THE ACCESSION OF DARIUS.
B.C. 520
Confusion at Susa.--No heir to the throne.--Five days'
interregnum.--Provisional government.--Consultation of the
confederates.--Otanes in favor of a republic.--Otanes's
republic.--Principles of representation.--Large assemblies.--Nature
of ancient republics.--Nature of a representative
republic.--Megabyzus.--He opposes the plan of Otanes.--Speech of
Megabyzus.--He proposes an oligarchy.--Speech of Darius.--He advocates
a monarchy.--Four of the seven confederates concur with Darius.--Otanes
withdraws.--Agreement made by the rest.--Singular mode of deciding
which should be the king.--The groom Oebases.--His method of making
Darius's horse neigh.--Probable truth or falsehood of this
account.--Ancient statesmen.--Their character and position.--The
conspirators governed, in their decision, by superstitious
feelings.--The conspirators do homage to Darius.--The equestrian
statue.
For several days after the assassination of the magi the city was
filled with excitement, tumults, and confusion. There was no heir, of
the family of Cyrus, entitled to succeed to the vacant throne, for
neither Cambyses, nor Smerdis his brother, had left any sons. There
was, indeed, a daughter of Smerdis, named Parmys, and there were also
still living two daughters of Cyrus. One was Atossa, whom we have
already mentioned as having been married to Cambyses, her brother, and
as having been afterward taken by Smerdis the magian as one of his
wives. These princesses, though of royal lineage, seem neither of them
to have been disposed to assert any claims to the throne at such a
crisis. The mass of the community were stupefied with astonishment at
the sudden revolution which had occurred. No movement was made toward
determining the succession. For five days nothing was done.
During this period, all the subordinate functions of government in
the provinces, cities, and towns, and among the various garrisons and
encampments of the army, went on, of course, as usual, but the general
administration of the government had no head. The seven confederates
had been regarded, for the time being, as a sort of provisional
government, the army and the country in general, so far as appears,
looking to them for the means of extrication from the political
difficulties in which this sudden revolution had involved them, and
submitting, in the mean time, to their direction and control. Such a
state of things, it was obvious, could not long last; and after five
days, when the commotion had somewhat subsided, they began to consider
it necessary to make some arrangements of a more permanent character,
the power to make such arrangements as they thought best resting with
them alone. They accordingly met for consultation.
Herodotus the historian,[C] on whose narrative of these events we have
mainly to rely for all the information respecting them which is now
to be attained, gives a very minute and dramatic account of the
deliberations of the conspirators on this occasion. The account is, in
fact, too dramatic to be probably true.
[Footnote C: An account of Herodotus, and of the circumstances under
which he wrote his history, which will aid the reader very much in
forming an opinion in respect to the kind and degree of confidence
which it is proper to place in his statements, will be found in the
first chapter of our history of Cyrus the Great.]
Otanes, in this discussion, was in favor of establishing a republic.
He did not think it safe or wise to intrust the supreme power again to
any single individual. It was proved, he said, by universal
experience, that when any one person was raised to such an elevation
above his fellow-men, he became suspicious, jealous, insolent, and
cruel. He lost all regard for the welfare and happiness of others, and
became supremely devoted to the preservation of his own greatness and
power by any means, however tyrannical, and to the accomplishment of
the purposes of his own despotic will. The best and most valuable
citizens were as likely to become the victims of his oppression as the
worst. In fact, tyrants generally chose their favorites, he said, from
among the most abandoned men and women in their realms, such
characters being the readiest instruments of their guilty pleasures
and their crimes. Otanes referred very particularly to the case of
Cambyses as an example of the extreme lengths to which the despotic
insolence and cruelty of a tyrant could go. He reminded his colleagues
of the sufferings and terrors which they had endured while under his
sway, and urged them very strongly not to expose themselves to such
terrible evils and dangers again. He proposed, therefore, that they
should establish a republic, under which the officers of government
should be elected, and questions of public policy be determined, in
assemblies of the people.
