GENERAL DIRECTIONS AND PARTICULAR CASES OF CONSCIENCE, ABOUT CONTRACTS
IN GENERAL, AND ABOUT BUYING AND SELLING, BORROWING AND LENDING,
USURY, &C. IN PARTICULAR.
_Tit. 1. General Directions against injurious Bargaining and
Contracts._
Besides the last directions, chap. xviii., take these as more nearly
pertinent to this case.
_Direct._ I. See that your hearts have the two great principles
of justice deeply and habitually innaturalized or radicated in them,
viz. The true love of your neighbour, and the denial of yourself;
which in one precept are called, The loving of your neighbour as
yourself. For then you will be freed from the inclination to injuries
and fraud, and from the power of those temptations which carry men to
these sins. They will be contrary to your habitual will or
inclination; and you will be more studious to help your neighbour,
than to get from him.
_Direct._ II. Yet do not content yourself with these habits, but
be sure to call them up to act, whenever you have any bargaining with
others; and let a faithful conscience be to you as a cryer to proclaim
God's law, and say to you, Now remember love and self-denial, and do
as you would be done by. If Alexander Severus so highly valued this
saying, _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_, as to make
it his motto, and write and engrave it on his doors and buildings
(having learned it of some christians or Jews, saith Lampridius); what
a crime and shame is it for Christ's own professed disciples neither
to learn nor love it! Put home the question when you have any
bargaining with others, How would I be dealt with myself, if my case
were the same with his?
_Direct._ III. When the tempter draweth you to think only of your
own commodity and gain, remember how much more you will lose by sin,
than your gain can any way amount to. If Achan, Gehazi, Ahab, Judas,
&c. had foreseen the end, and the greatness of their loss, it would
have curbed their covetous desires. Believe God's word from the bottom
of your heart, that you shall lose things eternal if you sinfully get
things temporal, and then you will not make haste to such a bargain,
to win the world and lose your souls.
_Direct._ IV. Understand your neighbour's case aright, and
meditate on his wants and interest. You think what you want yourself;
but you think not whether his wants with whom you deal, may not be as
great as yours: consider what his commodity costeth him; or what the
toil of the workman's labour is; what house rent he hath to pay, and
what a family to maintain; and whether all this can be well done upon
the rates that you desire to trade with him. And do not believe every
common report of his riches, or of the price of his commodity; for
fame in such cases is frequently false.
_Direct._ V. Regard the public good above your own commodity. It
is not lawful to take up or keep up any oppressing monopoly or trade,
which tendeth to enrich you by the loss of the commonwealth or of
many.
_Direct._ VI. Therefore have a special regard to the laws of the
country where you live; both as to your trade itself, and as to the
price of what you sell or buy. For the law is made for the public
benefit, which is to be preferred before any private man's. And when
the law doth directly or indirectly set rates upon labours or
commodities, ordinarily they must be observed; or else you will commit
two sins at once, injury and disobedience.
_Direct._ VII. Also have special respect to the common estimate,
and to the market price. Though it be not always to be our rule, yet
ordinarily it must be a considerable part of it, and of great regard.
_Direct._ VIII. Let not imprudent thinking make you seem more
covetous than you are. Some imprudent persons cannot tell how to make
their markets without so many words, even about a penny or a trifle,
that it maketh others think them covetous, when it is rather want of
wit. The appearance of evil must be avoided. I know some that are
ready to give a pound to a charitable use at a word, who will yet use
so many words for a penny in their bargaining as maketh them deeply
censured and misunderstood. If you see cause to break for a penny or a
small matter, do it more handsomely in fewer words, and be gone: and
do not tempt the seller to multiply words, because you do so.
_Direct._ IX. Have no more to do in bargaining with others,
especially with censorious persons, than you needs must; for in much
dealing usually there will be much misunderstanding, offence, censure,
and complaint.
_Direct._ X. In doubtful cases, when you are uncertain what is
lawful, choose that side which is safest to the peace of your
consciences hereafter; though it be against your commodity, and may
prove the losing of your right.
_Tit. 2. Cases of Conscience about Justice in Contracts._
_Quest._ I. Must I always do as I would be done by? Or hath this
rule any exceptions?
_Answ._ The rule intendeth no more but that your just self-denial
and love to others, be duly exercised in your dealings with all. And,
1. It supposeth that your own will or desires be honest and just, and
that God's law be their rule. For a sinful will may not be made the
rule of your own actions or of other men's. He that would have another
make him drunk, may not therefore make another drunk: and he that
would abuse another man's wife, may not therefore desire that another
man would lust after or abuse his wife. He that would not be
instructed, reproved, or reformed, may not therefore forbear the
instructing or reproving others. And he that would kill himself, may
not therefore kill another. But he that would have no hurt done to
himself injuriously, should do none to others: and he that would have
others do him good, should be as willing to do good to them.
2. It supposeth that the matter be to be varied according to your
various conditions. A parent that justly desireth his child to obey
him, is not bound therefore to obey his child; nor the prince to obey
his subjects; nor the master to do all the work for his servants,
which he would have his servants do for him. But you must deal by
another as you would (regularly) have them deal by you, if you were in
their case, and they in yours. And on these terms it is a rule of
righteousness.
_Quest._ II. Is a son bound by the contract which his parents or
guardians made for him in his infancy?
_Answ._ To some things he is bound, and to some things not. The
infant is capable of being obliged by another upon four accounts:
1. As he is the parents' own (or a master's to whom he is in absolute
servitude). 2. As he is to be ruled by the parents. 3. As he is a
debtor to his parents for benefits received. 4. As he is an expectant,
or capable of future benefits to be enjoyed upon conditions to be
performed by him. 1. No parents or lord have an absolute propriety in
any rational creature; but they have a propriety _secundum quid, et
ad hoc_: and a parent's propriety doth in part expire or abate, as
the son groweth up to the full use of reason, and so hath a greater
propriety in himself. Therefore he may oblige his son only so far as
his propriety extendeth, and to such acts, and to no other; for in
those his will is reputatively his son's will. As if a parent sell his
son to servitude, he is bound to such service as beseemeth one man to
put another to. 2. As he is rector to his child, he may by contract
with a third person promise that his child shall do such acts, as he
hath power to command and cause him to do: as to read, to hear God's
word, to labour as he is able; but this no longer than while he is
under his parent's government: and so long obedience requireth him to
perform their contracts, in performing their commands. 3. The child
having received his being and maintenance from them, remains obliged
to them as his benefactors in the debt of gratitude as long as he
liveth: and that so deeply that some have questioned whether ever he
can requite them (which _quoad valorem beneficii_ he can do only
by furthering their salvation; as many a child hath been the cause of
the parent's conversion). And so far as the son is thus a debtor to
his parents, he is obliged to do that which the parents by contract
with a third person shall impose upon him. As if the parents could not
be delivered out of captivity, but by obliging the son to pay a great
sum of money, or to live in servitude for their release: though they
never gave him any money, yet is he bound to pay the sum, if he can
get it, or to perform the servitude; because he hath received more
from them, even his being. 4. As the parents are both owners,
(_secundum quid_,) and rulers, and benefactors to their child, in all
three respects conjunct, they may oblige him to a third person who is
willing to be his benefactor, by a conditional obligation to perform
such conditions that he may possess such or such benefits: and thus a
guardian or any friend who is fit to interpose for him, may oblige
him. As to take a lease in his name, in which he shall be bound to pay
such a rent, or do such a service, that he may receive such a
commodity which is greater. Thus parents oblige their children under
civil governments to the laws of the society or kingdom, that they may
have the protection and benefits of subjects. In these cases the child
can complain of no injury; for it is for his benefit that he is
obliged: and the parent (in this respect) cannot oblige him to his
hurt: for if he will quit the benefit, he may be freed when he will
from his obligation, and may refuse to stand to the covenant if he
dislike it. If he will give up his lease, he may be disobliged from
the rent and service.
