AFTER the letters sent to Europe by Dupont de Nemours in May, neither
the President nor the Secretary of State again stirred before the
meeting of Congress in December. The diplomacy of 1800 was slow.
Nearly six months were required to decide upon a policy, write to
Europe, receive a reply, and decide again upon an answer. An entire
year was needed for taking a new line of action, and ascertaining its
chances of success. In October, Madison wrote to Livingston that the
President still waited to learn the impression produced at Paris by
Dupont.[172] Livingston, on his side, had been active and unsuccessful.
The President again wrote to him, by the October packet, a letter which
would have perplexed any European diplomatist.[173]
“We shall so take our distance between the two rival nations,” said
Jefferson, “as, remaining disengaged till necessity compels us, we may
haul finally to the enemy of that which shall make it necessary. We
see all the disadvantageous consequences of taking a side, and shall
be forced into it only by a more disagreeable alternative; in which
event we must countervail the disadvantages by measures which will
give us splendor and power, but not as much happiness as our present
system. We wish, therefore, to remain well with France; but we see
that no consequences, however ruinous to them, can secure us with
certainty against the extravagance of her present rulers.... No matter
at present existing between them and us is important enough to risk a
breach of peace,--peace being indeed the most important of all things
for us, except the preserving an erect and independent attitude.”
“Peace is our passion!” This phrase of President Jefferson, taken from
a letter written a few months later,[174] expressed his true policy.
In spite of his frequent menaces, he told Livingston in October, 1802,
that the French occupation of Louisiana was not “important enough to
risk a breach of peace.” Within a week after this letter was written,
New Orleans was closed to American commerce, and a breach of peace
seemed unavoidable. Down to that time the Executive had done nothing
to check Napoleon. The President had instructed his agents at Paris
and Madrid to obtain, if they could, the cession of New Orleans and
West Florida, and had threatened an alliance with England in case
this request were refused; but England was at peace with France, and
Bonaparte was not likely to provoke another war until he should be able
to defend Louisiana. So far as any diplomatic action by the United
States government was concerned, Madison and Jefferson might equally
well have written nothing; and when news arrived that the Mississippi
was closed, alarming as the situation became, no new action was at
first suggested. The President was contented to accept the assistance
of the Spanish and French representatives at Washington.
In Jefferson’s domestic as well as in his political household Don
Carlos Martinez de Yrujo,--created in 1802 Marquis of Casa Yrujo,--the
minister of Spain, was thoroughly at home, for he had a double title
to confidence, and even to affection. His first claim was due to his
marriage with a daughter of Governor McKean of Pennsylvania, whose
importance in the Republican party was great. His second claim was
political. Some years earlier he had so exasperated Timothy Pickering,
then Secretary of State, as to provoke a demand for his recall. One of
President Jefferson’s first diplomatic acts was to ask from the Spanish
government that Yrujo should be allowed to remain at Washington; and
Godoy, who knew even better than Jefferson the character and merits of
Yrujo, readily granted the favor.
Thus Yrujo was doubly and trebly attached to the Administration.
Proud as a typical Spaniard should be, and mingling an infusion of
vanity with his pride; irascible, headstrong, indiscreet as was
possible for a diplomatist, and afraid of no prince or president;
young, able, quick, and aggressive; devoted to his King and country;
a flighty and dangerous friend, but a most troublesome enemy;
always in difficulties, but in spite of fantastic outbursts always
respectable,--Yrujo needed only the contrast of characters such as
those of Pickering or Madison to make him the most entertaining figure
in Washington politics. He had become an American in language, family,
and political training. He loved the rough-and-tumble of democratic
habits, and remembered his diplomatic dignity only when he could
use it as a weapon against a secretary of state. If he thought the
Government to need assistance or warning, he wrote communications to
the newspapers in a style which long experience had made familiar to
the public and irritating to the Government whose acts he criticised.
For natural reasons the American Executive, which never hesitated to
use the press without limit for its own purposes, held it indecorous
that a foreign minister should attempt to affect public opinion. The
example of Genet was regarded as a proof even more than a warning
that such action was highly improper; but from Yrujo’s point of view,
as from Genet’s, the question of decorum was ridiculous in a country
which prided itself on the absence of etiquette, and the only question
he cared to consider was whether the press answered his purpose. His
success could be best measured by the exasperation it caused to the
tempers of Pickering and Madison.
Yrujo felt no love for Bonaparte, and no wish to serve his ends. At
this moment of anxiety, stepping forward to assist the President, he
asserted that there was no cause for alarm;[175] that the act of
Morales was not authorized by the King of Spain, but rose from some
excess of zeal or mistaken interpretation of the treaty on the part
of the Intendant; and that a packet-boat should be instantly sent to
New Orleans to inquire the reasons of the measure. His letter to the
Intendant was in reality extremely sharp,--“a veritable diatribe,”
according to Laussat, the new French prefect, to whom Morales showed
it. Yrujo pointed out the fatal consequences of Morales’s conduct, and
the ground it gave to United States citizens for claiming indemnity
for their commercial losses.[176] At the same time Madison instructed
Charles Pinckney at Madrid to inform the Spanish government that the
President expected it to lose not a moment in countermanding the order
of Morales, and in repairing every damage that might result from
it.[177]
There the matter rested until December 6, when Congress met. Even at
so exciting a moment, senators were slow in arriving at Washington,
and a week passed before a quorum was formed. Not till December 15
could the Annual Message be read. No message could be more pacific
in tone. The President discussed everything except the danger which
engrossed men’s minds. He talked of peace and friendship, of law,
order, and religion, of differential duties, distressed seamen, the
blockade of Tripoli, Georgia lands, Indian treaties, the increase in
revenue, “the emancipation of our posterity from that mortal canker”
a national debt, “by avoiding false objects of expense;” he said that
no change in the military establishment was deemed necessary, but that
the militia might be improved; he regretted that the behavior of the
Barbary Powers rendered a small squadron still necessary to patrol
the Mediterranean, but at the same time he strongly urged Congress to
take measures for laying up the whole navy, by constructing a large
dry-dock on the Eastern Branch, where the seven frigates might be
stowed away side by side under cover, and kept from decay or expense.