It must be understood, however, by the reader, that a republic, as
contemplated and intended by Otanes in this speech, was entirely
different from the mode of government which that word denotes at the
present day. They had little idea, in those times, of the principle of
representation, by which the thousand separate and detached
communities of a great empire can choose _delegates_, who are to
deliberate, speak, and act for them in the assemblies where the great
governmental decisions are ultimately made. By this principle of
representation, the people can really all share in the exercise of
power. Without it they can not, for it is impossible that the people
of a great state can ever be brought together in one assembly; nor,
even if it were practicable to bring them thus together, would it be
possible for such a concourse to deliberate or act. The action of any
assembly which goes beyond a very few hundred in numbers, is always,
in fact, the action exclusively of the small knot of leaders who call
and manage it. Otanes, therefore, as well as all other advocates of
republican government in ancient times, meant that the supreme power
should be exercised, not by the great mass of the people included
within the jurisdiction in question, but by such a portion of certain
privileged classes as could be brought together in the capital. It was
such a sort of republic as would be formed in this country if the
affairs of the country at large, and the municipal and domestic
institutions of all the states, were regulated and controlled by laws
enacted, and by governors appointed, at great municipal meetings held
in the city of New York.
This was, in fact, the nature of all the republics of ancient times.
They were generally small, and the city in whose free citizens the
supreme power resided, constituted by far the most important portion
of the body politic. The Roman republic, however, became at one period
very large. It overspread almost the whole of Europe; but, widely
extended as it was in territory, and comprising innumerable states
and kingdoms within its jurisdiction, the vast concentration of power
by which the whole was governed, vested entirely and exclusively in
noisy and tumultuous assemblies convened in the Roman forum.
Even if the idea of a representative system of government, such as is
adopted in modern times, and by means of which the people of a great
and extended empire can exercise, conveniently and efficiently, a
general sovereignty held in common by them all, had been understood in
ancient times, it is very doubtful whether it could, in those times,
have been carried into effect, for want of certain facilities which
are enjoyed in the present age, and which seem essential for the safe
and easy action of so vast and complicated a system as a great
representative government must necessarily be. The regular transaction
of business at public meetings, and the orderly and successful
management of any extended system of elections, requires a great deal
of writing; and the general circulation of newspapers, or something
exercising the great function which it is the object of newspapers to
fulfill, that of keeping the people at large in some degree informed
in respect to the progress of public affairs, seems essential to the
successful working of a system of representative government comprising
any considerable extent of territory.
However this may be, whether a great representative system would or
would not have been practicable in ancient times if it had been tried,
it is certain that it was never tried. In all ancient republics, the
sovereignty resided, essentially, in a privileged class of the people
of the capital. The territories governed were provinces, held in
subjection as dependencies, and compelled to pay tribute; and this was
the plan which Otanes meant to advocate when recommending a republic,
in the Persian council.
The name of the second speaker in this celebrated consultation was
Megabyzus. He opposed the plan of Otanes. He concurred fully, he said,
in all that Otanes had advanced in respect to the evils of a monarchy,
and to the oppression and tyranny to which a people were exposed whose
liberties and lives were subject to the despotic control of a single
human will. But in order to avoid one extreme, it was not necessary to
run into the evils of the other. The disadvantages and dangers of
popular control in the management of the affairs of state were
scarcely less than those of a despotism. Popular assemblies were
always, he said, turbulent, passionate, capricious. Their decisions
were controlled by artful and designing demagogues. It was not
possible that masses of the common people could have either the
sagacity to form wise counsels, or the energy and steadiness to
execute them. There could be no deliberation, no calmness, no secrecy
in their consultations. A populace was always governed by excitements,
which spread among them by a common sympathy; and they would give way
impetuously to the most senseless impulses, as they were urged by
their fear, their resentment, their exultation, their hate, or by any
other passing emotion of the hour.
Megabyzus therefore disapproved of both a monarchy and a republic. He
recommended an oligarchy. "We are now," said he, "already seven. Let
us select from the leading nobles in the court and officers of the
army a small number of men, eminent for talents and virtue, and thus
form a select and competent body of men, which shall be the depository
of the supreme power. Such a plan avoids the evils and inconveniences
of both the other systems. There can be no tyranny or oppression
under such a system; for, if any one of so large a number should be
inclined to abuse his power, he will be restrained by the rest. On the
other hand, the number will not be so large as to preclude prudence
and deliberation in counsel, and the highest efficiency and energy in
carrying counsels into effect."
