1860—March and June.
THE SO-CALLED “COVODE INVESTIGATION.”
Reference has been made by Mr. Henry, in a part of his communication
quoted in the last chapter, to a proceeding in the House of
Representatives, which has been called the “Covode Investigation.”
It is proper that a detailed account of this occurrence should be
here given.
Among the lower, or rather the lowest, political tactics,
inculpation of a retiring administration has often been resorted to
for promoting the success of the opposite party, and it seems not
infrequently to have been the calculation that the effect produced
would be in proportion to the grossness of the imputations. Mr.
Buchanan could not hope to escape calumny. None of his predecessors,
not even the most illustrious of them all, not even Washington
himself, had escaped it. Scarcely any of them, however, had been
made the object of this kind of attack, by a method so base and by
means so foul, as those to which President Buchanan was now to be
subjected. Before any of the troubles of secession arrived, before
either of the political parties had made its nomination for the next
Presidential election, it was determined that an assault should be
made upon him that would render him and his administration odious to
the people of the country.
It is certainly unavoidable, perhaps it is well, that free
governments should be administered by parties. In a vigilant,
jealous and active opposition, there is great security against the
misuse of power by those who hold it. But the freedom of opposition,
like the freedom of the press, can easily degenerate into
licentiousness; and the greater the latitude allowed by the
political maxims or habits of a people, the greater will be the
danger of abuse of that right of criticism and inculpation which is
essential to liberty, to purity, and to the public interests.
Happily, there are some restraints upon the exercise of this right,
imposed by the forms of procedure which our Constitution
has prescribed when the conduct of the executive branch of
the Government is to be called in question by the House of
Representatives. When these restraints are violated, as they were
violated against President Buchanan, there is but one judgment for
history to pronounce. Those who institute a proceeding that is out
of the limits of their constitutional function, for the purpose of
exciting hatred of one who fills for the time a coördinate and
independent department of the Government, and who conduct such a
proceeding in secret, leave upon the records of the country a
condemnation of themselves; and it is some evidence of the progress
which a people are making in freeing their partisan warfare from
such abuses, if we are able to say, as probably we can say, that
such a proceeding would not be tolerated at the present day by any
portion of the people of this country, as that which was begun and
prosecuted against President Buchanan in the spring and summer of
1860.
The House of Representatives was at this time under the control of a
majority held by the opponents of the administration. If they had
reason to believe that the President had been guilty of an exercise,
or of any attempt at an exercise, of improper influence over
legislation, or that he or any of his subordinate executive officers
had defeated, or attempted to defeat, the execution of any law, or
that he had failed or refused to execute any law, their course was
plain. In regard to the President, it was their duty to make a
specific charge, to investigate it openly, and to impeach him before
the Senate, if the evidence afforded reasonable ground to believe
that the charge could be substantiated. In regard to his
subordinates, their power to investigate was somewhat broader,
because, as a legislative body, the House of Representatives might
have occasion to remedy by legislation any future wrongs of the same
kind. But over the President, they had no authority of investigation
or inquiry, excepting as the impeaching body to which the
Constitution had committed the duty of accusation. By no
constitutional propriety, by no precedent and no principle, could an
accusation of official misconduct on the part of the President be
brought within the jurisdiction of the House, excepting by the
initiation of a proceeding looking to his impeachment. Any
proceeding, aside from the impeaching process, could have no object
and no effect but to propagate calumny, without opportunity for
exculpation and defence; and from the beginning to the end of this
extraordinary persecution every step was marked by the design with
which it was originated.
It began by the introduction of a resolution, offered in the House
by Mr. Covode, a member from Pennsylvania, on the 5th March, 1860;
and to make way for its introduction, he moved and obtained a
suspension of the rules. This was of course by previous concert. The
Speaker, after the reading of the resolution, ruled that it was not
debatable. Attempts were made by different members to point out the
absence from the resolution of any specific or tangible charge, or
to extract from the mover some declaration that he had been informed
or believed that the President had been guilty of some official
misconduct, within the generality and vagueness of the inquiry that
he proposed to have made. All these efforts were put down by the
Speaker and by clamorous cries of “order.” It became evident that
the resolution was to pass, as a foregone conclusion, without a
moment’s consideration of its character or its terms. Under the
operation of “the previous question,” it was adopted, and the mover
was afterwards placed by the Speaker at the head of the committee
which he called for. Thus, so far as there was any accuser, that
accuser was made the principal judge who was to try the accusation;
and by the terms of the resolution, all the accusation that was made
was wrapped in the following vague and indefinite language:
_Resolved_, That a committee of five members be appointed by the
Speaker, for the purpose, first, of investigating whether the
President of the United States, or any officer of the Government,
has, by money, patronage, or other improper means, sought to
influence the action of Congress, or any committee thereof, for or
against the passage of any law appertaining to the rights of any
State or Territory; and, second, also to inquire into and
investigate whether any officer or officers of the Government
have, by combination or otherwise, prevented or defeated, or
attempted to prevent or defeat, the execution of any law or laws
now upon the statute book, and whether the President has failed or
refused to compel the execution of any law thereof.
