CASES RESOLVED ABOUT FORGIVING INJURIES AND DEBTS, AND ABOUT
SELF-DEFENCE, AND SEEKING RIGHT BY LAW OR OTHERWISE.
The cases about forgiving, and revenging, are many, and some of them
difficult: I shall resolve those of ordinary use in our practice, and
pass by the rest.
_Quest._ I. Is a man bound to forgive all injuries and damages
that are done him? If not, what injuries be they which every man is
obliged to forgive?
_Answ._ To both these questions I briefly answer, 1. We must
distinguish between a crime or sin against God, and the common good;
and an injury or damage to ourselves. 2. And between public justice
and private revenge. 3. And between those damages which fall upon
myself only, and those that by me redound to others, (as wife or
children, &c.) 4. And between the remitting of a punishment, and the
remitting of reparations of my loss. 5. And between the various
punishments to be remitted. He that will confound any of these shall
sooner deceive himself and others, than resolve the doubts.
_Prop._ I. It frequently falleth out, that it is not in our power
to remit the penalty of a crime; no, not the temporal penalty. For
this is a wrong to God the universal Governor, and God only can
forgive it, and man no further than God hath commissioned him. Murder,
whoredom, drunkenness, swearing, &c. as they are sins against God, the
magistrate is bound to punish, and private men to endeavour it by the
magistrate. And if it may be said, that the sovereign ruler of a
nation hath power to forgive such crimes, the meaning is no more than
this: 1. That as to the species of these sins, if he do forgive the
temporal punishment which in his office he should have inflicted, yet
no human power can question him for it, because he hath none on earth
above him; but yet God will question him, and show him that he had no
power to dispense with his laws, nor disoblige himself from his duty.
2. And that in some cases an individual crime may be forgiven by the
magistrate as to the temporal punishment, even where the ends of the
law and government require it; but this must not be ordinary.
_Prop._ II. It is not always in the power of the magistrate to
remit the temporal punishment of heinous crimes, against the common
good. Because it is ordinarily necessary to the common good that they
be punished; and his power is for the common good, and not against it.
The enemies of the public peace must by punishment be restrained.
_Prop._ III. Much less is it in the power of a private man to
remit a penalty to be inflicted by a magistrate. And what I say of
magistrates, holdeth of parents, and other governors, _cæteris
paribus_, according to the proportion of their authority.
_Prop._ IV. I may by just means exact satisfaction for damages to
myself, in my reputation or estate, when the ends of christianity,
even the honour of God, and the public good, and the benefit of men's
souls, require it; that is, when I only vindicate these by lawful
means, as they are the talents which God hath committed to me for his
service, and for which he will call me to account. It may fall out
that the vindicating of a minister's or other christian's name from a
slander, may become very needful for the interest and honour of
religion, and for the good of many souls. And if I have an estate
which I resolve to use for God, and a thief or a deceiver take it from
me, who will do no good with it but hurt, I may be bound to vindicate
it; that I may be enabled to do good, and may give God a comfortable
account of my stewardship; besides the suppressing of thievery and
deceit, as they are against the common good.
_Prop._ V. When my estate is not entirely my own, but wife or
child or any other is a sharer in it, it is not wholly in my power to
remit any debt or damage out of it, but I must have the consent of
them that are joint-owners; unless I be intrusted for them.
_Prop._ VI. If I be primarily obliged to maintain wife and
children, or any others, with my estate, I am bound on their behalf to
use all just means to vindicate it from any that shall injuriously
invade it; otherwise I am guilty of their sufferings whom I should
maintain; I may no more suffer a thief than a dog to go away with my
children's meat.
_Prop._ VII. And as I must vindicate my estate for others to whom
I am intrusted to administer it by God, so must I for myself also, so
far as God would have me use it myself. For he that hath charged me to
provide for my family, requireth also that I famish not myself; and he
hath required me to love my neighbour but as myself; and therefore as
I am bound to vindicate and help my neighbour if a thief or oppressor
would rob him, (according to my place and power,) so must I do also
for myself. In all these seven cases I am not obliged to forgive.
But on the other side, in all these cases following, I am bound to
forgive and let go my right.
