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PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
PLATO,
AND THE
OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
BY
GEORGE GROTE,
AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'.
_A NEW EDITION._
IN FOUR VOLUMES.
VOL. II.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1888.
_The right of Translation is reserved._
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XII.
ALKIBIADES I. AND II.
Situation supposed in the dialogue. Persons--Sokrates and
Alkibiades 1
Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of Alkibiades 2
Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in
his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What does he
intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does he
know? _ib._
Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of
war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those
whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better refer? To
just and unjust 3
How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or
distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he
always knew it, even as a boy 4
Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as
he learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach just and
unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it.
Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not
know himself 5
Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally
debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to every
one--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with
just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He
asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing but
question 6
Comment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the respondent
makes the discoveries for himself _ib._
Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is
good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both
does well, and procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal
reasoning of Sokrates 7
Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are
equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is
to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic
description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make
himself as good as possible 8
But good--for what end, and under what circumstances?
Abundant illustrative examples 9
Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his
ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to
make such discovery in youth 10
Platonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its anticipated
effect--applicable to the season of youth 11
Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent importance--What
is myself? My mind is myself _ib._
I cannot know myself, except by looking into another
mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the
conditions both of happiness and of freedom 11
Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares
that he will never quit Sokrates 12
Second Alkibiades--situation supposed _ib._
Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which
may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic
word: madmen, a particular variety under it _ib._
Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms
comprehended under it, was not then familiar 13
Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits,
and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies
that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance 14
Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must
discriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is always
mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always _ib._
Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we
call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or
accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what occasions
and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used 15
Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good
or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial 16
It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice,
until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the
Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel
of Sokrates _ib._
Different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues 17
Grounds for disallowing them--less strong against the
Second than against the First 18
The supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only
marks of inferiority _ib._
The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's earlier
compositions 20
Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic
Memorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men 21
Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for
idealising this feature in Sokrates _ib._
Plato's manner of replying to the accusers of Sokrates.
Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of Sokrates 22
The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology is
followed out in Alkibiades I. Warfare against the false persuasion of
knowledge 24
Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing
Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance 25
Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties.
He exhorts to Justice and Virtue--but these are acknowledged
Incognita 26
Prolixity of Alkibiadês I.--Extreme multiplication of
illustrative examples--How explained _ib._
Alkibiadês II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined 27
Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the Gods for
favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular, semi-irregular
agency of the Gods--he prays to them for premonitory warnings 28
Comparison of Alkibiadês II. with the Xenophontic
Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus.
Sokrates not always consistent with himself 29
Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiadês II.--that knowledge is
not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is indispensable:
without that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than
beneficial _ib._
Knowledge of Good--appears postulated and divined, in many
of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles 31
The Good--the Profitable--what is it?--How are we to know
it? Plato leaves this undetermined _ib._
CHAPTER XIII.
HIPPIAS MAJOR--HIPPIAS MINOR.
Hippias Major--situation supposed--character of the
dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias 33
Real debate between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in
the Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate 34
Opening of the Hippias Major**--Hippias describes the
successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown
as well as the gain acquired by his lectures 35
Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans
did not admit his instructions--their law forbids _ib._
Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at the
Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they
fail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is
also unlawful 36
Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with
that of the Xenophontic Sokrates 37
The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is
the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he does not
always adhere 38
Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or
astronomy, &c., but upon the question--What pursuits are
beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth? 39
Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the
background, who has just been puzzling him with it--What is the
Beautiful? _ib._
Hippias thinks the question easy to answer 40
Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is
Beauty, or the Beautiful? _ib._
Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by
indicating one particularly beautiful object _ib._
Cross-questioning by Sokrates--Other things also are
beautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under
some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes
not beautiful 41
Second answer of Hippias--_ Gold_, is that by the
presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied to
the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies _ib._
Third answer of Hippias--questions upon it--proof given
that it fails of universal application 42
Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself--1. The
Suitable or Becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected 43
2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will not hold 44
3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable--that
which is received through the eye and the ear 45
Objections to this last--What property is there common to
both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two
senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful? _ib._
Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in common,
the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this
ground they are called beautiful 46
This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of Good,
and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful is
the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has
been already declared inadmissible _ib._
Remarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations ascribed to
Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates
are attempts to assign some general concept 47
Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to
Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the
Memorabilia 49
Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates 51
Rhetoric against Dialectic 52
Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the
speculative and analytical philosophers _ib._
Concrete Aggregates--abstract or logical Aggregates.
Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician 53
Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought into
debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty 54
Hippias Minor--characters and situation supposed 55
Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols
Achilles as better than Odysseus--the veracious and straightforward
hero better than the mendacious and crafty 56
This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the
mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can answer
truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses,
_i. e._ the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make sure of
doing either the one or the other 57
Analogy of special arts--it is only the arithmetician who
can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses
_ib._
View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He
thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains
that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent
purpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose 58
Issue here taken--Sokrates contends that those who hurt,
or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like
unwillingly--he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his
questions _ib._
Questions of Sokrates--multiplied analogies of the special
arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly,
whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well
when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses 59
It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his
mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when he intends
to hit 60
Dissent and repugnance of Hippias _ib._
Conclusion--That none but the good man can do evil
wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist
the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion--Sokrates confesses
his perplexity 61
Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted,
the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the
sophistry and corruption of the Sophists 62
Polemical purpose of the dialogue--Hippias humiliated by
Sokrates 63
Philosophical purpose of the dialogue--theory of the
Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by
Plato _ib._
The Hippias is an exemplification of this theory--Sokrates
sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it
up. Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias--Error in the Greater 64
The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed
by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia 66
Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it 67
Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively
on the intellectual conditions of human conduct _ib._
They rely too much on the analogy of the special arts--they
take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of
praise and blame 68
Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be
suggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of
the question under review 69
Antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic 70
CHAPTER XIV.
HIPPARCHUS--MINOS.
Hipparchus--Question--What is the definition of Lover of
Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth
nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man
expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing:
in this sense, no man is a lover of gain 71
Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all men are
lovers of gain 72
Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of
trying to deceive him--accusation is retorted upon Sokrates 73
Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the
Peisistratid--never deceive a friend. Eulogy of Hipparchus by
Sokrates _ib._
Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers.
The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain is evil 74
Questions by Sokrates--bad gain is _gain_, as much as
good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are
called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a
smaller outlay, is gain. Objections--the acquisition may be
evil--embarrassment confessed _ib._
It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be
greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay.
The valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good.
Conclusion comes back. That Gain is Good 75
Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good,
and that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no man
ought to be reproached for being so the companion is compelled to
admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded _ib._
Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion. What is
Law, or The Law? All law is the same, _quatenus_ law: what is
the common constituent attribute? 76
Answer--Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding customs. 2.
The decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion _ib._
Cross-examination by Sokrates--just and lawfully-behaving
men are so through law; unjust and lawless men are so through the
absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful: lawlessness is
ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city--or bad social
opinion--cannot be law 77
Suggestion by Sokrates--Law is the _good_ opinion of
the city--but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding out of
reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of
reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so 77
Objection taken by the Companion--That there is great
discordance of laws in different places--he specifies several cases
of such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity,
and requests him to confine himself to question or answer 78
Farther questions by Sokrates--Things heavy and light, just and
unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so, and are accounted
so everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever
fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful _ib._
There are laws of health and of cure, composed by the few
physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by
them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared
by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the
laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who
know how to rule 79
That which is right is the regal law, the only true and
real law--that which is not right, is not law, but only seems to be
law in the eyes of the ignorant 80
Minos, King of Krete--his laws were divine and excellent,
and have remained unchanged from time immemorial _ib._
Question about the character of Minos--Homer and Hesiod
declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians defame him
as a tyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens 81
That Minos was really admirable--and that he has found out truth and
reality respecting the administration of the city--we may be sure
from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered _ib._
The question is made more determinate--What is it that the
good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the
mind, as the physician measures out food and exercise for the body?
Sokrates cannot tell. Close 81
The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each other, and
both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished 82
Hipparchus--double meaning of [Greek: philokerdê\s] and
[Greek: ke/rdos] _ib._
State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent
inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found 83
Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain,
what is the meaning of the word _gain_**? None is found _ib._
Purpose of Plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the
confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for
clearing it up 84
Historical narrative and comments given in the dialogue
respecting Hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to
be spurious _ib._
Minos. Question--What is the characteristic property
connoted by the word [Greek: No/mos] or law? 86
This question was discussed by the historical Sokrates,
Memorabilia of Xenophon _ib._
Definitions of law--suggested and refuted. Law includes,
as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c.
Bad decrees are not laws 86
Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it is the declared
judgment and command of the Wise man upon the subject to which it
refers--it is truth and reality, found out and certified by him 87
Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but
Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato--he
acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought to
_be_ Law 88
Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind--the work of
systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man 89
Different applications of this general Platonic view, in
the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. _Natural_ Rectitude of
Law, Government, Names, &c _ib._
Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on this divine
type or natural rectitude 90
The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a
Trilogy along with the Leges 91
Explanations of the word Law--confusion in its meaning _ib._
CHAPTER XV.
THEAGES.
Theagês--has been declared spurious by some modern
critics--grounds for such opinion not sufficient 98
Persons of the dialogue--Sokrates, with Demodokus and
Theagês, father and son. Theagês (the son), eager to acquire
knowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist 99
Sokrates questions Theagês, inviting him to specify what he
wants _ib._
Theagês desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can
govern freemen with their own consent 100
Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else.
Theagês requests that Sokrates will himself teach him _ib._
Sokrates declares that he is not competent to teach--that
he knows nothing except about matters of love. Theagês maintains that
many of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation
of Sokrates 101
Sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened--he
recites his experience of the divine sign or Dæmon _ib._
The Dæmon is favourable to some persons, adverse to others.
Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by
the society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt anything from
Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him 102
Theagês expresses his anxiety to be received as the
companion of Sokrates 103
Remarks on the Theagês--analogy with the Lachês 104
Chief peculiarity of the Theagês--stress laid upon the
divine sign or Dæmon _ib._
Plato employs this divine sign here to render some
explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of
his unequal influence upon different companions _ib._
Sokrates, while continually finding fault with other
teachers, refused to teach himself--difficulty of finding an excuse
for his refusal. The Theagês furnishes an excuse 106
Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues, allude to
the divine sign in the same way. Its character and working
essentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person _ib._
CHAPTER XVI.
ERASTÆ OR ANTERASTÆ--RIVALES.
Erastæ--subject and persons of the dialogue--dramatic
introduction--interesting youths in the palæstra 111
Two rival Erastæ--one of them literary, devoted to
philosophy--the other gymnastic, hating philosophy _ib._
Question put by Sokrates--What is philosophy? It is the
perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sum
total 112
In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise
which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the mind
also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured quantity
which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure? _ib._
No answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the
literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the
greatest reputation as a philosopher--as much as will enable him to
talk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise 113
The philosopher is one who is second-best in several
different arts--a Pentathlus--who talks well upon each _ib._
On what occasions can such second-best men be useful? There
are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the
second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner 114
Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned
acquirements _ib._
Sokrates changes his course of examination--questions put
to show that there is one special art, regal and political, of
administering and discriminating the bad from the good 115
In this art the philosopher must not only be second-best,
competent to talk--but he must be a fully qualified practitioner,
competent to act _ib._
Close of the dialogue--humiliation of the literary Erastes 116
Remarks--animated manner of the dialogue _ib._
Definition of philosophy--here sought for the first
time--Platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered 117
View taken of the second-best critical talking man, as
compared with the special proficient and practitioner 118
Plato's view--that the philosopher has a province special
to himself, distinct from other specialties--dimly indicated--regal
or political art 119
Philosopher--the supreme artist controlling other artists 120
CHAPTER XVII.
ION.
Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion among
modern critics as to its genuineness 124
Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at
the festivals. Ion has been triumphant 124
Functions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation--exposition of the
poets--arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent 125
The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from
their recitation--powerful effect which they produced _ib._
Ion both reciter and expositor--Homer was considered more
as an instructor than as a poet 126
Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional
working _ib._
Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of
Sokrates to him--How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon
other poets? The poetic art is one 127
Explanation given by Sokrates--both the Rhapsode and the
Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration--fine
poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from
some God _ib._
Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction
successive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then
act through him and through Ion upon the auditors 128
This comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an
expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the Apology 129
Platonic Antithesis: systematic procedure distinguished
from unsystematic: which latter was either blind routine, or madness
inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good and bad 129
Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in
Grecian life--privileged communications from the Gods to
Sokrates--his firm belief in them 130
Condition of the inspired person--his reason is for the
time withdrawn 131
Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind 132
Homer talks upon all subjects--Is Ion competent to explain
what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its
province? _ib._
The Rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the
craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the
business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers, having
learnt it from Homer 133
Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of
what he says, but by divine inspiration 134
The generals in Greece usually possessed no professional
experience--Homer and the poets were talked of as the great
teachers--Plato's view of the poet, as pretending to know
everything, but really knowing nothing _ib._
Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge 136
Illustration of Plato's opinion respecting the uselessness
of written geometrical treatises _ib._
CHAPTER XVIII.
LACHES.
Lachês. Subject and persons of the dialogue--whether it is
useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of
arms. Nikias and Lachês differ in opinion 138
Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion--he replies that the point
cannot be decided without a competent professional judge 139
Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their
competence to judge--Sokrates avows his own incompetence 140
Nikias and Lachês submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates 141
Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their
feelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the question
shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education 141
Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man--this
man is never seen or identified 142
We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on
education--virtue, as a whole, is too large a question--we will
enquire about one branch of virtue--courage _ib._
Question--what is courage? Laches answers by citing
one particularly manifest case of courage--mistake of not giving a
general explanation 143
Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the
mind--Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and
incorrect--endurance is not always courage: even intelligent
endurance is not always courage _ib._
Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort
of Intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not
terrible. Objections of Lachês 144
Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events,
not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of future
events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present 145
Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil
generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and
we declared that courage was only a part thereof--it will not hold
therefore as a definition of courage 146
Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion
of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about
courage without knowing what it is _ib._
No solution given by Plato--apparent tendency of his mind,
in looking for a solution. Intelligence--cannot be understood without
reference to some object or end 147
Object--is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence--of
things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is not
possessed by professional artists 148
Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly
indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man--correlates with the
undiscovered Science of Ends _ib._
Perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one
sufficient condition of virtue 149
Dramatic contrast between Lachês and Sokrates, as cross-examiners 150
CHAPTER XIX.