When Megabyzus had completed his speech, Darius expressed his opinion.
He said that the arguments of those who had already spoken appeared
plausible, but that the speakers had not dealt quite fairly by the
different systems whose merits they had discussed, since they had
compared a good administration of one form of government with a bad
administration of another. Every thing human was, he admitted, subject
to imperfection and liable to abuse; but on the supposition that each
of the three forms which had been proposed were equally well
administered, the advantage, he thought, would be strongly on the side
of monarchy. Control exercised by a single mind and will was far more
concentrated and efficient than that proceeding from any conceivable
combination. The forming of plans could be, in that case, more secret
and wary, and the execution of them more immediate and prompt. Where
power was lodged in many hands, all energetic exercise of it was
paralyzed by the dissensions, the animosities and the contending
struggles of envious and jealous rivals. These struggles, in fact,
usually resulted in the predominance of some one, more energetic or
more successful than the rest, the aristocracy or the democracy
running thus, of its own accord, to a despotism in the end, showing
that there were natural causes always tending to the subjection of
nations of men to the control of one single will.
Besides all this, Darius added, in conclusion, that the Persians had
always been accustomed to a monarchy, and it would be a very dangerous
experiment to attempt to introduce a new system, which would require
so great a change in all the habits and usages of the people.
Thus the consultation went on. At the end of it, it appeared that four
out of the seven agreed with Darius in preferring a monarchy. This was
a majority, and thus the question seemed to be settled. Otanes said
that he would make no opposition to any measures which they might
adopt to carry their decision into effect, but that he would not
himself be subject to the monarchy which they might establish. "I do
not wish," he added, "either to govern others or to have others
govern me. You may establish a kingdom, therefore, if you choose, and
designate the monarch in any mode that you see fit to adopt, but he
must not consider me as one of his subjects. I myself, and all my
family and dependents, must be wholly free from his control."
This was a very unreasonable proposition, unless, indeed, Otanes was
willing to withdraw altogether from the community to which he thus
refused to be subject; for, by residing within it, he necessarily
enjoyed its protection, and ought, therefore, to bear his portion of
its burdens, and to be amenable to its laws. Notwithstanding this,
however, the conspirators acceded to the proposal, and Otanes
withdrew.
The remaining six of the confederates then proceeded with their
arrangements for the establishment of a monarchy. They first agreed
that one of their own number should be the king, and that on
whomsoever the choice should fall, the other five, while they
submitted to his dominion, should always enjoy peculiar privileges and
honors at his court. They were at all times to have free access to the
palaces and to the presence of the king, and it was from among their
daughters alone that the king was to choose his wives. These and some
other similar points having been arranged, the manner of deciding
which of the six should be the king remained to be determined. The
plan which they adopted, and the circumstances connected with the
execution of it, constitute, certainly, one of the most extraordinary
of all the strange transactions recorded in ancient times. It is
gravely related by Herodotus as sober truth. How far it is to be
considered as by any possibility credible, the reader must judge,
after knowing what the story is.
They agreed, then, that on the following morning they would all meet
on horseback at a place agreed upon beyond the walls of the city, and
that the one whose horse should neigh first should be the king! The
time when this ridiculous ceremony was to be performed was sunrise.
As soon as this arrangement was made the parties separated, and each
went to his own home. Darius called his groom, whose name was
OEbases, and ordered him to have his horse ready at sunrise on the
next morning, explaining to him, at the same time, the plan which had
been formed for electing the king. "If that is the mode which is to be
adopted," said Oebases, "you need have no concern, for I can
arrange it very easily so as to have the lot fall upon you." Darius
expressed a strong desire to have this accomplished, if it were
possible, and Oebases went away.
The method which Oebases adopted was to lead Darius's horse out to
the ground that evening, in company with another, the favorite
companion, it seems, of the animal. Now the attachment of the horse to
his companion is very strong, and his recollection of localities very
vivid, and Oebases expected that when the horse should approach the
ground on the following morning, he would be reminded of the company
which he enjoyed there the night before, and neigh. The result was as
he anticipated. As the horsemen rode up to the appointed place, the
horse of Darius neighed the first, and Darius was unanimously
acknowledged king.
