AFTER THE VICTORY.
While the French troops were still around the walls of Kairwán, the
Ministry of M. Ferry formally placed its resignation in the hands of the
President of the Republic. Public opinion in France had of late been so
severely exercised on the Tunisian Question, that even the dramatic
announcement of the well-timed conquest of Kairwán failed to produce any
other effect than ill-concealed hilarity. The unexpected surrender of
the Government deprived the Tunisian debate of its natural interest, and
its excessive dulness was only relieved by the credulous sentimentality
of M. Ferry, the sarcasms of M. Clémenceau, and the unanswerable
criticism of M. Le Faure.
Six months had brought about a remarkable change in French public
opinion, and the very deputies who had cheered M. Ferry’s warlike
utterances in May came only to gibe and jeer at his halting apologies in
November. It was in vain for M. Ferry to strike his breast and declare
that there was “the most perfect accord” between the Bey and the French.
This bold assertion was received with undisguised merriment, and even
created what is technically known as “an incident.” An eye-witness gives
an amusing account of M. Ferry’s perplexities:—
M. FERRY said—I do not see why you should laugh at that. If you were
patriots you should rejoice at it.
DUC DE FELTRE—Certainly, if it were true; but it happens not to be true.
M. FERRY—I beg your pardon; it is absolutely true.
DUC DE FELTRE—Prove it.
M. FERRY—I am going to prove it. The Tunisians are so much the
auxiliaries of our men, that we pay them, and supply them with rations
(loud cries of “Oh, oh,” and peals of ironical laughter from the Right).
This scene continued for some time longer. M. George Perin, of the
Extreme Left, seizing the opportunity, said the massacre of the station-
master and _employés_ at Oued Zerga, some of whom had been burnt alive,
had been traced to those faithful allies the troops of the Bey. At this
there was fresh uproar. In conclusion, M. Ferry denied that the Tunisian
Expedition had interfered with the mobilisation of the army at home, and
asserted that were it necessary to mobilise they would find the
reserves, which formed the really defensive force of France, embodied in
the _cadres_, which need not be numerous, without any difficulty or
trouble. It had also been alleged that the Tunis Expedition had cost
France her alliances. Why, only the previous day they had concluded a
Commercial Treaty with Italy (cries of “Oh, oh,” on the Right). That
treaty should be laid before the House; but an accord had been
established between the representatives of the two Governments, and
surely the signature of a Commercial Treaty was not the sign of a
misunderstanding between two neighbouring and friendly nations. The
march to Kairwán had been a splendid achievement.
After three days of wrangle and recriminations M. Gambetta came to the
rescue, by proposing an issue which nobody had ever raised or contested.
On the 9th November the discussion was brought to a close by adopting
the following resolution by 379 votes to 71:—“The Chamber, resolved on
the integral execution of the treaty signed by the French nation on the
12th May 1881, passes to the order of the day.” M. Clémenceau’s motion
for a Parliamentary Inquiry into the whole matter was rejected, but his
bold indictment of the Tunisian Expedition is certainly entitled to a
prominent place amongst the state papers connected with the latest Punic
War. It ran thus:—
Whereas, on the 7th of April 1881, the Government asked of the Chambers
the opening of two credits, amounting together to 5,695,276f., to
repress acts committed on Algerian territory bordering on Tunis.
