"When the Constitution has been framed by the Convention, copies

thereof shall be supplied to the Members of the Convention, and the

President shall declare the sitting of the Convention adjourned to a

time and place to be fixed by the Convention, not being less than sixty

nor more than one hundred and twenty days thereafter. And as soon as

convenient the draft constitution shall be submitted for consideration

to each House of Parliament sitting in Committee of the whole, and such

amendments as may be desired by the Legislature, {232} together with

the draft Constitution, shall be remitted to the Convention through the

Senior Representative.

"On the reassembling of the Convention the Constitution as framed prior

to the adjournment shall be reconsidered, together with such suggested

amendments as shall have been forwarded by the various Legislatures,

and the Constitution so framed shall be finally adopted with any

amendments that may be agreed to."

"So soon as practicable after the close of the proceedings of the

Convention the question of the acceptance or rejection of the

Constitution shall be referred and submitted to the vote of all persons

in Victoria qualified and entitled to vote for the election of Members

of the Legislative Assembly."

"The majority of votes shall decide the question, and if the

Constitution be thereby rejected, no further action shall be taken

pursuant to this Act: Provided that any number of votes in the

affirmative less than fifty thousand shall be equivalent to the

rejection of the Bill.

"If two Colonies in addition to Victoria accept the Constitution the

Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly of Victoria may adopt

a Joint Address to the Queen praying that the Constitution may be

passed into law by the Imperial Parliament upon receipt from the

Parliaments of such two Colonies, either of similar joint or separate

Addresses from each House of such Parliaments."

{233}

It will be noticed that the Convention will have entire freedom in

regard to any amendments suggested by the Provincial Parliaments, and

that if the Constitution be accepted, the Victorian Parliament will not

be bound to join in submitting it for Imperial enactment. It is

assumed that it will bow to the popular pronouncement unless the

Government should have some grave reason for recommending a contrary

course. A difficulty, not provided against in the Act, might arise if

the Constitution were to be amended during its passage through the

Imperial Parliament.

The Act passed by Western Australia provided for the election of the

delegates by the two Houses of Parliament sitting as one Chamber, the

area of selection being limited to candidates nominated by not less

than twenty persons who are qualified to vote at elections for Members

of the Assembly. "The draft Constitution, as finally adopted by the

Convention, if approved by Parliament, shall be submitted for the

decision of the electors of Western Australia by their vote; and if a

majority of the electors voting on such question signify their approval

of such Constitution, the same may be adopted by the Colony, provided

that any number of votes in the affirmative less than six thousand

shall be equivalent to the rejection of the Constitution." "The

adoption of the Constitution by Western Australia may be signified by

the passing of an Act or by a joint resolution of both Houses of {234}

Parliament, and both Houses may thereupon adopt Addresses to the Queen,

praying that the Constitution may be passed into law by the Imperial

Parliament, subject to the adoption of similar Addresses by at least

two other Colonies, of which New South Wales shall be one." Parliament

thus retains the initiative in each successive phase of the movement,

but will have no power to alter the Bill when it finally leaves the

Convention. If the provisions are regarded as unacceptable, it will be

able to decline to submit the Bill to the electorate. The Western

Australian measure was based in its general language upon that

previously introduced in Queensland, but differed from it in several

important particulars. In the latter case it was proposed that the

election of the delegates should be vested in the members of the

Assembly alone, that, of the ten delegates, five should be chosen by

the Southern, three by the Northern, and two by the Central

Parliamentary Representatives, a provision inserted in view of the

somewhat divergent interests of different portions of the Province, and

that the draft Constitution should be submitted for the consideration

of the electors in such manner as Parliament might prescribe. The Bill

was passed by the Assembly, in spite of a widespread feeling that

Queensland should have followed the course of the other Provinces, and

was amended by the Council, which regarded itself as unjustifiably

ignored, and provided that it should have an equal {235} share with the

Assembly in the appointment of the delegates to the Convention. It is

unnecessary to consider the arguments by which the Premier supported

his proposal of indirect election, or those put forward by the two

Houses during the deadlock which followed upon their disagreement.

Finally, when each House had insisted several times upon its attitude,

the Bill was laid aside by the Council. As a result of this action the

new movement was blocked at its first step, which was regarded with

little anxiety even by those who appreciated the difficulties which

were likely to attend the later stages. Great disappointment was felt

in Australia, and efforts were made, though in vain, to induce Sir Hugh

Nelson to reintroduce the Bill in some form that would be acceptable to

both Houses. At the same time public opinion demanded that the

Convention should be held, even though one of the Provinces would be

unrepresented.