In all this you may see that no man can oblige another against God or
his salvation: and therefore a parent cannot oblige a child to sin,
nor to forbear hearing or reading the word of God, or praying, or any
thing necessary to his salvation: nor can he oblige him to hear an
heretical pastor; nor to marry an infidel or wicked wife, &c.
And here also you may perceive on what grounds it is that God hath
appointed parents to oblige their children in the covenant of baptism,
to be the servants of God and to live in holiness all their days.
And hence it is apparent, that no parents can oblige their children to
be miserable, or to any such condition which is worse than to have no
being.
Also that when parents do (as commonly they do) profess to oblige
their children as benefactors for their good, the obligation is then
to be interpreted accordingly: and the child is then obliged to
nothing which is really his hurt.
Yea, all the propriety and government of parents, cannot authorize
them to oblige the child to his hurt, but in order to some greater
good, either to the parents themselves, or to the commonwealth, or
others; at least that which the parents apprehend to be a greater
good: but if they err through ignorance or partiality, and bind the
child to a greater hurt for their lesser good, (as to pay two hundred
pounds to save them from paying one hundred pounds,) whether their
injury and sin do excuse the child from being obliged to any more than
the proportion of the benefit required, I leave undetermined.
_Quest._ III. But what if the parents disagree, and one of them
will oblige the child, and the other will not?
_Answ._ 1. If it be an act of the parents as mere proprietors for
their own good, either of them may oblige him in a just degree;
because they have severally a propriety. 2. If it be an act of
government, (as if they oblige him to do this or that act of service
at their command in his minority,) the father may oblige him against
the mother's consent, because he is the chief ruler; but not the
mother against the father's will, though she may without it.
_Quest._ IV. Is a man obliged by a contract which he made in
ignorance or mistake of the matter?
_Answ._ I have answered this before in the case of marriage, part
iii. chap. i.: I add here,
1. We must distinguish between culpable and inculpable error. 2.
Between an error about the principal matter, and about some smaller
accidents or circumstances. 3. Between a case where the law of the
land or the common good interposeth, and where it doth not.
1. If it be your own fault that you are mistaken you are not wholly
freed from the obligation; but if it was your gross fault, by
negligence or vice, you are not at all freed; but if it were but such
a frailty as almost all men are liable to, so that none but a person
of extraordinary virtue or diligence could have avoided the mistake,
then equity will proportionably make you an abatement or free you from
the obligation. So far as you were obliged to understand the matter,
so far you are obliged by the contract; especially when another is a
loser by your error.
2. An inculpable error about the circumstances, or smaller parts, will
not free you from an obligation in the principal matter; but an
inculpable error in the essentials will.
3. Except when the law of the land or the common good, doth otherwise
overrule the case; for then you may be obliged by that accident. In
divers cases the rulers may judge it necessary, that the effect of the
contract shall depend upon the bare words, or writings, or actions;
lest false pretences of misunderstanding should exempt deceitful
persons from their obligations, and nothing should be a security to
contractors. And then men's private commodity must give place to the
law and to the public good.
4. Natural infirmities must be numbered with faults, though they be
not moral vices, as to the contracting of an obligation, if they be in
a person capable of contracting. As if you have some special defect of
memory or ignorance of the matter which you are about. Another who is
no way faulty by over-reaching you, must not be a loser by your
weakness. For he that cometh to the market, or contracteth with
another that knoweth not his infirmity, is to be supposed to
understand what he doth, unless the contrary be manifest: you should
not meddle with matters which you understand not; or if you do, you
must he content to be a loser by your weakness.
5. Yet in such cases, another that hath gained by the bargain, may be
obliged by the laws of equity and charity, to remit the gain, and not
to take advantage of your weakness; but he may so far hold you to it,
as to secure himself from loss; except in cases where you become the
object of his charity, and not of commutative justice only.
_Quest._ V. Is a drunken man, or a man in a transporting passion,
or a melancholy person, obliged by a contract made in such a case?
_Answ._ Remember still, that we are speaking only of contracts
about matters of profits or worldly interest; and not of marriage or
any of another nature. And the question as it concerneth a man in
drunkenness or passion, is answered as the former about culpable
error; and as it concerneth a melancholy man, it is to be answered as
the former question, in the case of natural infirmity. But if the
melancholy be so great as to make him uncapable of bargaining, he is
to be esteemed in the same condition as an idiot, or one in deliration
or distraction.
_Quest._ VI. But may another hold a man to it, who in drunkenness
or passion maketh an ill bargain, or giveth or playeth away his money;
and repenteth when he is sober?
_Answ._ He may (ordinarily) take the money from the loser, or him
that casteth it thus away; but he may not keep it for himself: but if
the loser be poor, he should give it to his wife or children whom he
robbeth by his sin: if not, he should either give it to the magistrate
or overseer for the poor, or give it to the poor himself. The reason
of this determination is, because the loser hath parted with his
propriety, and can lay no further claim to the thing; but yet the
gainer can have no right from another's crime: if it were from an
injury, he might, so far as is necessary to reparations; but from a
crime he cannot; for his loss is to be estimated as a mulct or
penalty, and to be disposed of as such mulcts as are laid on swearers
and drunkards are. Only the person by his voluntary bargain, hath made
the other party instead of the magistrate, and authorized him (in
ordinary cases) to dispose of the gain, for the poor or public good.
_Quest._ VII. Am I obliged by the words or writings which usually
express a covenant, without any covenanting or self-obliging intention
in me, when I speak or write them?
