1853-1856.
BRITISH ENLISTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES—RECALL OF THE ENGLISH
MINISTER AT WASHINGTON—THE OSTEND CONFERENCE.
Two topics entirely unexpected by Mr. Buchanan when he accepted the
mission to England must here claim some attention. The first relates
to an occurrence which brought upon the United States the necessity
of demanding a recall of the British minister who then represented
the queen’s government at Washington. This was Mr. John F. Crampton,
a well-meaning and amiable gentleman, who had long resided in this
country as secretary of the British legation, and had been made
minister some time previously, but whose zeal in the service of his
government had led him into a distinct violation of our neutrality
in the war between England and Russia. It is altogether probable
that in his efforts to promote enlistments of men to serve in that
war, Mr. Crampton did not keep within the letter of his
instructions. It was, at all events, somewhat difficult, for a good
while, to convince Lord Clarendon that Mr. Crampton was personally
implicated in the unlawful acts which were undoubtedly done. But
there was but one course for the American government to pursue. The
history of this affair is somewhat curious.
When in April, 1854, Mr. Marcy had occasion to acknowledge the
receipt from Mr. Crampton of a note stating the new rule that would
be observed by Great Britain, in the war with Russia, towards
neutrals, after expressing his gratification, and, at the same time,
saying that the United States would have been still more gratified
if the rule that “free ships make free goods” had been extended to
all future wars to which Great Britain should be a party, he took
the precaution to remind Mr. Crampton in courteous terms of the
severe restrictions imposed by our laws against equipping
privateers, receiving commissions, or enlisting men within our
territories to take any part in a foreign war. Lord Clarendon, too,
at a later period (April 12, 1855), wrote to Mr. Crampton that “the
law of the United States, with respect to enlistment, however
conducted, is not only very just but very stringent, according to
the report which is enclosed in your despatch, and her Majesty’s
government would on no account run any risk of infringing this law
of the United States.”[18] For a time, Mr. Crampton acted
cautiously, but in the course of the summer of 1855, Mr. Marcy
received evidence which convinced him that the British minister was
personally implicated in carrying out arrangements for sending men
to Nova Scotia, under contracts made in the United States to enlist
as soldiers in the British army after their arrival in Halifax; and
that the means for sending them had been supplied by him and other
British functionaries. Mr. Buchanan was first instructed to bring
this matter to the attention of Lord Clarendon, before Mr.
Crampton’s direct agency in it had become known to our Government.
His letter of July 6, 1855, to Lord Clarendon, was a forcible
presentation of the grounds on which the United States complained of
such doings as an infraction of their laws and a violation of their
sovereignty. A long correspondence ensued, which was conducted at
times with some approach to acrimony, but which never actually
transcended the limits of diplomatic courtesy. At length the proofs
that Mr. Crampton was a party to this unlawful proceeding became so
forcible that the British government yielded to the request that he
might be recalled, and he was transferred to another diplomatic
post. The whole affair was attended at one time with serious risk of
an interruption in the friendly relations of the two countries. Mr.
Marcy’s course in the correspondence was greatly tempered in its
tone by the advice which he received from Mr. Buchanan, although the
hazard of an unfortunate issue of the trouble was much enhanced by
the sending of an unusual naval force to the coasts of the United
States, which the British government ordered while this affair was
pending, but without any special reference to it.
Footnote 18:
A copy of this note was delivered to Mr. Marcy in the course of
the month of May, 1855.
The so-called “Ostend Conference,” which at the time it occurred
made a great deal of noise, and in which Mr. Buchanan was directed
by his Government to participate, requires but a brief explanation.
It was not a meeting in any sense suggested by him, nor was there
anything connected with it which should have given rise to alarm.
When in the summer of 1856 he had become the nominee of the
Democratic party for the Presidency, as is usual on such occasions,
biographical sketches of his public and private character were
prepared and circulated. Among them was a small volume in duodecimo
form of 118 pages, written with far greater ability and precision
than was common in such ephemeral publications intended for
electioneering purposes. Its account of the whole matter of the
“Ostend Conference” is so exact and lucid that I do not hesitate to
quote it as a true history of that proceeding:[19]
Footnote 19:
The copy of this little biography which is before me is entitled,
THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF JAMES BUCHANAN of Pennsylvania.
Twentieth thousand. New York: Published by Livermore & Rudd, 310
Broadway, 1856. It was published anonymously, but I am informed
that the name of the author was Edward F. Underhill.