The committee, under the mover of the resolution as chairman,
proceeded to make, with closed doors, a general investigation into
every thing that any enemy of the President could bring to them.
Never, in the history of parliamentary proceedings, since they
ceased to be made the instruments of mere partisan malice, had there
been such a violation of constitutional principles and of every
maxim of justice. A secret inquisition into the conduct of a
President of the United States, not conducted in the forms or with
the safeguards of the impeachment process, without one specific
accusation, was a proceeding unknown alike to the Constitution and
to the practice, the habits and the instincts, of the people of the
United States. The President was left to learn what he could of the
doings of this committee from what they permitted to leak into the
public prints, or from other sources. More concerned for the safety
of his successors in the great office which he held than for his own
reputation, but not unmindful of the duty which he owed to himself,
he transmitted to the House, on the 28th of March, the following
message, embracing a dignified and energetic protest against this
unexampled proceeding:
TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:—
After a delay which has afforded me ample time for reflection, and
after much and careful deliberation, I find myself constrained by
an imperious sense of duty, as a coördinate branch of the Federal
Government, to protest against the first two clauses of the first
resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 5th
instant, and published in the _Congressional Globe_ on the
succeeding day. These clauses are in the following words:
“_Resolved_, That a committee of five members be appointed by the
Speaker, for the purpose, 1st, of investigating whether the
President of the United States, or any other officer of the
Government, has, by money, patronage, or other improper means,
sought to influence the action of Congress, or any committee
thereof, for or against the passage of any law appertaining to the
rights of any State or Territory; and 2d, also to inquire into and
investigate whether any officer or officers of the Government
have, by combination or otherwise, prevented or defeated, or
attempted to prevent or defeat, the execution of any law or laws
now upon the statute book, and whether the President has failed or
refused to compel the execution of any law thereof.”
I confine myself exclusively to these two branches of the
resolution, because the portions of it which follow relate to
alleged abuses in post offices, navy yards, public buildings, and
other public works of the United States. In such cases inquiries
are highly proper in themselves, and belong equally to the Senate
and the House as incident to their legislative duties, and being
necessary to enable them to discover and to provide the
appropriate legislative remedies for any abuses which may be
ascertained. Although the terms of the latter portion of the
resolution are extremely vague and general, yet my sole purpose in
adverting to them at present is to mark the broad line of
distinction between the accusatory and the remedial clauses of
this resolution. The House of Representatives possess no power
under the Constitution over the first or accusatory portion of the
resolution, except as an impeaching body; whilst over the last, in
common with the Senate, their authority as a legislative body is
fully and cheerfully admitted.
It is solely in reference to the first or impeaching power that I
propose to make a few observations. Except in this single case,
the Constitution has invested the House of Representatives with no
power, no jurisdiction, no supremacy whatever over the President.
In all other respects he is quite as independent of them as they
are of him. As a coördinate branch of the Government he is their
equal. Indeed, he is the only direct representative on earth of
the people of all and each of the sovereign States. To them, and
to them alone, is he responsible whilst acting within the sphere
of his constitutional duty, and not in any manner to the House of
Representatives. The people have thought proper to invest him with
the most honorable, responsible, and dignified office in the
world, and the individual, however unworthy, now holding this
exalted position, will take care, so far as in him lies, that
their rights and prerogatives shall never be violated in his
person, but shall pass to his successors unimpaired by the
adoption of a dangerous precedent. He will defend them to the last
extremity against any unconstitutional attempt, come from what
quarter it may, to abridge the constitutional rights of the
Executive, and render him subservient to any human power except
themselves.
