1857-1861.
FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING MR. BUCHANAN’S ADMINISTRATION.
The internal affairs of the country during the administration of Mr.
Buchanan occupied so much of the public attention at the time, and
have since been a subject of so much interest, that his management
of our foreign relations has been quite obscured. Before I approach
the troubled period which witnessed the beginning of the Southern
revolt, I shall describe, with as much brevity as I can use,
whatever is most important in the relations of the United States
with other countries, that transpired during his Presidency.
It will be seen, hereafter, from what he recorded in his private
papers at the time of the resignation of General Cass from the State
Department, in the latter part of the year 1860, that Mr. Buchanan
had to be virtually his own Secretary of State, until Judge Black
succeeded to that office. This was less irksome to him than it might
have been to other Presidents, because of his great familiarity with
the diplomatic history of the country, and his experience in the
diplomatic service. His strong personal regard for General Cass,
whose high character, as well as his political standing in the party
of which they were both members, and the demand of the Western
States, had been the reasons for offering to him the Department of
State, made Mr. Buchanan patient and kind towards one who did not
render him much aid in the business of that office. Mr. Buchanan,
too, was a man who never shrank from labor. His industry was
incessant and untiring; it did not flag with his advancing years;
and it was an industry applied, in foreign affairs, to matters of
which he had a fuller and more intimate knowledge than any American
statesman of his time who was living when he became President of the
United States. His private papers bear ample testimony to the minute
and constant attention which he gave to the foreign relations of the
country, and to the extent of his employment of his own pen. He
wrote with great facility, precision and clearness, from a mind
stored with historical information and the principles of public law.
There was no topic and no question in the foreign relations of the
United States on which his knowledge did not come readily and
promptly to his hand. In this respect, with the exception of Mr.
Jefferson and Mr. John Quincy Adams, we have as yet had no President
who was his superior, or his equal. Like them, he had passed through
the office of Secretary of State, as well as through very important
foreign missions; an advantage which always tells in the office of
President, when it is combined with the qualifications that are
peculiar to American statesmanship.
First in importance, if not in dignity, the relations of the United
States with England, at any period of our history, and the mode in
which they were handled, are topics of permanent interest. How often
these two kindred nations have been on the verge of war, and how
that peril has been encountered and averted cannot cease to be
instructive. Nor is it of less consequence to note the course of a
President, who, during an administration fraught with the most
serious hazards to the internal relations of the United States with
each other, kept steadily in view the preservation of peace and good
will between the United States and Great Britain, while he abated
nothing from our just claims or our national dignity. Mr. Buchanan
left to his successor no unsettled question between these two
nations, that was of any immediate importance, and he left the
feeling between them and their respective governments in a far
better condition than he found it on his accession to the
Presidency, and in a totally different state from that which ensued
after the beginning of our civil war.
But when he became President, two irritating and dangerous questions
were pending, inherited from former administrations. The first of
these related, as we have seen, to the British claim of a
protectorate over the Mosquito coast, and to the establishment of
colonial government over the Bay Islands; territories that belonged
respectively to the feeble republics of Nicaragua and Honduras. It
has been seen in a former chapter how the ambiguity of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty had led the British government to adopt a
construction of it which would support these claims, and which would
justify the pretension that by that treaty the United States had
receded from what was called the “Monroe Doctrine.” This treaty,
concluded in 1850 by the administration of General Taylor, was
supposed in this country to have settled these questions in favor of
the United States, and that Great Britain would withdraw from the
territories of Nicaragua and Honduras. But she did not withdraw. Her
ministers continued to claim that the treaty only restrained her
from making future acquisitions in Central America, and that the
true inference from this was that she could hold her existing
possessions. It was, as has been seen, in the hope of settling this
question, that Mr. Buchanan accepted the mission to England in 1853.
Why it was not settled at that time, has been already stated in
detail. It remained to be amicably and honorably settled, under his
advice and approbation, after he became President, by treaties
between Great Britain and the two Central American States, in
accordance with the American construction of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty.
The long standing question in regard to the right of search came
into the hands of President Buchanan at a moment and under
circumstances that required the most vigorous action. The
belligerent right of search, exercised by Great Britain in the
maritime wars of 1812, had been a cause of constant irritation to
the people of this country. In progress of time, England undertook
to assert a right to detain and search merchantmen on the high seas,
in time of peace, suspected of being engaged in the slave trade.