THE OSTEND CIRCULAR.
It is the rare good fortune of Mr. Buchanan to have sustained a
long career of public life with such singular discretion,
integrity, and ability, that now, when he is presented by the
great national party of the country as their candidate for the
highest dignity in the Republic, nothing is seriously urged by
political hostility in extenuation of his merit, save the alleged
countenance to filibuster enterprise and cupidity, inferred by his
enemies from a strained interpretation of the recommendations and
views of the Ostend Conference. The political opponents of Mr.
Buchanan call upon his supporters to vindicate the claim they
assert in behalf of Mr. Buchanan to conservatism, by reconciling
that assumption with his participation in the American Diplomatic
Conference at Ostend and Aix la Chapelle, and with his adoption
and endorsement, jointly with the ministers of the United States
to France and Spain, of the views and recommendations addressed by
the three ambassadors to the Department of State, on the 18th of
October, 1854, in the letter commonly known as the Ostend
Manifesto. The circumstance that the opposition meet the
nomination of Mr. Buchanan with no other objection impugning his
qualifications for the Presidential trust, cannot fail to confirm
the popular belief in the justice and wisdom of the judgment that
governed the Cincinnati convention in selecting a statesman so
unassailable in the record of his political life, and so little
obnoxious to personal censure and distrust, as the candidate of
the great national party of the Union for the highest dignity in
the Republic. For it is demonstrable that an erroneous impression
exists as to the purport of the Aix la Chapelle letter; and that
the policy therein declared by Mr. Buchanan and his associates, is
identical with that which has uniformly been regarded and avowed
as the policy of the United States in respect to the Island of
Cuba. And a belief endeavored to be inculcated, that the policy of
the Ostend conference was adopted in consultation or co-operation
with the Red Republicans of Europe, is equally erroneous. This
belief has originated in another supposition equally unfounded,
that Mr. Soulé was in league with the leaders of the European
revolutionary movement. The truth is, that fundamental differences
existed between the policy of Mr. Soulé and Mazzini, Ledru Rollin,
Kossuth, and Louis Blanc; and besides which fact it is well known
that these revolutionary leaders themselves were agreed only upon
one point, the necessity of revolution, and that they seldom speak
to one another. The policy of the revolutionary party of Europe in
reference to Cuba was this. They desired the United States to
assist the Democratic party of Spain in creating a revolution at
Madrid, which should dethrone the queen, and place the Democratic
party in power, by the establishment of a republic, and then leave
Cuba at her option to either remain a portion of the Spanish
republic, or seek annexation to the United States. This concession
to the United States was to be in return for material aid
furnished in effecting the Spanish revolution. The revolution thus
accomplished was intended to be the initiative of further
revolutions on the Continent. The Pyrenees range of mountains
which forms the boundary line between France and Spain are
populated on either side by the most liberal men in either empire,
the great mass of the inhabitants being Republican; and could a
republic be established in Spain, the Pyrenees would not only
furnish points from which to begin their revolutionary designs
against France, but would form a barrier behind which they could
defend themselves against any attack which Louis Napoleon might
make. The revolution accomplished in France, Kossuth and Mazzini
would have but little difficulty in overthrowing the power of
Austria in Hungary and Italy. Such were the objects which the
revolutionary leaders of Europe had in view in endeavoring to
secure the influence of the United States Government in support of
their policy.
It is needless to say, that neither the Ostend conference nor the
cabinet at Washington gave any countenance to this policy. The
Ostend conference looked at the Cuba question solely from an
American point of view, and quite disconnected from the conflicts
and interests of European politics, or the aspirations of
revolutionary leaders. On this account, so far from that policy
receiving the favor of the Red Republicans, they were as pointed
in their hostility to it as any of the monarchical organs of
Europe, and did not hesitate to privately, and sometimes publicly,
denounce Mr. Soulé for having signed the Ostend circular, as
recreant to the expectations which they had formed in regard to
him. Mr. Buchanan from first to last opposed the policy which
would lead to the United States becoming involved in the European
struggle, and held strictly to the American view of the question,
in accordance with which the Ostend letter was framed.