The benefits which would follow Federation are so obvious as scarcely

to require enumeration. The Federal Government would be able to deal

adequately with the problem of National Defence and to speak

authoritatively, to the manifest satisfaction of the Imperial

Authorities, upon such matters as the contribution of Australia towards

the expenses of the Imperial squadron maintained upon its coast; the

consolidation of the debts would, it has been estimated, enable a

million pounds to be saved upon the annual bill of interest;

Interprovincial {236} Free Trade would promote intercourse between

neighbours who have hitherto been estranged by arbitrary lines of

demarcation; and in the words of the Chief Justice of Queensland,[4]

"The first effect in point of importance, though some time may elapse

before the effect is fully felt, will be the creation of an Australian

Nation, forming a distinct constituent part of the British Empire,

having one mind, speaking with one voice instead of the six, often

discordant and sometimes inarticulate, voices now heard, consulted on

all matters of Imperial concern, and exercising a powerful influence in

the political affairs of the whole world." Such would appear to be the

destiny of Australia, which has, however, doubtless been benefited by

the independent development of its component parts. In the absence of

distinctions of race and language, in the general diffusion of the

Roman Catholics among the Protestants, and the steady determination to

exclude coloured races, the early establishment of Federal relations

would have produced among Australians a monotonous uniformity of

characteristics, which has to some extent been prevented by the

divergent political tendencies of the several Provinces.

But, to put the practical question, what are the prospects of

Federation? The general impression is not one of hopefulness: it is

pointed out that the {237} Provinces have so long maintained an

independent existence that they are unlikely to submit to a curtailment

of their powers except under the imperative impulse of the fear of

foreign invasion; that all but the leading politicians realise that

they would be affected prejudicially by a change which would dwarf the

Legislatures with which they are connected; that many, especially

during the period of depression, dread the creation of a new taxing and

governing body; and that the Labour members, in the natural belief that

their influence would be smaller in a Federal Parliament, are either

apathetic or actively hostile. The economic aspects of Intercolonial

Free Trade, in reference to its probable effect upon the prosperity of

manufacturers and producers in the different Provinces, also form an

important factor in the situation. Time alone can show whether popular

participation in the successive stages of the movement, though it will

not be universal, will generate an enthusiasm sufficient to outweigh

the opposing forces and weld Australia into a strong and united Nation.

APPENDIX TO IX.

THE NEW FEDERAL SCHEME.[5]

Now that the Adelaide Convention has completed its labours, it is

possible to give a connected view of the provisions of the draft

Constitution Bill, as it will be submitted to the local {238}

Parliament, and then after it has been again dealt with by a second

meeting of the Convention at Sydney, to the vote of the people.

The Bill provides for the constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia

and for the appointment of a governor-general by the Queen, at a salary

of L10,000. The Federal Parliament is to consist of two Houses--the

Senate and the House of Representatives. The former chamber will be

composed of six members for each state. They are to be elected by the

electors of the Legislative Assembly in each colony for a term of six

years, and one-half will retire every three years. For the election of

these senators each colony will be regarded as one electorate, and no

one will be allowed to vote at more than one polling-booth on the day

of election. In other words, the election will be conducted on the

same lines as the recent election of representatives to the Federation

Convention. At the first meeting of the Senate, the members elected

for each state will be divided by lot into two classes, and the seats

of those in the first class are to be vacated at the end of the third

year, but the others will continue to be members of that House for the

full term of six years. In this way one-half the members of the Senate

will be elected by the people every third year.

The House of Representatives is to be composed of members directly

chosen by the people of the several states, and the number which each

colony will return will depend on its population. This Chamber is, as

nearly as practicable, to contain double the number of members of the

Senate. The House of Representatives would therefore consist, at the

outset, of about seventy-two members, which would give as nearly as

possible, one member for every 50,000 of the population. Victoria

would, roughly speaking, have about twenty-two members. In order,

however, to protect the interests of the smaller states in this House,

it is provided that Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia,

shall be entitled to at least five members each, although on the

population basis, the island colony might not be able to claim more

than four members. Until the Federal Parliament otherwise provides,

each local or state Parliament can determine into how many electoral

divisions the colony should be divided for the purpose of returning

members to the House of Representatives, but should it not divide the

state into {239} electoral districts, then each colony is to be

regarded as one electorate, in the same way as in the case of the

election of senators.

The duration of every House of Representatives will be three years,

unless it is sooner dissolved by the Governor-General. There is no

power, however, conferred on the Governor-General to dissolve the

Senate. The qualification of electors of members of the House of

Representatives is in each state to be that for electors of the more

numerous House--or Legislative Assembly--of the state. The members of

both Houses are to receive an allowance of L400 each per annum for

their services.