Whereas, these credits were inserted in the Budget under the head of
military operations on the Tunis frontier. Whereas, these credits were
solicited by the Government and voted by the Chambers only for a special
object—that of the repression of the Kroumírs. Whereas, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs even told the Senate that it was almost one of those
repressions with which the gendarmerie could be intrusted, yet the Prime
Minister declared, in the discussion of the 5th of November, that the
aim of the Government was the submission of the Regency. Whereas, the
Government had disclaimed all idea of conquest and annexation, yet the
Prime Minister, on the 5th of November, spoke for the first time of our
Protectorate over Tunis, an idea expressly repudiated by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs in the Senate on the 25th of July. Whereas, the Prime
Minister’s declarations show that the repression of the Kroumírs was
only the pretext for French intervention in Tunis, and that consequently
the Government deceived the Chambers. Whereas, the march of General
Bréart on Tunis, the Treaty of Protectorate imposed on the Bey, the
bombardment of the Tunisian towns, the occupation of the capital of the
Regency, and the present military operations can in no wise be deemed
simple measures of repression against the frontier tribes, and really
amount to war. Whereas, the Chamber ratified the Treaty of Kasr-es-Said,
and, on the 15th of June, the Chamber voted the sum of 14,226,000f.,
which, according to the declarations of the Minister of War, were to
suffice for the expenses incurred, and even for the opening of means of
communication, which are the most powerful means of pacification.
Whereas, the Chamber believed it had an accomplished fact to deal with,
and thought it was setting up an expedition which was terminated, while
it was deceived by the Government, which submitted the treaty of Kasr-
es-Said to it as the final pacification of the Regency; while, on the
contrary, that treaty was the starting-point, for new expenses were
incurred. Whereas, in these conditions it is not possible to regard the
vote of the Chamber as even an implied authorisation to undertake and
pursue the present military operations, which amount to a positive state
of war. Whereas, it is impossible to allow the Government with impunity
to embark France in a surreptitious manner in a military enterprise
invested with all the character of a war, and which might result in
jeopardising the interests of our country. Whereas, this would be a
dangerous precedent, and if the Government were not stopped in this path
by Parliamentary action the security of France might be irremediably
compromised without Parliament being able to enforce in time the will of
the country. Whereas, therefore, it is proper to consider whether the
article of the Constitutional Law of the 18th of July 1875, has not been
violated, to ascertain the individual or collective responsibilities of
any kind incurred, to see whether the Ministry is guilty only of
incapacity, or whether there is ground for enforcing Ministerial
responsibility in the way prescribed by the Constitution—viz., by
impeaching the Ministers. Whereas, in present circumstances the origin
of the expedition is not sufficiently known. Whereas, the declarations
of the Government are conflicting, especially as to the Enfida affair.
Whereas, as private speculations are mixed up with the Tunis Expedition,
it is important to know whether one of the agents of the Government
obeyed wittingly or unwittingly the pressure exerted on him by private
interests. Whereas, it is important to know with precision what
questions were pending at Tunis between France and the Bey’s Government
at the date of the expedition, so as to ascertain the real grounds for
the crisis which the expedition was designed to adjust. Whereas, there
exist at the Ministry of Finance reports of financial inspectors on the
management of the Financial Commission, which might be advantageously
consulted on this point. Whereas, it ought to be known what use has been
made of the French Protectorate at Tunis by the French Consul, and
whether an examination of his acts would tend to enlighten Parliament on
the causes and object of the expedition. Whereas, the Government has not
met the necessities of the expedition, but, to avoid a mobilisation,
which would have disclosed the real bearing of its enterprise, recruited
the expeditionary corps in a way jeopardising our military organisation
and seriously impairing our means of defence. Whereas, after the Kasr-
es-Said Treaty the troops were recalled to France at the very moment
when their presence was about to become necessary, so that a fresh and
larger army had immediately afterwards to be sent to Tunis, a signal
proof of the incapacity of the Ministry. Whereas, the military
administration has been notoriously unequal to its task, and a good
medical service has been entirely wanting. Whereas, the information
furnished by the military authorities on the mortality of the troops, as
well as on the organisation of the medical service, has been positively