The conference at Ostend had its origin in the recommendation of
Governor Marcy, who justly conceived that the mission with which
Mr. Soulé was charged at the court of Spain might excite the
jealousy of other European powers, and that it was important for
the purpose of facilitating the negotiations there to be
conducted, that explanations should be made to the governments of
England and France, of the objects and purposes of the United
States in any movement that events might render necessary, having
in view the ultimate purchase or acquisition by this government of
the Spanish Island of Cuba. The object of the consultation
suggested by Mr. Marcy was, as stated in a letter to Mr. Soulé,
“to bring the common wisdom and knowledge of the three ministers
to bear simultaneously upon the negotiations at Madrid, London and
Paris.” These negotiations had not necessarily in view the
transfer of Cuba to this country; though that was one of the modes
indicated, and seemingly the most effective, of terminating the
constantly recurring grievances upon the commerce of the United
States, upon the honor of its flag, and the personal rights of its
citizens, which disturbed the cordial relations of the two
countries, and infused acrimony into their intercourse connected
with the prosecution of commerce. Another expedient which Governor
Marcy regarded with favor, was the independence of the Island
under the Creole sovereignty. At that time, in the summer of 1854,
apprehensions of some important change in the social and political
condition and relations of Cuba, were generally felt in this
country. Rumors prevailed, founded on the then recent decrees and
modifications of law pertaining to the servile condition, that it
was in contemplation to establish the domination of the blacks in
the Island; that the slaves were to be freed and armed, and that
an extensive introduction of native Africans was to be resorted to
as a means of re-enforcing the strength of the dominant party.
Such, indeed, was the policy of Great Britain; first, to keep
alive the slavery agitation in the United States, not from motives
of philanthropy, but, by thus inciting internal discord between
the people of different sections of the Union, the United States
would be prevented from turning its attention to further schemes
of territorial extension; and second, to flood Cuba with negroes
under a system of apprenticeship, in order to render it valueless
to the United States. The execution of such a scheme was regarded
as eminently dangerous to the peace and safety of this country,
and was one which the United States could not suffer, as the
inevitable effects of such a policy, carried out, would be, sooner
or later, to induce a servile insurrection in the Southern States.
With a colony containing a million and a half of free negroes,
immediately off our shores, an expedition could at any time be
organized under European aid, and sent from Cuba to our Southern
States to incite a rebellion, with all its attendant horrors,
among the slaves. Mr. Soulé was instructed to ascertain whether it
was in contemplation, and, if so, to seek to prevent it from being
carried out, and to avert its baleful consequences to ourselves,
by negotiating, first, for the purchase of Cuba, and if that were
impracticable, then for the independence of the Island. It was not
the greed of territorial expansion that prompted the instructions
which convoked the Ostend conference; nor was that sentiment the
controlling one that prompted the adoption by its members of the
recommendations embodied in the Aix la Chapelle letter. The
document is too long to publish at length, but the material
passage which contains the doctrines which the opposition would
fain lead the people to believe are dangerous, is subjoined:
“But if Spain, deaf to the voice of her own interest, and actuated
by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to
sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, what
ought to be the course of the American Government under such
circumstances? Self-preservation is the first law of nature with
states as well as with individuals. All nations have at different
periods acted upon this maxim. Although it has been made the
pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in the partition of
Poland, and other similar cases which history records, yet the
principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized.
The United States has never acquired a foot of territory except by
fair purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and
voluntary application of the people of that independent state, who
desired to blend their destinies with our own. Even our
acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to the rule, because,
although we might have claimed them by the right of conquest, in a
just war, yet we purchased them for what was then considered by
both parties a full and ample equivalent. Our past history forbids
that we should acquire the Island of Cuba without the consent of
Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We
must, in any event, preserve our own conscious rectitude and our
own self-respect.
“While pursuing this course, we can afford to disregard the
censure of the world, to which we have been so often and so
unjustly exposed. After we shall have offered Spain a price for
Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been
refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba
in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace
and the existence of our cherished Union? Should this question be
answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine,
we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the
power. And this, upon the very same principle that would justify
an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if
there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying
his own home. Under such circumstances, we ought neither to count
the cost nor regard the odds which Spain might enlist against us.
“We forbear to enter into the question whether the present
condition of the Island would justify such a measure. We should,
however, be recreant to our duty—be unworthy of our gallant
forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should
we permit Cuba to be Africanized and to become a second St.
Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and
suffer the flames to extend to our neighboring shores, seriously
to endanger or actually to consume the fair fabric of our Union.
We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending
towards such a catastrophe....