All these subjects he touched in a spirit of peace and good-will toward
mankind; but when he came to the question of Louisiana, about which
he had written so many alarming letters to Europe, he spoke in a tone
of apparent indifference. “The cession of the Spanish province of
Louisiana to France,” he said, “which took place in the course of the
late war, will, if carried into effect, make a change in the aspect
of our foreign relations which will doubtless have a just weight in
any deliberations of the Legislature connected with that subject.” No
allusion was made to the closure of the Mississippi.
Nothing could more disconcert the war party than this manner of
ignoring their existence. Jefferson afterward explained that his hope
was to gain time; but he could not more effectually have belittled his
Federalist enemies than by thus telling them that a French army at New
Orleans would “make a change in the aspect of our foreign relations.”
This manner of treating Congress was the more dexterous, because if
the President did not at once invite the Legislature to realize the
alarming state of foreign affairs, he abstained only in order to carry
out other tactics. Two days after the Message was read, December 17,
John Randolph, the Administration leader in the House, moved for the
papers relating to the violated right of deposit. Great curiosity was
felt to know what course the President meant to take.
“However timid Mr. Jefferson may be,” wrote Pichon to Talleyrand,[178]
“and whatever price he may put on his pacific policy, one cannot
foresee precisely what his answer will be.... I find in general
a bad temper as regards us; and I cannot help seeing that there
is a tendency toward adopting an irrevocably hostile system. This
circumstance will be decisive for Mr. Jefferson. If he acts feebly, he
is lost among his partisans; it will be then the time for Mr. Burr to
show himself with advantage.”
Thornton watched with equal anxiety the movement which promised to
throw the United States into the arms of England. He expected as little
as Pichon that the President would act with energy, but he hoped that
the situation would force him into taking a side.[179]
“From the language of his ministers, and from the insinuations of
some members of the Federal party, it will not be, I doubt, such a
measure of vigor as would place the country on a commanding ground in
the negotiation with Spain, or eventually with France; and the latter
persons have some of them designated it to me as likely to be a very
foolish thing.”
Five days passed before Jefferson answered the call of the House; and
when he did so, he sent papers which might have been prepared in five
minutes, for most of them had been long printed in the newspapers.[180]
In communicating these documents, the President added that he had not
lost a moment in causing every step to be taken which the occasion
claimed from him; but he did not say what these steps were. A week
later he sent another document, which he requested the House to return
without publication;[181] it was a letter which Governor Claiborne
had received from Governor Salcedo, denying responsibility for the
Intendant’s act, and asserting that it was not authorized by the
Spanish government. The House shut its doors and debated a week. Then
it reopened its doors, and announced to the world that by a party
vote of fifty to twenty-five, the following resolution had been
adopted:[182]--
“Adhering to that humane and wise policy which ought ever to
characterize a free people, and by which the United States have
always professed to be governed; willing at the same time to ascribe
this breach of compact to the unauthorized misconduct of certain
individuals rather than to a want of good faith on the part of
his Catholic Majesty; and relying with perfect confidence on the
vigilance and wisdom of the Executive,--they will wait the issue of
such measures as that department of the Government shall have pursued
for asserting the rights and vindicating the injuries of the United
States.”
Strenuously as the President exerted himself to stifle the warlike
feeling in Congress, his influence did not extend far enough to check
the same feeling elsewhere. Successful in Washington, he found himself
exposed to an alarming pressure from the West. One State legislature
after another adopted resolutions which shook the ground under his
feet. Eighteen months had passed since the seriousness of Napoleon’s
schemes became known to him, but as yet he had done nothing that could
be construed as an attempt to represent the demands of the western
country; all his ingenuity had, in fact, been exerted to evade these
demands. The West wanted troops at Natchez, to seize New Orleans at
the first sign of a French occupation; but the use of force at that
stage was not in Jefferson’s thoughts. To quiet Kentucky and Tennessee
without satisfying them was a delicate matter; but, delicate as it was,
Jefferson succeeded in doing it. He explained his plan in a letter to
Monroe, written at the moment when everything depended on Monroe’s
aid:[183]--
“The agitation of the public mind on occasion of the late suspension
of our right of deposit at New Orleans is extreme. In the western
country it is natural, and grounded on honest motives; in the seaports
it proceeds from a desire for war, which increases the mercantile
lottery; in the Federalists generally, and especially those of
Congress, the object is to force us into war if possible, in order to
derange our finances; or if this cannot be done, to attach the western
country to them as their best friends, and thus get again into power.
Remonstrances, memorials, etc., are now circulating through the whole
of the western country, and signed by the body of the people. The
measures we have been pursuing, being invisible, do not satisfy their
minds. Something sensible, therefore, has become necessary.”
This sensible, or rather this tangible, measure was the appointment
of a minister extraordinary to aid Livingston in buying New Orleans
and the Floridas. The idea was adopted after the secret debate in the
House. As Madison wrote soon afterward to Livingston,[184] “such has
been the impulse given to the public mind” by these debates and by the
press, “that every branch of the government has felt the obligation of
taking the measures most likely not only to re-establish our present
rights, but to promote arrangements by which they may be enlarged and
more effectually secured.” According to this view, the impulse of
Congress and the Press alone made the Executive feel its obligation.