The following are the subjects the Commonwealth Parliament is to be

empowered to legislate upon and deal with:--

1. The regulation of trade and commerce with other countries and among

the several states.

2. Customs and excise and bounties.

3. Raising money by any other mode or system of taxation.

4. Borrowing money on the public credit of the commonwealth.

5. Postal and telegraphic services.

6. The military and naval defence of the commonwealth and the several

states, and the calling out of the forces to execute and maintain the

laws of the commonwealth.

7. Munitions of war.

8. Navigation and shipping.

9. Ocean beacons and buoys and ocean lighthouses and lightships.

10. Astronomical and meteorological observations.

11. Quarantine.

12. Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits.

13. Census and statistics.

14. Currency, coinage, and legal tender.

15. Banking, the incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper money.

16. Insurance, excluding state insurance not extending beyond the

limits of the state concerned.

17. Weights and measures.

18. Bills of exchange and promissory notes.

19. Bankruptcy and insolvency.

20. Copyrights and patents of inventions, designs, and trade marks.

{240}

21. Naturalisation and aliens.

22. Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations, formed

in any state or part of the commonwealth.

23. Marriage and divorce.

24. Parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants.

25. The service and execution throughout the commonwealth of the civil

and criminal process and judgments of the courts of the states.

26. The recognition throughout the commonwealth of the laws, the public

acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of the states.

27. Immigration and emigration.

28. The influx of criminals.

29. External affairs and treaties.

30. The relations of the commonwealth to the islands of the Pacific.

31. The control and regulation of the navigation of the River Murray,

and the use of the waters thereof from where it first forms the

boundary between Victoria and New South Wales to the sea.

32. The control of railways with respect to transport for the military

purposes of the commonwealth.

33. The taking over by the commonwealth, with the consent of the state,

of the whole or any part of the railways of any state or states, upon

such terms as may be arranged between the commonwealth and the state.

34. Railway construction and extension with the consent of any state or

states concerned.

35. Matters referred to the Parliament of the commonwealth by the

Parliament or Parliaments of any state or states, but so that the law

shall extend only to the state or states by whose Parliament or

Parliaments the matter was referred, and to such other states as may

afterwards adopt the law.

36. The exercise within the commonwealth, at the request or with the

concurrence of the Parliaments of all the states concerned, of any

legislative powers which can at the establishment of this constitution

be exercised only by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or by the

Federal Council of Australasia.

37. Any matters necessary for, or incidental to, the carrying {241}

into execution of the foregoing powers or of any other powers vested by

this constitution in the Parliament or the Executive Government of the

commonwealth, or in any department or officer thereof.

All matters not mentioned above, such as land settlement, railway

construction, &c., are to remain vested in the Parliaments of the

several states. Each state shall retain its local Parliament and have

a Governor, who is to be appointed by the Crown, and communicate direct

with the Crown as at present.

On the establishment of the commonwealth the control of the following

departments will be taken over by the Federal Government, and the

commonwealth will assume the obligations of any state or states with

respect to such matters:--

Customs and excise.

Posts and telegraphs.

Military and naval defence.

Ocean beacons, buoys, lighthouses.

Quarantine.

There are to be seven Ministers of State, and their salaries will, in

the aggregate, be L12,000 per annum. A Minister, within three months

after being appointed to that office, must become a member of one of

the Houses of the Federal Parliament.

All Bills having for their main object the appropriation of any part of

the public revenue, or moneys, or the imposition of any tax, must

originate in the House of Representatives. Bills imposing taxation

must deal with the imposition of taxation only, and those imposing

duties of Customs or excise must deal with duties of Customs or excise

only. The expenditure for services other than the ordinary annual

services of the Government must not be authorised by the same law as

that which appropriates the supplies for the ordinary annual services,

but must be authorised by a separate measure. The Senate can amend any

Bills except those imposing taxation, or appropriating the necessary

supplies for the ordinary annual services of the Government. With

respect to these money measures, the Senate can, at any stage, return a

taxation or appropriation Bill to the House of Representatives,

suggesting that any provision or item therein should be omitted or

amended, and the House of Representatives may, if it thinks fit, make

such omissions or amendments with or without modifications. The Bill,

in its {242} amended or original form--should the House of

Representatives decline to adopt the suggestion of the Senate--will

then be sent back to the latter Chamber, which may either pass or

reject the measure.

The seat of the Government of the commonwealth is to be determined by

the Federal Parliament. Until such determination the Parliament shall

be summoned to meet at such place as the majority of the Governors of

the states, or, in the event of an equal division of opinion amongst

them, as the Governor-General may direct.

Before the Constitution can be amended an absolute majority of both the

House of Representatives and Senate must approve of the alteration, and

it must then be confirmed by a vote of the people, a majority of the

states being required as well as a majority of the people.

