This diffidence was an inseparable consequence of the vast predominance

of exalted passion over reflection, which is one of the revolutionary

marks. Byron was fundamentally and substantially, as has been already

said, one of the most rational of men. Hence when the passionate fit

grew cold, as it always does in temperaments so mixed, he wanted for

perfect strength a justification in thought. There are men whose being

is so universally possessed by phantasies, that they never feel this

necessity of reconciling the visions of excited emotion with the ideas

of ordered reason. Byron was more vigorously constituted, and his

susceptibility to the necessity of this reconciliation combined with

his inability to achieve it, to produce that cynicism which the simple

charity of vulgar opinion attributes to the possession of him by unclean

devils. It was his refuge, as it sometimes is with smaller men, from the

disquieting confusion which was caused by the disproportion between his

visions and aspirations, and his intellectual means for satisfying

himself seriously as to their true relations and substantive value. Only

the man arrives at practical strength who is convinced, whether rightly

or wrongly, that he knows all about his own ideas that needs to be

known. Byron never did thus know himself, either morally or

intellectually. The higher part of him was consciously dragged down by

the degrading reminiscence of the brutishness of his youth and its

connections and associations; they hung like miasma over his spirit. He

could not rise to that sublimest height of moral fervour, when a man

intrepidly chases from his memory past evil done, suppresses the

recollection of old corruptions, declares that he no longer belongs to

them nor they to him, and is not frightened by the past from a firm and

lofty respect for present dignity and worth. It is a good thing thus to

overthrow the tyranny of the memory, and to cast out the body of our

dead selves. That Byron never attained this good, though he was not

unlikely to have done so if he had lived longer, does not prove that he

was too gross to feel its need, but it explains a moral weakness which

has left a strange and touching mark on some of his later works.

So in the intellectual order, he knew too much in one sense, and in

another too little. The strong man is not conscious of gaps and

cataclysms in the structure of his belief, or else he would in so far

instantly cease to be strong. One living, as Byron emphatically did, in

the truly modern atmosphere, was bound by all the conditions of the

atmosphere to have mastered what we may call the natural history of his

own ideas and convictions; to know something of their position towards

fact and outer circumstance and possibility; above all to have some

trusty standard for testing their value, and assuring himself that they

do really cover the field which he takes them to cover. People with a

faith and people living in frenzy are equally under this law; but they

take the completeness and coherency of their doctrine for granted. Byron

was not the prey of habitual frenzy, and he was without a faith. That is

to say, he had no firm basis for his conceptions, and he was aware that

he had none. The same unrest which drove men of that epoch to Nature,

haunted them to the end, because they had no systematic conception of

her working and of human relations with her. In a word, there was no

science. Byron was a warm admirer of the genius and art of Goethe, yet

he never found out the central secret of Goethe's greatness, his

luminous and coherent positivity. This is the crowning glory of the

modern spirit, and it was the lack of this which went so far to

neutralise Byron's hold of the other chief characteristics of that

spirit, its freedom and spaciousness, its humaneness and wide

sociality, its versatility and many-sidedness and passionate feeling for

the great natural forces.

* * * * *

This positivity is the cardinal condition of strength for times when

theology lies in decay, and the abstractions which gradually replaced

the older gods have in their turn ceased to satisfy the intelligence and

mould the will. All competent persons agree that it is the first

condition of the attainment of scientific truth. Nobody denies that men

of action find in it the first law of successful achievement in the

material order. Its varied but always superlative power in the region of

æsthetics is only an object of recent recognition, though great work

enough has been done in past ages by men whose recognition was informal

and inexpress. It is plain that, in the different classes of æsthetic

manifestation, there will be differences in objective shape and colour,

corresponding to the varied limits and conditions of the matter with

which the special art has to deal; but the critic may expect to find in

all a profound unity of subjective impression, and that, the impression

of a self-sustaining order and a self-sufficing harmony among all those

faculties and parts and energies of universal life, which come within

the idealising range of art. In other words, the characteristically

modern inspiration is the inspiration of law. The regulated play of

forces shows itself as fit to stir those profound emotional impulses

which wake the artistic soul, as ever did the gracious or terrible gods

of antique or middle times. There are glories in Turner's idealisation

of the energies of matter, which are at least as nobly imaginative and

elevated, in spite of the conspicuous absence of the human element in

them, as the highest products of the artists who believed that their

work was for the service and honour of a deity.