_Prop._ I. As the church may declare to penitent sinners, the
remission of the eternal punishment, so may it remit the temporal
punishment of excommunication, to the penitent; yea, this they are
obliged by Christ to do, ministerially, as under him.
_Prop._ II. When the repentance and satisfaction of the sinner is
like to conduce more to the public good, and the honour of God, and
other ends of government, than his punishment would do, a private man
may not be obliged to prosecute him before the magistrate, and the
magistrate hath power to forgive him as to the penalty which it
belongeth to him to inflict. (Though this may not extend to the
remitting of crimes ordinarily and frequently, nor to the remitting of
some sort of heinous crimes at all; because this cannot attain the
ends of government as aforesaid.)
_Prop._ III. All personal wrongs, so far as they are merely
against myself, and disable me not from my duty to God and my
neighbour, I may and must forgive: for my own interest is put more in
my own power; and here it is that I am commanded to forgive. If you
say that I am bound to preserve my own life and soul as much as
another's; I answer, it is true, I am bound to preserve my own and
another's ultimately for the service and glory of God; and God's
interest in me I cannot remit or give away. As there is no obligation
to duty but what is originally from God, so there is none but what is
ultimately for God, even to please and glorify him.
_Object._ But if this be all, I shall forgive no wrongs; for
there is none which doth not some way hinder me in my duty.
_Answ._ Yes, there may be many to your body, your estate, and
name, which yet may be no disablement or hinderance to you, except you
make it so yourself: as if you receive a box on the ear, or be
slandered or reviled where none heareth it but yourself, or such as
will make no evil use of it, or if a little be diminished injuriously
out of a superfluous estate, or so as to be employed as well as you
would have done. 2. But I further answer this objection in the next
propositions.
_Prop._ IV. If my patient suffering a personal injury, which
somewhat hindereth me from my duty, be like to be as great a service
to God, or to do more good, than by that duty I should do, I ought to
pass by and forgive that injury; because then God's interest obligeth
me not to vindicate my right.
_Prop._ V. If when I am injured, and thereby disabled from doing
some good which I should else have done, I am not able by seeking
reparation or the punishment of the person, to recover my capacity,
and promote the service of God, I am bound to pass by and remit that
injury. (I speak not of the criminal part, but the injury as such; for
a man may be bound to bring a thief to punishment, on the account of
God's honour, and the common good, though else he might forgive the
injury to himself.)
_Prop._ VI. If it be probable that he that defraudeth me of my
estate, will do more good with it than I should have done, I am not
bound to vindicate it from him for my own interest (though as he is
criminal, and the crime is hurtful, as an ill example, to the common
good, so I may be bound to it). Nay, were it not for the said criminal
respect, I am bound rather to let him take it, than to vindicate it by
any such means as would break charity, and do more hurt than good.
_Prop._ VII. If I am absolutely trusted with the person or estate
of another, I may so far forgive the wrongs done to that other, upon
sufficient reasons, as well as against myself.
_Prop._ VIII. A private man may not usurp the magistrate's power,
or do any act which is proper to his office, nor yet may he break his
laws, for the avenging of himself; he may use no other means than the
law of God and his sovereign do allow him. Therefore he may not rail,
or revile, or slander, or rob, or strike, or hurt any, (unless in case
of defence, as afterward,) nor take any other prohibited course.
_Prop._ IX. No rigour or severity must be used to right myself,
where gentler means may probably do it; but the most harmless way must
first be tried.
_Prop._ X. In general, all wrongs, and debts, and damages, must
be forgiven, when the hurt is like to be greater, which will come by
our righting ourselves, than that which by forbearance we shall
sustain; and all must be forgiven where God's law or man's forbiddeth
us not to forgive. Therefore a man that will here know his duty, must
conduct his actions by very great prudence (which if he have not
himself, he must make use of a guide or counsellor): and he must be
able to compare the evil which he suffereth with the evil which will
in probability follow his vindication, and to discern which of them is
the greater; or else he can never know how far and when he may and
must forgive. And herein he must observe,
1. That hurt that cometh to a man's soul is greater than the hurt that
befalleth the body; and therefore if my suing a man at law be like to
hurt his soul by uncharitableness, or to hurt my own, or the souls of
others, by scandal or disturbances, I must rather suffer any mere
bodily injuries, than use that means; but if yet greater hurt to souls
would follow that bodily suffering of mine, the case is then altered
the other way. So if by forgiving debts or wrongs, I be liker to do
more good to the soul of him whom I forgive, or others, than the
recovery of my own, or the righting of myself, is like any way to
equal, I am obliged to forgive that debt or wrong.