The people have not confined the President to the exercise of
executive duties. They have also conferred upon him a large
measure of legislative discretion. No bill can become a law
without his approval, as representing the people of the United
States, unless it shall pass after his veto by a majority of
two-thirds of both Houses. In his legislative capacity he might,
in common with the Senate and the House, institute an inquiry to
ascertain any facts which ought to influence his judgment in
approving or vetoing any bill. This participation in the
performance of legislative duties between the coördinate branches
of the Government ought to inspire the conduct of all of them, in
their relations toward each other, with mutual forbearance and
respect. At least each has a right to demand justice from the
other. The cause of complaint is, that the constitutional rights
and immunities of the Executive have been violated in the person
of the President.
The trial of an impeachment of the President before the Senate on
charges preferred and prosecuted against him by the House of
Representatives, would be an imposing spectacle for the world. In
the result, not only his removal from the Presidential office
would be involved, but, what is of infinitely greater importance
to himself, his character, both in the eyes of the present and of
future generations, might possibly be tarnished. The disgrace cast
upon him would in some degree be reflected upon the character of
the American people who elected him. Hence the precautions adopted
by the Constitution to secure a fair trial. On such a trial it
declares that “the Chief Justice shall preside.” This was
doubtless because the framers of the Constitution believed it to
be possible that the Vice-President might be biassed by the fact
that “in case of the removal of the President from office,” “the
same shall devolve on the Vice-President.”
The preliminary proceedings in the House in the case of charges
which may involve impeachment, have been well and wisely settled
by long practice upon principles of equal justice both to the
accused and to the people. The precedent established in the case
of Judge Peck, of Missouri, in 1831, after a careful review of all
former precedents, will, I venture to predict, stand the test of
time. In that case, Luke Edward Lawless, the accuser, presented a
petition to the House, in which he set forth minutely and
specifically his causes of complaint. He prayed “that the conduct
and proceedings in this behalf of said Judge Peck may be inquired
into by your honorable body, and such decision made thereon as to
your wisdom and justice shall seem proper.” This petition was
referred to the Judiciary Committee; such has ever been deemed the
appropriate committee to make similar investigations. It is a
standing committee, supposed to be appointed without reference to
any special case, and at all times is presumed to be composed of
the most eminent lawyers in the House from different portions of
the Union, whose acquaintance with judicial proceedings, and whose
habits of investigation, qualify them peculiarly for the task. No
tribunal, from their position and character, could in the nature
of things be more impartial. In the case of Judge Peck, the
witnesses were selected by the committee itself, with a view to
ascertain the truth of the charge. They were cross-examined by
him, and everything was conducted in such a manner as to afford
him no reasonable cause of complaint. In view of this precedent,
and, what is of far greater importance, in view of the
Constitution and the principles of eternal justice, in what manner
has the President of the United States been treated by the House
of Representatives? Mr. John Covode, a Representative from
Pennsylvania, is the accuser of the President. Instead of
following the wise precedents of former times, and especially that
in the case of Judge Peck, and referring the accusation to the
Committee on the Judiciary, the House have made my accuser one of
my judges.
To make the accuser the judge is a violation of the principles of
universal justice, and is condemned by the practice of all
civilized nations. Every free-man must revolt at such a spectacle.
I am to appear before Mr. Covode, either personally or by a
substitute, to cross-examine the witnesses which he may produce
before himself to sustain his own accusations against me, and
perhaps even this poor boon may be denied to the President.
And what is the nature of the investigation which his resolution
proposes to institute? It is as vague and general as the English
language affords words in which to make it. The committee is to
inquire, not into any specific charge or charges, but whether the
President has, “by money, patronage, or other improper means,
sought to influence,” not the action of any individual member or
members of Congress, but “the action” of the entire body “of
Congress” itself, “or any committee thereof.” The President might
have had some glimmering of the nature of the offence to be
investigated, had his accuser pointed to the act or acts of
Congress which he sought to pass or to defeat by the employment of
“money, patronage, or other improper means.” But the accusation is
bounded by no such limits. It extends to the whole circle of
legislation; to interference “for or against the passage of any
law appertaining to the rights of any State or Territory.” And
what law does not appertain to the rights of some State or
Territory? And what law or laws has the President failed to
execute? These might easily have been pointed out had any such
existed.