CHARMIDES.
Scene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded palæstra.
Emotions of Sokrates 153
Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate
Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness 154
But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and slowness
is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary.
Temperance cannot be slowness _ib._
Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of
shame. Refuted by Sokrates _ib._
Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one's own
business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, and
refutes it. Distinction between making and doing 155
Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in self-knowledge. _ib._
Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does
self-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this case?
Answer: There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the knowledge
itself 156
Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge, without a
given _cognitum_ as its object. Analogies to prove that
knowledge of knowledge is impossible 156
All knowledge must be relative to some object 157
All properties are relative--every thing in nature has its
characteristic property with reference to something else _ib._
Even if cognition of cognition were possible, cognition of
non-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what he knows, but
he cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the fact _that_
he knows: but he does not know how much he knows, and how much he
does not know 158
Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be of
little or no value 159
But even granting the possibility of that which has just
been denied, still Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that
all separate work were well performed, by special practitioners, we
should not attain our end--Happiness _ib._
Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to
well-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and evil 160
Without the science of good and evil, the other special
science will be of little or of no service. Temperance is not the
science of good and evil, and is of little service 161
Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research. He
cannot find out what temperance is: although several concessions have
been made which cannot be justified _ib._
Temperance is and must be a good thing: but Charmides
cannot tell whether he is temperate or not; since what temperance is
remains unknown 162
Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and
devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornament
throughout _ib._
The Charmides is an excellent specimen of Dialogues of
Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all ultimately
disallowed 163
Trial and Error, the natural process of the human mind.
Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of
the mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of
conscious ignorance 164
Familiar words--constantly used, with much earnest
feeling, but never understood nor defined--ordinary phenomenon in
human society 165
Different ethical points of view in different Platonic
dialogues 167
Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible _ib._
In other dialogues, Sokrates declares self-knowledge to be
essential and inestimable. Necessity for the student to have
presented to him dissentient points of view _ib._
Courage and Temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning,
except as founded on the general cognizance of good and evil 168
Distinction made between the special sciences and the
science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences are
of no use _ib._
Knowledge, always relative to some object known. Postulate
or divination of a Science of Teleology 169
Courage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and by
Aristotle. Comparison between the two 170
CHAPTER XX.
LYSIS.
Analogy between Lysis and Charmides. Richness of dramatic
incident in both. Youthful beauty 172
Scenery and personages of the Lysis _ib._
Origin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to give an example
of the proper way of talking to a youth, for his benefit 173
Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis _ib._
Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothalês 177
Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain to
Menexenus _ib._
Value of the first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis,
as an illustration of the Platonico-Sokratic manner 177
Sokrates begins to examine Menexenus respecting friendship.
Who is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue 178
Questions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims of the
poets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected _ib._
Other poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion;
unlikeness, of friendship. Reasons _pro_ and _con_.
Rejected 179
Confusion of Sokrates. He suggests, That the Indifferent
(neither good nor evil) is friend to the Good 180
Suggestion canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend to the
Good, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil, from
which it is anxious to escape 180
Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate
condition--not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance 181
Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new suggestion. The
Primum Amabile, or object originally dear to us, _per se_: by
relation or resemblance to which other objects become dear _ib._
The cause of love is desire. We desire that which is akin
to us or our own 182
Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is alien to every one.
Inconsistency with what has been previously laid down 183
Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue 184
Remarks. No positive result. Sokratic purpose in analysing the familiar
words--to expose the false persuasion of knowledge _ib._
Subject of Lysis. Suited for a Dialogue of Search. Manner
of Sokrates, multiplying defective explanations, and showing reasons
why each is defective 185
The process of trial and error is better illustrated by a
search without result than with result. Usefulness of the dialogue
for self-working minds 186
Subject of friendship, handled both by the Xenophontic
Sokrates, and by Aristotle _ib._
Debate in the Lysis partly verbal, partly real.
Assumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, questionable, such as the
real Sokrates would have found reason for challenging 188
Peculiar theory about friendship broached by Sokrates.
Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a superficial
tinge of evil, and desiring good to escape from it 189
This general theory illustrated by the case of the
philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of ignorance
the attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and Plato
upon this attribute 190
Another theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or
original and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved
through association with this. The object is Good 191
Statement by Plato of the general law of mental association _ib._
Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates,
with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic
communion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler
analogical communion 192
Primum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima Amicitia
of Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical aggregate, not
member of a generic family 194
The Good and Beautiful, considered as objects of attachment _ib._
CHAPTER XXI.
EUTHYDEMUS.
Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthydêmus. Judgments
of various critics 195
Scenery and personages _ib._
The two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus: manner in
which they are here presented 196
Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by Sokrates,
next by the two Sophists _ib._
Contrast between the two different modes of interrogation 197
Wherein this contrast does not consist 198
Wherein it does consist 199
Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists--their bidding for the
applause of the by-standers _ibid._
Comparison of the Euthydêmus with the Parmenidês 200
Necessity of settling accounts with the negative, before
we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both: in the one the
process is solitary and serious; in the other, it is vulgarised and
ludicrous 201
Opinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the
Euthydêmus, that Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus represent the way in
which Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors 202
That opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more Eristic
than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by continuous
speech or lecture _ib._
Sokrates in the Euthydêmus is drawn suitably to the
purpose of that dialogue 203
The two Sophists in the Euthydêmus are not to be taken as
real persons, or representatives of real persons 204
Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias--possession of good things is
useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use them _ib._
But intelligence--of what? It must be such intelligence,
or such an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and
the right use of it when made 205
Where is such an art to be found? The regal or political
art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No answer can be
found. Ends in puzzle 206
Review of the cross-examination just pursued by Sokrates.
It is very suggestive--puts the mind upon what to look for 207
Comparison with other dialogues--Republic, Philêbus, Protagoras.
The only distinct answer is found in the Protagoras 208
The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically admired
while it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real
admiration, but the contrary _ib._
Mistaken representations about the Sophists--Aristotle's
definition--no distinguishable line can be drawn between the Sophist
and the Dialectician 210
Philosophical purpose of the Euthydêmus--exposure of
fallacies, in Plato's dramatic manner, by multiplication of
particular examples 211
Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a classification of
fallacies: Plato enumerates them without classification 212
Fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two Sophists
in the Euthydêmus _ib._
Fallacies--_à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum
simpliciter_--in the Euthydêmus 213
Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their
replies--determination not to contradict themselves 214
Farther verbal equivocations _ib._
Fallacies involving deeper logical principles--contradiction
is impossible.--To speak falsely is impossible 215
Plato's Euthydêmus is the earliest known attempt to set
out and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies is to
exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the conclusion
proved is known _aliunde_ to be false and absurd 216
Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and
propagated by Athenian Sophists--they are inherent inadvertencies and
liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal
debate affords the best means of correcting them 217
Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief, misguided by
one or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates, Plato, Bacon,
&c.,--complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by Mill 218
Value of formal debate as a means for testing and
confuting fallacies 221
Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could not have
composed his Euthydêmus, nor Aristotle the treatise De Sophisticis
Elenchis _ib._
Probable popularity of the Euthydêmus at Athens--welcomed
by all the enemies of Dialectic 222
Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to obviate this
inference by opponents--Conversation between Sokrates and Kriton 223
Altered tone in speaking of Euthydêmus--Disparagement of
persons half-philosophers, half-politicians 224
Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his
sons--Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher--tells him to search for
himself 225
Euthydêmus is here cited as representative of Dialectic
and philosophy 226
Who is the person here intended by Plato,
half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates? 227
Variable feeling at different times, between Plato and
Isokrates 228
CHAPTER XXII.
MENON.
Persons of the Dialogue 232
Question put by Menon--Is virtue teachable? Sokrates confesses that
he does not know what virtue is. Surprise of Menon _ib._
Sokrates stands alone in this confession. Unpopularity
entailed by it 233
Answer of Menon--plurality of virtues, one belonging to
each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the
property common to all of them _ib._
Analogous cases cited--definitions of figure and colour 235
Importance at that time of bringing into conscious view,
logical subordination and distinctions--Neither logic nor grammar had
then been cast into system _ib._
Definition of virtue given by Menon: Sokrates pulls it to pieces 236
Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds
him like an electric shock--Sokrates replies that he is himself in
the same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of
search by both 237
But how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man
searches for what he already knows: and for what he does not know,
it is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he has found it _ib._
Theory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates--anterior immortality
of the soul--what is called teaching is the revival and recognition
of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten _ib._
Illustration of this theory--knowledge may be revived by
skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught. Sokrates
questions the slave of Menon 238
Enquiry taken up--Whether virtue is teachable? without
determining what virtue is 239
Virtue is knowledge--no possessions, no attributes, either
of mind or body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance of
knowledge _ib._
Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there
are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No
teachers of it can be found 239
Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the
Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can
teach virtue 240
Confused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring
virtue is shown _ib._
Sokrates modifies his premisses--knowledge is not the only thing
which guides to good results--right opinion will do the same _ib._
Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind,
and can never give rational explanations, nor teach others--good
practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the
Gods 241
All the real virtue that there is, is communicated by
special inspiration from the Gods 242
But what virtue itself is, remains unknown _ib._
Remarks on the dialogue. Proper order for examining the
different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates _ib._
Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions when
the fundamental notions and word are unsettled _ib._
Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon--desire of good alleged
to be universally felt--in what sense this is true 243
Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of
virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what? 244
Subject of Menon; same as that of the Protagoras--diversity
of handling--Plato is not anxious to settle a question and
get rid of it 245
Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of
research 246
Great question discussed among the Grecian
philosophers--criterion of truth--Wherein consists the process
of verification? _ib._
None of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer
here made by Plato--that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal
experience 247
Plato's view of the immortality of the soul--difference
between the Menon, Phædrus, and Phædon 249
Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful
examination out of the unlettered mind--how far correct? _ib._
Plato's doctrine about _à priori_ reasonings--different
from the modern doctrine 251
Plato's theory about pre-natal experience. He took no
pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience 252
Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic
Ideas or Forms 253
What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning--his distinction
between knowledge and right opinion _ib._
This distinction compared with modern philosophical views 254
Manifestation of Anytus--intense antipathy to the Sophists
and to philosophy generally 255
The enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the
sophists--practical statesmen 256
The Menon brings forward the point of analogy between
Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the
practical statesmen 257
CHAPTER XXIII.
PROTAGORAS.
Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue 259
Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates to
become acquainted with Protagoras 260
Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose and
expectations from Protagoras _ib._
Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a Sophist
without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach 262
Remarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of knowledge
brought to light 263
Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias.
Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras 264
Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter,
declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own
openness in avowing himself a sophist _ib._
Protagoras prefers to converse in presence of the assembled
company 266
Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young men as
virtuous citizens _ib._
Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for
such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not. _ib._
Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe 267
Mythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods. Prometheus and
Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter. It
is partly amended by Prometheus 267
Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of
individual wants, but could not give them the social art--Mankind are
on the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions
essential for society 268
Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse. Justice and
the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but are possessed
by all citizens and taught by all to all 269
Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of punishment 270
Why eminent men cannot make their sons eminent 271
Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws,
dikastery, &c. _ib._
All learn virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a
learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his own
individual aptitude 272
Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special teacher
thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others 273
The sons of great artists do not themselves become great
artists 274
Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain the
manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates
and perpetuates itself 274
Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is
to be assimilated to a special art 275
Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of
Protagoras--he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of
the fundamental assumptions 276
One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous
discourse with short cross-examining question and answer 277
Questions by Sokrates--Whether virtue is one and
indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are
homogeneous or heterogeneous? _ib._
Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? How far
justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, "If
you please" 278
Intelligence and moderation are identical, because they
have the same contrary 279
Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to
distinguish different meanings of the same term _ib._
Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated 280
Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to
test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry
prolixity _ib._
Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as
inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates
rises to depart 281
Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued.
Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought
to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue 282
Claim of a special _locus standi_ and professorship
for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric _ib._
Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites
Protagoras to question him _ib._
Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of
the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides.
Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song 283
Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the
song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed
sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech 283
Character of this speech--its connection with the
dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in
continuous speech 284
Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets.
Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from
themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the
task of answering 285
Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really
feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this
purpose 287
The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that
courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue 288
Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in
knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates
changes his attack _ib._
Identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the painful
with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate 289
Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the
mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or
pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant 290
Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge.
We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a
preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures 291
Pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil. No man does
evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures
present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and pain 292
Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing
pleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it 293
To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase
for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance 294
Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which
conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable 295
Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of
things terrible and not terrible _ib._
Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of
the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in
confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras.
Amicable reply of Protagoras 297
Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least
allusion to Hippokrates 298
Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one
under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates 299
Order of ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates _ib._
Difference of method between him and Protagoras flows from
this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without
enquiry 300
Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to
established public sentiments with which he is in harmony 301
Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem
which Protagoras had left out _ib._
Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the
analytical cross-examiner 303
Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though
he is described as brought to a contradiction _ib._
Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by
Plato himself elsewhere _ib._
The harsh epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are
not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the
common consciousness 304
Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the
song of Simonides 305
Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at length
clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of
pleasures and pains of the agent _ib._
Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory 306
Reasoning of Sokrates 307
Application of that reasoning to the case of courage _ib._
The theory which Plato here lays down is more distinct and
specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues 308
Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is
too narrow, and exclusively prudential 309
Comparison with the Republic 310
The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part
of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates 311
The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of
Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of
other persons besides the agent himself 312
Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or
satisfactory, especially about courage 313
Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct.
That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato
as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists 314
Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency 315
Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close
of the dialogue 316
CHAPTER XXIV.