2. The good or hurt which cometh to a community or to many, is
(_cæteris paribus_) to be more regarded than that which cometh to
myself or any one alone. Because many are of more worth than one; and
because God's honour (_cæteris paribus_) is more concerned in the
good of many than of one. Therefore I must not seek my own right to
the hurt of many, either of their souls or bodies, unless some greater
good require it.
3. The good or hurt of public persons, magistrates, or pastors, is
(_cæterisc paribus_) of more regard than the good or hurt of
single men: therefore (_cæteris paribus_) I must not right myself
to the dishonour or hurt of governors; (no, though I were none of
their charge or subjects;) because the public good is more concerned
in their honour or welfare than in mine. The same may be said of
persons by their gifts and interests more eminently serviceable to God
and the common good than I am.
4. The good or hurt of a near relation, of a dear friend, of a worthy
person, is more to be regarded by me, _cæteris paribus_, than the
good or hurt of a vile, unworthy person, or a stranger. And therefore
the Israelites might not take usury of a poor brother, which yet they
might do of an alien of another land! The laws of nature and
friendship may more oblige me to one than to another, though they were
supposed equal in themselves. Therefore I am not bound to remit a
debt or wrong to a thief, or deceiver, or a vile person, when a nearer
or worthier person would be equally damnified by his benefit. And thus
far, (if without any partial self-love a man can justly estimate
himself,) he may not only as he is nearest himself, but also for his
real worth, prefer his own commodity before the commodity of a more
unworthy and unserviceable person.
5. Another man's necessities are more regardable than our own
superfluities; as his life is more regardable than our corporal
delights. Therefore it is a great sin for any man to reduce another to
extremity, and deprive him of necessaries for his life, merely to
vindicate his own right in superfluities, for the satisfaction of his
concupiscence and sensual desires. If a poor man steal to save his own
or his children's lives, and the rich man vindicate his own, merely to
live in greater fulness or gallantry in the world, he sinneth both the
sin of sensuality and uncharitableness (but how far for the common
good he is bound to prosecute the thief as criminal, is a case which
depends on other circumstances). And this is the most common case, in
which the forgiving of debts and damages is required in Scripture,
viz. When the other is poor and we are rich, and his necessities
require it as an act of charity (and also the former case, when the
hurt by our vindication is like to be greater than our benefit will
countervail).
_Quest._ II. What is the meaning of those words of Christ, Matt.
v. 38-42, "Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye,
and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, that ye resist not evil;
but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the
other also; and if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy
coat, let him have thy cloak also; and whosoever shall compel thee to
go a mile, go with him two: give to him that asketh thee; and from him
that would borrow of thee turn thou not away?"
_Answ._ The meaning of the text is this: as if he had said,
Because you have heard that magistrates are required to do justice
exactly between man and man, and to take an eye for an eye, &c.
