavors it
may make to strengthen your command. Should your despatches be of
a nature too important to be intrusted to the mails, you will
convey them by special messenger. Whenever, in your judgment,
additional supplies or reinforcements are necessary for your
safety or for a successful defence of the fort, you will at once
communicate the fact to this Department, and a prompt and vigorous
effort will be made to forward them.’
“Since the date of this letter Major Anderson has regularly and
frequently reported the progress of the batteries being
constructed around him, and which looked either to the defence of
the harbor, or to an attack on his own position; but he has not
suggested that these works compromised his safety, nor has he made
any request that additional supplies or reinforcements should be
sent to him. On the contrary, on the 30th January, 1861, in a
letter to this Department, he uses this emphatic language: ‘I do
hope that no attempt will be made by our friends to throw supplies
in; their doing so would do more harm than good.‘
“On the 5th February, when referring to the batteries, etc.,
constructed in his vicinity, he said: ‘Even in their present
condition, they will make it impossible for any hostile force,
other than a large and well-appointed one, to enter this harbor,
and the chances are that it will then be at a great sacrifice of
life;‘ and in a postscript he adds: ‘Of course, in speaking of
forcing an entrance, I do not refer to the little stratagem of a
small party slipping in.‘ This suggestion of a stratagem was well
considered in connection with all the information that could be
obtained bearing upon it; and in consequence of the vigilance and
number of the guard-boats in and outside of the harbor, it was
rejected as impracticable.
“In view of these very distinct declarations, and of the earnest
desire to avoid a collision as long as possible, it was deemed
entirely safe to adhere to the line of policy indicated in my
letter of the 16th January, which has been already quoted. In that
Major Anderson had been requested to report ‘at once,’ ‘whenever,
in his judgment, additional supplies or reinforcements were
necessary for his safety or for a successful defence of the fort.’
So long, therefore, as he remained silent upon this point, the
Government felt that there was no ground for apprehension. Still,
as the necessity for action might arise at any moment, an
expedition has been quietly prepared and is ready to sail from New
York, on a few hours’ notice, for transporting troops and supplies
to Fort Sumter. This step was taken under the supervision of
General Scott, who arranged its details, and who regarded the
reinforcements thus provided for as sufficient for the occasion.
The expedition, however, is not upon a scale approaching the
seemingly extravagant estimates of Major Anderson and Captain
Foster, now offered for the first time, and for the disclosures of
which the Government was wholly unprepared.
“The declaration now made by the Major that he would not be
willing to risk his reputation on an attempt to throw
reinforcements into Charleston harbor, and with a view of holding
possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thousand
good and well-disciplined men, takes the Department by surprise,
as his previous correspondence contained no such intimation.
“I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
“Your obedient servant,
”J. HOLT.
As the question of peace or war was now to turn on what might happen
at Fort Sumter, it is incumbent on me to give a brief summary of the
position in which Mr. Buchanan left the Government to Mr. Lincoln.
It is for some other pen than mine to unravel the dark story in
which is involved the true history of the informal negotiations
between Mr. Lincoln’s administration and the Confederate
commissioners, in regard to the evacuation of Fort Sumter;
negotiations out of which those commissioners came with the
professed belief that they had been tricked, and which were swiftly
followed by an order from Montgomery to expel Anderson from that
post. It is not for me to sit in judgment on that transaction. I
have not the means of penetrating the councils of the Lincoln
administration, such as I have had for understanding those of his
predecessor. I leave to others to explain the truth or falsity of
the accusation which has undertaken to justify the bombardment of
Fort Sumter and the initiation of a civil war, in which less than
thirty days saw the practical transfer of the Confederate Government
from Montgomery to Richmond. But it will not be stepping out of my
province, if I now describe the situation in which Mr. Buchanan
handed over the Government to his successor.
There was now an actual revolt of six States, having about five
millions of inhabitants, free and slave, with an organized
provisional government, based on the alleged right of States to
secede from the Union. Seven other slaveholding States, having
more than thirteen millions of inhabitants, free and slave,
still held aloof from the Southern Confederacy, still remained
loyal to the Government of the United States, still were
represented in the new Congress along with the whole North and
the whole West. It had been Mr. Buchanan’s policy, from the very
first, to save these so-called border States from joining the
Southern Confederacy.[164] He could not prevent the formation of
that Confederacy among the cotton States, without exercising
powers which the Constitution had not conferred upon him. To
make aggressive war upon a State, or its people, in order to
prevent it or them from doing an unconstitutional act, or
because one had been committed, was clearly not within the
constitutional powers of the Executive, even if it was within
the constitutional powers of Congress. The question has often
been asked, why did Mr. Buchanan suffer State after State to go
out of the Union? Why did he not prevent their adoption of
ordinances of secession? Why did he not call on the North for
volunteers, and put down the rebellion in its first stage? The
question is a very inconsiderate one, but it shall be answered.