There was no analogy, even, in this to the belligerent right of
visitation and search, whatever the latter might comprehend. An
accommodation, rather than a settlement, of this claim was made in
the treaty of 1842, negotiated between Lord Ashburton and Mr.
Webster, by which each nation agreed to keep a squadron of its own
on the coast of Africa, for the suppression of the slave trade when
carried on under their respective flags, or under any claim or use
of their flags, or by their subjects or citizens respectively.
Although this stipulation was accompanied by a very forcible
declaration made by Mr. Webster, under the direction of President
Tyler, that the American Government admitted of no right of
visitation and search of merchant vessels in time of peace, England
did not wholly abandon or renounce her claim of a right to detain
and search all vessels on the high seas which the commanders of her
cruisers might suspect to be slave traders. In the spring of 1858, a
number of small cruisers which had been employed in the Crimean war
was despatched by the British government to the coast of Cuba and
the Gulf of Mexico, with orders to search all merchantmen suspected
to be engaged in the slave trade. The presence of these cruisers,
acting under such orders, in waters traversed in all directions by
American vessels engaged in the foreign and coastwise trade, became
most alarming. Nor was the alarm lessened by the manner in which the
orders were carried out. Many American vessels were stopped and
searched rudely and offensively. A loud call was made upon the
President to interfere. A general indignation broke forth in all
quarters of the Union. President Buchanan, always vigilant in
protecting the commerce of the country, but mindful of the
importance of preventing any necessity for war, remonstrated to the
English government against this violation of the freedom of the
seas.
Still, the occasion required, in the opinion of the President, that
remonstrance should be backed by force. Great Britain had thought
proper, without warning, to send a force into waters filled with
American commerce, with orders to do what she had not the smallest
right to do. It was a very aggressive proceeding to be taken against
the commerce of a nation that had always denied the alleged right of
search as a right to be exercised in time of peace for any purpose
whatever. A very large naval force was at once despatched to the
neighborhood of Cuba, by order of the President, with instructions
“to protect all vessels of the United States on the high seas from
search or detention by the vessels of war of any other nation.” Any
one of the cruisers sent on this mission could have resisted a ship
of the largest class. The effect was most salutary. The British
government receded, recalled their orders, abandoned the claim of
the right of search, and recognized the principle of international
law in favor of the freedom of the seas. This was the end of a long
controversy between the two governments.[39]
Footnote 39:
The Senate, although at a late period, unanimously approved of the
instructions given to the Secretary of the Navy, and by him
carried out. (See _Congressional Globe_, 1858-9, p. 3061; Senate
Documents, vol. IV, p. 3, Report of the Secretary of the Navy.)
During the whole of Mr. Buchanan’s administration our relations with
Mexico were in a complicated and critical position, in consequence
of the internal condition of that country and of the danger of
interference by European powers. Mr. Buchanan has himself concisely
and accurately described the state of things in Mexico at the time
of his accession to the Presidency, and down to the end of the year
1859, and I therefore quote his description, rather than make one of
my own:
That republic has been in a state of constant revolution ever
since it achieved its independence from Spain. The various
constitutions adopted from time to time had been set at naught
almost as soon as proclaimed; and one military leader after
another, in rapid succession, had usurped the government. This
fine country, blessed with a benign climate, a fertile soil, and
vast mineral resources, was reduced by civil war and brigandage to
a condition of almost hopeless anarchy. Meanwhile, our treaties
with the republic were incessantly violated. Our citizens were
imprisoned, expelled from the country, and in some instances
murdered. Their vessels, merchandise, and other property were
seized and confiscated. While the central government at the
capital were acting in this manner, such was the general
lawlessness prevailing, that different parties claiming and
exercising local authority in several districts were committing
similar outrages on our citizens. Our treaties had become a dead
letter, and our commerce with the republic was almost entirely
destroyed. The claims of American citizens filed in the State
Department, for which they asked the interposition of their own
Government with that of Mexico to obtain redress and indemnity,
exceeded $10,000,000. Although this amount may have been
exaggerated by the claimants, still their actual losses must have
been very large.[40]
Footnote 40:
List of Claims, Senate Executive Documents, p. 18, 2d session
35th Congress, President’s Message.
In all these cases as they occurred our successive ministers
demanded redress, but their demands were only followed by new
injuries. Their testimony was uniform and emphatic in reference to
the only remedy which in their judgments would prove effectual.
