CASES AND DIRECTIONS ABOUT TRUSTS AND SECRETS.
_Tit. 1. Cases of Conscience about Trusts and Secrets._
_Quest._ I. How are we forbidden to put our trust in man? And how
may it be done?
_Answ._ 1. You must not trust man for more than his proportion,
and what belongs to man to do: you must not expect that from him which
God alone can do. 2. You must not trust a bad, unfaithful man to do
that which is proper to a good and faithful man to do. 3. You must not
trust the best man, being imperfect and fallible, as fully as if you
supposed him perfect and infallible: but having to do with a corrupted
world, we must live in it with some measure of distrust to all men
(for all that Cicero thought this contrary to the laws of friendship).
But especially ignorant, dishonest, and fraudulent men must be most
distrusted. As Bucholtzer said to his friend that was going to be a
courtier, _Commendo tibi fidem diabolorum, crede et contremisce_:
he that converseth with diabolical men, must believe them no further
than is due to the children of the father of lies. But we must trust
men as men, according to the principles of veracity that are left in
corrupted nature; and we must trust men so far as reason showeth us
cause, from their skill, fidelity, honesty, or interest: so a surgeon,
a physician, a pilot may be trusted with our lives: and the skilfuller
and faithfuller any man is, the more he is to be trusted.
_Quest._ II. Whom should a man choose for a matter of trust?
_Answ._ As the matter is: one that hath wisdom, skill, and
fidelity, through conscience, honesty, friendship, or his own apparent
interest.
_Quest._ III. In what cases may I commit a secret to another?
_Answ._ When there is a necessity of his knowing it, or a greater
probability of good than hurt by it, in the evidence which a prudent
man may see.
_Quest._ IV. What if another commit a thing to me with charge of
secrecy, and I say nothing to him, and so promise it not; am I bound
to secrecy in that case?
_Answ._ If you have cause to believe that he took your silence
for consent, and would not else have committed it to you, you are
obliged in point of fidelity, as well as friendship: except it be with
robbers, or such as we are not bound to deal openly with, and on terms
of equality.
_Quest._ V. What if it be a secret, but I am under no command or
promise at all about it?
_Answ._ You must then proceed according to the laws of charity
and friendship; and not reveal that which is to the injury of another,
without a greater cause.
_Quest._ VI. What if it be against the king, or state, or common
good?
_Answ._ You are bound to reveal it, so far as the safety of the
king, or state, or common good requireth it; yea, though you swear the
contrary.
_Quest._ VII. What if it be only against the good of some third
ordinary person.
_Answ._ You must endeavour to prevent his wrong, either by
revealing the thing, or dissuading from it, or by such means as
prudence shall tell you are the meetest, by exercising your love to
one, without doing wrong to the other.
_Quest._ VIII. What if a man secretly intrust his estate to me,
for himself or children, when he is in debt, to defraud his creditors?
_Answ._ You ought not to take such a trust: and if you have done
it, you ought not to hold it, but resign it to him that did intrust
you. Yea, and to disclose the fraud, for the righting of the
creditors, except it be in such a case as that the creditor is some
such vicious or oppressing person, as you are not obliged to exercise
that act of charity for; or when the consequents of revealing it will
be a greater hurt, than the righting of him will compensate;
especially when it is against the public good.
_Quest._ IX. What if a delinquent intrust me with his estate or
person to secure it from penalty?
_Answ._ If it be one that is prosecuted by a due course of
justice, _cujus pœna debetur reipublicæ_, whose punishment the
common good requireth, the case must be decided as the former: you
must not take nor keep such a trust. But if it be one whose repentance
giveth you reason to believe, that his impunity will be more to the
common good than his punishment, and that if the magistrate knew it,
he ought to spare or pardon him, in this case you may conceal his
person or estate; so be it you do it not by a lie, or any other sinful
means, or such as will do more hurt than good.
_Quest._ X. What if a friend intrust me with his estate to secure
it from some great taxes or tributes to the king? May I keep such a
trust or not?
_Answ._ No: if they be just and legal taxes, for the maintenance
of the magistrate or preservation of the commonwealth: but if it be
done by a usurper that hath no authority, (or done without or beyond
authority, the oppressing of the subject,) you may conceal his estate
or your own by lawful means.
_Quest._ XI. What if a man that suffereth for religion, commit
his person or estate to my trust?
_Answ._ You must be faithful to your trust, 1. If it be true
religion and a good cause for which he suffereth. 2. Or if he be
falsely accused of abuses in religion. 3. Or if he be faulty, but the
penalty intended, from which you secure him, is incomparably beyond
his fault and unjust. Supposing still that you save him only by lawful
means, and that it be not like to tend to do more hurt than good, to
the cause of religion or the commonwealth.