In the first place, Mr. Buchanan had no power to call for
volunteers under any existing law, and to make such a call
without law, was to step outside of the Constitution, and to
look to a future indemnification by Congress. Why he did not
take such a step has been explained by him so lucidly and
exactly, that I have only to quote his words:
Urgent and dangerous emergencies may have arisen, or may hereafter
arise in the history of our country, rendering delay disastrous,
such as the bombardment of Fort Sumter by the Confederate
government, which would for the moment justify the President in
violating the Constitution, by raising a military force without
the authority of law, but this only during a recess of Congress.
Such extreme cases are a law unto themselves. They must rest upon
the principle that it is a lesser evil to usurp, until Congress
can be assembled, a power withheld from the Executive, than to
suffer the Union to be endangered, either by traitors at home or
enemies from abroad. In all such cases, however, it is the
President’s duty to present to Congress, immediately after their
next meeting, the causes which impelled him thus to act, and ask
for their approbation; just as, on a like occasion, a British
minister would ask Parliament for a bill of indemnity. It would be
difficult, however, to conceive of an emergency so extreme as to
justify or even excuse a President for thus transcending his
constitutional powers whilst Congress, to whom he could make an
immediate appeal, was in session. Certainly no such case existed
during the administration of the late President. On the contrary,
not only was Congress actually in session, but bills were long
pending before it for extending his authority in calling forth the
militia, for enabling him to accept the services of volunteers,
and for the employment of the navy, if necessary, outside of ports
of entry for the collection of the revenue, all of which were
eventually rejected. Under these circumstances, had the President
attempted, of his own mere will, to exercise these high powers,
whilst Congress were at the very time deliberating whether to
grant them to him or not, he would have made himself justly liable
to impeachment. This would have been for the Executive to set at
defiance both the Constitution and the legislative branch of the
Government.[165]
Footnote 164:
President Buchanan kept before him all the while a table of the
Southern States, with the dates of their several secessions, their
populations, resources, and other facts, noted by himself,
discriminating the cotton and the border States in separate
groups.
Footnote 165:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 161.
This paragraph reveals, better than anything else he ever wrote, his
character as an American statesman. He was the last of a race of
eminent public men who had been bred in a profound reverence for the
Constitution and intimate knowledge of it. With his great
contemporaries of an earlier period, he may have differed upon the
construction of particular powers; he belonged to the school of
strict construction, while some of the famous men with whom he had
contended in former days were more lax in their interpretations. But
on the fundamental questions of the nature of the Union, the
authority of the Federal Government, and the means by which it was
to enforce its laws, there was no distinction between the school of
Jackson and Buchanan and the school of Clay and Webster. Moreover,
there was not one of his very eminent Whig antagonists, not even
Webster, whose loyalty to the Constitution—loyalty in the truest and
most comprehensive sense—the loyalty that will not violate, any more
than it will fail to assert, the just authority of such an
instrument—was more deep and fervid than Buchanan’s. This had been,
if one may use such an expression, the ruling passion of his public
life, from the time when he knew anything of public affairs. He was
not a man of brilliant genius, nor had he ever done any one thing
that had made his name illustrious and immortal, as Webster did when
he defended the Constitution against the heresy of nullification.
But in the course of a long, useful and consistent life, filled with
the exercise of talents of a fine order and uniform ability, he had
made the Constitution of his country the object of his deepest
affection, the constant guide of all his public acts. He was in
truth conspicuously and emphatically open to the reproach, if it be
a reproach, of regarding the Constitution of the United States with
what some have considered as idolatry. This trait in Mr. Buchanan’s
public character must not be overlooked, when the question is asked
to which I am now making an answer. How, in the long distant future,
the example of his fidelity to the Constitution contributed to its
restoration, after a period of turmoil and of more than neglect of
its principles, is worthy of reflection.