“Nothing but a manifestation of the power of the Government of the
United States,” wrote Mr. John Forsyth, our minister in 1856, “and
of its purpose to punish these wrongs will avail. I assure you
that the universal belief here is, that there is nothing to be
apprehended from the Government of the United States, and that
local Mexican officials can commit these outrages upon American
citizens with absolute impunity.”
In the year 1857 a favorable change occurred in the affairs of the
republic, inspiring better hopes for the future. A constituent
congress, elected by the people of the different States for this
purpose, had framed and adopted a republican constitution. It
adjourned on the 17th February, 1857, having provided for a
popular election to be held in July for a president and members of
congress. At this election General Comonfort was chosen president
almost without opposition. His term of office was to commence on
the 1st of December, 1857, and to continue for four years. In case
his office should become vacant, the constitution had provided
that the chief justice of Mexico, then General Juarez, should
become president, until the end of the term. On the 1st December,
1857, General Comonfort appeared before the congress then in
session, took the oath to support the constitution, and was duly
inaugurated.
But the hopes thus inspired for the establishment of a regular
constitutional government soon proved delusive. President
Comonfort, within one brief month, was driven from the capital and
the republic by a military rebellion headed by General Zuloaga;
and General Juarez consequently became the constitutional
president of Mexico until the 1st day of December, 1861. General
Zuloaga instantly assumed the name of president with indefinite
powers; and the entire diplomatic corps, including the minister
from the United States, made haste to recognize the authority of
the usurper without awaiting instructions from their respective
governments. But Zuloaga was speedily expelled from power. Having
encountered the resistance of the people in many parts of the
republic, and a large portion of the capital having “pronounced”
against him, he was in turn compelled to relinquish the
presidency. The field was now cleared for the elevation of General
Miramon. He had from the beginning been the favorite of the
so-called “Church party,” and was ready to become their willing
instrument in maintaining the vast estates and prerogatives of the
Church, and in suppressing the Liberal constitution. An assembly
of his partisans, called together without even the semblance of
authority, elected him president, but he warily refused to accept
the office at their hands. He then resorted to another but
scarcely more plausible expedient to place himself in power. This
was to identify himself with General Zuloaga, who had just been
deposed, and to bring him again upon the stage as president.
Zuloaga accordingly reappeared in this character, but his only act
was to appoint Miramon “president substitute,” when he again
retired. It is under this title that Miramon has since exercised
military authority in the city of Mexico, expecting by this
stratagem to appropriate to himself the recognition of the foreign
ministers which had been granted to Zuloaga. He succeeded. The
ministers continued their relations with him as “president
substitute” in the same manner as if Zuloaga had still remained in
power. It was by this farce, for it deserves no better name, that
Miramon succeeded in grasping the presidency. The idea that the
chief of a nation at his own discretion may transfer to whomsoever
he please the trust of governing, delegated to him for the benefit
of the people, is too absurd to receive a moment’s countenance.
But when we reflect that Zuloaga, from whom Miramon derived his
title, was himself a military usurper, having expelled the
constitutional president (Comonfort) from office, it would have
been a lasting disgrace to the Mexican people had they tamely
submitted to the yoke. To such an imputation a large majority
proved themselves not to be justly exposed. Although, on former
occasions, a seizure of the capital and the usurpation of power by
a military chieftain had been generally followed, at least for a
brief season, by an acquiescence of the Mexican people, yet they
now rose boldly and independently to defend their rights.
President Juarez, after having been driven from the city of Mexico
by Zuloaga, proceeded to form a constitutional government at
Guanajuato. From thence he removed to Vera Cruz, where he put his
administration in successful operation. The people in many
portions of the republic rallied in its support and flew to arms.
A civil war thus began between the friends of the constitution and
the partisans of Miramon. In this conflict it was not possible for
the American people to remain indifferent spectators. They
naturally favored the cause of President Juarez, and expressed
ardent wishes for his success. Meanwhile Mr. Forsyth, the American
minister, still continued at the city of Mexico in the discharge
of his official duties until June, 1858, when he suspended his
diplomatic relations with the Miramon government, until he should
ascertain the decision of the President. Its outrages towards
American citizens and its personal indignities towards himself,
without hope of amendment or redress, rendered his condition no
longer tolerable. Our relations, bad as they had been under former
governments, had now become still worse under that of Miramon.