GORGIAS.
Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the
historical Gorgias 317
Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and
Kalliklês 318
Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good
definition _ib._
Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the
artisan of persuasion 319
The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what
matters is he competent to advise? 319
The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even
against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among
the ignorant 320
Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes
up the debate with Sokrates 321
Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he
gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical
knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to
cookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery _ib._
Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of
the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the
same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure 322
Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have
any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish 323
All men wish for what is good for them. Despots and
Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for
them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, and
therefore have no real power 324
Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia--Polus
affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks
so--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless
denies it 325
Sokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil to do
wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is
better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished 326
Sokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and
Turpe--Proof of the first point 327
Proof of the second point _ib._
The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which
though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure
for him. To be punished is best for him 328
Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our friend
has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought
to keep him unpunished 329
Argument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed by
Kalliklês whether he means it seriously 330
Principle laid down by Sokrates--That every one acts with
a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery _ib._
Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness 331
Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the
Platonic meaning _ib._
Examination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency
between the general answer of Polus and his previous
declarations--Law and Nature 332
The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates,
will not hold 334
Worse or better--for whom? The argument of Sokrates does
not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference,
the definition would be inadmissible _ib._
Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and
misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus
is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it 335
If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in
which punishment is considered would be reversed 336
Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper
and bodily distemper--Material difference between the two--Distemper
must be felt by the distempered persons 337
Kalliklês begins to argue against Sokrates--he takes a
distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature--Reply of
Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly
understood 338
What Kalliklês says is not to be taken as a sample of the
teachings of Athenian sophists. Kalliklês--rhetor and politician 339
Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may
be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kalliklês is
made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it 340
Sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is
requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kalliklês defends
the negative 343
Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man,
provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties
of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are
identical? 344
Kalliklês maintains that pleasurable and good are
identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad.
A scientific adviser is required to discriminate them 345
Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and
Sokrates in the Protagoras _ib._
Views of critics about this contradiction 346
Comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of Sokrates
in both dialogues _ib._
Distinct statement in the Protagoras. What are good and
evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed
in discriminating them. No such distinct statement in the Gorgias 347
Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense--not
recognised by Plato in either of the dialogues 348
In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is
self-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the
pleasures and pains of other persons, so far as affected by
the agent 349
Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in
substance the same, but differing in classification _ib._
Kalliklês, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, maintains
a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in the
Protagoras 350
The refutation of Kalliklês by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is
unsuccessful--it is only so far successful as he adopts
unintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras 351
Permanent elements--and transient elements--of human
agency--how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues 353
In the Protagoras _ib._
In the Gorgias 354
Character of the Gorgias generally--discrediting all the
actualities of life 355
Argument of Sokrates resumed--multifarious arts of
flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure 357
The Rhetors aim at only flattering the public--even the
best past Rhetors have done nothing else--citation of the four great
Rhetors by Kallikles 357
Necessity for temperance, regulation, order. This is the
condition of virtue and happiness 358
Impossible to succeed in public life, unless a man be
thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force 359
Danger of one who dissents from the public, either for
better or for worse _ib._
Sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself--to
study permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction 360
Sokrates announces himself as almost the only man at Athens,
who follows out the true political art. Danger of doing this 361
Mythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of deceased
persons therein, according to their merits during life--the
philosopher who stood aloof from public affairs, will then be
rewarded _ib._
Peculiar ethical views of Sokrates--Rhetorical or
dogmatical character of the Gorgias 362
He merges politics in Ethics--he conceives the rulers as
spiritual teachers and trainers of the community _id._
_Idéal_ of Plato--a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer,
on scientific principles, fashioning all characters pursuant to
certain types of his own 363
Platonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily
health--incomplete analogy--circumstances of difference _ib._
Sokrates in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a
community of fixed opinions and habits. Impossible that a dissenter,
on important points, should acquire any public influence 364
Sokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen. He
is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic 365
Antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric _ib._
Position of one who dissents, upon material points, from
the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen 366
Probable feelings of Plato on this subject--Claim put
forward in the Gorgias of an independent _locus standi_ for
philosophy, but without the indiscriminate cross-examination
pursued by Sokrates 367
Importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion.
Tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance 368
Issue between philosophy and rhetoric--not satisfactorily
handled by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble manner in which
it is presented by Polus and Kalliklês 369
Perikles would have accepted the defence of rhetoric, as
Plato has put it into the mouth of Gorgias 370
The Athenian people recognise a distinction between the
pleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which Plato
conceived 371
Rhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to all the
various established sentiments and opinions. Erroneous inferences
raised by the Kalliklês of Plato 373
The Platonic Idéal exacts, as good, some order, system,
discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good.
Divergent ideas about virtue 374
How to discriminate the right order from the wrong. Plato
does not advise us 375
The Gorgias upholds the independence and dignity of the
dissenting philosopher _ib._
CHAPTER XXV.
PHÆDON.
The Phædon is affirmative and expository 377
Situation and circumstances assumed in the Phædon. Pathetic
interest which they inspire _ib._
Simmias and Kebês, the two collocutors with Sokrates. Their
feelings and those of Sokrates 378
Emphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate, active
exercise of reason, and independent judgment for each reasoner 379
Anxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on their
guard against being influenced by his authority--that they shall
follow only the convictions of their own reason 380
Remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned
truth and the liberty of individual dissent 381
Phædon and Symposion--points of analogy and contrast 382
Phædon--compared with Republic and Timæus. No recognition
of the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul and body 383
Different doctrines of Plato about the soul. Whether all
the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul alone 385
The life and character of a philosopher is a constant
struggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone enables
him to do this completely 386
Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after
death into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher alone is
relieved from all communion with body 387
Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the Phædon
apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers 388
Simmias and Kebês do not admit readily the immortality of
the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by asking for proof.
Unabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate 390
Simmias and Kebês believe fully in the pre-existence of
the soul, but not in its post-existence. Doctrine--That the soul is a
sort of harmony--refuted by Sokrates _ib._
Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings
through which his mind had passed 391
First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons why he
rejected it _ib._
Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of
Anaxagoras 393
Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow out the
optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes
efficient and causes co-efficient 394
Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle
for himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it, and
embraced a third doctrine about cause 395
He now assumes the separate existence of ideas. These
ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain
attributes 396
Procedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned. He
insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the hypothesis and the
discussion of its consequences 397
Exposition of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers. Remarks
upon it 398
The philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned upon
different views as to a true cause _ib._.
Problems and difficulties of which Sokrates first sought
solution 399
Expectations entertained by Sokrates from the treatise of
Anaxagoras. His disappointment. His distinction between causes and
co-efficients 400
Sokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of substituting
physical agencies in place of mental. This is the same which
Aristophanes and others imputed to Sokrates 401
The supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be carried out,
either by Sokrates himself or any one else. Sokrates turns to general
words, and adopts the theory of ideas 403
Vague and dissentient meanings attached to the word Cause.
That is a cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to his
inquisitive feelings 404
Dissension and perplexity on the question.--What is a
cause? revealed by the picture of Sokrates--no intuition to guide him
407
Different notions of Plato and Aristotle about causation,
causes regular and irregular. Inductive theory of causation,
elaborated in modern times _ib._
Last transition of the mind of Sokrates from things to
words--to the adoption of the theory of ideas. Great multitude of
ideas assumed, each fitting a certain number of particulars 410
Ultimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme generality 411
Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul rests
upon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to prove this 412
The soul always brings life, and is essentially living. It
cannot receive death: in other words, it is immortal 413
The proof of immortality includes pre-existence as well as
post-existence--animals as well as man--also the metempsychosis or
translation of the soul from one body to another 414
After finishing his proof that the soul is immortal,
Sokrates enters into a description, what will become of it after the
death of the body. He describes a [Greek: Nekui/a] 415
Sokrates expects that his soul is going to the islands of
the blest. Reply to Kriton about burying his body 416
Preparations for administering the hemlock. Sympathy of
the gaoler. Equanimity of Sokrates _ib._
Sokrates swallows the poison. Conversation with the gaoler 417
Ungovernable sorrow of the friends present. Self-command
of Sokrates. Last words to Kriton, and death _ib._
Extreme pathos, and probable trustworthiness of these
personal details 419
Contrast between the Platonic Apology and the Phædon _ib._.
Abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the Phædon
compared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the
Apology 421
Total renunciation and discredit of the body in the Phædon.
Different feeling about the body in other Platonic dialogues 422
Plato's argument does not prove the immortality of the
soul. Even if it did prove that, yet the mode of pre-existence and
the mode of post-existence, of the soul, would be quite undetermined 423
The philosopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul
unattached to any body 425
Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul did
not appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers. The question
remained debated and problematical 426
PLATO.
CHAPTER XII
ALKIBIADES I. AND II.
ALKIBIADES I.--ON THE NATURE OF MAN.
[Side-note: Situation supposed in the dialogue.
Persons--Sokrates and Alkibiades.]
This dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Alkibiades. It
introduces Alkibiades as about twenty years of age, having just
passed through the period of youth, and about to enter on the
privileges and duties of a citizen. The real dispositions and
circumstances of the historical Alkibiades (magnificent personal
beauty, stature, and strength, high family and connections, great
wealth already possessed, since his father had died when he was a
child,--a full measure of education and accomplishments--together
with exorbitant ambition and insolence, derived from such accumulated
advantages) are brought to view in the opening address of Sokrates.
Alkibiades, during the years of youth which he had just passed, had
been surrounded by admirers who tried to render themselves acceptable
to him, but whom he repelled with indifference, and even with scorn.
Sokrates had been among them, constantly present and near to
Alkibiades, but without ever addressing a word to him. The youthful
beauty being now exchanged for manhood, all these admirers had
retired, and Sokrates alone remains. His attachment is to Alkibiades
himself: to promise of mind rather than to attractions of person.
Sokrates has been always hitherto restrained, by his divine sign
or Dæmon, from speaking to Alkibiades. But this prohibition has now
been removed; and he accosts him for the first time, in the full
belief that he shall be able to give improving counsel, essential to
the success of that political career upon which the youth is about to
enter.[1]
[Footnote 1: Plato, Alkib. i. 103, 104, 105. Perikles is supposed to
be still alive and political leader of Athens--104 B.
I have briefly sketched the imaginary situation to which this
dialogue is made to apply. The circumstances of it belong to Athenian
manners of the Platonic age.
Some of the critics, considering that the relation supposed between
Sokrates and Alkibiades is absurd and unnatural, allege this among
their reasons for denying the authenticity of the dialogue. But if
any one reads the concluding part of the Symposion--the authenticity
of which has never yet been denied by any critic--he will find
something a great deal more abnormal in what is there recounted about
Sokrates and Alkibiades.
In a dialogue composed by Æschines Socraticus (cited by the rhetor
Aristeides--[Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s], Or. xlv. p. 23-24),
expressions of intense love for Alkibiades are put into the mouth of
Sokrates. Æschines was [Greek: gnê/sios e(tai=ros Sôkra/tous], not
less than Plato. The different companions of Sokrates thus agreed in
their picture of the relation between him and Alkibiades.]
[Side-note: Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of
Alkibiades.]
You are about to enter on public life (says Sokrates to Alkibiades)
with the most inordinate aspirations for glory and aggrandisement.
You not only thirst for the acquisition of ascendancy such as
Perikles possesses at Athens, but your ambition will not be satisfied
unless you fill Asia with your renown, and put yourself upon a level
with Cyrus and Xerxes. Now such aspirations cannot be gratified
except through my assistance. I do not deal in long discourses such
as you have been accustomed to hear from others: I shall put to you
only some short interrogatories, requiring nothing more than answers
to my questions.[2]
[Footnote 2: Plato, Alkib. i. 106 B. [Greek: A)=ra e)rôtta=|s ei)/
tina e)/chô ei)pei=n lo/gon makro/n, oi(/ous dê\ a)kou/ein
ei)/thisai? ou) ga/r e)sti toiou=ton to\ e)mo/n.] I give here, as
elsewhere, not an exact translation, but an abstract.]
[Side-note: Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to
Alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What
does he intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does
he know?]
_Sokr._--You are about to step forward as adviser of the public
assembly. Upon what points do you intend to advise them? Upon points
which you know better than they? _Alk._--Of course.
_Sokr._--All that you know, has been either learnt from others
or found out by yourself. _Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--But
you would neither have learnt any thing, nor found out any thing,
without the desire to learn or find out: and you would have felt no
such desire, in respect to that which you believed yourself to know
already. That which you now know, therefore, there was a time when
you believed yourself not to know? _Alk._--Necessarily so.
_Sokr._--Now all that you have learnt, as I am well aware,
consists of three things--letters, the harp, gymnastics. Do you
intend to advise the Athenians when they are debating about letters,
or about harp-playing, or about gymnastics? _Alk._--Neither of
the three. _Sokr._--Upon what occasions, then, do you propose to
give advice? Surely, not when the Athenians are debating about
architecture, or prophetic warnings, or the public health: for to
deliver opinions on each of these matters, belongs not to you but to
professional men--architects, prophets, physicians; whether they be
poor or rich, high-born or low-born? If not _then_, upon what
other occasions will you tender your counsel? _Alk._--When they
are debating about affairs of their own.
[Side-note: Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on
questions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must
fight those whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better
refer? To just and unjust.]
_Sokr._--But about what affairs of their own? Not about affairs
of shipbuilding: for of that you know nothing. _Alk._--When they
are discussing war and peace, or any other business concerning the
city. _Sokr._--You mean when they are discussing the question
with whom they shall make war or peace, and in what manner? But it is
certain that we must fight those whom it is best to fight--also
_when_ it is best--and _as long as_ it is best.
_Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--Now, if the Athenians wished
to know whom it was best to wrestle with, and when or how long it was
best which of the two would be most competent to advise them, you or
the professional trainer? _Alk._--The trainer, undoubtedly.
_Sokr._--So, too, about playing the harp or singing. But when
you talk about _better_, in wrestling or singing, what standard
do you refer to? Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art?
_Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--Answer me in like manner about war or
peace, the subjects on which you are going to advise your countrymen,
whom, and at what periods, it is _better_ to fight, and
_better_ not to fight? What in this last case do you mean by
_better_? To what standard, or to what end, do you refer?[3]
_Alk._--I cannot say. _Sokr._--But is it not a disgrace,
since you profess to advise your countrymen when and against whom
it is better for them to war,--not to be able to say to what end your
_better_ refers? Do not you know what are the usual grounds and
complaints urged when war is undertaken? _Alk._--Yes:
complaints of having been cheated, or robbed, or injured.
_Sokr._--Under what circumstances? _Alk._--You mean,
whether justly or unjustly? That makes all the difference.
_Sokr._--Do you mean to advise the Athenians to fight those who
behave justly, or those who behave unjustly? _Alk._--The
question is monstrous. Certainly not those who behave justly. It
would be neither lawful nor honourable. _Sokr._--Then when you
spoke about _better_, in reference to war or peace, what you
meant was _juster_--you had in view justice and injustice?
_Alk._--It seems so.
[Footnote 3: Plato, Alkib. i. 108 E--109 A.
[Greek: i)/thi dê/, kai\ to\ en tô=| polemei=n be/ltion kai\ to\ en
tô=| ei)rê/nên a)/gein, tou=to to\ be/ltion ti/ o)noma/zeis? ô(/sper
e)kei= e)ph' e)ka/stô| e)/leges to\ a)/meinon, o(/ti mousikô/teron,
kai\ e)pi\ tô=| e(terô|, o(/ti gumnastikô/teron; peirô= dê\ kai\
e)ntau=tha le/gein to\ be/ltion . . . . . pro\s ti/ teinei to\ e)n
tô=| ei)rê/nên te a)/gein a)/meinon kai\ to\ e)n tô=| polemei=n oi(=s
dei=?] _Alkib._ [Greek: A)lla\ skopô=n ou) du/namai
e)nnoê=sai.]]
[Side-note: How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern
or distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he
always knew it, even as a boy.]
_Sokr._--How is this? How do you know, or where have you learnt,
to distinguish just from unjust? Have you frequented some master,
without my knowledge, to teach you this? If you have, pray introduce
me to him, that I also may learn it from him. _Alk._--You are
jesting. _Sokr._--Not at all: I love you too well to jest.
_Alk._--But what if I had no master? Cannot I know about justice
and injustice, without a master? _Sokr._--Certainly: you might
find out for yourself, if you made search and investigated. But this
you would not do, unless you were under the persuasion that you did
not already know. _Alk._--Was there not a time when I really
believed myself not to know it? _Sokr._--Perhaps there may have
been: tell me _when_ that time was. Was it last year?
_Alk._--No: last year I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--Well,
then two years, three years, &c., ago? _Alk._--No: the case
was the same then, also, I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--But
before that, you were a mere boy; and during your boyhood you
certainly believed yourself to know what was just and unjust; for I
well recollect hearing you then complain confidently of other boys,
for acting unjustly towards you. _Alk._--Certainly: I was not
then ignorant on the point: I knew distinctly that they were acting
unjustly towards me. _Sokr._--You knew, then, even in your
boyhood, what was just and what was unjust? _Alk._--Certainly: I
knew even then. _Sokr._--At what moment did you first find it
out? Not when you already believed yourself to know: and what time
was there when you did not believe yourself to know?
_Alk._--Upon my word, I cannot say.
[Side-note: Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the
multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach
just and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it.
Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not
know himself.]
_Sokr._--Since, accordingly, you neither found it out for
yourself, nor learnt it from others, how come you to know justice or
injustice at all, or from what quarter? _Alk._--I was mistaken
in saying that I had not learnt it. I learnt it, as others do, from
the multitude.[4] _Sokr._--Your teachers are none of the best:
no one can learn from them even such small matters as playing at
draughts: much less, what is just and unjust. _Alk._--I learnt
it from them as I learnt to speak Greek, in which, too, I never had
any special teacher. _Sokr._--Of that the multitude are
competent teachers, for they are all of one mind. Ask which is a tree
or a stone,--a horse or a man,--you get the same answer from every
one. But when you ask not simply which are _horses_, but also
which horses are fit to run well in a race--when you ask not merely
about which are _men_, but which men are healthy or unhealthy--are
the multitude all of one mind, or all competent to answer?
_Alk._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--When you see the multitude
differing among themselves, that is a clear proof that they are not
competent to teach others. _Alk._--It is so. _Sokr._--Now,
about the question, What is just and unjust--are the multitude all of
one mind, or do they differ among themselves? _Alk._--They
differ prodigiously: they not only dispute, but quarrel and destroy
each other, respecting justice and injustice, far more than about
health and sickness.[5] _Sokr._ How, then, can we say that the
multitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely
dispute about it among themselves? _Alk._--I now perceive that
we cannot say so. _Sokr._--How can we say, therefore, that
they are fit to teach others: and how can you pretend to know, who
have learnt from no other teachers? _Alk._--From what you say,
it is impossible.
[Footnote 4: Plato, Alkib. i. 110 D-E. [Greek: e)/mathon, oi)=mai,
kai\ e)gô\ ô(/sper kai\ oi( a)/lloi . . . . para\ tô=n pollô=n.]]
[Footnote 5: Plato, Alkib. i. 112 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de\
dê\? nu=n peri\ tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn a)nthrô/pôn kai\
pragma/tôn, oi( polloi\ dokou=si/ soi o(mologei=n au)toi\ e(autoi=s
ê)\ a)llê/lois?] _Alkib._ [Greek: Ê(/kista, nê\ Di/', ô)=
Sô/krates.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de/? ma/lista peri\ au)tô=n
diaphe/resthai?] _Alkib._ [Greek: polu/ ge.]]
_Sokr._--No: not from what _I_ say, but from what
_you_ say yourself. I merely ask questions: it is you who give
all the answers.[6] And what you have said amounts to this--that
Alkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust, but believes
himself to know, and is going to advise the Athenians about what he
does not know himself?
[Footnote 6: Plato, Alkib. i. 112-113.]
[Side-note: Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not
generally debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to
every one--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not
coincident with just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the
expedient. He asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do
nothing but question.]
_Alk._--But, Sokrates, the Athenians do not often debate about
what is just and unjust. They think that question self-evident; they
debate generally about what is expedient or not expedient. Justice
and expediency do not do not always coincide. Many persons commit
great crimes, and are great gainers by doing so: others again behave
justly, and suffer from it.[7] _Sokr_--Do you then profess to
know what is expedient or inexpedient? From whom have you learnt--or
when did you find out for yourself? I might ask you the same round of
questions, and you would be compelled to answer in the same manner.
But we will pass to a different point. You say that justice and
expediency are not coincident. Persuade _me_ of this, by
interrogating me as I interrogated you. _Alk._--That is beyond
my power. _Sokr._--But when you rise to address the assembly,
you will have to persuade _them_. If you can persuade them, you
can persuade me. Assume _me_ to be the assembly, and practise
upon me.[8] _Alk._--You are too hard upon me, Sokrates. It is
for you to speak and prove the point. _Sokr_--No: I can only
question: you must answer. You will be most surely persuaded when the
point is determined by your own answers.[9]
[Footnote 7: Plato, Alkib. i. 113 D. [Greek: Oi)=mai me\n o)liga/kis
A)thênai/ous bouleu/esthai po/tera dikaio/tera ê)\ a)dikôtera; ta\
me\n ga\r toiau=ta ê(gou=ntai dê=la ei)=nai], &c.]
[Footnote 8: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 B-C. This same argument is
addressed by Sokrates to Glaukon, in Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6, 14-15.]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 E.
[Greek: Ou)kou=n ei) le/geis o(/ti tau=th' ou(/tôs e)/chei, ma/list'
a)\n ei)/ês pepeisme/nos?]]
[Side-note: Comment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the
respondent makes the discoveries for himself.]
Such is the commencing portion (abbreviated or abstracted) of
Plato's First Alkibiadês. It exhibits a very characteristic specimen
of the Sokratico-Platonic method: both in its negative and positive
aspect. By the negative, false persuasion of knowledge is exposed.
Alkibiades believes himself competent to advise about just and
unjust, which he has neither learnt from any teacher nor investigated
for himself--which he has picked up from the multitude, and supposes
to be clear to every one, but about which nevertheless there is so
much difference of appreciation among the multitude, that fierce and
perpetual quarrels are going on. On the positive side, Sokrates
restricts himself to the function of questioning: he neither affirms
nor denies any thing. It is Alkibiades who affirms or denies every
thing, and who makes all the discoveries for himself out of his own
mind, instigated indeed, but not taught, by the questions of his
companion.
[Side-note: Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is
just, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts
honourably, both does well, and procures for himself happiness
thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates.]
By a farther series of questions, Sokrates next brings Alkibiades to
the admission that what is just, is also honourable, good,
expedient--what is unjust, is dishonourable, evil, inexpedient: and
that whoever acts justly, and honourably, thereby acquires happiness.
Admitting, first, that an act which is good, honourable, just,
expedient, &c., considered in one aspect or in reference to some
of its conditions--may be at the same time bad, dishonourable,
unjust, considered in another aspect or in reference to other
conditions; Sokrates nevertheless brings his respondent to admit,
that every act, _in so far as it is just and honourable_, is
also good and expedient.[10] And he contends farther, that whoever
acts honourably, does well: now every man who does well, becomes
happy, or secures good things thereby: therefore the just, the
honourable, and the good or expedient, coincide.[11] The argument,
whereby this conclusion is here established, is pointed out by
Heindorf, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, as not merely inconclusive, but
as mere verbal equivocation and sophistry--the like of which,
however, we find elsewhere in Plato.[12]
[Footnote 10: Plato, Alkib. i. 115 B--116 A.
[Greek: Ou)kou=n tê\n toiau/tên boêthei/an kalê\n me\n le/geis kata\
tê\n e)pichei/rêsin tou= sô=sai ou(=s e)/dei; tou=to d' e)sti\n
a)ndri/a; . . . . kakê\n de/ ge kata\ tou\s thana/tous te kai\ ta\
e(/lkê. . . .
Ou)kou=n ô(=de di/kaion prosagoreu/ein e(ka/stên tô=n pra/xeôn;
ei)/per ê)=| kako\n a)perga/zetai kakê\n kalei=s, kai\ ê)=| a)gatho\n
a)gathê\n klête/on.
A)r' ou)=n kai\ ê)=| a)gatho\n kalo/n,--ê)=| de\ kako\n ai)schro/n?
Nai/.]
Compare Plato, Republic, v. p. 479, where he maintains that in every
particular case, what is just, honourable, virtuous, &c., is also
unjust, dishonourable, vicious, &c. Nothing remains unchanged,
nor excludes the contrary, except the pure, self-existent, Idea or
general Concept.--[Greek: au)to\-dikaiosu/nê], &c.]
[Footnote 11: Plato, Alkib. i. 116 E.]
[Footnote 12: The words [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein--eu)pragi/a] have a
double sense, like our "doing well". Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 175;
Steinhart, Einl. p. 149.
We have, p. 116 B, the equivocation between [Greek: kalô=s pra/ttein]
and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein], also with [Greek: kakô=s pra/ttein], p.
134 A, 135 A; compare Heindorf ad Platon. Charmid. p. 172 A, p. 174
B; also Platon. Gorgias, p. 507 C, where similar equivocal meanings
occur.]
[Side-note: Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen
are equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades
is to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia.
Eulogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must
make himself as good as possible.]
Alkibiades is thus reduced to a state of humiliating embarrassment,
and stands convicted, by his own contradictions and confession, of
ignorance in its worst form: that is, of being ignorant, and yet
believing himself to know.[13] But other Athenian statesmen are no
wiser. Even Perikles is proved to be equally deficient--by the fact
that he has never been able to teach or improve any one else, not
even his own sons and those whom he loved best.[14] "At any rate"
(contends Alkibiades) "I am as good as my competitors, and can hold
my ground against them." But Sokrates reminds him that the real
competitors with whom he ought to compare himself, are foreigners,
liable to become the enemies of Athens, and against whom he, if he
pretends to lead Athens, must be able to contend. In an harangue of
unusual length, Sokrates shows that the kings of Sparta and Persia
are of nobler breed, as well as more highly and carefully trained,
than the Athenian statesmen.[15] Alkibiades must be rescued from his
present ignorance, and exalted, so as to be capable of competing with
these kings: which object cannot be attained except through the
auxiliary interposition of Sokrates. Not that Sokrates professes to
be himself already on this elevation, and to stand in need of no
farther improvement. But he can, nevertheless, help others to attain
it for themselves, through the discipline and stimulus of his
interrogatories.[16]
[Footnote 13: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118.]
[Footnote 14: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-119.]
[Footnote 15: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 120-124.]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124.]
[Side-note: But good--for what end, and under what
circumstances? Abundant illustrative examples.]
The dialogue then continues. _Sokr._--We wish to become as good
as possible. But in what sort of virtue? _Alk._--In that virtue
which belongs to good men. _Sokr._--Yes, but _good_, in
what matters? _Alk._--Evidently, to men who are good in
transacting business. _Sokr._--Ay, but what kind of business?
business relating to horses, or to navigation? If that be meant, we
must go and consult horse-trainers or mariners? _Alk._--No, I
mean such business as is transacted by the most esteemed leaders in
Athens. _Sokr._--You mean the intelligent men. Every man is
good, in reference to that which he understands: every man is bad, in
reference to that which he does not understand. _Alk._--Of
course. _Sokr._--The cobbler understands shoemaking, and is
therefore good at _that_: he does not understand weaving, and is
therefore bad at that. The same man thus, in your view, will be both
good and bad?[17] _Alk._--No: that cannot be. _Sokr._--Whom
then do you mean, when you talk of _the good_? _Alk._--I mean
those who are competent to command in the city. _Sokr._--But
to command whom or what--horses or men? _Alk._--To command
men. _Sokr._--But what men, and under what circumstances? sick
men, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in harvesting, or in
what occupations? _Alk._--I mean, men living in social and
commercial relation with each other, as we live here; men who live in
common possession of the same laws and government. _Sokr._--When
men are in communion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we
name the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend?