It is as mistaken to suppose that this conviction of the supremacy of a

cold and self-sustained order in the universe is fatal to emotional

expansion, as it would be to suppose it fatal to intellectual curiosity.

Experience has shown in the scientific sphere, that the gradual

withdrawal of natural operations from the grasp of the imaginary

volitions of imaginary beings has not tamed, but greatly stimulated and

fertilised scientific curiosity as to the conditions of these

operations. Why should it be otherwise in the æsthetic sphere? Why

should all that part of our mental composition which responds to the

beautiful and imaginative expression of real truths, be at once inflamed

and satisfied by the thought that our whole lives, and all the movements

of the universe, are the objects of the inexplicable caprice of Makers

who are also Destroyers, and yet grow cold, apathetic, and unproductive,

in the shadow of the belief that we can only know ourselves as part of

the stupendous and inexorable succession of phenomenal conditions,

moving according to laws that may be formulated positively, but not

interpreted morally, to new destinies that are eternally unfathomable?

Why should this conception of a coherent order, free from the arbitrary

and presumptuous stamp of certain final causes, be less favourable,

either to the ethical or the æsthetic side of human nature, than the

older conception of the regulation of the course of the great series by

a multitude of intrinsically meaningless and purposeless volitions? The

alertness of our sensations for all sources of outer beauty remains

unimpaired. The old and lovely attitude of devout service does not pass

away to leave vacancy, but is transformed into a yet more devout

obligation and service towards creatures that have only their own

fellowship and mutual ministry to lean upon; and if we miss something of

the ancient solace of special and personal protection, the loss is not

unworthily made good by the growth of an imperial sense of participation

in the common movement and equal destination of eternal forces.

To have a mind penetrated with this spiritual persuasion, is to be in

full possession of the highest strength that man can attain. It springs

from a scientific and rounded interpretation of the facts of life, and

is in a harmony, which freshly found truths only make more ample and

elaborate, with all the conclusions of the intellect in every order. The

active energies are not paralysed by the possibilities of enfeebling

doubt, nor the reason drawn down and stultified by apprehension lest its

methods should discredit a document, or its inferences clash with a

dogma, or its light flash unseasonably on a mystery. There is none of

the baleful distortion of hate, because evil and wrong-doing and

darkness are acknowledged to be effects of causes, sums of conditions,

terms in a series; they are to be brought to their end, or weakened and

narrowed, by right action and endeavour, and this endeavour does not

stagnate in antipathy, but concentrates itself in transfixing a cause.

In no other condition of the spirit than this, in which firm

acquiescence mingles with valorous effort, can a man be so sure of

raising a calm gaze and an enduring brow to the cruelty of circumstance.

The last appalling stroke of annihilation itself is measured with purest

fortitude by one, whose religious contemplation dwells most habitually

upon the sovereignty of obdurate laws in the vast revolving circle of

physical forces, on the one hand, and, on the other, upon that moral

order which the vision and pity of good men for their fellows, guiding

the spontaneous energy of all men in strife with circumstance, have

raised into a structure sublimer and more amazing than all the majesty

of outer nature.

In Byron's time the pretensions of the two possible answers to the great

and eternally open questions of God, Immortality, and the like, were

independent of that powerful host of inferences and analogies which the

advance of physical discovery, and the establishment of a historical

order, have since then brought into men's minds. The direct aggressions

of old are for the most part abandoned, because it is felt that no

fiercest polemical cannonading can drive away the impalpable darkness

of error, but only the slow and silent presence of the dawning truth.