President Buchanan approved the step which Mr. Forsyth had taken.
He was consequently directed to demand his passports, to deposit
the archives of the legation with Mr. Black, our consul at the
city of Mexico, and to proceed to Vera Cruz, where an armed
steamer would be in readiness to convey himself and family to the
United States.[41]
Footnote 41:
Letter of General Cass to Mr. Forsyth, July 15th, 1858. Senate
Documents, 1858-1859, vol. i., p. 48
Thus was all diplomatic intercourse finally terminated with the
government of Miramon, whilst none had been organized with that of
Juarez. The President entertained some hope that this rupture of
diplomatic relations might cause Miramon to reflect seriously on
the danger of war with the United States, and might at least
arrest future outrages on our citizens. Instead of this, however,
he persisted in his course of violence against the few American
citizens who had the courage to remain under his power. The
President, in his message of December, 1859,[42] informs Congress
that “murders of a still more atrocious character have been
committed in the very heart of Mexico, under the authority of
Miramon’s government, during the present year. Some of these were
worthy only of a barbarous age, and if they had not been clearly
proven, would have seemed impossible in a country which claims to
be civilized.” And in that of December, 1860, he says: “To cap the
climax, after the battle of Tacubaya, in April, 1859, General
Marquez ordered three citizens of the United States, two of them
physicians, to be seized in the hospital at that place, taken out
and shot, without crime, and without trial. This was done,
notwithstanding our unfortunate countrymen were at the moment
engaged in the holy cause of affording relief to the soldiers of
both parties who had been wounded in the battle, without making
any distinction between them.”
Footnote 42:
House Journal, p. 207.
“Little less shocking was the recent fate of Ormond Chase, who was
shot in Tepic, on the 7th August, by order of the same Mexican
general, not only without a trial, but without any conjecture by
his friends of the cause of his arrest.” He was represented to
have been a young man of good character and intelligence, who had
made numerous friends in Tepic, and his unexpected execution
shocked the whole community. “Other outrages,” the President
states, “might be enumerated; but these are sufficient to
illustrate the wretched state of the country and the unprotected
condition of the persons and property of our citizens in Mexico.”
“The wrongs which we have suffered from Mexico are before the
world, and must deeply impress every American citizen. A
government which is either unable or unwilling to redress such
wrongs, is derelict to its highest duties.”
Meanwhile, the civil war between the parties was conducted with
various success, but the scale preponderated in favor of the
constitutional cause. Ere long the government of Juarez extended
its authority, and was acknowledged in all the important ports and
throughout the sea-coasts and external territory of the republic;
whilst the power of Miramon was confined to the city of Mexico and
the surrounding States.
The final triumph of Juarez became so probable, that President
Buchanan deemed it his duty to inquire and ascertain whether,
according to our constant usage in such cases, he might not
recognize the constitutional government. For the purpose of
obtaining reliable information on this point, he sent a
confidential agent to Mexico to examine and report the actual
condition and prospects of the belligerents. In consequence of his
report, as well as of intelligence from other sources, he felt
justified in appointing a new minister to the Mexican republic.
For this office Mr. Robert M. McLane, a distinguished citizen of
Maryland, was selected. He proceeded on his mission on the 8th
March, 1859, invested “with discretionary authority to recognize
the government of President Juarez, if on his arrival in Mexico he
should find it entitled to such recognition, according to the
established practice of the United States.” In consequence, on the
7th of April, Mr. McLane recognized the constitutional government
by presenting his credentials to President Juarez, having no
hesitation, as he said, “in pronouncing the government of Juarez
to be the only existing government of the republic.” He was
cordially received by the authorities at Vera Cruz, who have ever
since manifested the most friendly disposition toward the United
States.
Unhappily, however, the constitutional government, though
supported by a large majority, both of the people and of the
several Mexican States, had not been able to expel Miramon from
the capital. In the opinion of the President, it had now become
the imperative duty of Congress to act without further delay, and
to enforce redress from the government of Miramon for the wrongs
it had committed in violation of the faith of treaties against
citizens of the United States.