Had Mr. Lawless asked an inquiry to be made by the House whether
Judge Peck, in general terms, had not violated his judicial
duties, without the specification of any particular act, I do not
believe there would have been a single vote in that body in favor
of the inquiry. Since the time of the Star Chamber and of general
warrants, there has been no such proceeding in England.
The House of Representatives, the high impeaching power of the
country, without consenting to hear a word of explanation, have
indorsed this accusation against the President, and made it their
own act. They even refused to permit a member to inquire of the
President’s accuser what were the specific charges against him.
Thus, in this preliminary accusation of “high crimes and
misdemeanors” against a coordinate branch of the Government, under
the impeaching power, the House refused to hear a single
suggestion even in regard to the correct mode of proceeding, but,
without a moment’s delay, passed the accusatory resolutions under
the pressure of the previous question. In the institution of a
prosecution for any offence against the most humble citizen—and I
claim for myself no greater rights than he enjoys—the Constitution
of the United States, and of the several States, require that he
shall be informed, in the very beginning, of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, in order to enable him to prepare
for his defence. There are other principles which I might
enumerate, not less sacred, presenting an impenetrable shield to
protect every citizen falsely charged with a criminal offence.
These have been violated in the prosecution instituted by the
House of Representatives against the executive branch of the
Government. Shall the President alone be deprived of the
protection of these great principles, which prevail in every land
where a ray of liberty penetrates the gloom of despotism? Shall
the Executive alone be deprived of rights which all his
fellow-citizens enjoy? The whole proceeding against him justifies
the fears of those wise and great men who, before the Constitution
was adopted by the States, apprehended that the tendency of the
Government was to the aggrandizement of the legislative at the
expense of the executive and judicial departments.
I again declare emphatically that I make this protest for no
reason personal to myself; and I do it with perfect respect for
the House of Representatives, in which I had the honor of serving
as a member for five successive terms. I have lived long in this
goodly land, and have enjoyed all the offices and honors which my
country could bestow. Amid all the political storms through which
I have passed, the present is the first attempt which has ever
been made, to my knowledge, to assail my personal or official
integrity; and this as the time is approaching when I shall
voluntarily retire from the service of my country. I feel proudly
conscious that there is no public act of my life which will not
bear the strictest scrutiny. I defy all investigation. Nothing but
the basest perjury can sully my good name. I do not fear even
this, because I cherish an humble confidence that the Gracious
Being who has hitherto defended and protected me against the
shafts of falsehood and malice will not desert me now, when I have
become “old and gray-headed.” I can declare, before God and my
country, that no human being (with an exception scarcely worthy of
notice) has, at any period of my life, dared to approach me with a
corrupt or dishonorable proposition; and, until recent
developments, it had never entered into my imagination that any
person, even in the storm of exasperated political excitement,
would charge me, in the most remote degree, with having made such
a proposition to any human being. I may now, however, exclaim, in
the language of complaint employed by my first and greatest
predecessor, that I have been abused “in such exaggerated and
indecent terms as could scarcely be applied to a Nero, to a
notorious defaulter, or even to a common pickpocket.”
I do, therefore, for the reasons stated, and in the name of the
people of the several States, solemnly protest against these
proceedings of the House of Representatives, because they are in
violation of the rights of the coördinate executive branch of the
Government, and subversive of its constitutional independence;
because they are calculated to foster a band of interested
parasites and informers, ever ready, for their own advantage, to
swear before _ex parte_ committees to pretended private
conversations between the President and themselves, incapable,
from their nature, of being disproved, thus furnishing material
for harassing him, degrading him in the eyes of the country, and
eventually, should he be a weak or a timid man, rendering him
subservient to improper influences, in order to avoid such
persecutions and annoyances; because they tend to destroy that
harmonious action for the common good which ought to be
maintained, and which I sincerely desire to cherish between
coördinate branches of the Government; and, finally, because, if
unresisted, they would establish a precedent dangerous and
embarrassing to all my successors, to whatever political party
they might be attached.
JAMES BUCHANAN.
WASHINGTON, March 28, 1860.