_Cain_ remains, a stern and lofty statement of the case against that

theological tradition which so outrages, where it has not already too

deeply depraved, the conscience of civilised man. Yet every one who is

competent to judge, must feel how infinitely more free the mind of the

poet would have been, if besides this just and holy rage, most laudable

in its kind, his intellectual equipment had been ample enough and

precise enough to have taught him, that all the conceptions that races

of men have ever held, either about themselves or their deities, have

had a source in the permanently useful instincts of human nature, are

capable of explanation, and of a historical justification; that is to

say, of the kind of justification which is, in itself and of its own

force, the most instant destruction to what has grown to be an

anachronism.

Byron's curiously marked predilection for dramatic composition, not

merely for dramatic poems, as _Manfred_ or _Cain_, but for genuine

plays, as _Marino Faliero_, _Werner_, the _Two Foscari_, was the only

sign of his approach to the really positive spirit. Dramatic art, in its

purest modern conception, is genuinely positive; that is, it is the

presentation of action, character, and motive in a self-sufficing and

self-evolving order. There are no final causes, and the first moving

elements are taken for granted to begin with. The dramatist creates, but

it is the climax of his work to appear to stand absolutely apart and

unseen, while the play unfolds itself to the spectator, just as the

greater drama of physical phenomena unfolds itself to the scientific

observer, or as the order of recorded history extends in natural process

under the eye of the political philosopher. Partly, no doubt, the

attraction which dramatic form had for Byron is to be explained by that

revolutionary thirst for action, of which we have already spoken; but

partly also it may well have been due to Byron's rudimentary and

unsuspected affinity with the more constructive and scientific side of

the modern spirit.

His idea of Nature, of which something has been already said, pointed in

the same direction; for, although he made an abstraction and a goddess

of her, and was in so far out of the right modern way of thinking about

these outer forces, it is to be remembered, that, while this dominant

conception of Nature as introduced by Rousseau and others into politics

was most mischievous and destructive, its place and worth in poetry are

very different; because here in the region of the imagination it had the

effect, without any pernicious practical consequences, of giving shape

and proportion to that great idea of _ensemble_ throughout the visible

universe, which may be called the beginning and fountain of right

knowledge. The conception of the relationship of the different parts and

members of the vast cosmos was not accessible to Byron, as it is to a

later generation, but his constant appeal in season and out of season to

all the life and movement that surrounds man, implied and promoted the

widest extension of consciousness of the wholeness and community of

natural processes.

* * * * *

There was one very manifest evil consequence of the hold which this idea

in its cruder shape, gained over Byron and his admirers. The vastness of

the material universe, as they conceived and half adored it, entirely

overshadowed the principle of moral duty and social obligation. The

domestic sentiment, for example, almost disappears in those works which

made Byron most popular, or else it only appears, to be banished with

reproach. This is quite in accordance with the revolutionary spirit,

which was in one of its most fundamental aspects a revolt on behalf of

unconditioned individual rights, and against the family. If we accept

what seems to be the fatal law of progress, that excess on one side is

only moderated by a nearly corresponding excess of an opposite kind, the

Byronic dissolution of domestic feeling was not entirely without

justification. There is probably no uglier growth of time than that mean

and poor form of domesticity, which has always been too apt to fascinate

the English imagination, ever since the last great effort of the

Rebellion, and which rose to the climax of its popularity when George

III. won all hearts by living like a farmer. Instead of the fierce light

beating about a throne, it played lambently upon a sty. And the nation

who admired, imitated. When the Regent came, and with him that coarse

profligacy which has alternated with cloudy insipidity in the annals of

the line, the honest part of the world, out of antipathy to the son,

was driven even further into domestic sentimentality of a greasy kind,

than it had gone from affection for the sire.