_Answ._ Either you utter or write those words with a purpose to
make another believe that you intend a covenant; or at least by
culpable negligence, in such a manner as he is bound so to understand
you, or justified for so understanding you: or else you so use the
words, as in the manner sufficiently to signify that you intend no
covenant or self-obligation. In the former case you bind yourself (as
above said); because another man is not to be a loser, nor you a
gainer or a saver, by your own fraud or gross negligence. But in the
latter case you are not bound, because an intent of self-obliging is
the internal efficient of the obligation; and a signification of such
an intent, is the external efficient, without which it cannot be. If
you read over the words of a bond, or repeat them only in a narrative,
or ludicrously; or if a scrivener write a form of obligation of
himself, to a boy for a copy, or to a scholar for a precedent, these
do not induce any obligation in conscience, nor make you a debtor to
another. Thus also the case of the intent of the baptizer or baptized
(or parent) is to be determined.
_Quest._ VIII. May a true man promise a robber money, for the
saving of his life, or of a greater sum, or more precious commodity?
_Answ._ Yes, in case of necessity, when his life or estate cannot
better be preserved; and so taxes may be paid to an enemy in arms, or
to a plundering soldier (supposing that it do no other hurt, which is
greater than the good). Any man may part with a lesser good to
preserve a greater; and it is no more voluntary or imputable to our
wills, than the casting of our goods into the sea to save the vessel
and our lives.
_Quest._ IX. May I give money to a judge, or justice, or court
officer, to hire him to do me justice, or to keep him from doing me
wrong; or to avoid persecution?
_Answ._ You may not, in case your cause be bad, give any thing to
procure injustice against another; no nor speak a word for it nor
desire it: this I take as presupposed. You may not give money to
procure justice, when the law of the land forbiddeth it, and when it
will do more hurt accidentally to the others than good to you: when it
will harden men in the sin of bribery, and cause them to expect the
like from others. But except it be when some such accidental greater
hurt doth make it evil, it is as lawful as to hire a thief not to kill
me: when you cannot have your right by other means, you may part with
a smaller matter for a greater.
_Quest._ X. But if I make such a contract, may the other lawfully
take it of me?
_Answ._ No: for it is now supposed that it is unlawful on his
part.
_Quest._ XI. But if under necessity of force I promise money to a
robber, or a judge, or officer, am I bound to perform it when my
necessity is over?
_Answ._ You have lost your own propriety by your covenant, and
therefore must not retain it; but he can acquire no right by his sin:
and therefore some say that in point of justice you are not bound to
give it him, but to give it to the magistrate for the poor; but yet
prudence may tell you of other reasons _a fine_ to give it the man
himself, though justice bind you not to it; as in case that else he
may be revenged and do you some greater hurt; or some greater hurt is
any other way like to be the consequent; which it is lawful by money
to prevent. But many think that you are bound to deliver the money to
the thief or officer himself; because it is a lawful thing to do it,
though he have no just title to it; and because it was your meaning,
or the signification of your words in your covenant with him; and if
it were not lawful to do it, it could not be lawful to promise to do
it, otherwise your promise is a lie. To this, those of the other
opinion say, that as a man who is discharged of his promise by him
that it was made to, is not to be accounted false if he perform it
not; so is it as to the thief or officer in question; because he
having no right, is to you as the other that hath quit his right. And
this answer indeed will prove, that it is not strict injustice not to
pay the money promised; but it will not prove that it is not a lie to
make such a promise with an intent of not performing it, or that it is
not a lie to make it with an intent of performing it, and not to do it
when you may. Though here a Jesuit will tell you that you may say the
words of a promise, with an equivocation or mental reservation to a
thief or persecuting magistrate (of which see more in the chapters of
lying, vows, and perjury). I am therefore of opinion that your promise
must be sincerely made, and according to the true intent of it you
must offer the money to the thief or officer; except in case the
magistrate forbid you, or some greater reason lie against it, which
you foresaw not when you made the promise. But the offender is
undoubtedly obliged not to take the money.
The same determination holdeth as to all contracts and promises made
to such persons, who by injurious force constrained us to make them.
There is on us an obligation to veracity, though none to them in point
of justice, because they have no proper right; nor may they lawfully
take our payment or service promised them. And in case that the public
good unexpectedly cross our performance, we must not perform it: such
like is the case of conquerors, and those that upon conquest become
their vassals or subjects upon unrighteous terms. But still remember,
that if it be not only a covenant with man, but a vow to God, which
maketh him a party, the case is altered, and we remain obliged.
_Quest._ XII. But may I promise the thief or bribe-taker to
conceal his fault? And am I obliged to the performance of such a
promise?
_Answ._ This is a promise of omitting that which else would be a
duty. It is ordinarily a duty to reveal a thief and bribe-taker that
he may be punished. But affirmatives bind not _ad semper_; no act
(especially external) is a duty at all times, therefore not this, of
revealing an offender's fault. And if it be not always a duty, then it
must be none when it is inconsistent with some greater benefit or
duty; for when two goods come together, the greater is to be
preferred: therefore in case that you see in just probability, that
the concealment of the sinner will do more hurt to the commonwealth or
the souls of men, than the saving of your life is like to do good, you
may not promise to conceal him, or if you sinfully promise it, you may
not perform it; but in case that your life is like to be a greater
good than the not promising to conceal him, then such a promise is no
fault, because the disclosing him is no duty. But to judge rightly of
this is a matter of great difficulty. If it be less than life which
you save by such a promise, it oft falls out that it is a lesser good
than the detecting of the offence.
But it will here be said, If I promise not to conceal a robber, I must
conceal him nevertheless; for when he hath killed me, I cannot reveal
him: and I must conceal the bribe-taker; for till I have promised
secrecy, I cannot prove him guilty. And he that promiseth to forbear a
particular good action whilst he liveth, doth yet reserve his life for
all other good works; whereas if he die, he will neither do that nor
any other. But this case is not so easily determined: if Daniel die,
he can neither pray nor do any good on earth. And if he live he may do
much other good, though he never pray; and yet he might not promise to
give over praying to save his life. I conceive that we must
distinguish of duties essential to the outward part of christianity,
or of constant, indispensable necessity; and duties which are
alterable, and belong only to some persons, times, and places; also
between the various consequents of omissions. And I conceive that
ordinarily a man may promise for the saving of his life, that he will
forbear a particular, alterable duty or relation; as to read such a
commentary, to speak with such a minister, to be a magistrate or a
minister, &c. in case we have not before bound ourselves never to give
over our calling till death; and in case that the good which will
follow our forbearance, is likely (to a judicious person) to be
greater than the evil. But no man may promise to omit such a duty as
God hath made necessary during life; as not to love God, or fear, or
trust him; not to worship him, and call upon him, and praise him; not
to do good to men's souls or bodies in the general; or not to preach
or pray while I am a minister of Christ; or not at all to govern while
you are a governor; for all these contradict some former and greater
promises or duties. Nor may you omit the smallest duty to save your
life, at such a time when your death is like to do more good, than
your life would do without that one duty. Apply this to the present
case.
_Quest._ XIII. If another man deceive me into a promise or
covenant against my good, am I bound to perform it when I have
discovered the deceit?