contradicted by competent men, without a satisfactory reply to the grave
accusations made having been given. Whereas, contrary to the
declarations of the Minister of War, the last votes of credit have again
turned out insufficient in consequence of the new military operations
undertaken in Tunis. Whereas, the Government, having by the manœuvre of
early elections caused two Chambers of Deputies to co-exist for nearly
two months, did not deem it proper to convene Parliament, and did not
hesitate to resort to a financial proceeding distinctly condemned by the
law by carrying to the costs of the Tunis Expedition money provided for
the support of the troops in time of peace. Whereas, the Government is
the less excusable, seeing that it asserts that it foresaw an autumn
campaign. Whereas, the Tunisian Expedition has been a source of
disturbance and agitation in the Mussulman world. Whereas, it has not
attained the object indicated by the Government, which was to ensure the
tranquillity of our Algerian possessions, and has deeply modified the
political situation of France in Europe in a sense unfavourable to our
interests. Whereas, a Parliamentary debate, however extended, is
powerless to throw complete light on all the above questions on account
of the documents which must be produced and closely examined, as well as
verbal statements, the correctness of which it may be necessary to
verify. Whereas, the country has a right to know the truth and the whole
truth, both as to the real causes of the expedition and as to the
circumstances which accompanied it, its results and consequences, as
well as the manner in which it has been conducted. Whereas, it is the
duty of Parliament to seek that truth, both in order to ensure the
exercise of ministerial responsibility in the conditions in which it has
been organised by the Constitution, and to prepare the elements of a
good solution of the Tunisian question. The Chamber resolves that a
committee of investigation of twenty-two members shall be nominated in
the Bureaux, in order to present a report on the causes, results, and
consequences of the Tunisian Expedition, as well as on the conduct of
the military operations, and to make any proposals which may be
suggested to it by the interests of the country and the maintenance of
the rights of Parliament.
The deceptions and contradictions of MM. Ferry and Saint-Hilaire now
brought their own reward; the Cabinet to which they belonged died of
Tunis-on-the-brain. Its requiem was written appropriately enough by one
who had been himself woefully deceived:—
As to the now defunct Ministry (telegraphed M. De Blowitz on the 10th
November to the _Times_), it might be styled the Roustan Cabinet, or the
“Cabinet des Naïfs.” M. Ferry was simple enough to believe that M.
Gambetta would accept office on the eve of the session, and would be
forced to retain him in his Cabinet. He was simple enough to credit M.
Roustan’s assurances that the subjugation of Tunis would be a military
promenade. He is simple enough himself to believe, or expect the Chamber
to believe, that the Marseilles financiers, from pure patriotism,
rejected a bonus of half a million francs for the sale of the Enfida
property, that France is stronger with Tunis on her hands than without
it, and that expenditure has not been incurred without constitutional
sanction, because the money has not yet been debited against any
Parliamentary vote. M. Saint-Hilaire was simple enough to think Prince
Bismarck egged on France in the Tunis Expedition out of pure
friendliness, and he was simple enough to picture Tunis as about to
become a perfect paradise under French patronage. General Farre is
simple enough to believe, or at least to say, that soldiers do not get
acclimatised in the field, and that the science of war consists in
bringing back one set of raw levies and sending out another. The whole
Cabinet were simple enough to think Parliament would regard the
conclusion of the May Treaty on the eve of re-assembling after Easter,
and the occupation of Kairwán on the eve of the meeting in October, as
pure coincidences, not as theatrical strokes, analogous to an instalment
of a novel, leaving off at a thrilling point. Nobody suspects the late
Ministers of any dishonourable motives. Nobody imagines that they
plunged into the Tunisian hornets’ nest from any complicity in Bourse
speculations. Even their little artifices in accelerating the elections
and meeting Parliament with a bulletin from Kairwán are matters for a
smile rather than for grave reprehension. They have simply been the
dupes of their own sanguineness, and perhaps of the craft of others.
· · · · · · · · · ·
At Tunis, however, M. Roustan was pleased to consider the result of the
vote on M. Gambetta’s order of the day as a personal victory of his own.
Early on the following morning the “approval of the Tunisian Expedition”
was placarded all over the city, and four days later, when the local
Cleopatra returned to Tunis from a visit to Paris, the Bey’s gilded
barge was made ready to convey her to the shore, while eager deputations
represented both the legendary colony and the financial associations,
and the Pro-Bey fondly believed that his position was now secure.