Byron helped to clear the air of this. His fire, his lofty spaciousness

of outlook, his spirited interest in great national causes, his romance,

and the passion both of his animosity and his sympathy, acted for a

while like an electric current, and every one within his influence

became ashamed to barter the large heritage of manhood, with its many

realms and illimitable interests, for the sordid ease of the hearth and

the good word of the unworthy. He fills men with thoughts that shake

down the unlovely temple of comfort. This was good, to force whoever was

not already too far sunk into the mire, high up to the larger

atmosphere, whence they could see how minute an atom is man, how

infinite and blind and pitiless the might that encompasses his little

life. Many feeble spirits ran back homewards from the horrid solitudes

and abysses of _Manfred_, and the moral terrors of _Cain_, and even the

despair of _Harold_, and, burying themselves in warm domestic places,

were comforted by the familiar restoratives and appliances. Firmer souls

were not only exhilarated, but intoxicated by the potent and

unaccustomed air. They went too far. They made war on the family, and

the idea of it. Everything human was mischievously dwarfed, and the

difference between right and wrong, between gratification of appetite

and its control for virtue's sake, between the acceptance and the

evasion of clear obligation, all became invisible or of no account in

the new light. That constancy and permanence, of which the family is the

type, and which is the first condition alike of the stability and

progress of society, was obliterated from thought. As if the wonders

that have been wrought by this regulated constancy of the feeling of man

for man in transforming human life were not far more transcendently

exalting than the contemplation of those glories of brute nature, which

are barbaric in comparison.

It would be unjust not to admit that there are abundant passages in his

poems of too manifest depth and sincerity of feeling, for us to suppose

that Byron himself was dead to the beauty of domestic sentiment. The

united tenderness and dignity of Faliero's words to Angiolina, before he

goes to the meeting of the conspirators, would, if there were nothing

else, be enough to show how rightly in his better moods the poet

appreciated the conditions of the family. Unfortunately the better moods

were not fixed, and we had _Don Juan_, where the wit and colour and

power served to make an anti-social and licentious sentiment attractive

to puny creatures, who were thankful to have their lasciviousness so

gaily adorned. As for Great Britain, she deserved _Don Juan_. A nation,

whose disrespect for all ideas and aspirations that cannot be supported

by a text, nor circulated by a religious tract society, was systematic,

and where consequently the understanding is least protected against

sensual sophisms, received no more than a just chastisement in 'the

literature of Satan.' Here again, in the licence of this literature, we

see the finger of the Revolution, and of that egoism which makes the

passions of the individual his own law. Let us condemn and pass on,

homily undelivered. If Byron injured the domestic idea on this side, let

us not fail to observe how vastly he elevated it on others, and how,

above all, he pointed to the idea above and beyond it, in whose light

only can that be worthy, the idea of a country and a public cause. A man

may be sure that the comfort of the hearth has usurped too high a place,

when he can read without response the lines declaring that domestic ties

must yield in 'those who are called to the highest destinies, which

purify corrupted commonwealths.'

We must forget all feelings save the one--

We must resign all passions save our purpose--

We must behold no object save our country--

And only look on death as beautiful,

So that the sacrifice ascend to heaven

And draw down freedom on her evermore.

_Calendaro._ But if we fail----

_I. Bertuccio._ They never fail who die

In a great cause: the block may soak their gore;

Their heads may sodden in the sun; their limbs

Be strung to city gates and castle walls--

But still their spirit walks abroad. Though years

Elapse, and others share as dark a doom,

They but augment the deep and sweeping thoughts

Which overpower all others, and conduct

The world at last to freedom. What were we

If Brutus had not lived? He died in giving

Rome liberty, but left a deathless lesson--

A name which is a virtue, and a soul

Which multiplies itself throughout all time,

When wicked men wax mighty, and a state

Turns servile.

And the man who wrote this was worthy to play an even nobler part than

the one he had thus nobly described; for it was not many years after,

that Byron left all and laid down his life for the emancipation of a

strange land, and 'Greece and Italy wept for his death, as it had been

that of the noblest of their own sons.' Detractors have done their best

to pare away the merit of this act of self-renunciation by attributing

it to despair. That contemporaries of their own humour had done their

best to make his life a load to him is true, yet to this talk of despair

we may reply in the poet's own words:

When we know

All that can come, and how to meet it, our

Resolves, if firm, may merit a more noble

Word than this, to give it utterance.