_Answ._ Yes, 1. In case that the law of the land, or other
reasons for the public good, require it. 2. Or in case that you were
faulty by negligence, heedlessness, or otherwise guilty of your own
deceit, in any considerable and avoidable degree. Otherwise, in that
measure that he deceived you, and in those respects, you are not
obliged.
_Quest._ XIV. If the contracting parties do neither of them
understand the other, is it a covenant? Or if it be, whose sense must
carry it?
_Answ._ If they understand not each other in the essentials of
the contract, it is no contract in point of conscience; except where
the laws for the public safety do annex the obligation to bare
external act. But if they understand not one another in some
circumstances, and be equally culpable or innocent, they must come to
a new agreement in those particulars; but if one party only be guilty
of the misunderstanding, he must bear the loss, if the other insist on
it.
_Quest._ XV. Am I bound to stand to the bargains which my friend,
or trustee, or servant maketh for me, when it proveth much to my
injury or loss?
_Answ._ Yes, 1. If they exceed not the bounds of that commission
or trust which they received from you. 2. Or if they do, yet if by
your former trusting and using them, or by any other sign, you have
given the other party sufficient cause to suppose them intrusted by
you to do what they do, so that he is deceived by your fault, you are
bound at least to see that he be no loser by you; though you are not
bound to make him a gainer, unless you truly signified that you
authorized them to make the contract. For if it be merely your
friend's or servant's error, without your fault, it doth not bind you
to a third person. But how far you may be bound to pardon that error
to your friend or servant, is another question; and how far you are
bound to save them harmless. And that must be determined by laying
together all other obligations between them and you.
_Quest._ XVI. If I say I will give such or such a one this or
that, am I bound thereby to do it?
_Answ._ It is one thing to express your present mind and
resolution, without giving away the liberty of changing it; and it is
another thing to intend the obliging of yourself to do the thing
mentioned. And that obligation is either intended to man, or to God
only; and that is either in point of rendition and use, or in point of
veracity, or the performance of that moral duty of speaking truth. If
you meant no more in saying, I will do it, or I will give it, but that
this is your present will, and purpose, and resolution, yea, though it
add the confident persuasion that your will shall not change; yet this
no further obligeth you than you are obliged to continue in that will;
and a man's confident resolutions may be lawfully changed upon
sufficient cause. But if you intended to alienate the title to
another, or to give him present right, or to oblige yourself for the
future to him by that promise; or to oblige yourself to God to do it
by way of peremptory assertion, as one that will be guilty of a lie if
you perform it not; or if you dedicate the thing to God by those words
as a vow; then you are obliged to do accordingly (supposing nothing
else to prohibit it).
_Quest._ XVII. Doth an inward promise of the mind not expressed,
oblige?
_Answ._ In a vow to God it doth; and if you intend it as an
assertion obliging you in point of veracity, it doth so oblige you
that you must lie. But it is no contract, nor giveth any man a title
to what you tacitly thought of.
_Quest._ XVIII. May I promise an unlawful thing (simply so)
without an intention of performing it, to save my life from a thief or
persecutor?
Answ. No: because it is a lie, when the tongue agreeth not with the
heart. Indeed those that think a lie is no sin when it hurteth not
another, may justify this, if that would hold good; but I have before
confuted it, part i. in the chapter against lying.
_Quest._ XIX. May any thing otherwise unlawful become a duty upon
a promise to do it?
_Answ._ This is answered before, part i. chapter of perjury and
vows: a thing unlawful will be so still, notwithstanding a vow or
promise; and some so of that also which is unlawful antecedently but
by accident; as e. g. It is not simply unlawful to cast away a cup of
wine or a piece of silver (for it is lawful upon a sufficient cause);
but it is unlawful to do it without any sufficient cause. Now suppose
I should contract with another that I will do it; am I bound by such a
contract? Many say no, because the matter is unlawful though but by
accident; and the contract cannot make it lawful. I rather think that
I am bound in such a case; but yet that my obligation doth not exclude
me wholly from sin; it was a sin before I promised it (or vowed it) to
cast away a farthing causelessly. And if I causelessly promised it, I
sinned in that promise; but yet there may be cause for the
performance: and if I have entangled myself in a necessity of sinning
whether I do it or not, I must choose the lesser sin; for that is then
my duty. (Though I should have chosen neither as long as I could avoid
it.) In a great and hurtful sin I may be obliged rather to break my
covenant than to commit it, yet it is hard to say so of every
accidental evil: my reasons are, 1. Because the promise or covenant is
now an accident to be put into the balance; and may weigh down a
lighter accident on the other side (but I know that the great
difficulty is to discern which is indeed the preponderating accident).
2. I think if a magistrate command me to do any thing which by a small
accident is evil (as to spend an hour in vain, to give a penny in
vain, to speak a word which, antecedently, was vain) that I must do
it; and that then it is not vain because it manifesteth my obedience
(otherwise obedience would be greatly straitened). Therefore my own
contract may make it my duty; because I am able to oblige myself as
well as a magistrate is. 3. Because covenant-breaking (and perjury) is
really a greater sin than speaking a vain word; and my error doth not
make it no sin, but only entangles me in a necessity of sinning which
way soever I take.
_Quest._ XX. If a man make a contract to promote the sin of
another for a reward, (as a corrupt judge or lawyer, officer or clerk,
to promote injustice; or a resetter, to help a thief; or a bawd or
whore, for the price of fornication,) may he take the reward, when the
sin is committed (suppose it repented of)?
_Answ._ The offender that promised the reward, hath parted with
his title to the money; therefore you may receive it of him (and
ought, except he will rightly dispose of it himself); but withal to
confess the sin and persuade him also to repent: but you may not take
any of that money as your own (for no man can purchase true propriety
by iniquity); but either give it to the party injured, (to whom you
are bound to make satisfaction,) or to the magistrate or the poor,
according as the case particularly requireth.
_Quest._ XXI. If I contract, or bargain, or promise to another,
between us two, without any legal form or witness, doth it bind me to
the performance?
_Answ._ Yes, _in foro conscientiæ_, supposing the thing
lawful; but if the thing be unlawful _in foro Dei_, and such as
the law of the land only would lay hold of you about, or force you to,
if it had been witnessed, then the law of the land may well be
avoided, by the want of legal forms and witnesses.
_Quest._ XXII. May I buy an office for money in a court of
justice?
_Answ._ Some offices you may buy (where the law alloweth it, and
it tendeth not to injustice); but other offices you may not: the
difference the lawyers may tell you better than I, and it would be
tedious to pursue instances.
_Quest._ XXIII. May one buy a place of magistracy or judicature
for money?