_Quest._ XII. What if a papist or other erroneous person intrust
me (being of the same mind) to educate his children in that way, when
he is dead, and afterward I come to see the error, must I perform that
trust or not?
_Answ._ No: 1. Because no trust can oblige you to do hurt. 2.
Because it is contrary to the primary intent of your friend; which was
his children's good. And you may well suppose that had he seen his
error, he would have intrusted you to do accordingly: you are bound
therefore to answer his primary intention, and truly to endeavour his
children's good.
_Quest._ XIII. But what if a man to whom another hath intrusted
his children, turn papist or heretic, and so thinketh error to be
truth? what must he do?
_Answ._ He is bound to turn back again to the truth, and do
accordingly.
_Object._ But one saith this is the truth and another that; and
he thinketh he is right.
_Answ._ There is but one of the contraries true. Men's thinking
themselves to be in the right doth not make it so. And God will not
change his laws, because they misunderstand or break them: therefore
still that which God bindeth them to is to return unto the truth. And
if they think that to be truth which is not, they are bound to think
otherwise. If you say, They cannot; it is either not true, or it is
long of themselves that they cannot: and they that cannot immediately,
yet mediately can do it, in the due use of means.
_Quest._ XIV. What if I foresee that the taking a trust may
hazard my estate, or otherwise hurt me, and yet my dying (or living)
friend desireth it?
_Answ._ How far the law of christianity or friendship oblige you
to hurt yourself for his good, must be discerned by a prudent
considering, what your obligations are to the person, and whether the
good of your granting his desires, or the hurt to yourself, is like to
be the greater, and of more public consequence: and whether you injure
not your own children or others by gratifying him. And upon such
comparison, prudence must determine the case.
_Quest._ XV. But what if afterward the trust prove more to my
hurt than I foresaw?
_Answ._ If it was your own fault that you foresaw it not, you
must suffer proportionably for that fault; but otherwise you must
compare your own hurt with the orphans', in case you do not perform
the trust: and consider whether they may not be relieved another way;
and whether you have reason to think that if the parent were alive and
knew the danger, he would expect you should perform your trust, or
would discharge you of it. If it be some great and unexpected dangers,
which you think upon good grounds the parent would acquit you from if
he were living, you fulfil your trust if you avoid them, and do that
which would have been his will if he had known it. Otherwise you must
perform your promise though it be to your loss and suffering.
_Quest._ XVI. But what if it was only a trust imposed by his
desire and will, without my acceptance or promise to perform it?
_Answ._ You must do as you would be done by, and as the common
good, and the laws of love and friendship, do require. Therefore the
quality of the person, and your obligations to him, and especially the
comparing of the consequent good and evil together, must decide the
case.
_Quest._ XVII. What if the surviving kindred of the orphan be
nearer to him than I am, and they censure me and calumniate me as
injurious to the orphan, may I not ease myself of the trust, and cast
it upon them?
_Answ._ In this case also, the measure of your suffering must first
be compared with the measure of the orphan's good; and then your
conscience must tell you whether you verily think the parent who
intrusted you, would discharge you if he were alive and knew the case.
If he would, though you promised, it is to be supposed that it was not
the meaning of his desire or your promise, to incur such suffering:
and if you would not believe that he would not discharge you if he
were alive, then if you promised you must perform; but if you promised
not, you must go no further than the law of love requireth.
_Quest._ XVIII. What is a minister of Christ to do, if a penitent
person confess secretly some heinous or capital crime to him (as
adultery, theft, robbery, murder); must it be concealed or not?
_Answ._ 1. If a purpose of sinning be antecedently confessed, it
is unlawful to further the crime, or give opportunity to it by a
concealment: but it must be so far opened as is necessary for the
prevention of another's wrong, or the person's sin; especially if it
be treason against the king or kingdom, or any thing against the
common good.
2. When the punishment of the offender is apparently necessary to the
good of others, especially to right the king or country, and to
preserve them from danger by the offender or any other, it is a duty
to open a past fault that is confessed, and to bring the offender to
punishment, rather than injure the innocent by their impunity.
3. When restitution is necessary to a person injured, you may not by
concealment hinder such restitution; but must procure it to your power
where it may be had.
4. It is unlawful to promise universal secrecy absolutely to any
penitent. But you must tell him before he confesseth, If your crime be
such, as that opening it is necessary to the preservation or righting
of king, or country, or your neighbour, or to my own safety, I shall
not conceal it. That so men may know how far to trust you.