For more than a year the Executive had known the danger and had done
nothing; being obliged to do something, its first object was to avoid
doing too much.
Accordingly, General Smith of Maryland, Jan. 11, 1803, carried the
House again into secret session, and moved to appropriate two million
dollars “to defray any expenses which may be incurred in relation to
the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.” The
next day a committee reported, through Joseph Nicholson, in favor of
appropriating the money, with a view to purchasing West Florida and
New Orleans.[185] The Report argued that there was no alternative
between purchase and war. Meanwhile, January 11, the President sent
to the Senate the name of James Monroe as minister extraordinary to
France and Spain to help Livingston and Pinckney in “enlarging and more
effectually securing our rights and interests in the river Mississippi
and in the territories eastward thereof.”
The nomination was approved by the Senate January 13; and without
losing a moment, Jefferson wrote to Monroe, explaining the reasons
which made his course necessary:[186]--
“The measure has already silenced the Federalists here. Congress will
no longer be agitated by them; and the country will become calm as
fast as the information extends over it. All eyes, all hopes, are now
fixed on you; and were you to decline, the chagrin would be universal,
and would shake under your feet the high ground on which you stand
with the public. Indeed, I know nothing which would produce such a
shock; for on the event of this mission depend the future destinies of
this Republic. If we cannot, by a purchase of the country, insure to
ourselves a course of perpetual peace and friendship with all nations,
then, as war cannot be distant, it behooves us immediately to be
preparing for that course, without however hastening it; and it may be
necessary, on your failure on the Continent, to cross the Channel. We
shall get entangled in European politics; and, figuring more, be much
less happy and prosperous.”
With infinite pertinacity Jefferson clung to his own course. He
deserved success, although he hardly expected to win it by means of
Monroe, whom he urged to go abroad, as his letter implied, not so
much to purchase New Orleans, as to restore political quiet at home.
For the purchase of New Orleans, Livingston was fully competent; but
the opposition at home, as Jefferson candidly wrote to him,[187] were
pressing their inflammatory resolutions in the House so hard that “as a
remedy to all this we determined to name a minister extraordinary to
go immediately to Paris and Madrid to settle this matter. This measure
being a visible one, and the person named peculiarly popular with the
western country, crushed at once and put an end to all further attempts
on the Legislature. From that moment all has been quiet.” The quiet was
broken again, soon after this letter was written, by a sharp attack in
the Senate. Ross of Pennsylvania, White of Delaware, and Gouverneur
Morris of New York, assailed the Administration for the feebleness of
its measures. In private, Jefferson did not deny that his measures
were pacific, and that he had no great confidence in Monroe’s success;
he counted rather on Bonaparte’s taking possession of New Orleans and
remaining some years on the Mississippi.[188]
“I did not expect he would yield until a war took place between France
and England; and my hope was to palliate and endure, if Messrs. Ross,
Morris, etc., did not force a premature rupture, until that event. I
believed the event not very distant, but acknowledge it came on sooner
than I expected.”
“To palliate and endure” was therefore the object of Jefferson’s
diplomacy for the moment. Whether the Western States could be persuaded
to endure or to palliate the presence of a French army at New Orleans
was doubtful; but Jefferson’s success in controlling them proved his
personal authority and political skill. Meanwhile the interest and
activity of the little diplomatic world at Washington increased.
Monroe accepted his appointment and came for his instructions. Every
one was alive with expectation. As public opinion grew more outspoken,
the President was obliged to raise his tone. He talked with a degree
of freedom which seemed more inconsistent than it really was with his
radical policy of peace. With Thornton he was somewhat cautious.[189]
Immediately after Monroe’s nomination, Thornton asked the President
whether he intended to let the new envoy pass to England and converse
with British ministers about the free navigation of the Mississippi,--a
right to which Great Britain, as well as the United States, was
entitled by treaty.
“The inquiry was somewhat premature, and I made it with some apology.
Mr. Jefferson replied, however, unaffectedly, that at so early a
stage of the business he had scarcely thought himself what it might
be proper to do; that I might be assured the right would never be
abandoned by this country; that he wished earnestly for a tranquil
and pacific recognition and confirmation of it; that on the whole he
thought it very probable that Mr. Monroe might cross the Channel.
He reiterated to me with additional force the resolution of the
country never to abandon the claim of the free navigation,--which
indeed cannot be without dissevering the Western States from the
Union,--declaring that should they be obliged at last to resort to
force, _they would throw away the scabbard_.”
Thornton added that the President still hoped the French would not for
some time take possession of Louisiana, and rested his hope on the
demand which the Island of St. Domingo would create for every soldier
that could be spared; but he also talked of building gunboats for the
navigation of the Mississippi.
“In the mean time,” continued Thornton, “the country seems in general
well satisfied with the resolution taken by the House and the measure
adopted by himself; and, what is more important, authentic information
is received that the people of Kentucky will wait with patience the
result of the steps which the executive government may think it right
to take, without recurring, as was apprehended would be the case to
force, for the assertion of their claims. The President regards this
circumstance (with great justice, it appears to me) as the surest
pledge of the continuance of his authority, and as the death-blow of
the Federal party.”