_Alk._--It is the art of the pilot; and the purpose towards which
it tends, is, bringing them safely through the dangers of the sea.
_Sokr._--When men are in social and political communion, to what
purpose does the art of commanding them tend? _Alk._--Towards
the better preservation and administration of the city.[18]
_Sokr._--But what do you mean by _better_? What is that,
the presence or absence of which makes _better_ or _worse_?
If in regard to the management of the body, you put to me the
same question, I should reply, that it is the presence of health, and
the absence of disease. What reply will you make, in the case of the
city? _Alk._--I should say, when friendship and unanimity among
the citizens are present, and when discord and antipathy are absent.
_Sokr._--This unanimity, of what nature is it? Respecting what
subject? What is the art or science for realising it? If I ask you
what brings about unanimity respecting numbers and measures, you will
say the arithmetical and the metrêtic art. _Alk._--I mean that
friendship and unanimity which prevails between near relatives,
father and son, husband and wife. _Sokr._--But how can there be
unanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of
them knows, and the other does not know? For example, about spinning
and weaving, which the husband does not know, or about military
duties, which the wife does not know, how can there be unanimity
between the two? _Alk._--No: there cannot be. _Sokr._--Nor
friendship, if unanimity and friendship go together?
_Alk._--Apparently there cannot. _Sokr._--Then when men and women
each perform their own special duties, there can be no friendship
between them. Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen
performs his own special duties? or (which is the same thing) when
each citizen acts justly? _Alk._--Not so: I think there may be
friendship, when each person performs his or her own business.
_Sokr._--Just now you said the reverse. What is this friendship
or unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become
good men?
[Footnote 17: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 125 B.
[Greek: O( au)to\s a)/ra tou/tô| ge tô=| lo/gô| kako/s te kai\
a)gatho/s.]
Plato slides unconsciously here, as in other parts of his reasonings,
_à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter_.]
[Footnote 18: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 126 A. [Greek: ti/ de/? ê)\n su\
kalei=s eu)bouli/an, ei)s ti/ e)stin?] _Alk._ [Greek: Ei)s to\
a)/meinon tê\n po/lin dioikei=n kai\ sô/zesthai.] _Sokr._
[Greek: A)meinon de\ dioikei=tai kai\ sô/zetai ti/nos paragignome/nou
ê)\ a)pogignomenou?]]
[Side-note: Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his
ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to
make such discovery in youth.]
_Alk._--In truth, I am puzzled myself to say. I find myself in a
state of disgraceful ignorance, of which I had no previous suspicion.
_Sokr._--Do not be discouraged. If you had made this discovery
when you were fifty years old, it would have been too late for taking
care of yourself and applying a remedy: but at your age, it is the
right time for making the discovery. _Alk._--What am I to do,
now that I have made it? _Sokr._--You must answer my questions.
If my auguries are just, we shall soon be both of us better for the
process.[19]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Alkib. i. 127 D-E. _Alk._ [Greek: A)lla\
ma\ tou\s theou/s, ou)d' au)to\s oi)=da o(/ ti le/gô, kinduneu/ô de\
kai\ pa/lai lelêthe/nai e)mauto\n ai)/schist' e)/chôn.]
_Sokr._ [Greek: A)lla\ chrê\ thar)r(ei=n; ei) me\n ga\r au)to\
ê)=|sthou peponthô\s pentêkontae/tês, chalepo\n a)\n ê)=n soi
e)pimelêthê=nai sautou=; nu=n de\ ê)\n e)/cheis ê(liki/an, au)/tê
e)sti/n, e)n ê(=| dei= au)to\ ai)sthe/sthai.]
_Alk._ [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n to\n ai(stho/menon chrê\ poiei=n?]
_Sokr._ [Greek: _A)pokri/nesthai ta\ e)rôtô/mena_, kai\
e)a\n tou=to poiê=|s, a)\n theo\s e)the/lê|, ei)/ ti dei= kai\ tê=|
e)mê=| mantei/a| pisteu/ein, su/ te ka)gô\ beltio/nôs schê/somen.]]
[Side-note: Platonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its
anticipated effect--applicable to the season of youth.]
Here we have again, brought into prominent relief, the dialectic
method of Plato, under two distinct aspects: 1. Its actual effects,
in exposing the false supposition of knowledge, in forcing upon the
respondent the humiliating conviction, that he does not know familiar
topics which he supposed to be clear both to himself and to others.
2. Its anticipated effects, if continued, in remedying such defect:
and in generating out of the mind of the respondent, real and living
knowledge. Lastly, it is plainly intimated that this shock of
humiliation and mistrust, painful but inevitable, must be undergone
in youth.
[Side-note: Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent
importance--What is myself? My mind is myself.]
The dialogue continues, in short questions and answers, of which the
following is an abstract. _Sokr._--What is meant by a man
_taking care of himself_? Before I can take care of myself, I
must know what myself is: I must _know myself_, according to the
Delphian motto. I cannot make myself better, without knowing what
_myself_ is.[20] That which belongs to me is not _myself_:
my body is not myself, but an instrument governed by myself.[21] My
mind or soul only, is myself. To take care of myself is, to take care
of my mind. At any rate, if this be not strictly true,[22] my mind is
the most important and dominant element within me. The physician who
knows his own body, does not for that reason know himself: much less
do the husbandman or the tradesman, who know their own properties or
crafts, know themselves, or perform what is truly their own business.
[Footnote 20: Plato, Alkib. i. 129 B. [Greek: ti/n' a)\n tro/pon
eu(rethei/ê _au)to\ to\ au)to/_?]]
[Footnote 21: Plato, Alkib. i. 128-130. All this is greatly expanded
in the dialogue--p. 128 D: [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra o)/tan tô=n sautou=
e)pimelê=|, sautou= e)pime/lei?] This same antithesis is employed by
Isokrates, De Permutatione, sect. 309, p. 492, Bekker. He recommends
[Greek: au)tou= pro/teron ê)\ tô=n au)tou= poiei=sthai tê\n
e)pime/leian].]
[Footnote 22: Plato considers this point to be not clearly made out.
Alkib. i. 130.]
[Side-note: I cannot know myself, except by looking into
another mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice
are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom.]
Since temperance consists in self-knowledge, neither of these
professional men, as such, is temperate: their professions are of a
vulgar cast, and do not belong to the virtuous life.[23] How are
we to know our own minds? We know it by looking into another mind,
and into the most rational and divine portion thereof: just as the
eye can only know itself by looking into another eye, and seeing
itself therein reflected.[24] It is only in this way that we can come
to know ourselves, or become temperate: and if we do not know
ourselves, we cannot even know what belongs to ourselves, or what
belongs to others: all these are branches of one and the same
cognition. We can have no knowledge of affairs, either public or
private: we shall go wrong, and shall be unable to secure happiness
either for ourselves or for others. It is not wealth or power which
are the conditions of happiness, but justice and temperance. Both for
ourselves individually, and for the public collectively, we ought to
aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth and power. The evil and
unjust man ought to have no power, but to be the slave of those who
are better than himself.[25] He is fit for nothing but to be a slave:
none deserve freedom except the virtuous.
[Footnote 23: Plato, Alkib. i. 131 B.]
[Footnote 24: Plato, Alkib. i. 133.]
[Footnote 25: Plato, Alkib. i. 134-135 B-C.
[Greek: Pri\n de/ ge a)retê\n e)/chein, to\ a)/rchesthai a)/meinon
u(po\ tou= belti/onos ê)\ to\ a)/rchein a)ndri\, ou) mo/non paidi/
. . . . Pre/pei a)/ra tô=| kakô=| douleu/ein; a)/meinon ga/r.]]
[Side-note: Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and
declares that he will never quit Sokrates.]
_Sokr._--How do you feel your own condition now, Alkibiades. Are
you worthy of freedom? _Alk._--I feel but too keenly that I am
not. I cannot emerge from this degradation except by your society and
help. From this time forward I shall never leave you.[26]
[Footnote 26: Plato, Alkib. i. 135.]
ALKIBIADES II.
[Side-note: Second Alkibiades--situation supposed.]
The other Platonic dialogue, termed the Second Alkibiades, introduces
Alkibiades as about to offer prayer and sacrifice to the Gods.
[Side-note: Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts
which may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the
generic word: madmen, a particular variety under it.]
_Sokr._--You seem absorbed in thought, Alkibiades, and not
unreasonably. In supplicating the Gods, caution is required not to
pray for gifts which are really mischievous. The Gods sometimes grant
men's prayers, even when ruinously destructive; as they granted
the prayers of Oedipus, to the destruction of his own sons.
_Alk._--Oedipus was mad: what man in his senses would put up
such a prayer? _Sokr._--You think that madness is the opposite
of good sense or wisdom. You recognise men wise and unwise: and you
farther admit that every man must be one or other of the two,--just
as every man must be either healthy or sick: there is no third
alternative possible? _Alk._--I think so. _Sokr._--But each
thing can have but one opposite:[27] to be unwise, and to be mad, are
therefore identical? _Alk._--They are. _Sokr._--Wise men
are only few, the majority of our citizens are unwise: but do you
really think them mad? How could any of us live safely in the society
of so many mad-men? _Alk._--No: it cannot be so: I was mistaken.
_Sokr._--Here is the illustration of your mistake. All men who
have gout, or fever, or ophthalmia are sick; but all sick men have
not gout, or fever, or ophthalmia. So, too, all carpenters, or
shoemakers, or sculptors, are craftsmen; but all craftsmen are not
carpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors. In like manner, all mad men
are unwise; but all unwise men are not mad. _Unwise_ comprises
many varieties and gradations of which the extreme is, being mad: but
these varieties are different among themselves, as one disease
differs from another, though all agree in being disease and one art
differs from another, though all agree in being art.[28]
[Footnote 27: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139 B.
[Greek: Kai\ mê\n du/o ge u(penanti/a e(ni\ pra/gmati pô=s a)\n
ei)/ê?]
That each thing has one opposite, and no more, is asserted in the
Protagoras also, p. 192-193.]
[Footnote 28: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139-140 A-B.
[Greek: Kai\ ga\r oi( pure/ttontes pa/ntes nosou=sin, ou) me/nntoioi(
nosou=ntes pa/ntes pure/ttousin ou)de\ podagrô=sin ou)de/ ge
o)phthalmiô=sin; a)lla\ no/sos me\n pa=n to\ toiou=to/n e)sti,
diaphe/rein de/ phasin ou(\s dê\ kalou=men i)atros tê\n a)pergasi/an
au)tô=n; ou) ga\r pa=sai ou)/te o(/moiai ou)/te o(moi/ôs
diapra/ttontai, a)lla\ kata\ tê\n au)tê=s du/namin e(ka/stê.]]
[Side-note: Relation between a generic term, and the specific
terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar.]
(We may remark that Plato here, as in the Euthyphron, brings under
especial notice one of the most important distinctions in formal
logic--that between a generic between a term and the various specific
terms comprehended under it. Possessing as yet no technical language
for characterising this distinction, he makes it understood by an
induction of several separate but analogous cases. Because the
distinction is familiar now to instructed men, we must not suppose
that it was familiar then.)
[Side-note: Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed
benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every
one fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of
ignorance.]
_Sokr._--Whom do you call wise and unwise? Is not the wise man,
he who knows what it is proper to say and do--and the unwise man, he
who does not know? _Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--The unwise man
will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or
done? Though not mad like Oedipus, he will nevertheless pray to the
Gods for gifts, which will be hurtful to him if obtained. You, for
example, would be overjoyed if the Gods were to promise that you
should become despot not only over Athens, but also over Greece.
_Alk._--Doubtless I should: and every one else would feel as I
do. _Sokr._--But what if you were to purchase it with your life,
or to damage yourself by the employment of it? _Alk._--Not on
those conditions.[29] _Sokr._--But you are aware that many
ambitious aspirants, both at Athens and elsewhere (among them, the
man who just now killed the Macedonian King Archelaus, and usurped
his throne), have acquired power and aggrandisement, so as to be
envied by every one: yet have presently found themselves brought to
ruin and death by the acquisition. So, also, many persons pray that
they may become fathers; but discover presently that their children
are the source of so much grief to them, that they wish themselves
again childless. Nevertheless, though such reverses are perpetually
happening, every one is still not only eager to obtain these supposed
benefits, but importunate with the Gods in asking for them. You see
that it is not safe even to accept without reflection boons offered
to you, much less to pray for boons to be conferred.[30] _Alk._--I
see now how much mischief ignorance produces. Every one thinks
himself competent to pray for what is beneficial to himself; but
ignorance makes him unconsciously imprecate mischief on his own head.
[Footnote 29: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141.]
[Footnote 30: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141-142.]
[Side-note: Mistake in predications about ignorance generally.
We must discriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is
always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always.]
_Sokr._--You ought not to denounce ignorance in this unqualified
manner. You must distinguish and specify. Ignorance of what? and
under what modifications of persons and circumstances? _Alk._--How?
Are there _any_ matters or circumstances in which it is
better for a man to be ignorant, than to know? _Sokr._--You will
see that there are such. Ignorance of good, or ignorance of what is
best, is always mischievous: moreover, assuming that a man knows what
is best, then all other knowledge will be profitable to him. In his
special case, ignorance on any subject cannot be otherwise than
hurtful. But if a man be ignorant things of good, or of what is best,
in his case knowledge on other subjects will be more often hurtful
than profitable. To a man like Orestes, so misguided on the question,
"What is good?" as to resolve to kill his mother, it would be a real
benefit, if for the time he did not know his mother. Ignorance on
that point, in his state of mind, would be better for him than
knowledge.[31] _Alk._--It appears so.
[Footnote 31: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 144.]
[Side-note: Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground
do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special
arts or accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what
occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought
to be used.]
