[Illustration: THE FORTRESS OF VERDUN, THE BASIN OF BRIEY, THE
FORTRESS OF METZ.]
During 1915, Germany was particularly on the defensive, in Artois
(May-June) and in Champagne (September-October). Her successes in
Serbia and Russia had not brought the final victory which could only
be won on the Western front.
Germany feared an allied offensive and was anxious over the continual
increase of their forces in men and material. To forestall this
offensive would cause it to miscarry and keep the initiative in her
own hands.
The Germans wanted too, to make an impression on the world at large
which began to have doubts about her ultimate victory. Finally they
were influenced by political considerations at home. The rationing
of the population had lowered the general morale, and the prestige
of the Crown Prince had slumped heavily on account of his failure
in Argonne. A grand victory was necessary to strengthen the German
morale, to appease dissension and to rehabilitate the prestige of
the Imperial family. The German High Command chose Verdun. Was this
choice of ground as paradoxical as it has been said?
"_Verdun in all the war is the hinge of the door which swings open
sometimes on France, sometimes on Germany_". (L. GILLET.)
To capture Verdun was to threaten the whole French right wing, to
gain an important stake, a stronghold fronting the rich basin of
Briey, and to get the benefit of a great moral effect.
The Verdun salient lent itself to converging enemy attacks and
concentrated fire. On the right bank the defenders of Verdun would be
fighting with their backs to the Meuse. The neighbourhood of Verdun
with its valleys and woods, facilitated the moving of troops and the
concentration of artillery screened from view.
The enemy too had fourteen railways at his disposal and Metz close at
hand from which to bring up troops and supplies.
On the French side, there was only one broad gauge railway connecting
Verdun, via Saint-Menehould, with the rest of France. This
railway, too, was always liable to be cut off by shell-fire. (_See
illustration opposite_).
[Illustration: _The only communication between Verdun and the
rear was by the Meusian railway and the "Sacred Way". The
Verdun-Commercy railway was cut by the Saint-Mihiel salient and the
Verdun-Sainte-Menehould railway would be cut by shell fire at the
very outset of the battle._]
=Geographical Sketch.=
The table-lands of Verdun where the battle was to be fought are the
last of the series of heights which form the top of the basin in
which Paris lies. The Meuse which often overflows in winter divides
them from North to South.
The terrace of the table-lands of the right bank, for some ten
kilometres in width, separates the valley of the Meuse from the
marshy plain of the Woëvre.
Numerous streams flow at a depth of more than a hundred metres for a
very short distance, thus hollowing out deep ravines which give to
the hills of the Meuse a contour "jagged, cut in festoons, as though
it was hand-modelled in a clay substance". The summit line, where not
indented, contains the highest points (388 m.), keys to the battle
field.
"_All this country with its partitions and compartments seemed built
like a natural fortress. The sheltered ways and ravines provided
covered approaches and first-rate artillery positions. Every wood and
copse could be converted into a redoubt._
"_If the branching off of the valleys and their innumerable
ramifications added to the dangers of movement or manoeuvre or
facilitated surprise attacks, the ridges, on the other hand, made
marvellous observation posts. On all sides were the very slopes,
banks and flank protection which engineers could desire._" (L.
GILLET: _La Bataille de Verdun_).
=German plans for a decisive attack.=
Following the lesson of the offensives in Artois (May 1915) and
Champagne (September 1915), the German commander intended to put
into practice the French offensive methods but to add, by means of
artillery fire, an unparalleled ferocity. To concentrate masses
of artillery, to cut by shell fire the only broad-gauge railway
that connected Verdun with France (_see plan p. 18_), to flatten
out the French defences, to isolate the occupants by barrages of
heavy shells, then to rush headlong on the town and crush the last
resistance, at the same time sending forward overwhelming masses of
troops, without regard to losses: such was the plan which the Germans
carried out on February 21st, 1916.
[Illustration: TROOPS IN POSITION ON FEBRUARY 21ST, 1916.
_The enemy concentration round the fortress of Verdun._]
=Character of the battle of Verdun=
The battle of Verdun was a battle of annihilation, mutual
annihilation. The method was to concentrate the fire of all the
guns, not over a line but on a zone, and not only on the position
to be captured but also as far as possible in rear on everything
that could support the position. The simile that best expresses it
is no longer that of a battering ram striking against a wall, but
that of a rammer falling perpendicularly and hammering an encircled
zone. The encircled zone was the part where the old territorials
who were screening from observation a road behind the lines, ran
almost as great a danger as men in other battles did in an attacking
wave. Here, while the shells continued to fall, no fatigue party of
men or munitions could go three hundred metres without being wiped
out entirely. Here the wounded in deep-dug aid-posts went mad from
lack of air. Here often a mug of water meant life or death to a
man. This encircled zone was bounded by a narrow stretch of ground
which the opposing artilleries tried to spare because the infantry
were fighting there hand to hand, with bombs, machine guns, and
flame-throwers; every square yard of ground being hotly disputed.
[Illustration: THE BATTERED FORT OF DOUAUMONT (AUGUST 1916).]
"In front of Verdun, one day, the O. C. of a new force asks the
officer of the chasseurs whom he has just relieved: "Where does our
line run here?--I'll show you. There where you will find on the
ground my dead chasseurs, lying side by side, that is where our line
runs".
"In front of Verdun, one day, a battalion commander being completely
cut off sends twenty runners one after another, to the Colonel's
headquarters. These runners are bound to follow a certain track to
go and another to return. Not one comes back and on the next day he
finds the bodies of all twenty, ten lying on the path there and ten
on the path back.
"In front of Verdun, one day, at nightfall, a battalion commander
goes up towards the front line to see his men and cheer them on. The
front line is a string of shell holes and in these holes, one by one,
the men are crouched. He leans over one of these pits of darkness,
for the night was pitch black, and in a low voice so that the enemy
may not hear asks: "How goes it?". There is no movement but a voice
replies in muffled tones as though telling a secret: "All well,
Colonel, they shall not pass". He goes on his way continuing his
rounds "How goes it?" and from each dark shell-hole rises the same
secret whisper.
[Illustration: AT THE AID POST OF THE FORT OR TAVANNES, TWO WOUNDED
MEN AND A RUNNER LEAVING THE "FURNACE".