This message was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, a
majority of whom, through their chairman, on the 9th of April,
reported resolutions against its constitutional doctrines, which the
House adopted on the 8th of June, by a party vote, and the
proceedings of the Covode Committee went on until the 16th of that
month. Mr. Train, of Massachusetts, one of the committee, then
reported to the House a great mass of testimony which had been taken
from all sorts of willing witnesses against the President, but
without a single resolution accusing or censuring either him or any
member of his cabinet. This was, in one sense, as he has himself
said, “a triumphant result for the President.”[57] But the movers in
this business had attained their object, in procuring and spreading
before the country the means of traducing the President; means which
rested for the most part on perjury, and for the residue were
colored by personal or political hostility. It was impossible for
Mr. Buchanan to allow this to pass without further notice. It is
more than probable that the further notice which he took of it
prevented a repetition of this kind of proceeding, when, on a future
occasion, another President of the United States incurred the
hostility of a dominant majority in the House of Representatives. On
the 22d of June he sent to the House the following additional
message:—
Footnote 57:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 218.
“TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:—
“In my message to the House of Representatives of the 28th March
last, I solemnly protested against the creation of a committee, at
the head of which was placed my accuser, for the purpose of
investigating whether the President had, ‘by money, patronage or
other improper means, sought to influence the action of Congress,
or any committee thereof, for or against the passage of any law
appertaining to the rights of any State or Territory.’ I protested
against this because it was destitute of any specification;
because it referred to no particular act to enable the President
to prepare for his defence; because it deprived him of the
constitutional guards, which, in common with every citizen of the
United States, he possesses for his protection; and because it
assailed his constitutional independence as a coördinate branch of
the Government. There is an enlightened justice, as well as a
beautiful symmetry, in every part of the Constitution. This is
conspicuously manifested in regard to impeachments. The House of
Representatives possesses ‘the sole power of impeachment;’ the
Senate ‘the sole power to try all impeachments;’ and the
impeachable offences are ‘treason, bribery, or other high crimes
or misdemeanors.’ The practice of the House, from the earliest
times, had been in accordance with its own dignity, the rights of
the accused, and the demands of justice. At the commencement of
each judicial investigation which might lead to an impeachment,
specific charges were always preferred; the accused had an
opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses, and he was placed in
full possession of the precise nature of the offence which he had
to meet. An impartial and elevated standing committee was charged
with this investigation, upon which no member inspired with the
ancient sense of honor and justice would have served, had he ever
expressed an opinion against the accused. Until the present
occasion, it was never deemed proper to transform the accuser into
the judge, and to confer upon him the selection of his own
committee.
“The charges made against me, in vague and general terms, were of
such a false and atrocious character, that I did not entertain a
moment’s apprehension for the result. They were abhorrent to every
principle instilled into me from my youth, and every practice of
my life, and I did not believe it possible that the man existed
who would so basely perjure himself as to swear to the truth of
any such accusations. In this conviction I am informed I have not
been mistaken. In my former protest, therefore, I truly and
emphatically declared that it was made for no reason personal to
myself, but because the proceedings of the House were in violation
of the rights of the coördinate executive branch of the
Government, subversive of its constitutional independence, and, if
unresisted, would establish a precedent dangerous and embarrassing
to all my successors. Notwithstanding all this, if the committee
had not transcended the authority conferred upon it by the
resolution of the House of Representatives, broad and general as
this was, I should have remained silent upon the subject. What I
now charge is, that they have acted as though they possessed
unlimited power, and, without any warrant whatever in the
resolution under which they were appointed, have pursued a course
not merely at war with the constitutional rights of the Executive,
but tending to degrade the presidential office itself to such a
degree as to render it unworthy of the acceptance of any man of
honor or principle.
“The resolution of the House, so far as it is accusatory of the
President, is confined to an inquiry whether he had used corrupt
or improper means to influence the action of Congress or any of
its committees on legislative measures pending before them.
Nothing more, nothing less. I have not learned through the
newspapers, or in any other mode, that the committee have touched
the other accusatory branch of the resolution, charging the
President with a violation of duty in failing to execute some law
or laws. This branch of the resolution is therefore out of the
question. By what authority, then, have the committee undertaken
to investigate the course of the President in regard to the
convention which framed the Lecompton constitution? By what
authority have they undertaken to pry into our foreign relations,
for the purpose of assailing him on account of the instructions
given by the Secretary of State to our minister in Mexico,
relative to the Tehuantepec route? By what authority have they
inquired into the causes of removal from office, and this from the
parties themselves removed, with a view to prejudice his
character, notwithstanding this power of removal belongs
exclusively to the President under the Constitution, was so
decided by the first Congress in the year 1789, and has
accordingly ever since been exercised? There is in the resolution
no pretext of authority for the committee to investigate the
question of the printing of the post-office blanks, nor is it to
be supposed that the House, if asked, would have granted such an
authority, because this question had been previously committed to
two other committees—one in the Senate and the other in the House.