_Answ._ Not when your own honour or commodity is your end:
because the common good is the end of government; and to a faithful
governor, it is a place of great labour and suffering, and requireth
much self-denial and patience. Therefore they that purchase it as a
place of honour, gain, or pleasure, either know not what they
undertake, or have carnal ends; else they would rather purchase their
liberty and avoid it. But if a king, or a judge, or other magistrate,
see that a bad man (more unfit to govern) is like to be put in, if he
be put by, it is lawful for him to purchase the people's deliverance
at a very dear rate (even by a lawful war, which is more than money,
when the sovereign's power is in such danger): but the heart must be
watched, that it pretend not the common good, and intend your own
commodity and honour; and the probable consequents must be weighed;
and the laws of the land must be consulted also; for if they
absolutely prohibit the buying of a place of judicature, they must be
obeyed.[156] And ill effects may make it sinful.
_Quest._ XXIV. May one sell a church benefice, or rectory, or
orders?
_Answ._ If the benefice be originally of your own gift, it is at
first in your power to give part or all, to take some deductions out
of it or not: but if it be really given to the church, and you have
but the patronage or choice of the incumbent, it is sacrilege to sell
it for any commodity of your own: but whether you may take somewhat
out of a greater benefice, to give to another church which is poorer,
dependeth partly on the law of the land, and partly upon the probable
consequents. If the law absolutely forbid it, (supposing that unlawful
contracts cannot be avoided unless some lawful ones be restrained,) it
must be obeyed for the common good; and if the consequent of a lawful
contract be like to be the more hurtful encouragement of unlawful
ones, such examples must be forborne, though the law were not against
them. But to sell orders is undoubted simony; (that is, the office of
the ministry, or the act of ordination;) though scribes may be paid
for writing instruments.
_Quest._ XXV. May a man give money for orders or benefices, when
they cannot otherwise be had?
_Answ._ This is answered in quest. xxii. 1. If the law absolutely
forbid it, for the common safety, you may not. 2. If your end be
chiefly your own commodity, ease, or honour, you may not. But in case
you were clear from all such evils, and the case were only this,
whether you might not give money to get in yourself, to keep out a
heretic, a wolf, or insufficient man, who might destroy the people's
souls, I see not but it might well be done.
_Quest._ XXVI. May I give money to officers, servants, or assistants
for their furtherance?
_Answ._ For writings or other servile acts about the circumstantials
you may; but not (directly or indirectly) to promote the simoniacal
contract. What you may not give to the principal agent, you may not
give his instruments or others for the same end.
_Quest._ XXVII. May I give or do any thing afterward by way of
gratitude, to the patron, bishop, or any others, their relations or
retainers?
_Answ._ Not when the expectation of that gratitude was a (secret
or open) condition of the presentation or orders; and you believe that
you should not else have received them: therefore promised gratitude
is but a kind of contracting. Nor may you show gratitude by any
scandalous way, which seemeth simony. Otherwise, no doubt but you may
be prudently grateful for that or any other kindness.
_Quest._ XXVIII. May not a bishop or pastor take money for
sermons, sacraments, or other offices?
_Answ._ Not for the things themselves; he must not sell God's
word and sacraments, or any other holy thing. But they that serve at
the altar may live on the altar, and the elders that rule well are
worthy of double honour; and the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the
corn should not be muzzled. They may receive due maintenance while
they perform God's service, that they may be vacant to attend their
proper work.
_Quest._ XXIX. May one person disoblige another of a promise made
to him?
_Answ._ Yes, if it be no more than a promise to that person;
because a man may give away his right; but if it be moreover a vow to
God, or you intend to oblige yourself in point of veracity under the
guilt of a lie if you do otherwise, these alter the case, and no
person can herein disoblige you.
_Quest._ XXX. But what if the contract be bound by an oath, may
another then release me?
_Answ._ Yes, if that oath did only tie you to perform your
promise; and were no vow to God, which made him a party by dedicating
any thing to him; for then the oath being but subservient to the
promise, he that dischargeth you from the promise, dischargeth you
also from the oath which bound you honestly to keep it.
_Quest._ XXXI. Am I bound by a promise when the cause or reason
of it proveth a mistake?
_Answ._ If by the cause you mean only the extrinsical reasons
which moved you to it, you may be obliged nevertheless for finding
your mistake; only so far as the other was the culpable cause, (as is
aforesaid,) he is bound to satisfy you; but if by the cause you mean
the formal reason, which constituteth the contract, then the mistake
may in some cases nullify it (of which enough before).
_Quest._ XXXII. What if a following accident make it more to my
hurt than could be foreseen?
_Answ._ In some contracts it is supposed or expressed, that men
do undertake to run the hazard; and then they must stand obliged. But
in some contracts, it is rationally supposed that the parties intend
to be free, if so great an alteration should fall out. But to give
instances of both these cases would be too long a work.
_Quest._ XXXIII. What if something unexpectedly fall out, which
maketh it injurious to a third person? I cannot sure be obliged to
injure another.
_Answ._ If the case be the latter mentioned in the foregoing
answer, you may be thus free; but if it be the former, (you being
supposed to run the hazard, and secure the other party against all
others,) then either you were indeed authorized to make this bargain,
or not; if not, the third person may secure his right against the
other; but if you were, then you must make satisfaction as you can to
the third person. Yea, if you made a covenant without authority, you
are obliged to save the other harmless, unless he knew your power to
be doubtful, and did resolve to run the hazard.
_Quest._ XXXIV. What if something fall out which maketh the
performance to be a sin?
_Answ._ You must not do it; but you must make the other
satisfaction for all the loss which you were the cause of, unless he
undertook to stand to the hazard of this also (explicitly or
implicitly).
_Quest._ XXXV. Am I obliged if the other break covenant with me?
_Answ._ There are covenants which make relations (as between
husband and wife, pastor and flock, rulers and subjects); and
covenants which convey title to commodities, of which only I am here
to speak. And in these there are some conditions which are essential
to the covenant; if the other first break these conditions, you are
disobliged. But there are other conditions which are not essential,
but only necessary to some following benefit, whose non-performance
will only forfeit that particular benefit; and there are conditions
which are only undertaken subsequent duties, trusted on the honesty of
the performer; and in these a failing doth not disoblige you. These
latter are but improperly called conditions.
_Quest._ XXXVI. May I contract to perform a thing which I foresee
is like to become impossible or sinful, before the time of
performance come, though it be not so at present.
_Answ._ With all persons you must deal truly; and with just
contractors openly; but with thieves, and murderers, and persecutors,
you are not always bound to deal openly. This being premised, either
your covenant is absolutely, This I will do, be it lawful or not,
possible or impossible; and such a covenant is sin and folly: or it is
conditional, This I will do, if it continue lawful, or possible: this
condition (or rather exception) is still implied where it is not
expressed, unless the contrary be expressed: therefore such a covenant
is lawful with a robber with whom you are not bound to deal openly;
because it is but the concealing from him the event which you foresee.
As e. g. you have intelligence that a ship is lost at sea, or is like
to be taken by pirates, which the robber expecteth shortly to come
safe into the harbour: you may promise him to deliver up yourself his
prisoner, when that ship cometh home. Or you know a person to be
mortally sick, and will die before the next week; you may oblige
yourself to marry or serve that person two months hence; for it is
implied, if he or she be then alive. But with equal contractors, this
is unlawful, with whom you are obliged not only to verity but to
justice; as in the following cases will be further manifested.