Upon Pichon the Government concentrated its threats, and Pichon sent to
Talleyrand cry after cry of distress:--
“It is impossible to be more bitter than this Government is at the
present posture of affairs and at the humiliating attitude in which
our silence about Louisiana places them.... Mr. Jefferson will be
forced to yield to necessity his pretensions and scruples against
a British alliance. I noticed at his table that he redoubled his
civilities and attentions to the British _chargé_. I should also say
that he treats me with much consideration and politeness, in spite of
the actual state of affairs.”
No sooner had Monroe been confirmed by the Senate, than Secretary
Madison sent for Pichon and asked him to do what he could for the
success of Monroe’s mission.[190] At ample length he explained that the
undivided possession of New Orleans and West Florida was a necessity
for the American settlements on the upper Mississippi and Mobile
rivers, and that Monroe was instructed to obtain the whole territory
east of the Mississippi, including New Orleans, at a price not
exceeding two or three million dollars. This part of the Secretary’s
argument was simple; but not content with this, “he entered into
details to prove that New Orleans had no sort of interest for us,
that its situation was acknowledged to be bad, the choice of it was
due to accident, and we might very soon build a city on the opposite
bank.” He argued further that the true policy of France required her
to make the river her boundary against the United States; for “the
United States had no interest in seeing circumstances rise which should
eventually lead their population to extend itself on the right bank. In
point of fact, was it not evident that since these emigrations tended
to weaken the State and to slacken the concentration of its forces,
sound policy ought not to encourage them? In spite of affinities in
manners and language, no colony beyond the river could exist under the
same government, but would infallibly give birth to a separate State
having in its bosom germs of collision with the East, the easier to
develop in proportion to the very affinities between the two empires.”
The Secretary ended by hinting that should the First Consul not be
persuaded by these suggestions, “it might happen that the conduct of
France would decide political combinations which, getting the upper
hand of all these considerations, would tend to produce results no
doubt disagreeable to the United States, but certainly still more so to
France and her allies.”
Pichon was a sore trial to the moderate amount of patience which
Bonaparte possessed. Instead of hinting to Madison that these arguments
would have more weight if the President proposed to support them
by acts such as a military First Consul was accustomed to respect,
Pichon wrote melancholy accounts of his situation to Talleyrand.
The Americans, he said, were throwing themselves into the arms of
England; they thought they held the balance of power between France
and Great Britain, and meant to make the nation which should force
them into war regret the inconsiderate act; the States of New York,
Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, either through their legislatures
or their governors, had energetically announced their readiness to
risk everything to maintain the dignity and rights of the nation;
Madison refused to do business, on the ground that Talleyrand’s want
of attention to Livingston required reprisals; the Secretary of the
Treasury talked of war; a public dinner had been given to Monroe, at
which General Smith offered the toast, “Peace, if peace is honorable;
war, if war is necessary!” the President was open in denouncing
Bonaparte’s ambition; Monroe who had talked long with Pichon, used
language even more startling than that of the President or the
Cabinet:--
“He did not conceal from me that if his negotiation failed, the
Administration had made up its mind to act with the utmost vigor, and
to receive the overtures which England was incessantly making. He
repeated to me several times that I could only imperfectly imagine the
extent of those overtures, and that if the tie were once made between
the two States, they would not stop half way.”[191]
If Monroe made such an assertion as Pichon reported, he carried his
diplomacy beyond the line of truthfulness; for although Thornton,
without instructions, had offered one or two suggestions of concert,
England had made no overture. Monroe’s own instructions rested on
the opposite principle,--that England was to receive, not to make,
overtures. Jefferson wished only to create the impression that disaster
impended over France if she persevered in closing the Mississippi. He
spoke clearly to this effect in a letter written to Dupont at the time
he was alarming Pichon:--
“Our circumstances are so imperious as to admit of no delay as
to our course, and the use of the Mississippi so indispensable
that we cannot hesitate one moment to hazard our existence for its
maintenance. If we fail in this effort to put it beyond the reach of
accident, we see the destinies we have to run, and prepare at once for
them.”[192]
Alarmed by such language, Pichon volunteered to imitate Yrujo and write
a letter to the future French prefect whose arrival at New Orleans was
expected, urging him to raise the interdict on American commerce.[193]
Madison was pleased with the offer, and in return communicated to
Pichon a despatch just received from Livingston, which announced that
Talleyrand had consented to speak, so far as to promise that France
would strictly observe in Louisiana the treaties which existed between
America and Spain. “I quickly saw, by the rapidity with which this
news circulated in the two houses of Congress, the salutary effect it
produced. On all sides I was talked with, and the Administration is
sincerely satisfied by it.” Small as the favor was, the Administration
had reason to be grateful, as it served for the moment to pacify
Kentucky and Tennessee.
The months of January and February passed. Not until spring came,
and the Seventh Congress was about to expire, did Monroe receive his
instructions and prepare to sail. The nature of these instructions was
so remarkable as to deserve a moment of study.[194]
They were framed to provide for three contingencies. Should the
French government be willing to sell New Orleans and the Floridas,
the President would bid high rather than lose the opportunity. Should
France refuse to cede any territory whatever, even the site for a
town, the two commissioners were to content themselves with securing
the right of deposit, with such improvements as they could obtain.
Should Bonaparte deny the right of deposit also, the commissioners were
to be guided by instructions specially adapted to the case. For New
Orleans and West Florida Monroe and Livingston were to offer any sum
within ten million dollars, commercial privileges for ten years in the
ceded ports, incorporation of the inhabitants on an equal footing with
citizens without unnecessary delay, and, if absolutely necessary, a
guaranty of the west bank of the Mississippi.