Notwithstanding this absolute want of power, the committee rushed
into this investigation in advance of all other subjects.
“The committee proceeded for months, from March 22d, 1860, to
examine _ex parte_, and without any notice to myself, into every
subject which could possibly affect my character. Interested and
vindictive witnesses were summoned and examined before them; and
the first and only information of their testimony which, in almost
every instance, I received, was obtained from the publication of
such portions of it as could injuriously affect myself, in the New
York journals. It mattered not that these statements were, so far
as I have learned, disproved by the most respectable witnesses who
happened to be on the spot. The telegraph was silent respecting
these contradictions. It was a secret committee in regard to all
the testimony which could by possibility reflect on my character.
The poison was left to produce its effect upon the public mind,
whilst the antidote was carefully withheld.
“In their examinations the committee violated the most sacred and
honorable confidences existing among men. Private correspondence,
which a truly honorable man would never even entertain a distant
thought of divulging, was dragged to light. Different persons in
official and confidential relations with myself, and with whom it
was supposed I might have held conversations, the revelation of
which would do me injury, were examined. Even members of the
Senate and members of my own cabinet, both my constitutional
advisers, were called upon to testify, for the purpose of
discovering something, if possible, to my discredit.
“The distribution of the patronage of the Government is by far
the most disagreeable duty of the President. Applicants are so
numerous, and their applications are pressed with such
eagerness by their friends both in and out of Congress, that
the selection of one for any desirable office gives offence to
many. Disappointed applicants, removed officers, and those who
for any cause, real or imaginary, had become hostile to the
administration, presented themselves, or were invited by a
summons to appear before the committee. These are the most
dangerous witnesses. Even with the best intentions, they are
so influenced by prejudice and disappointment, that they
almost inevitably discolor truth. They swear to their own
version of private conversations with the President without
the possibility of contradiction. His lips are sealed and he
is left at their mercy. He cannot, as a coördinate branch of
the Government, appear before a committee of investigation to
contradict the oaths of such witnesses. Every coward knows
that he can employ insulting language against the President
with impunity, and every false or prejudiced witness can
attempt to swear away his character before such a committee
without the fear of contradiction.
“Thus for months, whilst doing my best at one end of the avenue to
perform my high and responsible duties to the country, has there
been a committee of the House of Representatives in session at the
other end of the avenue, spreading a drag-net, without the shadow
of authority from the House, over the whole Union, to catch any
disappointed man willing to malign my character, and all this in
secret conclave. The lion’s mouth at Venice, into which secret
denunciations were dropped, is an apt illustration of the Covode
committee. The Star Chamber, tyrannical and odious as it was,
never proceeded in such a manner. For centuries there has been
nothing like it in any civilized country, except the revolutionary
tribunal of France, in the days of Robespierre. Now, I undertake
to state and to prove that should the proceedings of the committee
be sanctioned by the House, and become a precedent for future
times, the balance of the Constitution will be entirely upset, and
there will no longer remain the three coördinate and independent
branches of the Government—legislative, executive, and judicial.
The worst fears of the patriots and statesmen who framed the
Constitution in regard to the usurpations of the legislative on
the executive and judicial branches will then be realized. In the
language of Mr. Madison, speaking on this very subject, in the
forty-eighth number of the _Federalist_: ‘In a representative
republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited both
in the extent and duration of its power, and where the legislative
power is exercised by an assembly which is inspired by a supposed
influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own
strength, which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions
which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable
of pursuing the objects of its passions by means which reason
prescribes, it is against the enterprising ambition of this
department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and
exhaust all their precautions.’ And in the expressive and pointed
language of Mr. Jefferson, when speaking of the tendency of the
legislative branch of Government to usurp the rights of the weaker
branches: ‘The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely
the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation
that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and
not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would
surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it turn their
eyes on the Republic of Venice. As little will it avail us that
they are chosen by ourselves. An elective despotism was not the
government we fought for, but one which should not only be founded
on free principles, but in which the powers of government should
be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as
that no one could transcend their legal limits without being
effectually checked and controlled by the others.”