therefore you may perhaps believe those teachers who would persuade
you that for any man to exact this satisfaction, is no fault: but I
tell you that duties of charity must be performed, as well as justice
must be done; and though it must be the magistrate's duty to do you
this justice, it is not your duty always to require it, but charity
may make the contrary to be your duty. Therefore I say unto you,
overvalue not the concernments of your flesh, nor the trifles of this
world; but if a man abuse you, or wrong you in these trifles, make no
great matter of it, and be not presently inflamed to revenge, and to
right yourselves; but exercise your patience and your charity to him
that wrongeth you, and by an habituated stedfastness herein, be ready
to receive another injury with equal patience, yea many such, rather
than to fly to an unnecessary vindication of your right. For what if
he give you another stroke? Or what if he also take your cloak? Or
what if he compel you to go another mile for him? Let him do it; let
him take it; how small is your hurt! What inconsiderable things are
these! Your resistance and vindication of your right may violate
charity and peace, and inflame his passion, and kindle your own, and
hurt both your souls, and draw you into other sins, and cost you
dearer than your right was worth: whereas your patience, and
yieldingness, and submission, and readiness to serve another, and to
let go your own for peace and charity, may shame him or melt him, and
prevent contention, and keep your own and the public peace, and may
show the excellency of your holy religion, and win men's souls to the
love of it, that they may be saved. Therefore instead of exacting or
vindicating your utmost right, set light by your corporal sufferings
and wrongs, and study and labour with all your power to excel in
charity, and to do good to all, and to stoop to any service to
another, and humble yourselves, and exercise patience, and give and
lend according to your abilities, and pretend not justice against the
great duties of charity and patience. So that here is forbidden both
violent and legal revenge for our corporal abuses, when the law of
charity or patience is against it: but this disobligeth not
magistrates to do justice, or men to seek it, in any of the cases
mentioned in the seven first propositions.
_Quest._ III. Am I bound to forgive another, if he ask me not
forgiveness? The reason of the question is, because Christ saith, Luke
xvii. 3, 4, "If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him: and if
he repent, forgive him; and if he trespass against thee seven times in
a day, and seven times in a day turn again to thee, saying, I repent,
thou shalt forgive him."
_Answ._ In the resolving of this, while some have barely
affirmed, and others denied, for want of distinguishing, they have
said worse than nothing. It is necessary that we distinguish,
1. Between the forgiving of an enemy, and of a stranger, and of a
neighbour, and of a brother, as such.
2. Between the several penalties to be remitted (as well as revenges
to be forborne). And so briefly the case must be thus resolved.
_Prop._ I. An enemy, a stranger, and a neighbour, as such, must
be forgiven (in the cases before asserted) though they ask not
forgiveness, nor say, I repent: for,
1. Many other scriptures absolutely require it.
2. And forgiving them as such, is but the continuing them in our
common charity, as men, or neighbours; that is, our not endeavouring
to ruin them, or do them any hurt, and our hearty desiring and
endeavouring their good, according to their capacities or ours; and
thus far we must forgive them.
_Prop._ II. A brother also must be thus far forgiven, though he
say not, I repent; that is, we must love him as a man, and wish and
endeavour his good to our power.
_Prop._ III. A brother as a brother, is not to be so forgiven, as
to be restored to our estimation and affection, and usage of him as a
brother, either in spiritual account, or intimate special love and
familiarity, as long as he is impenitent in his gross offences; and
that is, till he turn again and say, I repent. A natural brother is
still to be loved as a natural brother. For that kind of love
dependeth not on his honesty or repentance. But,
1. A brother in a religious sense,
2. Or a bosom, familiar friend, are both unfit for to be received in
these capacities, till they are penitent for gross offences; therefore
the church is not to pardon the impenitent, in point of communion, nor
particular christians to pardon them in their esteem and carriage; nor
am I bound to take an unfit person to be my bosom friend to know my
secrets: therefore if either of these offend, I must not forgive them,
that is, by forgiveness continue them in the respect and usage of this
brotherhood, till they repent; and this (first especially) is the
brother mentioned in the text.
_Quest._ IV. Is it lawful to sue a brother at law? The reason of
the question is, from the words of the apostle Paul, 1 Cor. vi. 7,
"There is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to law one with
another. Why do ye not rather take wrong? why do ye not rather suffer
yourselves to be defrauded?"
_Answ._ 1. Distinguish betwixt going to law before heathens, or
other enemies to the christian religion, and before christian
magistrates.
2. Between going to law in malice for revenge, and going merely to
seek my right, or to seek the suppression and reformation of sin.
3. Between going to law when you are bound to forgive, and when you
are not.
4. And between going to law in haste and needlessly, and going to law
as the last remedy, in case of necessity, when other means fail.
5. And between going to law when the hurt is like to be greater than
the benefit, and going to law when it is likely to do good. There is a
great deal of difference between these cases.