_Tit. 3. Special Cases about Justice in Buying and Selling._
_Quest._ I. Am I bound to endeavour that he whom I deal with may
be a gainer by the bargain as well as I?
_Answ._ Yes, if you be equally in want, or in the like condition;
but if he be very poor, and you be rich, charity must be so mixed with
justice, that you must endeavour that it be more to his commodity than
yours (if he be one indeed that you owe charity to). And if you be
poor, and he be rich, you may be willing to be the only gainer
yourself, so be it you covet not another's, nor desire that he be
wronged; for when he hath power to deal charitably, you may be willing
of his charity or kindness.
_Quest._ II. May I desire or take more than my labour or goods
are worth, if I can get it?
_Answ._ 1. Not by deceit, persuading another that they are worth
more than they are. 2. Not by extortion, working upon men's ignorance,
error, or necessity (of which more anon). 3. Not of any one that is
poorer than yourself, or of any one that intendeth but an equal
bargain. 4. But if you deal with the rich, who in generosity stick not
at a small matter, and are willing another should be a gainer by them,
and understand what they do, it is lawful to take as much as they will
give you.
_Quest._ III. May I ask in the market more than my goods are
truly worth?
_Answ._ In the case last mentioned you may; when you are selling
to the rich, who are willing to show their generosity, and to make you
gainers. But then the honest way is to say, it is worth but so much;
but if you will give so much more because I need it, I will take it
thankfully. Some think also where the common custom is to ask more
than the worth, and people will not buy unless you come down from your
first demand, that then you may lawfully ask more, because else there
is no trading with such people. My judgment in this case is this,
1. That ordinarily it is better to ask no more at all but a just gain;
and that the inconveniences of doing otherwise are greater than any on
the other side; for he that heareth you ask unjustly may well think
that you would take unjustly if you could get it, and consequently
that you are unjust. 2. But this just gain lieth not always just in an
indivisible quantity, or determinate price. A man that hath a family
to maintain by his trade, may lawfully take a proportionable, moderate
gain; though if he take less he may get something too. To be always
just at a word is not convenient; for he that may lawfully get two or
three shillings or more in the pound of the rich, may see cause to let
a poorer person have it for less; but never ask above what it is
reasonable to take. 3. And if you once peremptorily said, I will take
no less, then it is not fit to go from your word. 4. And if you do
meet with such fools or proud gallants, who will not deal with you
unless you ask dear, it is just that when they have given you more
than it is worth, you tell them so, and offer them the overplus again.
And for them that expect that you abate much of your asking, it is an
inconvenience to be borne, which will be ever to your advantage when
you are once better known.
_Quest._ IV. How shall the worth of a commodity be judged of?
_Answ._ 1. When the law setteth a rate upon any thing (as on
bread and drink with us) it must be observed. 2. If you go to the
market, the market price is much to be observed. 3. If it be in an
equal contract, with one that is not in want, you may estimate your
goods as they cost you, or are worth to you, though it be above the
common price; seeing the buyer is free to take or leave them. 4. But
if that which you have to sell be extraordinarily desirable, or worth
to some one person more than to you or another man, you must not make
too great an advantage of his convenience or desire; but be glad that
you can pleasure him, upon equal, fair, and honest terms. 5. If there
be a secret worth in your commodity which the market will take no
notice of, (as it is usual in a horse,) it is lawful for you to take
according to that true worth if you can get it. But it is a false rule
of them that think their commodity is worth as much as any one will
give.
_Quest._ V. Is it lawful to make a thing seem better than it is,
by trimming, adorning, or setting the best side outward or in sight;
or to conceal the faults of what I am to sell?
_Answ._ It is lawful to dress, polish, adorn, or set out your
commodity, to make it seem as it is indeed, but not to make it seem
better than it is: except in some very few unusual cases; as if you
deal with some fantastical fool, who will not buy it, nor give you the
true worth, except it be so set out, and made in some respects to seem
better than it is. It is lawful so far to serve their curiosity or
humour, as to get the worth of your commodity. But if you do it to get
more than the worth by deceiving, it is a sin. And such glossing hath
so notable an appearance of deceit, that for that scandal it should be
avoided.
2. And as for concealing the fault, the case is the same; you ought
not to deceive your neighbour, but to do as you would be done by; and
therefore must not conceal any fault which he desireth or is concerned
to know. Except it be when you deal with one who maketh a far greater
matter of that fault than there is cause, and would wrong you in the
price if it were known: yea, and that exception will not hold neither,
except in a case when you must needs sell, and they must buy it:
because, 1. You may not have another man's money against his will,
though it be no more than the thing is worth. 2. Because it will be
scandalous when the fault is known by him that buyeth it.
_Quest._ VI. What if the fault was concealed from me when I
bought it, or if I were deceived or over-reached by him that sold it
me, and gave more than the worth, may I not repair my loss by doing
as I was done by?
_Answ._ No: no more than you may cut another's purse, because
yours was cut; you must do as you would be done by, and not as you are
done by. What you may do with the man that deceived you, is a harder
question; but doubtless you may not wrong an honest man, because you
were wronged by a knave.
_Object._ But it is taken for granted in the market, that every
man will get as much as he can have, and that _caveat emptor_ is
the only security; and therefore every man trusteth to his own wit,
and not to the seller's honesty, and so resolveth to run the hazard.
_Answ._ It is not so among christians, nor infidels who profess
either truth or common honesty. If you come among a company of
cut-purses, where the match is made thus, Look thou to thy purse, and
I will look to mine, and he that can get most let him take it! then
indeed you have no reason to trust another. But there are no tradesmen
or buyers who will profess that they look not to be trusted, or say, I
will lie or deceive you if I can. Among thieves and pirates such total
distrust may be allowed; but among sober persons in civil societies
and converse, we must in reason and charity expect some truth and
honesty, and not presume them to be all liars and deceivers, that we
may seem to have allowance to be such ourselves. Indeed we trust them,
not absolutely as saints, but with a mixture of distrust, as fallible
and faulty men: and so as to trust our own circumspection above their
words, when we know not the persons to be very just. But we have no
cause to make a market a place of mere deceit, where every one saith,
Trust not me, and I will not trust thee; but let us all take one
another for cheats and liars, and get what we can! Such censures
savour not of charity, or of just intentions.
_Quest._ VII. What if I foresee a plenty and cheapness in a time
of dearth, which the buyer foreseeth not, (as if I know that there are
ships coming in with store of that commodity which will make it
cheap,) am I bound to tell the buyer of it, and hinder my own gain?
_Answ._ There may be some instances in trading with enemies, or
with rich men, that regard not such matters, or with men that are
supposed to know it as well as you, in which you are not bound to tell
them. But in your ordinary equal trading, when you have reason to
think that the buyer knoweth it not, and would not give so dear if he
knew it, you are bound to tell him; because you must love your
neighbour as yourself, and do as you would be done by, and not take
advantage of his ignorance.