Toward no other government would we have manifested so long and so
patient a forbearance. This arose from our warm sympathies for a
neighboring republic. The territory under the sway of Miramon
around the capital was not accessible to our forces without
passing through the States under the jurisdiction of the
constitutional government. But this from the beginning had aways
manifested the warmest desire to cultivate the most friendly
relations with our country. No doubt was therefore entertained
that it would cheerfully grant us the right of passage. Moreover,
it well knew that the expulsion of Miramon would result in the
triumph of the constitutional government and its establishment
over the whole territory of Mexico. What was, also, deemed of
great importance by the President, this would remove from us the
danger of a foreign war in support of the Monroe doctrine against
any European nation which might be tempted, by the distracted
condition of the republic, to interfere forcibly in its internal
affairs under the pretext of restoring peace and order.[43]
Footnote 43:
Buchanan’s Defence, p. 267 _et seq._
It is now necessary to trace the President’s policy in regard to
these Mexican affairs, for the remainder of his term after the
commencement of the session of Congress in December, 1859. He saw
very clearly that unless active measures should be taken by the
Government of the United States to reach a power with which a
settlement of all claims and difficulties could be effected, some
other nation would undertake to establish a government in Mexico,
and the United States would then have to interfere, not only to
secure the rights of their citizens, but to assert the principle of
the “Monroe Doctrine,” which, according to the long standing
American claim, opposes European establishments upon any part of
this continent. He had his eye especially at this time upon the
Emperor of the French, whose colonizing policy for France was well
known, and who, Mr. Buchanan was well informed, was exercising,
through his minister, great influence over Miramon. It was morally
certain that if our Congress did not give the President the means
necessary either to uphold the constitutional government of Juarez,
or to compel the government of Miramon to do justice to our
citizens, he would be involved in the necessity for counteracting
the designs of Louis Napoleon. If this would be an interference with
the internal affairs of a foreign nation, contrary to our long
avowed policy, was not this an exceptional case? Mexico was our
neighbor, with whom our social, commercial and political relations
were very close. She had no settled government. Without the friendly
aid of some external power, she could have no government that could
preserve her internal peace, or fulfill her treaty obligations. She
was, as Mr. Buchanan forcibly said, “a wreck upon the ocean,
drifting about as she is impelled by different factions.” What power
could more safely and appropriately undertake to assist her in
establishing a settled government than the great neighboring
Republic of the United States, whose people and rulers could have no
desire to see her depart from the principles of constitutional and
republican institutions? And if the United States had wrongs of
their own citizens for which to seek redress and indemnification
from the Mexican nation, was that a reason for refusing to do
whatever might appropriately be done towards assisting any
government which the Mexican people might be disposed to support and
acknowledge, to acquire the position and authority of a legitimate
representative of the nation? It seemed to President Buchanan that
there were but two alternatives: either to march a force into Mexico
which would be sufficient to enable the constitutional government to
reach the capital and extend its power over the whole republic, or
to let things drift in uncertainty until Louis Napoleon should
interfere. If the United States would act in concert with the
constitutional government, the President believed that their consent
and co-operation could be obtained. If the United States did
nothing, the French would enter the country and the whole condition
of affairs would become more complicated than they had ever been.
Accordingly, the President, in his message to Congress, of December
19th, 1859, recommended the passage of a law, authorizing him, under
such conditions as Congress might deem expedient, to employ a
sufficient military force to enter Mexico for the purpose of
obtaining indemnity for the past and security for the future. After
explaining the necessity and expediency of this step, and pointing
out in what manner this force could aid the constitutional
government of Juarez, he said that if this were not done, “it would
not be surprising should some other nation undertake the task, and
thus force us to interfere at last, under circumstances of increased
difficulty, for the maintenance of our established policy.” The
entire session of 1859-60 passed away without any notice being taken
in Congress of this recommendation. The attention of that body was
absorbed in discussions about slavery, and in shaping the politics
of the next Presidential election. If the President’s recommendation
about Mexico had been discussed, we might have been able to judge
whether his political opponents were fearful that more territory
would be acquired from Mexico, for the further extension of slavery.
But in regard to any such result of the mode in which the President
proposed to secure an indemnification of the claims of our citizens,
it is to be observed that according to the terms of his
recommendation, it would rest entirely with Congress to fix the
preceding conditions of the intervention, and that if a treaty were
to follow or precede, it would have to be ratified by the Senate.