In the next place, during the time of the formation of the
provisional confederacy of the cotton States, not only was Congress
in session, and not only did it neglect to do anything to strengthen
the hands of the Executive, but if the President had, without the
authority of law, issued a call for volunteers, it would not have
been responded to. It is true that some Northern legislatures passed
resolutions tendering men and money to the United States. But how
could such offers have been accepted and acted upon by the
Executive, without the authority of law? How could a regiment, or an
army of regiments, have been marched by the President into Georgia
or Mississippi, to prevent the adoption of a secession ordinance?
What but a declaration of war, made by the only war-making power,
would have protected officers and men from being in the condition of
trespassers and brigands, from the moment they set foot on the soil
of a Southern State on such an enterprise? War, war upon a State or
a people, must have a legal basis, if those who wage it are to be
entitled to the privileges and immunities of soldiers. On the other
hand, to enforce the laws of the United States against obstructions
put in the way of their execution by individuals or unlawful
combinations, was not to make war. But for this purpose, President
Buchanan could not obtain from Congress the necessary means.
Moreover, the public mind of the North was at that time intent upon
the measures by which it was hoped that all differences between the
two sections of the Union might be composed, and a call for
volunteers would have been regarded as fatal to any prospect of
adjustment, and would therefore have been little heeded. It required
all the excitement which followed the bombardment of Fort Sumter,
all the monstrous uprising of the North produced by that event, to
secure a response to President Lincoln’s irregular call for
seventy-five thousand men, in April, 1861.
But it was in the power of President Buchanan to hold the border
States back from the secession movement until his successor could
take the reins of Government, and this duty he successfully
performed. Notwithstanding the failure of Congress to second his
efforts to preserve the Union unbroken by anything but the secession
of South Carolina; notwithstanding the failure of the Peace
Convention to propose anything that Congress would accept, Virginia,
North Carolina, Maryland, Kentucky, even Tennessee and Missouri, had
not seceded, or taken steps to secede, on the 4th of March, 1861.
The same conservative sentiment which still animated the best
portion of the people of those States, kept them from the vortex of
secession. They did not yet regard the election of Mr. Lincoln by a
purely sectional vote of the non-slaveholding States as a sufficient
cause for breaking up the Union. They still looked to his
administration for measures that would prevent a civil war; still
looked to the Federal Government for a redress of all the grievances
of which any of the States could complain. So that when Mr. Buchanan
laid down and Mr. Lincoln took up the powers of the Executive, the
problem which remained for the latter, and which Mr. Buchanan left
for him in the best attitude that it could be made to assume, was
how still to keep those border States from joining the Southern
Confederacy, as they had been kept from it hitherto.
This was largely, almost exclusively, a matter for the Executive,
unless, indeed, he should think it best to call the new Congress,
then legally existing, together immediately, and insist on its doing
what the preceding Congress had neglected. This course was not at
once adopted, and consequently everything depended upon the dealing
of the Executive with the Confederate commissioners, who were then
in Washington, respecting the evacuation of Fort Sumter. Mr.
Buchanan had in no way trammelled his successor by negotiations with
those commissioners. He had, in fact, declined all intercourse with
them; and it was entirely optional with Mr. Lincoln to do the same
thing, as it was entirely open to him to determine whether he would
or would not order the evacuation of that fort, and to shape his
measures accordingly. Thus far, an attack upon Major Anderson’s
position had been prevented by the efforts of Virginia, and by the
prudent course pursued by Mr. Buchanan. It was to be expected that
the Southern commissioners would be most persistent in their
demands; that they would seek the aid of influential persons who
might desire to see the peace of the country preserved, and who
would be willing to hazard so much of a recognition of the new
Confederacy as a _de facto_ power, as would be involved in a
compliance with its immediate demands respecting Sumter. But by no
act, or word, or omission of the outgoing President, had his
successor been placed under any obligation to yield to those
demands, or even to consider them. That the military situation had
become such that Anderson could not be maintained in his position
without sending a considerable army to his relief, was not due to
President Buchanan’s unwillingness to send him reinforcements, but
it was a consequence of Anderson’s not asking for them until he was
so surrounded with fortifications and powerful batteries that he
could not be relieved without a force many times greater than all
that the Government then had at its command.