5. Yet in some rare cases, (as the preservation of our parents, king,
or country,) it may be a duty to promise and perform concealment, when
there is no hurt like to follow but the loss or hazard of our own
lives, or liberties, or estates; and consequently if no hurt be like
to follow but some private loss of another, which I cannot prevent
without a greater hurt.
6. If a man ignorant of the law, and of his own danger, have rashly
made a promise of secrecy, and yet be in doubt, he should open the
case _in hypothesi_ only, to some honest, able lawyer, inquiring
if such a case should be, what the law requireth of the pastor, or
what danger he is in if he conceal it; that he may be able further to
judge of the case.
7. He that made no promise of secrecy, virtual or actual, may,
_cæteris paribus_, bring the offender to shame or punishment
rather than to fall into the like himself for the concealment.
8. He that rashly promised universal secrecy, must compare the
penitent's danger and his own, and consider whose suffering is like to
be more to the public detriment, all things considered, and that must
be first avoided.
9. He that findeth it his duty to reveal the crime to save himself,
must yet let the penitent have notice of it, that he may fly and
escape; unless as aforesaid, when the interest of the king, or
country, or others, doth more require his punishment.
10. But when there is no such necessity of the offender's punishment,
for the prevention of the hurt or wrong of others, nor any great
danger by concealment to the minister himself, I think that the
crime, though it were capital, should be concealed. My reasons are,
(1.) Because though every man be bound to do his best to prevent sin,
yet every man is not bound to bring offenders to punishment. He that
is no magistrate, nor hath a special call so to do, may be in many
cases not obliged to it.
(2.) It is commonly concluded that (in most cases) a capital offender
is not bound to bring himself to punishment: and that which you could
not know but by his free confession, is confessed to you only on your
promise of concealment, seemeth to me to put you under no other
obligation to bring him to punishment than he is under himself.
(3.) Christ's words and practice, in dismissing the woman taken in
adultery, showeth that it is not always a duty for one that is no
magistrate to prosecute a capital offender, but that sometimes his
repentance and life may be preferred.
(4.) And magistrates' pardons show the same.
(5.) Otherwise no sinner would have the benefit of a counsellor to
open his troubled conscience to: for if it be a duty to detect a great
crime in order to a great punishment, why not a less also in order to
a less punishment. And who would confess when it is to bring
themselves to punishment?
11. In those countries where the laws allow pastors to conceal all
crimes that penitents freely confess, it is left to the pastor's
judgment to conceal all that he discerneth may be concealed without
the greater injury of others, or of the king or commonwealth.
12. There is a knowledge of the faults of others, by common fame,
especially many years after the committing, which doth not oblige the
hearers to prosecute the offender. And yet a crime publicly known is
more to be punished (lest impunity imbolden others to the like) than
an unknown crime, revealed in confession.
_Tit. 2. Directions about Trusts and Secrets._
_Direct._ I. Be not rash in receiving secrets or any other
trusts: but first consider what you are thereby obliged to, and what
difficulties may arise in the performance; and foresee all the
consequents as far as is possible, before you undertake the trust;
that you cast not yourselves into snares by mere inconsiderateness,
and prepare not for perplexities and repentance.
_Direct._ II. Be very careful what persons you commit either
trusts or secrets to; and be sure they be trusty by their wisdom,
ability, and fidelity.
_Direct._ III. Be not too forward in revealing your own secrets
to another's trust: for, 1. You cannot be certain of any one's
secrecy, where you are most confident. 2. You oblige yourself too much
to please that person, who by revealing your secrets may do you hurt;
and are in fear lest carelessness, or unfaithfulness, or any accident
should disclose it. 3. You burden your friend with the charge and care
of secrecy.[168]
_Direct._ IV. Be faithful to your friend that doth intrust you;
remembering that perfidiousness or falseness to a friend, is a crime
against humanity, and all society, as well as against christianity;
and stigmatizeth the guilty in the eyes of all men, with the brand of
an odious, unsociable person.
_Direct._ V. Be not intimate with too many, nor confident in too
many; for he that hath too many intimates, will be opening the secrets
of one to another.
_Direct._ VI. Abhor covetousness and ambition; or else a bribe or the
promise of preferment, will tempt you to perfidiousness. There is no
trusting a selfish, worldly man.
_Direct._ VII. Remember that God is the avenger of perfidiousness,
who will do it severely: and that even they that are pleased and
served by it, do yet secretly disdain and detest the person that doth
it; because they would not be so used themselves.
_Direct._ VIII. Yet take not friendship or fidelity to be an
obligation to perfidiousness to God, or the king, or commonwealth, or
to another, or to any sin whatsoever.
[168] Quod tacitum esse velis nemini dixeris. Si tibi non imperasti,
quomodo ab alio silentium speras? Martin. Dumiens, de morib.