These were the main ideas of Monroe’s instructions. In brief, they
offered to admit the French to Louisiana without condition. Bonaparte
could have regarded nothing in these instructions as hostile to his
own plans, and could have satisfied every demand by giving the United
States, in the terms of the Spanish treaty, a place of deposit anywhere
on the banks of the Mississippi, or by merely allowing American
vessels to pass up and down the river.[195] In private, Jefferson
professed preference for Natchez over New Orleans as the seat of
American trade.[196] He made no secret of his intention to put off the
day of forcible resistance until the national debt should be reduced
and the Mississippi Valley filled with fighting men.
The tenor of these expressions seemed inconsistent with that of his
letters by Dupont. After telling Bonaparte that[197] “the cession of
New Orleans and the Floridas to us would be a palliation,” but no
more, to the presence of France on the west bank, which would “cost
France, and perhaps not very long hence, a war which will annihilate
her on the ocean,” then within a year to guarantee France forever in
possession of the west bank,--had an air of vacillation. After telling
Dupont again in February that if the United States failed to put the
use of the Mississippi beyond the reach of accident, they should see
the destinies they had to run, and at once prepare for them; then
within a month to admit Bonaparte to possession of all Spanish rights
at New Orleans, without guaranty of any kind for putting the use of the
river beyond accident,--looked like fear. The instructions contained
one positive expression: “The United States cannot remain satisfied,
nor the Western people be kept patient, under the restrictions which
the existing treaty with Spain authorizes.” This sentence introduced
only a moderate request: “Should it be impossible to procure a complete
jurisdiction over any convenient spot whatever, it will only remain
to explain and improve the present right of deposit by adding thereto
the express privilege of holding real estate for commercial purposes,
of providing hospitals, of having consuls residing there,” and other
commercial agents. Even this moderate condition was not an ultimatum.
Madison required only that the Spanish treaty of 1795 should be
respected, and this had already been promised by Talleyrand.
In truth the inconsistency was more apparent than real. Jefferson
explained to the French government that the war he had in his mind was
a contingent result. While assuring Dupont that if he failed to put the
use of the Mississippi beyond the reach of accident he should prepare
for war, he added in italics an explanation:[198]--
“Not but that we shall still endeavor to go on in peace and friendship
with our neighbors as long as we can, _if our rights of navigation
and deposit are respected_; but as we foresee that the caprices of
the local officers and the abuse of those rights by our boatmen and
navigators, which neither government can prevent, will keep up a
state of irritation which cannot long be kept inactive, we should
be criminally improvident not to take at once eventual measures for
strengthening ourselves for the contest.”
The essence and genius of Jefferson’s statesmanship lay in peace.
Through difficulties, trials, and temptations of every kind he held
fast to this idea, which was the clew to whatever seemed inconsistent,
feeble, or deceptive in his administration. Yielding often, with
the suppleness of his nature, to the violence of party, he allowed
himself to use language which at first sight seemed inconsistent, and
even untruthful; but such concessions were momentary: the unswerving
intent could always be detected under every superficial disguise; the
consistency of the career became more remarkable on account of the
seeming inconsistencies of the moment. He was pliant and yielding in
manner, but steady as the magnet itself in aim. His manœuvres between
the angry West and the arbitrary First Consul of France offered an
example of his political method. He meant that there should be no war.
While waiting to hear the result of Monroe’s mission he wrote to an
English correspondent a letter[199] which expressed his true feelings
with apparent candor:--
“We see ... with great concern the position in which Great Britain is
placed, and should be sincerely afflicted were any disaster to deprive
mankind of the benefit of such a bulwark against the torrent which
has for some time been bearing down all before it. But her power and
prowess by sea seem to render everything safe in the end. Peace is our
passion, and wrongs might drive us from it. We prefer trying _every_
other just principle, right and safety, before we would recur to war.”
END OF VOL. I.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Sketches of Debate in the First Senate, by William Maclay, p. 212.
[2] The Quarterly Review (London, 1841), p. 24.
[3] The Quarterly Review (London, 1841), p. 23.
[4] Massachusetts Historical Society’s Proceedings, vol. xix. 1881-1882.
[5] Grigsby’s Convention of 1776, p. 85.
[6] Life of Story, i. 166.
[7] Old Churches of Virginia, ii. 222.
[8] Marshall to Hamilton, Jan. 1, 1801; Hamilton’s Works, vi. 502.
[9] Jefferson to Gallatin, Sept. 27, 1810; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 492.
[10] Evening Post, April 20, 1802.
[11] Thornton to Grenville, March 4, 1801; MSS. British Archives.
[12] Jefferson’s Works, ix. 469.
[13] Jefferson to J. Dickinson, March 6, 1801; Works, iv. 365.
[14] Jefferson’s Works, ix. 480.
[15] Jefferson to Roane, Sept. 6, 1819; Works, vii. 133.
[16] Jefferson to Judge Johnson, June 12, 1823; Works, vii. 293.
[17] Jefferson to W. H. Crawford, June 20, 1816; Works, vii. 6.
[18] Jefferson to John Taylor, May 28, 1816; Works, vi. 608.
[19] Jefferson to Edward Rutledge, June 24, 1797; Works, iv. 189.
[20] Jefferson to Gideon Granger, Aug. 13, 1800; Works, iv. 330.
[21] Jefferson to Thomas Paine, March 18, 1801; Works, iv. 370.
[22] Jefferson to Dr. Logan, March 22, 1801; Jefferson MSS.
[23] Jefferson to R. R. Livingston, Sept. 9, 1801; Works, iv. 408.
[24] Jefferson to Judge Roane, June 27, 1821; Works, vii. 212.
[25] Jefferson to Robert J. Garnett, Feb. 14, 1824; Works, vii. 336.