_Quest._ VIII. If I foresee a dearth, may I not keep my commodity
till then?
_Answ._ Yes, unless it be to the hurt of the commonwealth; as if
your keeping it in be the cause of the dearth, and your bringing it
forth would help to prevent it.
_Quest._ IX. May one use many words in buying and selling?
_Answ._ You must use no more than are true, and just, and useful:
but there are more words needful with some persons who are talkative
and unsatisfied than with others.
_Quest._ X. May I buy as cheap as I can get it, or give less than
the thing is worth?
_Answ._ If it be worth more to you than the market price,
(through your necessity,) you are not bound to give above the market
price. If it be worth less to you than the market price, you are not
bound to give more than it is worth to you, as suited to your use.
But you must not desire nor seek to get another's goods or labour for
less than it is worth in both these respects (in common estimate, and
to you).
_Quest._ XI. May I take advantage of another's necessity to buy
for less than the worth, or sell for more: as e. g. a poor man must
needs have money suddenly for his goods, though he sell them but for
half the worth; and I have no need of them: am I bound to give him the
worth when I have no need? and when it is a great kindness to him to
give him any thing in that strait? So also when I have no desire to
sell my horse, and another's necessity maketh him willing to give more
than he is worth, may I not take it?
_Answ._ To the first case: you must distinguish between an act of
justice and of charity; and between your need of the thing and the
worth of it to you. Though you have no need of the poor man's goods,
yet if you buy them, both justice and charity require that you give
him as much as they are worth to you, though not so much as they are
worth in the market: yea, and that you buy them of him in his
necessity; for if you give him but what they are worth to you, you are
no loser by it; and you should do another good, when it is not to your
own hurt or loss. By what they are worth to you, I mean so much as
that you be no loser. As, if it be meat or drink, though you have no
present need, perhaps you will shortly have need, and if you buy not
that, you must buy as much of somewhat else. In strict justice you may
be a saver, but not a gainer, by buying of the poor in their
necessity. 2. But if you buy a durable commodity for less than it is
worth, you should take it but as a pledge, and allow the seller
liberty to redeem it if he can, that he may get more after of another.
3. And to the poor in such necessity, charity must be exercised as
well as justice. Therefore if you are able to lend them money to save
them the loss of underselling, you should do it. (I account that man
only able who hath money which no greater service of God requireth.)
And if you are not able yourself, you should endeavour to get some
others to relieve him, if you can without a greater inconvenience.
And for the second case, it is answered before: you may not take more
than it is worth, ever the more for another's necessity; nor in any
other case than you might have done it in, if there had been no such
necessity of his.
_Quest._ XII. May I not make advantage of another's ignorance or
error in bargaining?
_Answ._ Not to get more than your commodity is worth, nor to get
his goods for less than the worth; no, nor to get the true worth
against his will, or with scandal: but if it be only to get a true
worth of your own commodity when he is willing, but would be offended
if his ignorance in some point were cured, you may so far make use of
his ignorance to a lawful end, as is said before in the case of
concealing faults.
_Quest._ XIII. May I strive to get before another, to get a good
bargain which he desireth?
_Answ._ Yes, if you do it not out of a greedy mind, nor to the
injury of one that is poorer than yourself: you should rather further
the supply of your neighbour's greater needs; otherwise speed and
industry in your calling is no fault, nor yet the crossing of a
covetous man's desires: you are not bound to let every man have what
he would have.
_Quest._ XIV. May I buy a thing out of another's hand, or hire a
servant which another is about or is treating with? Or may I call a
chapman from another to buy of me?
_Answ._ There are some cases in which you may not do it, and some
in which you may. You may not do it out of a greedy covetousness; nor
to the injury of the poor: nor when the other hath gone so far in the
bargain that it cannot be honestly broken; for then you injure the
third person, and tempt the other to a sin: nor may you do it so as to
disturb the due and civil order, which should be among moderate men in
trading. And it is a great matter how the thing is accounted of by the
custom of the country or market where you bargain; for where it is of
ill report, and accounted as unjust, the scandal should make you avoid
such a course. But yet in some cases it is lawful, and in some a
needful duty. It is lawful when none of the foresaid reasons (or any
such other) are against it: it is a duty when charity to the poor or
oppressed doth require it. As e. g. a poor man must needs sell his
land, his horse, his corn, or goods: a covetous oppressor offereth him
less than it is worth. The poor man must take his offer if he can get
no more: the oppressor saith that it is injustice for any one to take
his bargain out of his hand, or offer money till he have done: in this
case it may be a duty, to offer the poor man the worth of his
commodity, and save him from the oppressor. A covetous man offereth a
servant or labourer less than their service or labour is worth; and
will accuse you, if you interrupt his bargain and would offer his
servant more: in this case it may be your duty to help the servant to
a better master. A chapman is ready to be cheated by an unconscionable
tradesman, to give much more for a commodity than its worth: charity
may oblige you in such a case to offer it him cheaper. In a word, if
you do it for your own gain, in a greedy manner, it is a sin; but if
you do it when it is not scandalous or injurious, or do it in charity
for another's good, it is lawful, and sometimes a duty.
_Quest._ XV. May I dispraise another's commodity to draw the
buyer to my own?
_Answ._ This case is sufficiently answered in the former:
1. You may not use any false dispraise: 2. Nor a true one out of
covetousness, nor in a scandalous manner. 3. But you may help to save
another from a cheater, by opening the deceit in charity to him.
_Quest._ XVI. What should I do in doubtful cases, where I am
uncertain whether the thing be just or not?
_Answ._ Causeless, perplexing, melancholy scruples, which would
stop a man in the course of his duty, are not to be indulged: but in
rational doubts, first use your utmost diligence (as much as the
nature of the cause requireth) to be resolved; and if yet you doubt,
be sure to go the safer way, and to avoid sin rather than loss, and to
keep your consciences in peace.
_Quest._ XVII. If the buyer lose the commodity between the
bargain and the payment, (as if he buy your horse, and he die before
payment, or presently after,) what should the seller do to his relief?
_Answ._ If it were by the seller's fault, or by any fault in the
horse which he concealed, he is to make the buyer full satisfaction.
If it were casually only, rigorous justice will allow him nothing; and
therefore if it be either to a man that is rich enough to bear it
without any great sense of the loss, or in a case where in common
custom the buyer always standeth to the loss, mere justice will make
him no amends. But if it be where custom makes some abatement judged a
duty, or where the person is so poor as to be pinched by the loss,
that common humanity, which all good men use in bargaining, which
tempereth justice with charity, will teach men to bear their part of
the loss; because they must do as they would be done by.
_Quest._ XVIII. If the thing bought and sold prove afterward of
much more worth than was by either party understood, (as in buying of
ambergris and jewels it oft falleth out,) is the buyer bound to give
the seller more than was bargained for?