The President again brought this subject before Congress by his
annual message of December, 1860. Mr. Lincoln had now been elected
President and the foreign relations of the country would in three
months be in his hands. At this time, however, it had become still
more necessary for the United States Government to determine, and to
determine promptly, whether it would leave American citizens to the
mercy of Miramon’s government, or whether it would do something to
establish the constitutional government of Juarez. Again the
President repeated the warning that foreign powers would interfere
if this matter were to be much longer neglected, although at that
moment informal and verbal assurances had been given by some of the
European diplomatists in Mexico that such interference was not
intended. Congress, however, spent the whole winter of 1860-61 in a
dreary discussion of our internal affairs, without either making any
effort to arrest the spread of secession by conciliatory measures,
or doing anything to strengthen the hands of the President or his
successor.
But it had been for some time apparent to Mr. Buchanan that our
relations with Mexico could not be left in the condition in which
they stood. Both to satisfy the long deferred claims of our
citizens, and to prevent foreign interference with the internal
affairs of Mexico, he had instructed Mr. McLane to make a treaty
with the Constitutional government. On the 14th of December, 1859, a
“Treaty of Transit and Commerce” was signed between the Mexican
Republic and the United States, and also a “Convention to enforce
treaty stipulations, and to maintain order and security in the
territory of the Republics of Mexico and the United States.” Great
advantages of trade, transit and commerce were secured by these
arrangements. The United States was to pay $4,000,000 for the
surrender of certain Mexican duties, two millions to be paid down,
and two millions to be reserved and distributed to the American
claimants who could prove their injuries. With the two millions to
be placed in the hands of the constitutional government, it was
expected that it would be able to expel the usurping government from
the capital and establish itself over the whole territory of the
republic. All acquisition of further Mexican territory was thus
avoided. If this treaty had been approved by the Senate of the
United States, the empire of Maximilian would never have been heard
of. The American negotiator, Mr. McLane, in his despatch to the
Secretary of State, dated on the day this treaty and convention were
signed at Vera Cruz, expressed his apprehension that if they were
not ratified, further anarchy would prevail in Mexico, until it
should be ended by interference from some other quarter. The
President submitted the treaty and the convention to the Senate on
the 24th of January, 1860. They were neither of them approved.
Mexico was left to the interference of Louis Napoleon; the
establishment of an empire, under Maximilian, a prince of the House
of Hapsburg, followed, for the embarrassment of President Lincoln’s
administration while we were in the throes of our civil war, and the
claims of American citizens were to all appearance indefinitely
postponed.
The relations of the United States with Spain at the commencement of
Mr. Buchanan’s administration, and the manner in which he dealt with
them, have been described by him as follows:
Our relations with Spain were in a very unsatisfactory condition
on his accession to power. Our flag had been insulted, and
numerous injuries had been inflicted on the persons and property
of American citizens by Spanish officials acting under the direct
control of the Captain General of Cuba. These gave rise to many
but unavailing reclamations for redress and indemnity against the
Spanish government. Our successive ministers at Madrid had for
years ably presented and enforced these claims, but all without
effect. Their efforts were continually baffled on different
pretexts. There was a class of these claims called the “Cuban
claims,” of a nature so plainly just that they could not be
gainsayed. In these more than one hundred of our citizens were
directly interested. In 1844 duties were illegally exacted from
their vessels at different custom houses in Cuba, and they
appealed to the Government to have these duties refunded. Their
amount could be easily ascertained by the Cuban officials
themselves, who were in possession of all the necessary documents.
The validity of these claims was eventually recognized by Spain,
but not until after a delay of ten years. The amount due was
fixed, according to her own statement, with which the claimants
were satisfied, at the sum of $128,635.54. Just at the moment when
the claimants were expecting to receive this amount without
further delay, the Spanish government proposed to pay, not the
whole, but only one-third of it, and this provided we should
accept it in full satisfaction of the entire claim. They added
that this offer was made, not in strict justice, but as a special
favor.
Under these circumstances, the time had arrived when the President
deemed it his duty to employ strong and vigorous remonstrances to
bring all our claims against Spain to a satisfactory conclusion.
In this he succeeded in a manner gratifying to himself, and it is
believed to all the claimants, but unfortunately not to the Senate
of the United States. A convention was concluded at Madrid on the
5th March, 1860, establishing a joint commission for the final
adjudication and payment of all the claims of the respective
parties. By this the validity and amount of the Cuban claims were
expressly admitted, and their speedy payment was placed beyond
question. The convention was transmitted to the Senate for their
constitutional action on the 3d May, 1860, but on the 27th June
they determined, greatly to the surprise of the President, and the
disappointment of the claimants, that they would “not advise and
consent” to its ratification.