In the meantime Generals Saussier and Forgemol were conducting one of
the Kairwán columns back to Tebessa, while General Logerot was
hopelessly endeavouring to track the Arabs to their lairs in the south.
The seaport of Mehdia had been occupied without resistance on the same
day as Kairwán, but the insurgents still continued their raids and
attacks. In addition to the march of the column southward, troops under
General D’Aubigny and Colonel La Roque were operating in the north of
the Regency, with the hope of surrounding the remaining followers of Ali
Ben Amar.
Nothing of any particular moment occurred at Tunis during the weeks
which immediately succeeded the occupation of Kairwán. On the 14th
November, another Arab was accused of an attempt to endanger the safety
of passengers on the French line, by putting a stone on the rails. I am
unable to enter into the merits of the case, but the man pretended he
was merely running after his goat which had accidentally broken its
tether. The poor fellow had only been married the day before, and still
wore his wedding garment. He got a very short shrift, and was shot the
same day in sight of the Bey’s palace-windows. The ladies of Kasr-es-
Said were greatly alarmed, and were not reassured when a number of Arabs
afterwards came close to the building, and shouted out uncomplimentary
allusions to the diminished power and prestige of the descendants of
Heussein Ben Ali.
Before General Logerot had fairly started on his road to Gabes, a band
of the fugitives from Kairwán attacked the Arabs who refused to join
them, near the El Djem ruins between Susa and Sfax. Two men were killed
and thirty wounded in the _melée_, and the assailants made good their
retreat with a rich booty. Renewed _razzias_ were reported almost daily
from Susa and Sfax, and the inhabitants of Mahres proved so refractory,
that a French gunboat had to be sent to shell their village.
The French now began to exact a very heavy contribution from those
tribes which were willing to submit—forty francs and a gun from every
adult sometimes represented the whole wealth of the possessor, and the
payment often entailed misery if not absolute beggary. These proceedings
interfered considerably with the progress of any attempt at
pacification. Another great mistake was committed; the clans which asked
and received _aman_ were at once deprived of their arms; the result of
this step was quickly felt, for the “submitted tribes” were soon
defeated by their armed co-religionists, or again compelled to join in
the rising. A third and more important blunder was the appointment of
“Colonel” Joseph Allegro to the _Caidat_ or Governorship of Southern
Tunis. The part he had played in the Khamír rising, while ostensibly
receiving the Bey’s pay (or as the Arabs have it, eating the Bey’s salt)
at Bone, was now notorious, and its effect on the minds of the Tunisians
could not be effaced, even by his ostentatiously embracing the Moslem
faith, as he did shortly afterwards. Apart from personal courage, this
man had no single qualification for a place of trust and responsibility,
and his very presence amongst the Arabs afforded a continued provocation
to fanaticism and resistance.
On the 21st November the news reached Tunis that the elaborate
concentric movement of Generals Philibert and D’Aubigny and Colonel La
Roque had ended in the escape of Ali Ben Amar, who with a chosen band of
followers evaded their pursuit, and after joining Ali Ben Hlifa, finally
made good his retreat to Tripoli.
The doubtful wisdom of several of the steps taken by the French
authorities during the marches into Southern Tunis, to which I have
previously alluded, now seems to have culminated in a manifesto
published by “Giannino,” the French Vice-Consul and Pro-Roustan of Sfax.
On the 20th November he issued a circular “calling the attention of the
consular agents to the approach of the French column from Kairwán, and
to the _razzias_ which it might be necessary for the French troops to
execute against the Arabs during the march, and requesting the Europeans
to withdraw all their property from the interior, in case it should
otherwise be destroyed along with that of the natives!” As no European
had been able to reach the districts in question during the past six
months, this demand can only be qualified as a _mauvaise plaisanterie_.
As I was now anxious to meet the _colonne Logerot_ on its arrival at
Gabes, I left Tunis on the 26th November to journey along the Sahel to
Susa, Sfax, Gabes, and afterwards to Tripoli, which had now, according
to the _Agence Havas_, supplanted Kairwán as “a focus of Moslem intrigue
and sedition.”