There is to be a federal judiciary, consisting of a high court of

Australia, and such inferior courts as Parliament may determine. The

high court is to consist of a chief justice, and at least four other

judges, and is to hear appeals from the state courts and inferior

federal courts. This appeal is to be final, except that in matters

affecting the public interests of the commonwealth or of any state,

application may be made to the Queen for special leave to appeal to the

Privy Council. Uniform Customs duties are to be imposed within two

years of the establishment of the commonwealth, and trade and

intercourse throughout the commonwealth is then to be absolutely free.

In the meantime the local tariffs are to continue, but they will be

collected by the Federal Government, and after deducting from the

revenue received in each state the contribution of that state towards

federal expenses, the balance is to be returned to the state month by

month. During the first three years after federation the total annual

expenditure of the Federal Government is to be limited to L300,000 for

new federal expenses, and L1,250,000 for services transferred from the

states. During the first five years after the imposition of a uniform

tariff, the surplus revenue, after deducting the contribution of each

state to the federal expenses, is to be returned to the states in the

following way: Accounts of Customs and excise duties collected in each

state are to be kept during the twelve months following the coming into

operation of the uniform tariff, in order to ascertain, first the

average net amount per head in each state, and next the {243} average

per head for the whole commonweath. A sliding scale, extending over

four years, is then to be adopted, in order to determine the amount to

be returned. Where the average for a particular state for the first

year is less than the general average, the per capita sum is to be

increased by equal gradations, until, at the end of four years, it

equals the general average. Similarly, where the average for a state

is greater than the general average, it is to be gradually reduced to

the general average. Then, at the end of the five-year period, all the

states will be placed on the same footing, and will receive an equal

sum per head from the federal revenue. This scheme of distribution is

subject, however, to the important proviso that during the five years

the aggregate amount returned to all the states in any year must not be

less than the aggregate amount returned in the year immediately

preceding the imposition of uniform duties.

Equality of trade is to be preserved throughout the commonwealth, and

any law or regulation derogating from that principle is to be null and

void. Parliament may appoint an interstate commission to execute and

maintain upon railways within the commonwealth, and upon rivers flowing

through, in, or between two or more states the provisions of the

constitution relating to trade and commerce. The commission is to have

such powers of adjudication and administration as may be necessary for

its purposes, and as the Parliament may from time to time determine,

but shall have no powers in reference to the rates or regulations of

any railway in any state, except in cases of rates or regulations

preferential in effect, and made and used for the purpose of drawing

traffic to that railway from the railway of a neighbouring state.

[1] "The Federal Council of Australasia," by the Hon. Alfred Deakin,

_Australasian Review of Reviews_, February, 1895.

[2] Cap. iv., Clause 13.

[3] Cap. i., Clauses 54 and 55.

[4] "Notes on Australian Federation," by Sir S. W. Griffith.

Parliamentary Paper, Queensland, 1896.

[5] An article published in the Melbourne _Argus_ of April 26, 1897,

and included with the kind permission of the London agents of that

newspaper.

{244}

X

_SALIENT FEATURES OF THE AUSTRALASIAN DEMOCRACY_

Indirect effects of the discovery of gold--Causes of the financial

crisis--The origin and extent of State Socialism--The thriftiness of

the working-classes--Labour Representation in Parliament--Parliamentary

Government--Direct Taxation--Conciliation and Arbitration in Industrial

disputes--Protection and its corollaries--The feeling towards Great

Britain--General conclusions.

The enormous immigration of the fifties, due to the great discoveries

of gold in Victoria and New South Wales, has caused Australia to become

one of the most democratic countries in the world. Before that time

the soil was held in large areas by pastoralists who, in the absence of

opposing forces, would have formed themselves gradually into a strong

landed aristocracy. But the miners, a class of men who had shown their

energy and determination by their readiness to travel thousands of

miles in the search for wealth, introduced an entirely new element:

they had thrown off their traditionary reverence for vested

institutions, they were able to earn high wages or directly to enrich

themselves, {245} and they resented an assumption of superiority on the

part of any section in the community. When, in the course of years,

the mining industry began to wane, they swarmed into the towns and

constituted an important link in the chain of causes which has swelled

some of the capitals to their present unwieldy dimensions. Deprived of

their means of livelihood, and indisposed for rural life, they

clamoured for other employment, and were able, in several Provinces, to

induce the Ministry to impose a protective tariff which artificially

fostered the growth of manufactures. The protective tariff naturally

increased the urban population, as did the undiscriminative system of

State-aided immigration, the centralisation of all departments of the

Government, and, in its ultimate effects, the construction of public

works.

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