The reason for this decision, because made in executive session,
cannot be positively known. This, as stated and believed at the
time, was because the convention had authorized the Spanish
government to present its Amistad claim, like any other claim,
before the Board of Commissioners for decision. This claim, it
will be recollected, was for the payment to the Spanish owners of
the value of certain slaves, for which the Spanish government held
the United States to be responsible under the treaty with Spain of
the 27th October, 1795. Such was the evidence in its favor, that
three Presidents of the United States had recommended to Congress
to make an appropriation for its payment, and a bill for this
purpose had passed the Senate. The validity of the claim, it is
proper to observe, was not recognized by the convention. In this
respect it was placed on the same footing with all the other
claims of the parties, with the exception of the Cuban claims. All
the Spanish government obtained for it was simply a hearing before
the Board, and this could not be denied with any show of
impartiality. Besides, it is quite certain that no convention
could have been concluded without such a provision.
It was most probably the extreme views of the Senate at the time
against slavery, and their reluctance to recognize it even so far
as to permit a foreign claimant, although under the sanction of a
treaty, to raise a question before the Board which might involve
its existence, that caused the rejection of the convention. Under
the impulse of such sentiments, the claims of our fellow-citizens
have been postponed if not finally defeated. Indeed, the Cuban
claimants, learning that the objections in the Senate arose from
the Amistad claim, made a formal offer to remove the difficulty by
deducting its amount from the sum due to them, but this of course
could not be accepted.[44]
Footnote 44:
Buchanan’s Defence, pp. 258-260; written and published in
1865-’66.
The following account of an expedition which President Buchanan
found it necessary to send to Paraguay, is also taken from his
Defence of his Administration:
The hostile attitude of the government of Paraguay toward the
United States early commanded the attention of the President. That
government had, upon frivolous and even insulting pretexts,
refused to ratify the treaty of friendship, commerce and
navigation, concluded with it on the 4th March, 1853, as amended
by the Senate, though this only in mere matters of form. It had
seized and appropriated the property of American citizens residing
in Paraguay, in a violent and arbitrary manner; and finally, by
order of President Lopez, it had fired upon the United States
steamer Water Witch (1st February, 1855), under Commander Thomas
J. Page of the navy, and killed the sailor at the helm, whilst she
was peacefully employed in surveying the Parana river, to
ascertain its fitness for steam navigation. The honor, as well as
the interests of the country, demanded satisfaction.
The President brought the subject to the notice of Congress in his
first annual message (8th December, 1857). In this he informed
them that he would make a demand for redress on the government of
Paraguay, in a firm but conciliatory manner, but at the same time
observed, that “this will the more probably be granted, if the
Executive shall have authority to use other means in the event of
a refusal. This is accordingly recommended.” Congress responded
favorably to this recommendation. On the 2d June, 1858,[45] they
passed a joint resolution authorizing the President “to adopt such
measures, and use such force as, in his judgment, may be necessary
and advisable, in the event of a refusal of just satisfaction by
the government of Paraguay, in connection with the attack on the
United States steamer Water Witch, and with other matters referred
to in the annual message.”[46] They also made an appropriation to
defray the expenses of a commissioner to Paraguay, should he deem
it proper to appoint one, “for the adjustment of difficulties”
with that republic.
Footnote 45:
U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. xi, p. 370.
Footnote 46:
U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. xi, p. 319.
Paraguay is situated far in the interior of South America, and its
capital, the city of Asuncion, on the left bank of the river
Paraguay, is more than a thousand miles from the mouth of the La
Plata.
The stern policy of Dr. Francia, formerly the Dictator of
Paraguay, had been to exclude all the rest of the world from his
dominions, and in this he had succeeded by the most severe and
arbitrary measures. His successor, President Lopez, found it
necessary, in some degree, to relax this jealous policy; but,
animated by the same spirit, he imposed harsh restrictions in
his intercourse with foreigners. Protected by his remote and
secluded position, he but little apprehended that a navy from
our far distant country could ascend the La Plata, the Parana,
and the Paraguay, and reach his capital. This was doubtless the
reason why he had ventured to place us at defiance. Under these
circumstances, the President deemed it advisable to send with
our commissioner to Paraguay, Hon. James B. Bowlin, a naval
force sufficient to exact justice should negotiation fail.[47]
This consisted of nineteen armed vessels, great and small,
carrying two hundred guns and twenty-five hundred sailors and
marines, all under the command of the veteran and gallant
Shubrick. Soon after the arrival of the expedition at
Montevideo, Commissioner Bowlin and Commodore Shubrick proceeded
(30th December, 1858) to ascend the rivers to Asuncion in the
steamer Fulton, accompanied by the Water Witch. Meanwhile the
remaining vessels rendezvoused in the Parana, near Rosario, a
position from which they could act promptly, in case of need.