“JAMES BUCHANAN,
“JOHN Y. MASON,
“PIERRE SOULÉ.
“Aix la Chapelle, October 18, 1854.”
One brief sentence in the above describes the purport and
substance of the whole document: “Our past history forbids that we
should acquire the Island of Cuba without the consent of Spain,
unless justified by the great law of self-preservation.” If the
acquisition of the Island should become the very condition of our
existence, then if Spain shall refuse to part with it for a price
“far beyond its present value,” we shall be justified “in wresting
it” from her, “upon the very same principle that would justify an
individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor, if
there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying
his own home.”
This doctrine is not original with the Ostend conference, nor did
it emanate from filibustering cupidity, nor is it a mere party
issue. It has been as broadly asserted, and as confidently and
ably advocated, by a Whig statesman and administration, as in the
Ostend manifesto. Mr. Everett, United States Secretary of State,
in his letter to the British and French ministers declining the
alliance tendered by them to guarantee the possession of Cuba to
Spain for all coming time, defends his refusal, on the ground that
the United States have an interest in the condition of Cuba which
may justify her in assuming dominion over it—an interest in
comparison with which that of England and France dwindles into
insignificance.
The truth is, that its doctrines are the reverse of filibusterism,
which means an unlawful, unauthorized depredation of individuals
on the territory of countries with which we are at peace. The
Ostend circular recommends no suspension or repeal of the
neutrality laws, no modifications of the restrictions imposed by
our traditional policy and statutes upon the acts of individuals
who choose to filibuster; but it declares that, whenever an
occasion arrives for a hostile act against the territory of any
other nation, it must be by the sovereign act of the nation,
through its regular army and navy. So inconsistent are the
doctrines of the Ostend circular with filibusterism, that the
publication of that document resulted in the cessation of all
filibustering attempts against Cuba. But this is not the only
result. The acts of aggression upon our citizens and our commerce,
by the authorities in Cuba, prior to the Ostend conference, were
of a character to seriously imperil the relations between the two
countries. But since the Ostend conference, most of those
difficulties have been settled, and the remainder are now in the
course of settlement; and as the legitimate result of the bold and
determined policy enunciated at Ostend, there has not since been a
single outrage against the rights of our citizens in Cuba. A
vacillating or less determined course on the part of our ministers
would have only invited further aggression.
Thus it will be seen that the letter upon which the charge is
based by no means justifies the imputation. It only proves that,
under circumstances threatening actual danger to the Republic,
and in order to preserve its existence, the United States would
be “justified, by the great law of self-preservation,” in
acquiring the Island of Cuba without the consent of Spain. In
its careful preclusion of filibustering intent and assumption,
it shows the predominance of a conservative influence in the
Congress, which the country may safely attribute to the weight
of Mr. Buchanan’s counsels and character. It is obviously
manifest from the tenor of the document, that the construction
so sedulously contended for by the opponents of Democratic rule,
is that which was most earnestly deprecated by the prevailing
sentiment of its framers. Events were then in progress, and a
perilous catastrophe seemed to impend, that asked of American
statesmanship the exercise of all the decision, prudence and
energy at its command, to regulate and guide the one in such a
way as, if possible, to stay or avert the other. The local
administration in Cuba had become alarmed for its safety, and,
influenced by apprehension and terror of American filibusters,
had already adopted measures of undiscriminating aggression upon
the United States Government, by dishonoring its flag and
violating the rights of its citizens, which, if persisted in,
would inevitably have led to war. Nor was this the only danger;
for it was industriously affirmed by those in the interests of
Spanish rule, that the Island was to be “Africanized,” and
delivered over to “an internal convulsion which should renew the
horrors and the fate of St. Domingo”—an event to which, as Mr.
Everett truly declares in his letter to the British and French
ministers, declining the proposed alliance to guarantee Cuba to
Spain, both France and England would prefer any change in the
condition of that Island—not excepting even its acquisition by
the United States. Under the circumstances, nothing less than so
decided a manifestation of determined energy and purpose as was
made through the instrumentality of the Ostend conference, would
probably have prevailed to prevent that very struggle for the
conquest of Cuba, which it is now alleged to have been its
purpose to precipitate. And thus, as often happens in the
conduct of affairs, the decision and firmness which seemed
aggressive and menacing, facilitated a pacific and satisfactory
solution of difficulties that threatened war.