[26] Jefferson to Edward Livingston, April 4, 1824; Works, vii. 342.
[27] Life of Gallatin, p. 276.
[28] Jefferson to S. Smith, April 17, 1801; Jefferson MSS.
[29] Jefferson to Dr. Rush, March 24, 1801; Works, iv. 382.
[30] Madison to W. C. Nicholas, July 10, 1801; Nicholas MSS.
[31] Jefferson to Elias Shipman and others, July 12, 1801; Works, iv.
402.
[32] Jefferson’s Anas; Works, ix. 207.
[33] Gallatin to Jefferson, Sept. 14, 1801; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 288.
[34] Jefferson to George Clinton, May 17, 1801; Jefferson MSS.
[35] Burr to Gallatin, June 28, 1801; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 283.
[36] Gallatin to Jefferson, Sept. 14, 1801; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 288.
[37] Jefferson to Gallatin; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 289.
[38] Burr to Gallatin, March 5, 1802; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 289.
[39] Jefferson to Livingston, Feb. 24, 1801; Jefferson’s Works, iv. 360.
[40] Hammond’s Political History, i. 180.
[41] Gallatin to Jefferson, July 25, 1801; Gallatin’s Works, i. 28.
[42] Jefferson to Gallatin, August 14, 1801; Gallatin’s Works, i. 36.
[43] McKean to Jefferson, August 10, 1801; Jefferson MSS.
[44] Gallatin to Jefferson, Sept. 12, 1801; Gallatin’s Works, i. 47.
[45] Jefferson to Gallatin, July 26, 1801; Gallatin’s Works, i. 29.
Gallatin to Jefferson, Sept. 18, 1804; Gallatin’s Works, i. 208.
[46] Gallatin to Jefferson, August 17, 1801; Gallatin’s Works, i. 38.
[47] Jefferson to Walter Jones, March 31, 1801; Works, iv. 392.
[48] Jefferson to Macon, May 14, 1801; Works, iv. 396.
[49] Adams’s Randolph, p. 51.
[50] Life of Gallatin, p. 270.
[51] Annals of Congress, May 26, 1809, XI. Congress, Part I. p. 92.
[52] Letter to the President of the Senate, Dec. 8, 1801.
[53] Gallatin to Jefferson, Aug. 16, 1802; Works, i. 88.
[54] Gallatin to Jefferson, Sept. 12, 1805; Works, i. 253.
[55] Jefferson to J. Dickinson, Dec. 19, 1801; Works, iv. 424.
[56] Jefferson to Roane, Sept. 6, 1819; Works, vii. 133.
[57] Jefferson to W. T. Barry, July 2, 1822; Works, vii. 257.
[58] Annals of Congress, May 25, 1809. XI. Congress, Part I. 87.
[59] Hamilton to Bayard, Jan. 15, 1801; Hamilton’s Works, vi. 419.
[60] Bayard to Hamilton, April 12, 1802; Hamilton’s Works, vi. 539.
[61] The Virginia Report of 1799-1800, etc. Richmond, 1850, pp. 143-148.
[62] Giles to Jefferson, June 1, 1801. Hamilton’s History, vii. 585 n.
[63] Bayard to Hamilton, April 25, 1802; Hamilton’s Works, vi. 534.
[64] Jefferson to Peter Carr, Oct. 25, 1801; Jefferson MSS.
[65] Jefferson to M. Dupont, Jan. 18, 1802; Jefferson MSS.
[66] Jefferson to Cæsar A. Rodney, April 24, 1802; Jefferson MSS.
[67] Jefferson to Joel Barlow, May 3, 1802; Works, iv. 437.
[68] Life of Benjamin Silliman, i. 90-96.
[69] Jefferson to Priestley, March 21, 1801; Works, iv. 373.
[70] Jefferson to John Taylor, June 1, 1798; Works, iv. 247.
[71] Jefferson to Moses Robinson, March 23, 1801; Works, iv. 379.
[72] Jefferson to Gideon Granger, May 3, 1801; Works, iv. 395.
[73] Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, Aug. 26, 1801; Works, iv. 406.
[74] Jefferson to Pierpoint Edwards, July 21, 1801; Jefferson MSS.
[75] Jefferson to Thomas Paine, March 18, 1801; Works, iv. 370.
[76] Randall’s Jefferson, ii. 643.
[77] Jefferson to Paine, June 5, 1805; Works, iv. 582.
[78] Jefferson to W. B. Giles, March 23, 1801; Works, iv. 382.
[79] Jefferson to Governor McKean, July 24, 1801; Jefferson MSS.
[80] Madison to Monroe, June 1, 1801; Madison’s Works, ii. 173.
[81] Madison to Monroe, April 20, 1803; Madison’s Writings, ii. 181.
[82] Jefferson to R. R. Livingston, Oct. 10, 1802; Works, iv. 448.
[83] Jefferson to Monroe, July 15 and 17, 1802; Works, iv. 444-447.
[84] The Recorder, September-October, 1802.
[85] Jefferson to Callender, Oct. 6, 1799; Jefferson MSS.
[86] Jefferson to John Langdon; Jefferson MSS.
[87] Jefferson to Dr. Cooper, Nov. 29, 1802; Works, iv. 453.
[88] M. de Talleyrand, par Sainte-Beuve, p. 70.
[89] Alquier to Talleyrand, 26 Vendémiaire, An ix. (Oct. 18, 1800);
Archives des Aff. Etr. MSS.
[90] Mémoires du Prince de la Paix, iii. 36-38.
[91] Mémoire, etc., lu à l’Institut National le 15 Germinal, An v.