Mr. Lincoln, therefore, assumed the Government without a single
admission by his predecessor of the right of secession, or of any
claim founded on it; without any obligation, other than the duty of
preventing a civil war, to hold even an informal negotiation with
the Confederate commissioners; with thirteen millions of people in
the border States still in the Union, and not likely to leave it,
unless blood should be shed. It may be that in one sense it was
fortunate that the first gun was fired on and not from Fort Sumter.
But into that question it is not needful for me to enter. My
province is fulfilled, if I have correctly described the condition
in which Mr. Buchanan left the Government to his successor.
Excepting on the short drive from the White House to the Capitol, in
the same carriage, on the 4th day of March, according to the
graceful custom of inaugurating a new President, and in the public
ceremony of the day, there is no reason to suppose that Mr. Buchanan
and Mr. Lincoln ever met. All that is known is that Mr. Lincoln’s
demeanor, while in the carriage, produced upon Mr. Buchanan the
impression that he had no fears for his personal safety or the
safety of the capital. But it does not appear that at that or any
other time, Mr. Lincoln sought to know what his predecessor could
tell him. It is too much the habit of our public men to live and act
and confer only with their party associates. Unless it be in the
conflicts of public debate, they learn nothing of the views,
purposes, motives, and very little of the acts, of their political
opponents. If ever there was an occasion when this habit needed to
be broken, it was when one of these men was putting off and the
other was assuming the great duties of the Presidency. Mr. Buchanan
could not seek a conference with his successor on the state of
public affairs; his successor did not seek or apparently desire one.
How much there was that Mr. Buchanan could have communicated to Mr.
Lincoln, and how much it concerned the interest of the Republic that
the latter should learn, must be apparent from what has been gone
over in the preceding pages. Such a conference, if it had served no
other good purpose, would have fixed Mr. Lincoln’s attention upon
the extreme importance of so guiding the intercourse between his
administration, or any member of it, and the Confederate
commissioners, as to prevent all pretext for an assault upon Fort
Sumter.
Mr. Buchanan was detained by his private affairs in Washington until
the 9th day of March. On that day, he departed for Wheatland,
accompanied by Miss Lane and the other members of his household.
----------------------------
TROOPS AT THE CAPITAL.
The anonymous diarist of the _North American Review_, writing on
the 4th day of March, the day of Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration,
records his great disgust at the presence of troops in Washington,
and attributes it to “the mischievous influence of the Blairs.” It
is to be hoped that the statement which I have made will be
considered as sufficient proof of the source from which the first
suggestion of this very prudent and proper precaution came. There
was no single moment of time and no place in the Union, during the
whole period of Mr. Buchanan’s Presidency, at which the presence
of a military force was more necessary than it was at Washington
on the day of Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration; for, notwithstanding the
absence of any tangible evidence of a conspiracy to seize the city
or to interrupt the proceedings, yet, as Judge Black forcibly
remarked in his letter to the President, preparation could do no
possible harm, in any event, and in the event which seemed most
probable, it was the country’s only chance of salvation. If, then,
at this most critical time and place, there could be assembled
only 653 men of the rank and file of the army, a part of them
being the sappers and miners drawn from West Point, what a
commentary does this fact afford, upon the charge that President
Buchanan neglected his duty, by not garrisoning the Southern forts
in the month of October, 1860. At that time, the whole number of
seaboard forts of the United States was 57; the proper complement
for war garrisons of these forts would require 28,420 men; and
their actual garrisons were 1,334 men, 1,308 of whom were at
Governor’s Island, New York, Fort McHenry, Maryland, Fortress
Monroe, Virginia, and Alcantraz Island, San Francisco. The regular
army, when recruited to its maximum, was only 18,000 men; actually
it was not much over 16,000. At no time could any part of it have
been withdrawn from the remote frontiers; and of the 1,308 men
distributed at the five points above named, very few could have
been transferred to the nine Southern forts mentioned by General
Scott in his “views” of October, 1860. The Military Committee of
the House of Representatives, in their Report of February 18,
1861, said: “Unless it is the intention of Congress that the
forts, arsenals, clock yards and other public property, shall be
exposed to capture and spoliation by any lawless bands who may
have the inclination to commit depredations upon it, the President
must be armed with additional force for their protection.”
Accordingly, they reported a bill authorizing the President to
call out the militia, but it was never acted upon. (See Report, H.
R. No. 85, 36th Cong., 2d Session, and Bill No. 1,003.)