_Answ._ Yes, if it were the seller's mere ignorance and
insufficiency in that business which caused him so to undersell it (as
if an ignorant countryman sell a jewel or ambergris, who knoweth not
what it is, a moderate satisfaction should be made him). But if it
were the seller's trade, in which he is to be supposed to be
sufficient, and if it be taken for granted beforehand, that both buyer
and seller will stand to the bargain whatever it prove, and that the
seller would have abated nothing if it had proved less worse than the
price, then the buyer may enjoy his gain; much more if he run any
notable hazard for it, as merchants use to do.
_Quest._ XIX. What if the title of the thing sold prove bad,
which was before unknown?
_Answ._ If the seller either knew it was bad, or through his
notable negligence was ignorant of it, and did not acquaint the buyer
with so much of the uncertainty and danger as he knew, or if it was
any way his fault that the buyer was deceived, and not the buyer's
fault, he is bound to make him proportionable satisfaction. As also in
case that by law or bargain he be bound to warrant the title to the
buyer. But not in case that it be their explicit or implicit agreement
that the buyer stand to the hazard, and the seller hath done his duty
to make him know what is doubtful.
_Quest._ XX. What if a change of powers or laws do overthrow the
title, almost as soon as it is sold, (as it oft falls out about
offices and lands,) who must bear the loss?
_Answ._ The case is near the same with that in quest. xvii. It is
supposed that the seller should have lost it himself if he had kept it
but a little longer; and that neither of them foresaw the change; and
therefore that the seller hath all his money, rather for his good hap,
than for his lands or office (which the buyer hath not). Therefore
except it be to a rich man that feeleth not the loss, or one that
expressly undertook to stand to all hazards, foreseeing a possibility
of them, charity and humanity will teach the seller to divide the
loss.
The same is the case of London now consumed by fire; where thousands
of suits are like to rise between the landlords and the tenants. Where
the providence of God (permitting the burning zeal of some papists)
hath deprived men of the houses which they had hired or taken leases
of, humanity and charity requireth the rich to bear most of the loss,
and not to exact their rents or rebuilding from the poor, whatever the
law saith, which could not be supposed to foresee such accidents. Love
your neighbours as yourselves; do as you would be done by; and oppress
not your poor brethren; and then by these three rules you will
yourselves decide a multitude of such doubts and difficulties, which
the uncharitable only cannot understand.
_Tit. 4. Cases of Conscience about Lending and Borrowing._
_Quest._ I. May a poor man borrow money, who knoweth that he is
unable to repay it, and hath no rational proof that he is very likely
to be able hereafter?
_Answ._ No: unless it be when he telleth the lender truly of his
case, and he is willing to run the hazard; else it is mere thievery
covered with the cheat of borrowing; for the borrower desireth that
of another, which he would not lend him, if he expected it not again;
and to take a man's money or goods against his will is robbery.
_Object._ But I am in great necessity.
_Answ._ Begging in necessity is lawful; but stealing or cheating
is not, though you call it borrowing.
_Object._ But it is a shame to beg.
_Answ._ The sin of thievish borrowing is worse than shame.
_Object._ But none will give me if I beg.
_Answ._ If they will give but to save your life at the present,
you must take it, though they give you not what you would have: the
poorest beggar's life is better than the thief's.
_Object._ But I hope God may enable me to pay hereafter.
_Answ._ If you have no rational way to manifest the soundness of
that hope to another, it is but to pretend faith and hope for thievery
and deceit.
_Object._ God hath promised, that those that fear him shall want
no good thing. And therefore I hope I may be able to repay it.
_Answ._ If you want not, why do you borrow? If you have enough to
keep you alive by begging, God maketh good all his promises to you;
yea, or if you die by famine. For he only promiseth you that which is
best; which for aught you know may be beggary or death. God breaketh
not promise with his servants who die in common famine, no more than
with them who die in plagues or wars. Make not God the patron of sin;
yea, and your faith a pretence for your distrust. If you trust God,
use no sinful means; if you trust him not, this pleading of his
promise is hypocrisy.
_Quest._ II. May a tradesman drive a trade with borrowed money,
when his success, and so his repayment, is utterly an uncertain thing?
_Answ._ There are some trades where the gain is so exceeding
probable, next to certain, as may warrant the borrowing of money to
manage them, when there is no rational probability of failing in the
payment. And there are some tradesmen, who have estates of their own,
sufficient to repay all the money which they borrow. But otherwise,
when the money is rationally hazardous, the borrower is bound in
conscience to acquaint the lender fully with the hazard, that he may
not have it against his will. Otherwise he liveth in constant deceit
or thievery. And if he do happen to repay it, it excuseth not his sin.
_Quest._ III. If a borrower be utterly unable to pay, and so
break while he hath something, may he not retain somewhat for his food
or raiment?
_Answ._ No: unless it be in order to set up again in hope to
repay his debts: for all that he hath being other men's, he may not
take so much as bread to his mouth, out of that which is theirs,
without their consent.
_Quest._ IV. But if a man have bound himself to his wife's
friends upon marriage to settle so much upon her or her children, and
this obligation was antecedent to his debts, may he not secure that to
his wife or children, without any injury to his creditors?
_Answ._ The law of the land must much decide this controversy. If
the propriety be actually before transferred to wife or children, it
is theirs, and cannot be taken from them; but if it were done after by
a deed of gift to defraud the creditors, then that deed of gift is
invalid, till debts be paid. If it be but an obligation and no
collation of propriety, the law must determine who is to be first
paid; and whether the wife be supposed to run the hazard of gaining or
losing with the husband: and though the laws of several countries
herein differ, and some give the wife more propriety than others do,
yet must they in each place be conscientiously observed, as being the
rule of such propriety. But we must see that there be no fraudulent
intent in the transaction.
_Quest._ V. May not a tradesman retain somewhat to set up again,
if his creditors be willing to compound for a certain part of the
debt?
_Answ._ If he truly acquaint them with his whole estate, and they
voluntarily allow him part to himself, either in charity, or in hope
hereafter to be satisfied, this is no unlawful course; but if he hide
part from them, and make them believe that the rest is all, this is
but a thievish procurement of their composition or consent.
_Quest._ VI. May a borrower lawfully break his day of promised
payment, in case of necessity?
_Answ._ True necessity hath no law: that is, a man is not bound
to do things naturally impossible; but if he might have foreseen that
necessity, or the doubtfulness of his payment at the day, it was his
sin to promise it, unless he put in some limitation, If I be able, and
acquainted the lender with the uncertainty. However it be, when the
time is come, he ought to go to his creditor, and tell him of his
necessity, and desire further time, and endeavour to pay it as soon as
he is able: and if he be not able, to make him what satisfaction he
can, by his labour, or any other lawful way.
_Quest._ VII. May I borrow of one to pay another, to keep my day
with the first?