(April 4, 1797).
[92] Mémoires du Prince de la Paix, iii. 23.
[93] Instructions données an Citoyen Guillemardet, Prairial, An vi.
(May 20-June 19, 1798); Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[94] Talleyrand to E. Gerry, June 27, 1798; State Papers, ii. 215.
[95] Talleyrand to E. Gerry, July 12, 1798; Ibid. 219.
[96] Correspondance de Napoléon Premier, xxx. 330.
[97] Mémoires de Miot de Melito, i. 288.
[98] Gallatin’s Writings, ii. 490.
[99] Correspondance, vi. 415; Bonaparte to Talleyrand, July 22, 1800.
[100] Alquier to Talleyrand, 19 Thermidor, An viii. (Aug. 7, 1800);
Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[101] Note adressée par l’Ambassadeur da la République, etc., 15
Thermidor, An viii. (Aug. 3. 1800); Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[102] Correspondance, vi. 426; Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 9 Thermidor, An
viii. (July 28, 1800).
[103] Rapport au Premier Consul, 6 Fructidor, An viii. (Aug. 24, 1800);
Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[104] Correspondance, vi. 445.
[105] Instructions au Général Berthier, 8 Fructidor, An viii. (Aug. 26,
1800); Projet de Traité préliminaire et secret, 10 Fructidor, An viii.
(Aug. 28, 1800); Archives des Aff. Ètr. MSS.
[106] Rapport à l’Empereur, 28 Brumaire, An xiii. (Nov. 19, 1804);
Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[107] Mémoires, iii. 20, 55.
[108] Traité préliminaire et secret, Oct. 1, 1800; Recueil de Traités
de la France, par De Clercq, i. 411.
[109] Mémoires, iii. 76-78.
[110] Lucien Bonaparte et ses Mémoires, Th. Jung, ii. 104.
[111] Correspondance, vii. 190; Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 21 Messidor,
An ix. (July 10, 1801).
[112] Lucien Bonaparte, Jung, ii. 466.
[113] Correspondance, vii. 200; Note à remettre à Lord Hawkesbury, 4
Thermidor, An ix. (July 23, 1801).
[114] Ibid.; Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 8 Thermidor, An ix. (July 27,
1801).
[115] Correspondance, vii. 225; Projets de Notes, 27 Thermidor, An ix.
(15 Aug. 1801).
[116] Correspondance, vii. 226; Talleyrand to Saint Cyr, 16 Frimaire,
An x. (6 Dec. 1801); Lucien Bonaparte, Jung, ii. 468.
[117] Correspondance, vii. 279; Bonaparte to Berthier, 16 Vendémiaire,
An x. (Oct. 8, 1801).
[118] Correspondance, vii. 298. Bonaparte to Berthier, 1 Brumaire, An
x. (23 Oct. 1801).
[119] Pamphile de Lacroix, Mémoires, ii. 277.
[120] Vie de Toussaint, par Saint-Remy, p. 322.
[121] Toussaint to President Adams, 16 Brumaire, An vii. (Nov. 6,
1798); MSS. State Department Archives.
[122] Treaty of June 13, 1799; MSS. State Department Archives.
[123] Toussaint to President Adams, Aug. 14, 1799; MSS. State
Department Archives.
[124] Stevens to Pickering, Feb. 13, 1800; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[125] Stevens to Pickering, April 19, 1800; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Stevens to Pickering, May 24, 1800; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[128] Pamphile de Lacroix, Mémoires, ii. 52.
[129] Lear to Madison, July, 1801; MSS. State Department Archives.
[130] Pichon to Decrès, 18 Fructidor, An ix. (Sept. 5, 1801); Archives
de la Marine, MSS.
[131] Correspondance, vii. 319; Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 22 Brumaire,
An x. (Nov. 13, 1801).
[132] Correspondance, vii. 315; Proclamation, 17 Brumaire, An x. (Nov.
8, 1801).
[133] Correspondance, vii. 322; Bonaparte to Toussaint, 27 Brumaire, An
x. (Nov. 18, 1801).
[134] Ibid., 327; Exposé de la situation de la République, 1 Frimaire,
An x. (Nov. 22, 1801).
[135] Pamphile de Lacroix, Mémoires, ii. 228.
[136] Correspondance, vii. 413; Bonaparte to Leclerc, 25 Ventôse, An x.
(March 16, 1802).
[137] Ibid., 503, 504; Bonaparte to Leclerc, 12 Messidor, An x. (July
1, 1802).
[138] Moniteur, 24 Prairial, An x. (June 13, 1802).
[139] Correspondance, xxx. 535; Notes sur St. Domingue.
[140] Decrès to Leclerc, 25 Prairial, An x. (June 14, 1802); Archives
de la Marine, MSS. Cf. Revue Historique, “Napoléon Premier et Saint
Domingue,” Janvier-Février, 1884.
[141] Correspondance, vii. 485; Bonaparte to Decrès, 15 Prairial, An x.
(June 4, 1802).
[142] Talleyrand to Gouvion St.-Cyr, 30 Prairial, An x. (June 19,
1802); Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
[143] St.-Cyr to Don Pedro Cevallos, 23 Messidor, An x. (July 12,
1802). Yrujo to Madison, Sept. 4, 1803. State Papers, ii. 569.
[144] Correspondance, viii. 5; Bonaparte to Decrès, 6 Fructidor, An x.
(Aug. 24, 1802).
[145] Correspondance, viii. 112; Bonaparte to Leclerc, 6 Frimaire, An
xi. (Nov. 27, 1802).
[146] Ibid., 12; Bonaparte to the King of Tuscany, 11 Fructidor, An x.