“Should the proceedings of the Covode committee become a
precedent, both the letter and spirit of the Constitution will be
violated. One of the three massive columns on which the whole
superstructure rests will be broken down. Instead of the Executive
being a coördinate, it will become a subordinate branch of the
Government. The presidential office will be dragged into the dust.
The House of Representatives will then have rendered the Executive
almost necessarily subservient to its wishes, instead of being
independent. How is it possible that two powers in the State can
be coördinate and independent of each other, if the one claims and
exercises the power to reprove and to censure all the official
acts and all the private conversations of the other, and this upon
_ex parte_ testimony before a secret inquisitorial committee—in
short, to assume a general censorship over the others? The idea is
as absurd in public as it would be in private life. Should the
President attempt to assert and maintain his own independence,
future Covode committees may dragoon him into submission by
collecting the hosts of disappointed office-hunters, removed
officers, and those who desire to live upon the public treasury,
which must follow in the wake of every administration, and they,
in secret conclave, will swear away his reputation. Under such
circumstances, he must be a very bold man should he not surrender
at discretion and consent to exercise his authority according to
the will of those invested with this terrific power. The sovereign
people of the several States have elected him to the highest and
most honorable office in the world. He is their only direct
representative in the Government. By their Constitution they have
made him commander-in-chief of their army and navy. He represents
them in their intercourse with foreign nations. Clothed with their
dignity and authority, he occupies a proud position before all
nations, civilized and savage. With the consent of the Senate, he
appoints all the important officers of the Government. He
exercises the veto power, and to that extent controls the
legislation of Congress. For the performance of these high duties
he is responsible to the people of the several States, and not in
any degree to the House of Representatives.
“Shall he surrender these high powers, conferred upon him as the
representative of the American people, for their benefit, to the
House, to be exercised under their overshadowing influence and
control! Shall he alone of all the citizens of the United States
be denied a fair trial? Shall he alone not be ‘informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation’ against him? Shall he alone
not ‘be confronted with the witnesses’ against him? Shall the
House of Representatives, usurping the powers of the Senate,
proceed to try the President through the agency of a secret
committee of the body where it is impossible he can make any
defence, and then, without affording him an opportunity of being
heard, pronounce a judgment of censure against him? The very same
rule might be applied, for the very same reason, to every judge of
every court in the United States. From what part of the
Constitution is this terrible inquisitorial power derived? No such
express power exists. From which of the enumerated powers can it
be inferred? It is true the House cannot pronounce the formal
judgment against him of ‘removal from office,’ but they can, by
their judgment of censure, asperse his reputation, and thus, to
the extent of their influence, render the office contemptible. An
example is at hand of the reckless manner in which this power of
censure can be employed in high party times. The House, on a
recent occasion, have attempted to degrade the President by
adopting the resolution of Mr. John Sherman, declaring that he, in
conjunction with the Secretary of the Navy, “by receiving and
considering the party relations of bidders for contracts, and the
effect of awarding contracts upon pending elections, have set an
example dangerous to the public safety, and deserving the reproof
of this House.”
It will scarcely be credited that the sole pretext for this vote
of censure was the simple fact that in disposing of the numerous
letters of every imaginable character which I daily receive, I
had, in the usual course of business, referred a letter from
Colonel Patterson, of Philadelphia, in relation to a contract, to
the attention of the Secretary of the Navy, the head of the
appropriate department, without expressing or intimating any
opinion whatever on the subject; and to make the matter, if
possible, still plainer, the Secretary had informed the committee
that “_the President did not in any manner interfere in this case,
nor has he in any other case of contract since I have been in the
department_.” The absence of all proof to sustain this attempt to
degrade the President, whilst it manifests the venom of the shaft
aimed at him, has destroyed the vigor of the bow.