_Sokr._--Follow the argument farther. When we come forward to
say or do any thing, we either know what we are about to say and do,
or at least believe ourselves to know it. Every statesman who gives
counsel to the public, does so in the faith of such knowledge. Most
citizens are unwise, and ignorant of good as well as of other things.
The wise are but few, and by their advice the city is conducted. Now
upon what ground do we call these few, wise and useful public
counsellors? If a statesman knows war, but does not know whether it
is best to go to war, or at what juncture it is best--should we call
him wise? If he knows how to kill men, or dispossess them, or drive
them into exile,--but does not know upon whom, or on what occasions,
it is good to inflict this treatment--is he a useful counsellor? If
he can ride, or shoot, or wrestle, well,--we give him an epithet
derived from this special accomplishment: we do not call him wise.
What would be the condition of a community composed of bowmen,
horsemen, wrestlers, rhetors, &c., accomplished and excellent
each in his own particular craft, yet none of them knowing what is
good, nor when, nor on what occasions, it is good to employ their
craft? When each man pushes forward his own art and speciality,
without any knowledge whether it is good on the whole either for
himself or for the city, will not affairs thus conducted be reckless
and disastrous?[32] _Alk._--They will be very bad indeed.
[Footnote 32: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145.]
[Side-note: Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of
the good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial.]
_Sokr._--If, then, a man has no knowledge of good or of the
better--if upon this cardinal point he obeys fancy without
reason--the possession of knowledge upon special subjects will be
oftener hurtful than profitable to him; because it will make him more
forward in action, without any good result. Possessing many arts and
accomplishments, and prosecuting one after another, but without the
knowledge of good,--he will only fall into greater trouble, like a
ship sailing without a pilot. Knowledge of good is, in other words,
knowledge of what is useful and profitable. In conjunction with this,
all other knowledge is valuable, and goes to increase a man's
competence as a counsellor: apart from this, all other knowledge will
not render a man competent as a counsellor, but will be more
frequently hurtful than beneficial.[33] Towards right living, what we
need is, the knowledge of good: just as the sick stand in need of a
physician, and the ship's crew of a pilot. _Alk._--I admit your
reasoning. My opinion is changed. I no longer believe myself
competent to determine what I ought to accept from the Gods, or what
I ought to pray for. I incur serious danger of erring, and of asking
for mischiefs, under the belief that they are benefits.
[Footnote 33: Plato, Alkib. ii. 145 C:
[Greek: O(/stis a)/ra ti tô=n toiou/tôn oi)=den, e)a\n me\n
pare/pêtai au)tô=| ê( _tou= belti/stou e)pistê/mê--au(/tê d' ê)=n
ê( au)tê\ dê/pou ê(/per kai\ ê( tou= ô)pheli/mou_--phro/nimo/n ge
au)to\n phê/somen kai\ a)pochrô=nta xu/mboulou kai\ tê=| po/lei kai\
au)to\n au(tô=|; to\n de\ mê\ toiou=ton, ta)nanti/a tou/tôn.]
([Greek: Touou=ton] is Schneider's emendation for [Greek:
poiou=nta].) Ibid. 146 C: [Greek: Ou)kou=n phame\n pa/lin tou\s
pollou\s diêmartêke/nai tou= belti/stou, ô(s ta\ polla/ ge, oi)=mai,
a)/neu nou= do/xê| pepisteuko/tas?] Ibid. 146 E: [Greek: O(ra=|s
ou)=n, o(/te g' e)/phên kinduneu/ein to/ ge tô=n a)/llôn e)pistêmô=n
ktê=ma, e)a/n tis a)/neu tê=s tou= belti/stou e)pistê/mês kektême/nos
ê)=|, o)liga/kis me\n ô)phelei=n bla/ptein de\ ta\ plei/ô ton
e)/chont' au)to/.] Ibid. 147 A: [Greek: O( de\ dê\ tê\n kaloume/nên
poluma/theia/n te kai\ polutechni/an kektême/nos, o)rphano\s de\ ô)\n
tau/tês tê=s e)pistê/mês, a)go/menos de\ u(po\ mia=s e(ka/stês tô=n
a)/llôn, a)=r' ou)chi\ tô=| o)/nti dikai/ôs pollô=| cheimô=ni
chrê/setai, a(/t', oi)=mai, a)/neu kubernê/tou diatelô=n e)n
pela/gei], &c.]
[Side-note: It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his
sacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address
to the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the
counsel of Sokrates.]
_Sokr._--The Lacedæmonians, when they offer sacrifice, pray
simply that they may obtain what is honourable and good, without
farther specification. This language is acceptable to the Gods,
more acceptable than the costly festivals of Athens. It has procured
for the Spartans more continued prosperity than the Athenians have
enjoyed.[34] The Gods honour wise and just men, that is, men who know
what they ought to say and do both towards Gods and towards men--more
than numerous and splendid offerings.[35] You see, therefore, that it
is not safe for you to proceed with your sacrifice, until you have
learnt what is the proper language to be used, and what are the
really good gifts to be prayed for. Otherwise your sacrifice will not
prove acceptable, and you may even bring upon yourself positive
mischief.[36] _Alk._--When shall I be able to learn this, and
who is there to teach me? I shall be delighted to meet him.
_Sokr._--There is a person at hand most anxious for your
improvement. What he must do is, first to disperse the darkness from
your mind, next, to impart that which will teach you to discriminate
evil from good, which at present you are unable to do. _Alk._--I
shall shrink from no labour to accomplish this object. Until then, I
postpone my intended sacrifice: and I tender my sacrificial wreath to
you, in gratitude for your counsel.[37] _Sokr._--I accept the
wreath as a welcome augury of future friendship and conversation
between us, to help us out of the present embarrassment.
[Footnote 34: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 148.]
[Footnote 35: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.]
[Footnote 36: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.]
[Footnote 37: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 151.]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Different critical opinions respecting these two
dialogues.]
The two dialogues, called First and Second Alkibiadês, of which I
have just given some account, resemble each other more than most of
the Platonic dialogues, not merely in the personages introduced, but
in general spirit, in subject, and even in illustrations. The First
Alkibiadês was recognised as authentic by all critics without
exception, until the days of Schleiermacher. Nay, it was not only
recognised, but extolled as one of the most valuable and important of
all the Platonic compositions; proper to be studied first, as a key
to all the rest. Such was the view of Jamblichus and Proklus,
transmitted to modern times; until it received a harsh contradiction
from Schleiermacher, who declared the dialogue to be both worthless
and spurious. The Second Alkibiadês was also admitted both by
Thrasyllus, and by the general body of critics in ancient times: but
there were some persons (as we learn from Athenæus)[38] who
considered it to be a work of Xenophon; perceiving probably (what is
the fact) that it bears much analogy to several conversations which
Xenophon has set down. But those who held this opinion are not to be
considered as of one mind with critics who reject the dialogue as a
forgery or imitation of Plato. Compositions emanating from Xenophon
are just as much Sokratic, probably even more Sokratic, than the most
unquestioned Platonic dialogues, besides that they must of necessity
be contemporary also. Schleiermacher has gone much farther: declaring
the Second as well as the First to be an unworthy imitation of
Plato.[39]
[Footnote 38: Athenæus, xi. p. 506.]
[Footnote 39: See the Einleitung of Schleiermacher to Alkib. i. part
ii. vol. iii. p. 293 seq. Einleitung to Alkib. ii. part i. vol. ii.
p. 365 seq. His notes on the two dialogues contain various additional
reasons, besides what is urged in his Introduction.]
[Side-note: Grounds for disallowing them--less strong against
the Second than against the First.]
Here Ast agrees with Schleiermacher fully, including both the First
and Second Alkibiades in his large list of the spurious. Most of the
subsequent critics go with Schleiermacher only half-way: Socher,
Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, recognise the First
Alkibiadês, but disallow the Second.[40] In my judgment,
Schleiermacher and Ast are more consistently right, or more
consistently wrong, in rejecting both, than the other critics who
find or make so capital a distinction between the two. The similarity
of tone and topics between the two is obvious, and is indeed admitted
by all. Moreover, if I were compelled to make a choice, I should say
that the grounds for suspicion are rather less strong against the
Second than against the First; and that Schleiermacher, reasoning
upon the objections admitted by his opponents as conclusive against
the Second, would have no difficulty in showing that his own
objections against the First were still more forcible. The long
speech assigned in the First Alkibiadês to Sokrates, about the
privileges of the Spartan and Persian kings,[41] including the
mention of Zoroaster, son of Oromazes, and the Magian religion,
appears to me more unusual with Plato than anything which I find in
the Second Alkibiadês. It is more Xenophontic[42] than Platonic.
[Footnote 40: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 112. Stallbaum,
Prolegg. to Alkib. i. and ii. vol. v. pp. 171-304. K. F. Hermann,
Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos. p. 420-439. Steinhart,
Einleitungen to Alkib. i. and ii. in Hieronymus Müller's Uebersetzung
des Platon's Werke, vol. i. pp. 135-509.]
[Footnote 41: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 121-124.
Whoever reads the objections in Steinhart's Einleitung (p. 148-150)
against the First Alkibiadês, will see that they are quite as
forcible as what he urges against the Second; only, that in the case
of the First, he gives these objections their legitimate bearing,
allowing them to tell against the merit of the dialogue, but not
against its authenticity.]
[Footnote 42: See Xenoph. Oekonom. c. 4; Cyropæd. vii. 5, 58-64,
viii. 1, 5-8-45; Laced. Repub. c. 15.]
[Side-note: The supposed grounds for disallowance are in
reality only marks of inferiority.]
But I must here repeat, that because I find, in this or any other
dialogue, some peculiarities not usual with Plato, I do not feel
warranted thereby in declaring the dialogue spurious. In my judgment,
we must look for a large measure of diversity in the various
dialogues; and I think it an injudicious novelty, introduced by
Schleiermacher, to set up a canonical type of Platonism, all
deviations from which are to be rejected as forgeries. Both the First
and the Second Alkibiadês appear to me genuine, even upon the showing
of those very critics who disallow them. Schleiermacher, Stallbaum,
and Steinhart, all admit that there is in both the dialogues a
considerable proportion of Sokratic and Platonic ideas: but they
maintain that there are also other ideas which are not Sokratic or
Platonic, and that the texture, style, and prolixity of the Second
Alkibiadês (Schleiermacher maintains this about the First also) are
unworthy of Plato. But if we grant these premisses, the reasonable
inference would be, not to disallow it altogether, but to admit it as
a work by Plato, of inferior merit; perhaps of earlier days, before
his powers of composition had attained their maturity. To presume
that because Plato composed many excellent dialogues, therefore all
that he composed must have been excellent, is a pretension formally
disclaimed by many critics, and asserted by none.[42] Steinhart
himself allows that the Second Alkibiadês, though not composed by
Plato, is the work of some other author contemporary, an untrained
Sokratic disciple attempting to imitate Plato.[44] But we do not know
that there were any contemporaries who tried to imitate Plato:
though Theopompus accused him of imitating others, and called most of
his dialogues useless as well as false: while Plato himself, in his
inferior works, will naturally appear like an imitator of his better
self.
[Footnote 43: Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 186) makes this
general statement very justly, but he as well as other critics are
apt to forget it in particular cases.]
[Footnote 44: Steinhart, Einleitung, p. 516-519. Stallbaum and Boeckh
indeed assign the dialogue to a later period. Heindorf (ad Lysin, p.
211) thinks it the work "antiqui auctoris, sed non Platonis".
Steinhart and others who disallow the authenticity of the Second
Alkibiadês insist much (p. 518) upon the enormity of the
chronological blunder, whereby Sokrates and Alkibiadês are introduced
as talking about the death of Archelaus king of Macedonia, who was
killed in 399 B.C., in the same year as Sokrates, and four
years after Alkibiades. Such an anachronism (Steinhart urges) Plato
could never allow himself to commit. But when we read the Symposion,
we find Aristophanes in a company of which Sokrates, Alkibiades, and
Agathon form a part, alluding to the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of
Mantineia, which took place in 386 B.C. No one has ever made
this glaring anachronism a ground for disallowing the Symposion.
Steinhart says that the style of the Second Alkibiadês copies Plato
too closely (die ängstlich platonisirende Sprache des Dialogs, p.
515), yet he agrees with Stallbaum that in several places it departs
too widely from Plato.]
[Side-note: The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's
earlier compositions.]
I agree with Schleiermacher and the other recent critics in
considering the First and Second Alkibiadês to be inferior in merit
to Plato's best dialogues; and I contend that their own premisses
justify no more. They may probably be among his earlier productions,
though I do not believe that the First Alkibiadês was composed during
the lifetime of Sokrates, as Socher, Steinhart, and Stallbaum
endeavour to show.[45] I have already given my reasons, in a
previous chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at
all during the lifetime of Sokrates; still less in that of
Alkibiadês, who died four years earlier. There is certainly nothing
in either Alkibiadês I. or II. to shake this belief.
[Footnote 45: Stallbaum refers the composition of Alkib. i. to a time
not long before the accusation of Sokrates, when the enemies of
Sokrates were calumniating him in consequence of his past intimacy
with Alkibiades (who had before that time been killed in 404
B.C.) and when Plato was anxious to defend his master
(Prolegg. p. 186). Socher and Steinhart (p. 210) remark that such
writings would do little good to Sokrates under his accusation. They
place the composition of the dialogue earlier, in 406 B.C.
(Steinhart, p. 151-152), and they consider it the first exercise of
Plato in the strict dialectic method. Both Steinhart and Hermann
(Gesch. Plat. Phil. p. 440) think that the dialogue has not only a
speculative but a political purpose; to warn and amend Alkibiades,
and to prevent him from surrendering himself blindly to the
democracy.
I cannot admit the hypothesis that the dialogue was written in 406
B.C. (when Plato was twenty-one years of age, at most
twenty-two), nor that it had any intended bearing upon the real
historical Alkibiades, who left Athens in 415 B.C. at the
head of the armament against Syracuse, was banished three months
afterwards, and never came back to Athens until May 407 B.C.
(Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 13; i. 5, 17). He then enjoyed four months of
great ascendancy at Athens, left it at the head of the fleet to Asia
in Oct. 407 B.C., remained in command of the fleet for about
three months or so, then fell into disgrace and retired to
Chersonese, never revisiting Athens. In 406 B.C. Alkibiades
was again in banishment, out of the reach of all such warnings as
Hermann and Steinhart suppose that Plato intended to address to him
in Alkib. i.
Steinhart says (p. 152), "In dieser Zeit also, _wenige Jahre nach
seiner triumphirenden Rückkehr_, wo Alkibiades," &c. Now
Alkibiades left the Athenian service, irrevocably, within less
_than one year_ after his triumphant return.
Steinhart has not realised in his mind the historical and
chronological conditions of the period.]
[Side-note: Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic
Memorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men.]
If we compare various colloquies of Sokrates in the Xenophontic
Memorabilia, we shall find Alkibiadês I. and II. very analogous to
them both in purpose and spirit. In Alkibiadês I. the situation
conceived is the same as that of Sokrates and Glaukon, in the third
book of the Memorabilia. Xenophon recounts how the presumptuous
Glaukon, hardly twenty years of age, fancied himself already fit to
play a conspicuous part in public affairs, and tried to force
himself, in spite of rebuffs and humiliations, upon the notice of the
assembly.[46] No remonstrances of friends could deter him, nor could
anything, except the ingenious dialectic of Sokrates, convince him of
his own impertinent forwardness and exaggerated self-estimation.
Probably Plato (Glaukon's elder brother) had heard of this
conversation, but whether the fact be so or not, we see the same
situation idealised by him in Alkibiadês I., and worked out in a way
of his own. Again, we find in the Xenophontic Memorabilia another
colloquy, wherein Sokrates cross-questions, perplexes, and
humiliates, the studious youth Euthydemus,[47] whom he regards as
over-confident in his persuasions and too well satisfied with
himself. It was among the specialties of Sokrates to humiliate
confident young men, with a view to their future improvement. He made
his conversation "an instrument of chastisement," in the language of
Xenophon: or (to use a phrase of Plato himself in the Lysis) he
conceived. "that the proper way of talking to youth whom you love,
was, not to exalt and puff them up, but to subdue and humiliate
them".[48]
[Footnote 46: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6.]
[Footnote 47: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2.]
[Footnote 48: Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, 1. [Greek: skepsa/menoi mê\ mo/non
a(\ e)kei=nos] (Sokrates) [Greek: _kolastêri/ou e(/neka _tou/s
pa/nt' oi)ome/nous ei)de/nai e)rôtô=n ê)/legchen, a)lla\ kai\ a(\
le/gôn sunême/reue toi=s sundiatri/bousin], &c. So in the
Platonic Lysis, the youthful Lysis says to Sokrates "Talk to
Menexenus, [Greek: i(/n' au)to\n kola/sê|s]" (Plat. Lysis, 211 B).
And Sokrates himself says, a few lines before (210 E), [Greek: Ou(/tô
chrê\ toi=s paidikoi=s diale/gesthai, tapeinou=nta kai\ suste/llonta,
kai\ mê\ ô(/sper su\ chaunou=nta kai\ diathru/ptonta.]]
[Side-note: Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for
idealising this feature in Sokrates.]
If Plato wished to idealise this feature in the character of
Sokrates, no name could be more suitable to his purpose than that of
Alkibiades: who, having possessed as a youth the greatest personal
beauty (to which Sokrates was exquisitely sensible) had become in his
mature life distinguished not less for unprincipled ambition and
insolence, than for energy and ability. We know the real Alkibiadês
both from Thucydides and Xenophon, and we also know that Alkibiades
had in his youth so far frequented the society of Sokrates as to
catch some of that dialectic ingenuity, which the latter was expected
and believed to impart.[49] The contrast, as well as the
companionship, between Sokrates and Alkibiades was eminently
suggestive to the writers of Sokratic dialogues, and nearly all of
them made use of it, composing dialogues in which Alkibiades was the
principal name and figure.[50] It would be surprising indeed if Plato
had never done the same: which is what we must suppose, if we adopt
Schleiermacher's view, that both Alkibiadês I. and II. are spurious.
In the Protagoras as well as in the Symposion, Alkibiades figures;
but in neither of them is he the principal person, or titular hero,
of the piece. In Alkibiadês I. and II., he is introduced as the
solitary respondent to the questions of Sokrates--[Greek: kolastêri/ou
e(/neka]: to receive from Sokrates a lesson of humiliation such as
the Xenophontic Sokrates administers to Glaukon and Euthydemus,
taking care to address the latter when alone.[51]
[Footnote 49: The sensibility of Sokrates to youthful beauty is as
strongly declared in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (i. 3, 8-14), as in
the Platonic Lysis, Charmidês, or Symposion.
The conversation reported by Xenophon between Alkibiades, when not
yet twenty years of age, and his guardian Perikles, the first man in
Athens--wherein Alkibiades puzzles Perikles by a Sokratic
cross-examination--is likely enough to be real, and was probably the
fruit of his sustained society with Sokrates (Xen. Memor. i. 2, 40).]
[Footnote 50: Stallbaum observes (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 215, 2nd
ed.), "Ceterum etiam Æschines, Euclides, Phædon, et Antisthenes,
dialogos _Alcibiadis_ nomine inscriptos composuisse narrantur".
Respecting the dialogues composed by Æschines, see the first note to
this chapter.]
[Footnote 51: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 8.]
[Side-note: Plato's manner of replying to the accusers of
Sokrates. Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of
Sokrates.]
I conceive Alkibiadês I. and II. as composed by Plato among his
earlier writings (perhaps between 399-390 B.C.)[52] giving
an imaginary picture of the way in which "Sokrates handled every
respondent just as he chose" (to use the literal phrase of
Xenophon[53]): taming even that most overbearing youth, whom
Aristophanes characterises as the lion's whelp.[54] In selecting
Alkibiades as the sufferer under such a chastising process, Plato
rebuts in his own ideal style that charge which Xenophon answers with
prosaic directness--the charge made against Sokrates by his enemies,
that he taught political craft without teaching ethical sobriety; and
that he had encouraged by his training the lawless propensities of
Alkibiades.[55] When Schleiermacher, and others who disallow the
dialogue, argue that the inordinate insolence ascribed to Alkibiades,
and the submissive deference towards Sokrates also ascribed to him,
are incongruous and incompatible attributes,--I reply that such a
conjunction is very improbable in any real character. But this does
not hinder Plato from combining them in one and the same ideal
character, as we shall farther see when we come to the manifestation
of Alkibiades in the Symposion: in which dialogue we find a
combination of the same elements, still more extravagant and
high-coloured. Both here and there we are made to see that Sokrates,
far from encouraging Alkibiades, is the only person who ever succeeded
in humbling him. Plato attributes to the personality and conversation
of Sokrates an influence magical and almost superhuman: which Cicero
and Plutarch, proceeding probably upon the evidence of the Platonic
dialogues, describe as if it were historical fact. They represent
Alkibiades as shedding tears of sorrow and shame, and entreating
Sokrates to rescue him from a sense of degradation insupportably
painful.[56] Now Xenophon mentions Euthydemus and other young men as
having really experienced these profound and distressing
emotions.[56] But he does not at all certify the same about
Alkibiades, whose historical career is altogether adverse to the
hypothesis. The Platonic picture is an _idéal_, drawn from what
may have been actually true about other interlocutors of Sokrates,
and calculated to reply to Melêtus and his allies.
[Footnote 52: The date which I here suppose for the composition of
Alkib. i. (_i.e._ after the death of Sokrates, but early in the
literary career of Plato), is farther sustained (against those
critics who place it in 406 B.C. or 402 B.C. before
the death of Sokrates) by the long discourse (p. 121-124) of Sokrates
about the Persian and Spartan kings. In reference to the Persian
monarchy Sokrates says (p. 123 B), [Greek: e)pei/ pot' e)gô\ ê(/kousa
a)ndro\s a)xiopi/stou tô=n a)nabebêko/tôn para\ basile/a, o(\s e)/phê
parelthei=n chô/ran pa/nu pollê\n kai\ a)gathê/n--ê(\n kalei=n tou\s
e)pichôri/ous zô/nên tê=s basile/ôs gunaiko/s], &c. Olympiodorus
and the Scholiast both suppose that Plato here refers to Xenophon and
the Anabasis, in which a statement very like this is found (i. 4, 9).
It is plain, therefore, that _they_ did not consider the
dialogue to have been composed before the death of Sokrates. I think
it very probable that Plato had in his mind Xenophon (either his
Anabasis, or personal communications with him); but at any rate
visits of Greeks to the Persian court became very numerous between
399-390 B.C., whereas Plato can hardly have seen any such
visitors at Athens in 406 B.C. (before the close of the
war), nor probably in 402 B.C., when Athens, though relieved
from the oligarchy, was still in a state of great public prostration.
Between 399 B.C. and the peace of Antalkidas (387
B.C.), visitors from Greece to the interior of Persia became
more and more frequent, the Persian kings interfering very actively
in Grecian politics. Plato may easily have seen during these years
intelligent Greeks who had been up to the Persian court on military
or political business. Both the Persian kings and the Spartan kings
were then in the maximum of power and ascendancy--it is no wonder
therefore that Sokrates should here be made to dwell upon their
prodigious dignity in his discourse with Alkibiades. Steinhart (Einl.
p. 150) feels the difficulty of reconciling this part of the dialogue
with his hypothesis that it was composed in 406 B.C.: yet he
and Stallbaum both insist that it must have been composed before the
death of Sokrates, for which they really produce no grounds at all.]
[Footnote 53: Xen. Mem. i. 2, 14. [Greek: toi=s de\ dialegome/nois
au)tô=| pa=si chrô/menon e)n toi=s lo/gois o(/pôs bou/loito.]]
[Footnote 54: Aristoph. Ran. 1431. [Greek: ou) chrê\ le/ontos
sku/mnon e)n po/lei tre/phein.] Thucyd. vi. 15. [Greek: phobêthe/ntes
ga\r au)tou=] (Alkib.) [Greek: oi( polloi\ to\ me/gethos tê=s te
kata\ to\ e(autou= sô=ma paranomi/as e)s tê\n di/aitan, kai\ tê=s
dianoi/as ô(=n kath' e(\n e(/kaston, e)n o(/tô| gi/gnoito,
e)/prassen, ô(s turanni/dos e)pithumou=nti pole/mioi kathe/stasan],
&c.]
[Footnote 55: Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 17.]
[Footnote 56: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iii. 32, 77; Plutarch, Alkib. c.
4-6. Compare Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 D, 135 C; Symposion, p. 215-216.]
[Footnote 57: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 39-40.]
[Side-note: The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology
is followed out in Alkib. I. Warfare against the false persuasion of
knowledge.]
Looking at Alkibiadês I. and II. in this point of view, we shall find
them perfectly Sokratic both in topics proclaimed and in
manner--whatever may be said about unnecessary prolixity and common-place
here and there. The leading ideas of Alkibiadês I. may be found,
nearly all, in the Platonic Apology. That warfare, which Sokrates
proclaims in the Apology as having been the mission of his life,
against the false persuasion of knowledge, or against beliefs ethical
and æsthetical, firmly entertained without having been preceded by
conscious study or subjected to serious examination--is exemplified
in Alkibiadês I. and II. as emphatically as in any Platonic
composition. In both these dialogues, indeed (especially in the
first), we find an excessive repetition of specialising
illustrations, often needless and sometimes tiresome: a defect easily
intelligible if we assume them to have been written when Plato was
still a novice in the art of dialogic composition. But both dialogues
are fully impregnated with the spirit of the Sokratic process,
exposing, though with exuberant prolixity, the firm and universal
belief, held and affirmed by every one even at the age of boyhood,
without any assignable grounds or modes of acquisition, and amidst
angry discordance between the affirmation of one man and another. The
emphasis too with which Sokrates insists upon his own single function
of merely questioning, and upon the fact that Alkibiades gives all
the answers and pronounces all the self-condemnation with his own
mouth[58]--is remarkable in this dialogue: as well as the confidence
with which he proclaims the dialogue as affording the only, but
effective, cure.[59] The ignorance of which Alkibiades stands
unexpectedly convicted, is expressly declared to be common to him
with the other Athenian politicians: an exception being half allowed
to pass in favour of the semi-philosophical Perikles, whom Plato
judges here with less severity than elsewhere[60]--and a decided
superiority being claimed for the Spartan and Persian kings, who are
extolled as systematically trained from childhood.
[Footnote 58: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 112-113.]
[Footnote 59: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 E.]
[Footnote 60: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-120.]
[Side-note: Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of
bringing Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance.]
The main purpose of Sokrates is to drive Alkibiades into
self-contradictions, and to force upon him a painful consciousness of
ignorance and mental defect, upon grave and important subjects, while
he is yet young enough to amend it. Towards this purpose he is made
to lay claim to a divine mission similar to that which the real
Sokrates announces in the Apology[61] A number of perplexing
questions and difficulties are accumulated: it is not meant that
these difficulties are insoluble, but that they cannot be solved by
one who has never seriously reflected on them--by one who (as the
Xenophontic Sokrates says to Euthydemus),[62] is so confident of
knowing the subject that he has never meditated upon it at all. The
disheartened Alkibiades feels the necessity of improving himself and
supplicates the assistance of Sokrates:[63] who reminds him that he
must first determine what "Himself" is. Here again we find ourselves
upon the track of Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, and under the
influence of the memorable inscription at Delphi--_Nosce
teipsum_. Your mind is yourself; your body is a mere instrument of
your mind: your wealth and power are simple appurtenances or
adjuncts. To know yourself, which is genuine Sophrosynê or
temperance, is to know your mind: but this can only be done by
looking into another mind, and into its most intelligent compartment:
just as the eye can only see itself by looking into the centre of
vision of another eye.[64]
[Footnote 61: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124 C-127 E.]
[Footnote 62: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 36. [Greek: A)lla\ tau=ta me/n,
e)/phê o( Sôkra/tês, i)/sôs, dia\ to\ spho/dra posteu/ein ei)de/nai,
ou)d' e)/skepsai.]]