(Aug. 29, 1802).
[147] Rapport au Premier Consul; Frimaire, An xi. (November, 1802);
Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
[148] Correspondance, viii. 111; Bonaparte to the King of Spain, 6
Frimaire, An xi. (Nov. 27, 1802).
[149] Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 27 Nivôse, An xi. (Jan. 17, 1803);
Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
[150] Jefferson to W. C. C. Claiborne, July 13, 1801; Jefferson MSS.
[151] Jefferson to R. R. Livingston, Aug. 28, 1801; Jefferson MSS.;
State Department Archives.
[152] Jefferson to R. R. Livingston, March 16, 1802; Jefferson MSS.
[153] Rufus King to Madison, June 1, 1801; State Papers, ii. 509.
[154] Madison to Pinckney, June 9, 1801; Madison to Livingston, Sept.
28, 1801; State Papers, ii. 510.
[155] Rufus King to Madison, Nov. 20, 1801; State Papers, ii. 511.
[156] Pichon to Leclerc, 29 Ventôse-11 Messidor, An x. (March 20-June
30, 1802); Archives de la Marine, MSS.
[157] Leclerc to Bonaparte, 17 Prairial, An x. (June 6, 1802); Archives
Nationales, MSS.
[158] Correspondance, vii. 508; Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 15 Messidor,
An x. (July 4, 1802).
[159] Livingston to Madison, Dec. 10, 1801; Livingston to King, Dec.
30; King to Madison, Nov. 20; State Papers, ii. 511, 512.
[160] Madison to Livingston, May 1, 1802; State Papers, ii. 516.
[161] Jefferson to Dupont de Nemours, April 25, 1802; Works, iv. 435.
[162] Jefferson to Livingston, April 18, 1802; Works, iv. 431.
[163] Dupont to Jefferson, April 30, 1802; Jefferson MSS.
[164] Jefferson to Governor McKean, June 14, 1802; Jefferson MSS.
[165] Leclerc to Bonaparte, 29 Fructidor, An x. (Sept. 16, 1802);
Archives Nationales, MSS.
[166] Leclerc to Bonaparte, 15 Vendémiaire, An xi. (Oct. 7, 1802);
Archives Nationales, MSS.
[167] Correspondance, xxx. 534.
[168] Leclerc to Decrès, 21 Thermidor, An x. (Aug. 9, 1802); Archives
de la Marine, MSS.
[169] Leclerc to Bonaparte, 15 Vendémiaire, An xi. (Oct. 7, 1802);
Archives Nationales, MSS.
[170] Despatch of W. C. C. Claiborne, Oct. 29, 1802; State Papers, ii.
470.
[171] Laussat to Decrès, 29 Germinal, An xi. (April 19, 1803); Archives
de la Marine, MSS.
[172] Madison to Livingston, Oct. 15, 1802; State Papers, ii. 525.
[173] Jefferson to Livingston, Oct. 10, 1802; Works, iv. 447.
[174] Jefferson to Sir John Sinclair, June 30, 1803; Works, iv. 490.
[175] Yrujo to Madison, Nov. 27, 1802; MSS. State Department Archives.
[176] Yrujo to Morales, Nov. 26, 1802; Gayarré, History of Louisiana,
iii. 576.
[177] Madison to Pinckney, Nov. 27, 1802; State Papers, ii. 527.
[178] Pichon to Talleyrand, 2 Nivôse, An xi. (Dec. 22, 1802); Archives
des Aff. Étr., MSS.
[179] Thornton to Lord Hawkesbury, Jan. 3, 1803; MSS. British Archives.
[180] Message of Dec. 22, 1802; State Papers, ii. 469.
[181] Message of Dec. 30, 1802; State Papers, ii. 471.
[182] Resolutions of Jan. 7, 1803; Annals of Congress, 1802-1803, p.
339.
[183] Jefferson to Monroe, Jan. 13, 1803; Works, iv. 453.
[184] Madison to Livingston, Jan. 18, 1803; State Papers, ii. 529.
[185] Report of Jan. 12, 1803; Annals of Congress, 1802-1803, pp.
371-374.
[186] Jefferson to Monroe, Jan. 13, 1803; Works, iv. 453.
[187] Jefferson to Livingston, Feb. 3, 1803; Works, iv. 460.
[188] Jefferson to Dr. Priestley, Jan. 29, 1804; Works, iv. 524.
[189] Thornton to Lord Hawkesbury, Jan. 31, 1803; MSS. British Archives.
[190] Pichon to Talleyrand, 4 Pluviôse, An xi. (Jan. 24, 1803);
Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
[191] Pichon to Talleyrand, 29 Pluviôse, An xi. (Feb. 17, 1803);
Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
[192] Jefferson to Dupont, Feb. 1, 1803; Works, iv. 456.
[193] Pichon to Talleyrand, 24 Pluviôse, An xi. (Feb. 12, 1803);
Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
[194] Instructions to Livingston and Monroe, March 2, 1803; State
Papers, ii. 540.
[195] Madison to Monroe, April 20, 1803; Madison’s Writings, ii. 181.
[196] Jefferson to Hugh Williamson, April 30, 1803; Works, iv. 483.
[197] Jefferson to Dupont, April 25, 1802; Works, iv. 435.
[198] Jefferson to Dupont, Feb. 1, 1803; Works, iv. 456.
[199] Jefferson to Sir John Sinclair, 30 June, 1803; Works, iv. 490.
Transcriber's Notes:
Italics are shown thus: _sloping_.
Variations in spelling and hyphenation are retained.
Perceived typographical errors have been changed.