To return, after this digression. Should the House, by the
institution of Covode committees, votes of censure, and other
devices to harass the President, reduce him to subservience to
their will, and render him their creature, then the well-balanced
Government which our fathers framed will be annihilated. This
conflict has already been commenced in earnest by the House
against the Executive. A bad precedent rarely if ever dies. It
will, I fear, be pursued in the time of my successors, no matter
what may be their political character. Should secret committees be
appointed with unlimited authority to range over all the words and
actions, and, if possible, the very thoughts of the President,
with a view to discover something in his past life prejudicial to
his character, from parasites and informers, this would be an
ordeal which scarcely any mere man since the fall could endure. It
would be to subject him to a reign of terror from which the
stoutest and purest hearts might shrink. I have passed
triumphantly through this ordeal. My vindication is complete. The
committee have reported no resolution looking to an impeachment
against me, no resolution of censure, not even a resolution
pointing out any abuses in any of the executive departments of the
Government to be corrected by legislation. This is the highest
commendation which could be bestowed on the heads of these
departments. The sovereign people of the States will, however, I
trust, save my successors, whoever they may be, from any such
ordeal. They are frank, bold, and honest. They detest delators and
informers. I therefore, in the name and as the representative of
this great people, and standing upon the ramparts of the
Constitution which they “have ordained and established,” do
solemnly protest against these unprecedented and unconstitutional
proceedings.
There was still another committee raised by the House on the 6th
March last, on motion of Mr. Heard, to which I had not the
slightest objection. The resolution creating it was confined to
specific charges, which I have ever since been ready and willing
to meet. I have at all times invited and defied fair investigation
upon constitutional principles. I have received no notice that
this committee have ever proceeded to the investigation.
Why should the House of Representatives desire to encroach on the
other departments of the Government? Their rightful powers are
ample for every legitimate purpose. They are the impeaching body.
In their legislative capacity it is their most wise and wholesome
prerogative to institute rigid examinations into the manner in
which all departments of the Government are conducted, with a view
to reform abuses, to promote economy, and to improve every branch
of the administration. Should they find reason to believe, in the
course of their examinations, that any grave offence had been
committed by the President or any officer of the Government,
rendering it proper, in their judgment, to resort to impeachment,
their course would be plain. They would then transfer the question
from their legislative to their accusatory jurisdiction, and take
care that in all the preliminary judicial proceedings, preparatory
to the vote of articles of impeachment, the accused should enjoy
the benefit of cross-examining the witnesses, and all the other
safeguards with which the Constitution surrounds every American
citizen.
If, in a legislative investigation, it should appear that the
public interest required the removal of any officer of the
Government, no President has ever existed who, after giving him a
fair hearing, would hesitate to apply the remedy. This I take to
be the ancient and well-established practice. An adherence to it
will best promote the harmony and the dignity of the intercourse
between the coördinate branches of the Government, and render us
all more respectable both in the eyes of our own countrymen and of
foreign nations.
JAMES BUCHANAN.
WASHINGTON, June 22, 1860.
This last message was referred to a select committee, with
instructions to report at the next session. But no report was ever
made, and legislative action on the doings of the “Covode Committee”
thus came to an end. But in the country the materials for
calumniating the President continued to be used as they were
originally designed to be. It will be interesting to know something
more of the feelings of Mr. Buchanan on the subject, as expressed in
a private letter to the editor and proprietor of a great New York
journal.
[TO JAMES GORDON BENNETT, ESQ.]
(Private and Confidential.) WASHINGTON, June 18th, 1860.
MR DEAR SIR:—
I thought I never should have occasion to appeal to you on any
public subject, and I knew if I did, I could not swerve you from
your independent course. I therefore now only ask you as a
personal friend to take the trouble of examining yourself the
proceedings of the Covode Committee and the reports of the
majority and minority, and then to do me what you may deem to be
justice. That committee were engaged in secret conclave for nearly
three months in examining every man, _ex parte_, who, from
disappointment or personal malignity, would cast a shade upon the
character of the Executive. If this dragooning can exist, the
Presidential office would be unworthy of the acceptance of a
gentleman.
In performing my duty, I have endeavored to be not only pure but
unsuspected. I have never had any concern in awarding contracts,
but have left them to be given by the heads of the appropriate
departments. I have ever detested all jobs, and no man, at any
period of my life, has ever approached me on such a subject. The
testimony of —— contains nothing but falsehoods, whether for or
against me, for he has sworn all round.
I shall send a message to the House in a few days on the violation
of the Constitution involved in the vote of censure and in the
appointment and proceedings of the Covode Committee. I am glad to
perceive from the _Herald_ that you agree with me on the
Constitutional question. I shall endeavor to send you a copy in
advance.
With my kindest regards to Mrs. Bennett, I remain, very
respectfully,
Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.