Footnote 47:
Message, 19th Dec. 1859.
The commissioner arrived at Asuncion on the 25th January, 1859,
and left it on the 10th February. Within this brief period he had
ably and successfully accomplished all the objects of his mission.
In addition to ample apologies, he obtained from President Lopez
the payment of $10,000 for the family of the seaman (Chaney) who
had been killed in the attack on the Water Witch, and also
concluded satisfactory treaties of indemnity and of navigation and
commerce with the Paraguayan government.[48] Thus the President
was enabled to announce to Congress, in his annual message
(December, 1859), that “all our difficulties with Paraguay had
been satisfactorily adjusted.”
Footnote 48:
United States Pamphlet Laws, 1859-60, p. 119, appendix.
Even in this brief summary it would be unjust to withhold from
Secretary Toucey a commendation for the economy and efficiency he
displayed in fitting out this expedition.[49] It is a remarkable
fact in our history, that its entire expenses were defrayed out of
the ordinary appropriations for the naval service. Not a dollar
was appropriated by Congress for this purpose, unless we may
except the sum of $289,000 for the purchase of seven small
steamers of light draft, worth more than their cost, and which
were afterwards usefully employed in the ordinary naval service.
Footnote 49:
Report of Secretary Toucey, 2d Dec., 1859; Sen. Doc., 1859-60,
vol. iii, p. 1137.
It may be remarked that the President, in his message already
referred to, justly observes, “that the appearance of so large a
force, fitted out in such a prompt manner, in the far distant
waters of the La Plata, and the admirable conduct of the officers
and men employed in it, have had a happy effect in favor of our
country throughout all that remote portion of the world.”
The relations between the United States and China had been governed
for twelve years by the treaty made in 1844, by Mr. Caleb Cushing,
under the instructions of Mr. Webster as Secretary of State. This
treaty had provided for its own amendment at the expiration of
twelve years from its date, and it devolved on Mr. Buchanan’s
administration to institute the negotiations for this purpose, His
own account of these negotiations, although greatly condensed, is
all that need be here given:
The same success attended our negotiations with China.[50] The
treaty of July, 1844, with that empire, had provided for its own
revision and amendment at the expiration of twelve years from its
date, should experience render this necessary. Changes in its
provisions had now become indispensable for the security and
extension of our commerce. Besides, our merchants had just claims
against the Chinese government, for injuries sustained in
violation of the treaty. To effect these changes, and to obtain
indemnity for these injuries, the Hon. William B. Reed was sent as
minister to China. His position proved to be one of great
delicacy. England and France were engaged in war against China,
and urged the United States to become a party to it. They alleged
that it had been undertaken to accomplish objects in which we had
a common interest with themselves. This was the fact; but the
President did not believe that our grievances, although serious,
would justify a resort to hostilities. Whilst Mr. Reed was,
therefore, directed to preserve a strict neutrality between the
belligerents, he was instructed to coöperate cordially with the
ministers of England and France in all peaceful measures to secure
by treaty those just concessions to commerce which the civilized
nations of the world had a right to expect from China. The Russian
government, also, pursued the same line of policy.
Footnote 50:
Message, 8th December, 1857, p. 14.
The difficulty, then, was to obtain for our country, whilst
remaining at peace, the same commercial advantages which England
and France might acquire by war. This task our minister performed
with tact, ability and success, by the conclusion of the treaty of
Tientsin of the 18th June, 1858, and the two supplemental
conventions of Shanghae of the 8th November following.[51] These
have placed our commercial relations with China on the same
satisfactory footing with those of England and France, and have
resulted in the actual payment of the full amount of all the just
claims of our citizens, leaving a surplus to the credit of the
Treasury. This object has been accomplished, whilst our friendly
relations with the Chinese government were never for a moment
interrupted, but on the contrary have been greatly strengthened.
Footnote 51:
United States Pamphlet Laws, 1861-’62, p. 177, appendix.