_Prop._ I. Christians must rather suffer wrong, than go to law
before the enemies of religion, when it is like to harden them, and to
bring christianity into contempt.
_Prop._ II. It is not lawful to make law and justice the means of
private unlawful revenge; nor to vent our malice, nor to oppress the
innocent.
_Prop._ III. Whenever I am bound to forgive the trespass, wrong,
or debt, then it is unlawful to seek my own at law. For that is not
forgiving.
_Prop._ IV. There are many other remedies which must first be
tried (ordinarily) before we go to law. As,
1. To rebuke our neighbour for his wrong, and privately to desire
necessary reparations.
2. To take two or three to admonish him; or to refer the matter to
arbitrators (or in some cases to a lot). And if any make law their
first remedy needlessly, while the other means should first be used,
it is a sin.
_Prop._ V. It is not lawful to go to law-suits, when prudence may
discern that the hurt which may come by it, will be greater than the
benefit; (either by hardening the person, or disturbing ourselves, or
scandalizing others against religion, or drawing any to ways of
unpeaceableness and revenge, &c.) The foreseen consequences may
overrule the case.
But on the other side, _Prop._ I. It is lawful to make use of
christian judicatories, so it be done in a lawful manner; yea, and in
some cases, of the judicatories of infidels.
_Prop._ II. The suppressing of sin, and the defending of the
innocent, and righting of the wronged, being the duty of governors, it
is lawful to seek these benefits at their hands.
_Prop._ III. In cases where I am not obliged to forgive, (as I
have showed before some such there be,) I may justly make use of
governors as the ordinance of God.
_Prop._ IV. The order and season is when I have tried other means
in vain; when persuasion or arbitration will do no good, or cannot be
used with hope of success.
_Prop._ V. And the great condition to prove it lawful is, when it
is not like to do more hurt than good, either directly of itself, or
by men's abuse; when religion, or the soul of any man, or any one's
body, or estate, or name, is not like to lose more than my gain, or
any other benefits, will compensate; when all these concur, it is
lawful to go to law.
_Quest._ V. Is it lawful to defend my person, life, or estate
against a thief, or murderer, or unjust invader, by force of arms?
_Answ._ You must distinguish, 1. Between such defence as the law
of the land alloweth, and such as it forbiddeth.
2. Between necessary and unnecessary actions of defence.
_Prop._ I. There is no doubt but it is both lawful and a duty to
defend ourselves by such convenient means as are likely to attain
their end, and are not contrary to any law, of God or man. We must
defend our neighbour if he be assaulted or oppressed, and we must love
our neighbour as ourselves.
_Prop._ II. This self-defence by force, is then lawful, when it
is necessary, and other more gentle means have been uneffectual, or
have no place (supposing still that the means be such as the law of
God or man forbiddeth not).
_Prop._ III. And it is necessary to the lawfulness of it, that
the means be such as in its nature is like to be successful, or like
to do more good than harm.
But on the other side, _Prop._ I. We may not defend ourselves by
any such force as either the laws of God or our rulers, thereto
authorized by him, shall forbid. For,
1. The laws are made by such as have more power over our lives, than
we have over them ourselves.
2. And they are made for the good of the commonwealth; which is to be
preferred before the good or life of any single person. And whatever
selfish infidels say, both nature and grace do teach us to lay down
our lives, for the welfare of the church or state, and to prefer a
multitude before ourselves. Therefore it is better to be robbed,
oppressed, or killed, than to break the peace of the commonwealth.
_Prop._ II. Therefore a private man may not raise an army to
defend his life against his prince, or lawful governor. Perhaps he
might hold his hands if personally he went about to murder him,
without the violation of the public peace; but he cannot raise a war
without it.
_Prop._ III. We may not do that by blood or violence, which might
be done by persuasion, or by any lawful, gentle means: violence must
be used, even in defence, but in case of true necessity.
_Prop._ IV. When self-defence is like to have consequents so ill,
as the saving of ourselves cannot countervail, it is then unlawful
_finis gratia_, and not to be attempted.
_Prop._ V. Therefore if self-defence be unlikely to prevail, our
strength being inconsiderable, and when the enemy is but like to be
the more exasperated by it, and our sufferings like to be the greater;
nature and reason teach us to submit, and use the more effectual
(lawful) means.