[Footnote 63: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 128-132 A.]
[Footnote 64: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 133.
A Platonic metaphor, illustrating the necessity for two separate
minds co-operating in dialectic colloquy.]
[Side-note: Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these
difficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue--but these are
acknowledged Incognita.]
At the same time, when, after having convicted Alkibiades of
deplorable ignorance, Sokrates is called upon to prescribe
remedies--all distinctness of indication disappears. It is exacted only
when the purpose is to bring difficulties and contradictions to view:
it is dispensed with, when the purpose is to solve them. The conclusion
is, that assuming happiness as the acknowledged ultimate end,[65]
Alkibiades cannot secure this either for himself or for his city, by
striving for wealth and power, private or public: he can only secure
it by acquiring for himself, and implanting in his country-men,
justice, temperance, and virtue. This is perfectly Sokratic, and
conformable to what is said by the real Sokrates in the Platonic
Apology. But coming at the close of Alkibiadês I., it presents no
meaning and imparts no instruction: because Sokrates had shown in the
earlier part of the dialogue, that neither he himself, nor
Alkibiades, nor the general public, knew what justice and virtue
were. The positive solution which Sokrates professes to give, is
therefore illusory. He throws us back upon those old, familiar,
emotional, associations, unconscious products and unexamined
transmissions from mind to mind--which he had already shown to
represent the fancy of knowledge without the reality--deep-seated
belief without any assignable intellectual basis, or outward standard
of rectitude.
[Footnote 65: Plat. Alkibiad. i. p. 134.]
[Side-note: Prolixity of Alkibiadês I.--Extreme multiplication
of illustrative examples--How explained.]
Throughout the various Platonic dialogues, we find alternately two
distinct and opposite methods of handling--the generalising of the
special, and the specialising of the general. In Alkibiadês I, the
specialising of the general preponderates--as it does in most of the
conversations of the Xenophontic Memorabilia: the number of
exemplifying particulars is unusually great. Sokrates does not accept
as an answer a general term, without illustrating it by several of
the specific terms comprehended under it: and this several times on
occasions when an instructed reader thinks it superfluous and
tiresome: hence, partly, the inclination of some modern critics to
disallow the dialogue. But we must recollect that though a modern
reader practised in the use of general terms may seize the meaning at
once, an Athenian youth of the Platonic age would not be sure of
doing the same. No conscious analysis had yet been applied to general
terms: no grammar or logic then entered into education. Confident
affirmation, without fully knowing the meaning of what is affirmed,
is the besetting sin against which Plato here makes war: and his
precautions for exposing it are pushed to extreme minuteness. So,
too, in the Sophistês and Politikus, when he wishes to illustrate the
process of logical division and subdivision, he applies it to cases
so trifling and so multiplied, that Socher is revolted and rejects
the dialogues altogether. But Plato himself foresees and replies to
the objection; declaring expressly that his main purpose is, not to
expound the particular subject chosen, but to make manifest and
familiar the steps and conditions of the general classifying
process--and that prolixity cannot be avoided.[66] We must reckon upon
a similar purpose in Alkibiadês I. The dialogue is a specimen of that
which Aristotle calls Inductive Dialectic, as distinguished from
Syllogistic: the Inductive he considers to be plainer and easier,
suitable when you have an ordinary collocutor--the Syllogistic is the
more cogent, when you are dealing with a practised disputant.[67]
[Footnote 66: Plato, Politikus, 285-286.]
[Footnote 67: Aristotel. Topic. i. 104, a. 16. [Greek: Po/sa tô=n
lo/gôn ei)/dê tô=n dialektikô=n--e)/sti de\ to\ me\n e)pagôgê/, to\
de\ sullogismo/s . . . . e)/sti d' ê( me\n e)pagôgê\ pithanô/teron
kai\ saphe/steron kai\ kata\ tê\n ai)/sthêsin gnôrimô/teron kai\
toi=s polloi=s koino/n; o( de\ sullogismo\s biastikô/teron kai\ pro\s
tou\s a)ntilogikou\s e)nerge/steron.]]
[Side-note: Alkibiadês II. leaves its problem avowedly
undetermined.]
It has been seen that Alkibiadês I, though professing to give
something like a solution, gives what is really no solution at all.
Alkibiadês II., similar in many respects, is here different, inasmuch
as it does not even profess to solve the difficulty which had been
raised. The general mental defect--false persuasion of knowledge
without the reality--is presented in its application to a particular
case. Alkibiades is obliged to admit that he does not know what he
ought to pray to the Gods for: neither what is _good_, to be
granted, nor what is _evil_, to be averted. He relies upon
Sokrates for dispelling this mist from his mind: which Sokrates
promises to do, but adjourns for another occasion.
[Side-note: Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the
Gods for favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular,
semi-irregular agency of the Gods--he prays to them for premonitory
warnings.]
Sokrates here ascribes to the Spartans, and to various philosophers,
the practice of putting up prayers in undefined language, for good
and honourable things generally. He commends that practice. Xenophon
tells us that the historical Sokrates observed it:[68] but he tells
us also that the historical Sokrates, though not praying for any
special presents from the Gods, yet prayed for and believed himself
to receive special irregular revelations and advice as to what was
good to be done or avoided in particular cases. He held that these
special revelations were essential to any tolerable life: that the
dispensations of the Gods, though administered upon regular
principles on certain subjects and up to a certain point, were kept
by them designedly inscrutable beyond that point: but that the Gods
would, if properly solicited, afford premonitory warnings to any
favoured person, such as would enable him to keep out of the way of
evil, and put himself in the way of good. He declared that to consult
and obey oracles and prophets was not less a maxim of prudence than a
duty of piety: for himself, he was farther privileged through his
divine sign or monitor, which he implicitly followed.[69] Such
premonitory warnings were the only special favour which he thought it
suitable to pray for--besides good things generally. For special
presents he did not pray, because he professed not to know whether
any of the ordinary objects of desire were good or bad. He proves in
his conversation with Euthydêmus, that all those acquisitions which
are usually accounted means of happiness--beauty, strength, wealth,
reputation, nay, even good health and wisdom--are sometimes good
or causes of happiness, sometimes evil or causes of misery; and
therefore cannot be considered either as absolutely the one or
absolutely the other.[70]
[Footnote 68: Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 2; Plat. Alk. ii. p. 143-148.]
[Footnote 69: These opinions of Sokrates are announced in various
passages of the Xenophontic Memorabilia, i. 1, 1-10--[Greek: e)/phê
de\ dei=n, a(\ me\n matho/ntas poiei=n e)/dôkan oi( theoi/,
mantha/nein; a(\ de\ mê\ dê=la toi=s a)nthrô/pois e)sti/, peira=sthai
dia\ mantikê=s para\ tô=n theô=n puntha/nesthai; tou\s theou\s ga/r,
oi(=s a)\n ô)=sin i(/leô|, sêmai/nein]--i. 3, 4; i. 4, 2-15; iv. 3,
12; iv. 7, 10; iv. 8, 5-11.]
[Footnote 70: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 31-32-36.[Greek: Tau=ta ou)=n
pote\ me\n ô)phelou=nta pote\ de\ bla/ptonta, ti/ ma=llon a)gatha\
ê)\ kaka/ e)stin?]]
[Side-note: Comparison of Alkibiadês II. with the Xenophontic
Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus.
Sokrates not always consistent with himself.]
This impossibility of determining what is good and what is evil, in
consequence of the uncertainty in the dispensations of the Gods and
in human affairs--is a doctrine forcibly insisted on by the
Xenophontic Sokrates in his discourse with Euthydêmus, and much akin
to the Platonic Alkibiadês II., being applied to the special case of
prayer. But we must not suppose that Sokrates adheres to this
doctrine throughout all the colloquies of the Xenophontic
Memorabilia: on the contrary, we find him, in other places, reasoning
upon such matters, as health, strength, and wisdom, as if they were
decidedly good.[71] The fact is, that the arguments of Sokrates, in
the Xenophontic Memorabilia, vary materially according to the
occasion and the person with whom he is discoursing: and the case is
similar with the Platonic dialogues: illustrating farther the
questionable evidence on which Schleiermacher and other critics
proceed, when they declare one dialogue to be spurious, because it
contains reasoning inconsistent with another.
[Footnote 71: For example, Xen. Mem. iv. 5, 6--[Greek: sophi/an to\
me/giston a)gatho/n], &c.]
We find in Alkibiadês II. another doctrine which is also proclaimed
by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia: that the Gods are not
moved by costly sacrifice more than by humble sacrifice, according to
the circumstances of the offerer:[72] they attend only to the mind of
the offerer, whether he be just and wise: that is, "whether he knows
what ought to be done both towards Gods and towards men".[73]
[Footnote 72: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149-150; Xen. Mem. i. 3. Compare
Plato, Legg. x. p. 885; Isokrat. ad Nikok.]
[Footnote 73: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149 E, 150 B.]
[Side-note: Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiadês II.--that
knowledge is not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is
indispensable: without that, the knowledge of other things is more
hurtful than beneficial.]
But we find also in Alkibiadês II. another doctrine, more remarkable.
Sokrates will not proclaim absolutely that knowledge is good, and
that ignorance is evil. In some cases, he contends, ignorance is
good; and he discriminates which the cases are. That which we
are principally interested in knowing, is _Good_, or The
_Best_--The _Profitable_:[74] phrases used as equivalent.
The knowledge of this is good, and the ignorance of it mischievous,
under all supposable circumstances. And if a man knows good, the more
he knows of everything else, the better; since he will sure to make a
good use of his knowledge. But if he does not know good, the
knowledge of other things will be hurtful rather than beneficial to
him. To be skilful in particular arts and accomplishments, under the
capital mental deficiency supposed, will render him an instrument of
evil and not of good. The more he knows--and the more he believes
himself to know--the more forward will he be in acting, and therefore
the greater amount of harm will he do. It is better that he should
act as little as possible. Such a man is not fit to direct his own
conduct, like a freeman: he must be directed and controlled by
others, like a slave. The greater number of mankind are fools of this
description--ignorant of good: the wise men who know good, and are
fit to direct, are very few. The wise man alone, knowing good,
follows reason: the rest trust to opinion, without reason.[75] He
alone is competent to direct both his own conduct and that of the
society.
[Footnote 74: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145 C. [Greek: O(/stis a)/ra ti
tô=n toiou/tôn oi)=den, e)a\n me\n pare/pêtai au)tô=| ê( tou=
belti/stou e)pistê/mê--au)tê\ d' ê)=n ê( au)tê\ dê/pou ê(per kai\ ê(
tou= ô)pheli/mou]--also 146 B.]
[Footnote 75: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 146 A-D. [Greek: a)/neu nou=
do/xê| pepisteuko/tas.]]
The stress which is laid here upon the knowledge of good, as
distinguished from all other varieties of knowledge--the
identification of the good with the profitable, and of the knowledge
of good with reason ([Greek: nou=s]), while other varieties of
knowledge are ranked with opinion ([Greek: do/xa])--these are points
which, under one phraseology or another, pervade many of the Platonic
dialogues. The old phrase of Herakleitus--[Greek: Polumathi/ê no/on
ou) dida/skei]--"much learning does not teach reason"--seems to have
been present to the mind of Plato in composing this dialogue. The man
of much learning and art, without the knowledge of good, and
surrendering himself to the guidance of one or other among his
accomplishments, is like a vessel tossed about at sea without a
pilot.[76]
[Footnote 76: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 147 A. [Greek: o( de\ dê\ tê\n
kaloume/nên poluma/theia/n te kai\ polutechni/an kektême/nos,
o)rphano\s de\ ô)\n tau/tês tê=s e)pistê/mês, a)go/menos de\ u(po\
mia=s e(ka/stês tô=n a)/llôn], &c.]
[Side-note: Knowledge of Good--appears postulated and divined,
in many of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles.]
What Plato here calls the knowledge of Good, or Reason--the just
discrimination and comparative appreciation of Ends and
Means--appears in the Politikus and Euthydêmus, under the title of the
Regal or Political Art, of employing or directing[77] the results of all
other arts, which are considered as subordinate: in the Protagoras,
under the title of art of calculation or mensuration: in the
Philêbus, as measure and proportion: in the Phædrus (in regard to
rhetoric) as the art of turning to account, for the main purpose of
persuasion, all the special processes, stratagems, decorations,
&c., imparted by professional masters. In the Republic, it is
personified in the few venerable Elders who constitute the Reason of
the society, and whose directions all the rest (Guardians and
Producers) are bound implicitly to follow: the virtue of the
subordinates consisting in this implicit obedience. In the Leges, it
is defined as the complete subjection in the mind, of pleasures and
pains to right Reason,[78] without which, no special aptitudes are
worth having. In the Xenophontic Memorabilia, it stands as a Sokratic
authority under the title of Sophrosynê or Temperance:[79] and the
Profitable is declared identical with the Good, as the directing and
limiting principle for all human pursuits and proceedings.[80]
[Footnote 77: Plato, Politikus, 292 B, 304 B, 305 A; Euthydêmus, 291
B, 292 B. Compare Xenophon, Oekonomicus, i. 8, 13.]
[Footnote 78: Leges, iii. 689 A-D, 691 A.]
[Footnote 79: Xenoph. Memor. i. 2. 17; iv. 3. 1.]
[Footnote 80: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 6, 8; iv. 7, 7.]
[Side-note: The Good--the Profitable--what is it?--How are we
to know it? Plato leaves this undetermined.]
But what are we to understand by the _Good_, about which there
are so many disputes, according to the acknowledgment of Plato as
well as of Sokrates? And what are we to understand by the Profitable?
In what relation does it stand to the Pleasurable and the Painful?
These are points which Plato here leaves undetermined. We shall find
him again touching them, and trying different ways of determining
them, in the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Republic, and
elsewhere. We have here the title and the postulate, but nothing
more, of a comprehensive Teleology, or right comparative estimate of
ends and means one against another, so as to decide when, how far,
under what circumstances, &c., each ought to be pursued. We shall
see what Plato does in other dialogues to connect this title and
postulate with a more definite meaning.