In respect to the credibility of this famous story, the first thought
which arises in the mind is, that it is utterly impossible that sane
men, acting in so momentous a crisis, and where interests so vast and
extended were at stake, could have resorted to a plan so childish and
ridiculous as this. Such a mode of designating a leader, seriously
adopted, would have done discredit to a troop of boys making
arrangements for a holiday; and yet here was an empire extending for
thousands of miles through the heart of a vast continent, comprising,
probably, fifty nations and many millions of people, with capitals,
palaces, armies, fleets, and all the other appointments and machinery
of an immense dominion, to be appropriated and disposed of absolutely,
and, so far as they could see, forever. It seems incredible that men
possessing such intelligence, and information, and extent of view as
we should suppose that officers of their rank and station would
necessarily acquire, could have attempted to decide such a momentous
question in so ridiculous and trivial a manner. And yet the account is
seriously recorded by Herodotus as sober history, and the story has
been related again and again, from that day to this, by every
successive generation of historians, without any particular question
of its truth.
And it may possibly be that it is true. It is a case in which the
apparent improbability is far greater than the real. In the first
place, it would seem that, in all ages of the world, the acts and
decisions of men occupying positions of the most absolute and exalted
power have been controlled, to a much greater degree, by caprice and
by momentary impulse, than mankind have generally supposed. Looking up
as we do to these vast elevations from below, they seem invested with
a certain sublimity and grandeur which we imagine must continually
impress the minds of those who occupy them, and expand and strengthen
their powers, and lead them to act, in all respects, with the
circumspection, the deliberation, and the far-reaching sagacity which
the emergencies continually arising seem to require. And this is, in
fact, in some degree the case with the statesmen and political leaders
raised to power under the constitutional governments of modern times.
Such statesmen are clothed with their high authority, in one way or
another, by the combined and deliberate action of vast masses of men,
and every step which they take is watched, in reference to its
influence on the condition and welfare of these masses, by many
millions; so that such men live and act under a continual sense of
responsibility, and they appreciate, in some degree, the momentous
importance of their doings. But the absolute and independent
sovereigns of the Old World, who held their power by conquest or by
inheritance, though raised sometimes to very vast and giddy
elevations, seem to have been unconscious, in many instances, of the
dignity and grandeur of their standing, and to have considered their
acts only as they affected their own personal and temporary interests.
Thus, though placed on a great elevation, they took only very narrow
and circumscribed views; they saw nothing but the objects immediately
around them; and they often acted, accordingly, in the most frivolous
and capricious manner.
It was so, undoubtedly, with these six conspirators. In deciding which
of their number should be king, they thought nothing of the interests
of the vast realms, and of the countless millions of people whose
government was to be provided for. The question, as they considered
it, was doubtless merely which of them should have possession of the
royal palaces, and be the center and the object of royal pomp and
parade in the festivities and celebrations of the capital.
And in the mode of decision which they adopted, it may be that some
degree of superstitious feeling mingled. The action and the voices of
animals were considered, in those days, as supernatural omens,
indicating the will of heaven. These conspirators may have expected,
accordingly, in the neighing of the horse, a sort of divine
intimation in respect to the disposition of the crown. This idea is
confirmed by the statement which the account of this transaction
contains, that immediately after the neighing of Darius's horse, it
thundered, although there were no clouds in the sky from which the
thunder could be supposed naturally to come. The conspirators, at all
events, considered it solemnly decided that Darius was to be king.
They all dismounted from their horses and knelt around him, in
acknowledgment of their allegiance and subjection.
It seems that Darius, after he became established on his throne,
considered the contrivance by which, through the assistance of his
groom, he had obtained the prize, not as an act of fraud which it was
incumbent on him to conceal, but as one of brilliant sagacity which he
was to avow and glory in. He caused a magnificent equestrian statue to
be sculptured, representing himself mounted on his neighing horse.
This statue he set up in a public place with this inscription:
DARIUS, SON OF HYSTASPES, OBTAINED THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PERSIA
BY THE SAGACITY OF HIS HORSE AND THE INGENIOUS CONTRIVANCE
OF OEBASES HIS GROOM.