_Quest._ VI. Is it lawful to take away another's life, in the
defending of my purse or estate?
_Answ._ 1. You must again distinguish between such defence as the
law of the land alloweth, and such as it forbiddeth.
2. Between what is necessary, and what is unnecessary.
3. Between a life less worth than the prize which he contendeth for,
and a life more worth than it, or than mine own.
4. Between the simple defence of my purse, and the defence of it and
my life together.
5. Between what I do with purpose and desire, and what I do
unwillingly through the assailant's temerity or violence.
6. And between what I do in mere defence, and what I do to bring a
thief or robber unto legal punishment. And so I answer,
_Prop._ I. You may not defend your purse, or your estate, by such
actions, as the law of the land forbiddeth; (unless it go against the
law of God;) because it is to be supposed, that it is better a man's
estate or purse be lost, than law and public order violated.
_Prop._ II. You may not (against an ordinary thief or robber) defend
your purse with the probable hazard of his life, if a few good words,
or other safe and gentle means, which you have opportunity to use, be
like to serve turn without such violence.
_Prop._ III. If it might be supposed that a prince, or other
person of great use and service to the commonwealth, should in a
frolic, or otherwise, assault your person for your estate or purse, it
is not lawful to take away his life by a defensive violence, if you
know it to be he; because (though in some countries the law might
allow it you, yet) _finis gratia_ it is unlawful; because his
life is more necessary to the common good than yours.
_Prop._ IV. If a pilfering thief would steal your purse, without
any violence which hazardeth your life, (ordinarily,) you may not take
away his life in the defending of it. Because it is the work of the
magistrate to punish him by public justice, and your defence requireth
it not.
_Prop._ V. All this is chiefly meant, of the voluntary, designed
taking away of his life; and not of any lawful action, which doth it
accidentally against your will.
On the other side, _Prop._ I. If the law of the land allow you to
take away a man's life in the defending of your purse, it removeth the
scruple, if the weight of the matter also do allow it: because it
supposeth, that the law taketh the offender to be worthy of death, and
maketh you in that case the executioner of it. And if, indeed, the
crime be such as deserveth death, you may be the executioner when the
law alloweth it.
_Prop._ II. And this is more clear, when the robber for your
money doth assault your life, or is like for aught you see to do it.
_Prop._ III. And when gentler means will not serve the turn, but
violence is the only remedy which is left you, which is like to avail
for your defence.
_Prop._ IV. And when the person is a vile offender, who is rather
a plague and burden to the commonwealth than any necessary member of
it.
_Prop._ V. If you desire not, and design not his death, but he
rush upon it himself in his fury, while you lawfully defend your own,
the case is yet less questionable.
_Prop._ VI. If a thief have taken your purse, though you may not
take away his life after to recover it, (because it is of less value,)
nor yet in revenge (because that belongeth not to private men); yet if
the law require or allow you to pursue him to bring him to a judicial
trial, if you kill him while he resisteth, it is not your sin; because
you are but suppressing sin in your place, according to the allowance
of the law.
_Quest._ VII. May I kill or wound another in the defence or
vindication of my honour, or good name?
_Answ._ No: not by private assault or violence; but if the crime
be so great, that the law of the land doth punish it with death, if
that law be just, you may in some cases seek to bring the offender to
public justice; but that is rare, and otherwise you may not do it.
For,
1. It belongeth only to the magistrate, and not to you, to be the
avenger.
2. And killing a man can be no meet defence against calumny or
slander; for if you will kill a man for prevention, you kill the
innocent; if you kill him afterwards, it is no defence, but an
unprofitable revenge, which vindicateth not your honour, but
dishonoureth you more. Your patience is your honour, and your bloody
revenge doth show you to be so like the devil, the destroyer, that it
is your greatest shame.
3. It is odious pride which maketh men overvalue their reputation
among men, and think that a man's life is a just compensation to them
for their dishonour! Such bloody sacrifices are fit to appease only
the bloodthirsty spirit! But what is it that pride will not do and
justify?