There was an estimate of the value and purpose of a human life, which

our Age of Comfort may fruitfully ponder.

To fix upon violent will and incessant craving for movement as the mark

of a poet, whose contemporaries adored him for what they took to be the

musing sweetness of his melancholy, may seem a critical perversity.

There is, however, a momentous difference between that melancholy, which

is as the mere shadow projected by a man's spiritual form, and that

other melancholy, which itself is the reality and substance of a

character; between the soul to whom dejection brings graceful relief

after labour and effort, and the soul which by irresistible habit and

constitution dwells ever in Golgotha. This deep and penetrating

subjective melancholy had no possession of Byron. His character was

essentially objective, stimulated by outward circumstance, moving to

outward harmonies, seeking colour and image and purpose from without.

Hence there is inevitably a certain liveliness and animation, even when

he is in the depths. We feel that we are watching clouds sweep

majestically across the sky, and, even when they are darkest, blue

interspaces are not far off. Contrast the moodiest parts of _Childe

Harold_ or of _Cain_ with Novalis's _Night Hymns_. Byron's gloom is a

mere elegance in comparison. The one pipes to us with a graceful

despondency on the edge of the gulf, while the other carries us actually

down into the black profound, with no rebellious cry, nor shriek of woe,

but sombrely awaiting the deliverance of death, with soul absorbed and

consumed by weariness. Let the reader mark the note of mourning struck

in the opening stanzas, for instance, of Novalis's _Longing after

Death_, their simplicity, homeliness, transparent sincerity, and then

turn to any of the familiar passages where Byron meditates on the good

things which the end brings to men. How artificial he seems, and

unseasonably ornate, and how conscious of his public. In the first, we

sit sadly on the ground in some veritable Place of a Skull; in the

second, we assist at tragical distress after the manner of the Italian

opera. We should be disposed to call the first a peculiarly German

quality, until we remember Pascal. With Novalis, or with Pascal, as with

all those whom character, or the outer fates, or the two together, have

drawn to dwell in the valley of the shadow, gloom and despondency are

the very stuff of their thoughts. Material energy could have done

nothing for them. Their nerves and sinews were too nearly cut asunder.

To know the quality of Byron's melancholy, and to recognise how little

it was of the essence of his character, we have only to consider how far

removed he was from this condition. In other words, in spite of morbid

manifestations of one sort and another, he always preserved a salutary

and vivid sympathy for action, and a marked capacity for it.

* * * * *

It was the same impetuous and indomitable spirit of effort which moved

Byron to his last heroic exploit, that made the poetry inspired by it so

powerful in Europe, from the deadly days of the Holy Alliance onwards.

Cynical and misanthropical as he has been called, as though that were

his sum and substance, he yet never ceased to glorify human freedom, in

tones that stirred the hearts of men and quickened their hope and upheld

their daring, as with the voice of some heavenly trumpet. You may, if

you choose, find the splendour of the stanzas in the Fourth Canto on the

Bourbon restoration, on Cromwell, and Washington, a theatrical

splendour. But for all that, they touched the noblest parts of men. They

are alive with an exalted and magnanimous generosity, the one high

virtue which can never fail to touch a multitude. Subtlety may miss

them, graces may miss them, and reason may fly over their heads, but the

words of a generous humanity on the lips of poet or chief have never

failed to kindle divine music in their breasts. The critic may censure,

and culture may wave a disdainful hand. As has been said, all such words

'are open to criticism, and they are all above it.' The magic still

works. A mysterious and potent word from the gods has gone abroad over

the face of the earth.

This larger influence was not impaired by Byron's ethical poverty. The

latter was an inevitable consequence of his defective discipline. The

triteness of his moral climax is occasionally startling. When

Sardanapalus, for instance, sees Zarina torn from him, and is stricken

with profound anguish at the pain with which he has filled her life, he

winds up with such a platitude as this:

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