DIPLOMACY
What had become evident, even at Constantinople, was that Mustapha
and his influence, as well as the policy of repression by cruelty and
devastation, had failed. Barbarities continued, and were met by active
resistance on a small scale wherever the Turks attempted to penetrate.
Small Turkish detachments were beaten here and there, but no general
plan of operation appeared to offer a chance of ultimate success to
either party. The Porte, therefore, sent its best diplomatic agent,
Server Effendi, with a magniloquent and mendacious proclamation and a
summons for the election of a deputation of Cretans of both
religions, to meet at Constantinople to receive the promises of
the well-intentioned Turkish government for their pacification and
contentment. Server Effendi was an intelligent and liberal man, and we
became very good friends, and if he had been permitted to treat on the
basis of accomplished facts he might have attained something. But he
was compelled to assume that the island had been subjected by arms to
the will of the Porte, and must accept as concession what they had won
a right to from an effective resistance, as yet not even partially
subdued. He was not himself deceived, but the Sultan had passed into
a condition of insane fury, and could not be induced to listen to any
concessions or entertain any proposition but complete surrender. He
had, Mr. Morris wrote me, had a model of the island made, which he
used to bombard with little cannon, to give vent to his rage. All
the powers, with the exception of England, now advised the Porte to
concede a principality. The English policy in this case has always
seemed to me mistaken, and in questionable faith, for by the protocol
of February 20, 1830, the signatory powers bound themselves to secure
for Crete a principality like that of Samos. For this defection of
England from the general accord of the powers, Greece was, probably,
mainly responsible, for at that juncture the influence of Greek
demagogues prevailed in the island to make a compromise difficult, and
the principality would certainly have been refused; still, England was
pledged to the offer of it. I find in the record I made at the time
the following passage:--
"The tactics of Greece were of a nature to make the chances of Crete
more precarious than they need have been. The policy of Crete for
Greece, rather than Crete for her own good, made confusion and
jealousy in the conduct of the war much greater than they need have
been. What the Cretans wanted was a good leader, arms, and bread.
Greece sent them rival chiefs without subordination, a rabble of
volunteers, who quarreled with the islanders, and weakened the
cause by deserting it as soon as they felt the strain of danger and
hardship; and if, after the first campaign, they were more wise in
enrolling men to go to Crete, they still allowed the jealousies and
hostilities of the leaders to go unchecked by any of those measures
which were in their power. But the radical fault of the Hellenes was
that they compromised the question by the introduction of the
question of annexation, and forced it into the field of international
interests, disguising the real causes and justification of the
movement, and making it impossible for England consistently with her
declared policy to entertain the complaints of the Cretans without
also admitting the pretensions of the Hellenes. If the latter had not
intruded their interests into the discussion, the former might have
been heard; but from the moment in which annexation to Greece became
the alternative of the reconquest of Crete, the English government
could clearly not interfere against the Porte without upsetting its
own work; and, if in some minor respects, especially the question of
the principality, it had been more kind to Crete, no one could have
found fault with a policy which was in its general tendency obligatory
on it."
This opinion, formed and expressed while all my sympathies were with
the Greek government, and in complete knowledge of all that it was
doing for the Cretans, remains as the mildest criticism I can make on
the policy of Athens. At this time, looking over the events of the
thirty years which have lapsed since the end of that unhappy affair, I
can see more clearly the matter as a whole, and that the miseries of
Crete especially, and of the Greeks in the Levant in general, have
been mainly due to the want of commonsense in the race, and the
incapacity of individuals to subordinate their personal views and
interests to the general good. The Italians have a proverb, "Six
Greeks, seven captains," which in a pithy way expresses the reason
why the Greeks have never been able to succeed in any national
movement--the necessary subordination and self-effacement needed for
civic or military solidity are, and always have been absolutely out
of the character of the people. Courage they had, but discipline they
never would submit to, nor will they now.
Server Effendi got his deputies, some by compulsion, some by bribery,
and some with good-will, and most of them he succeeded in getting to
Constantinople. One escaped and came to my house for asylum, and
there he remained six weeks, and then was smuggled on board a Russian
corvette, in sailor's costume, and carried to Greece; the rest of the
Christians when they got to Constantinople took refuge at the Russian
Embassy, declaring that they came against their own free will and that
of the Cretans. At this time a change for the better took place at
Athens, the incompetent ministry which had neither known how to do nor
how not to do giving place to that in which Comoundouros was prime
minister and Tricoupi minister of foreign affairs; and, while the
paralysis of utter failure rested on the Turkish administration
in Crete, the policy in Greece became comparatively energetic and
intelligent. Comoundouros was a demagogue, without any scruples as to
the means of success, but he was intelligent enough to understand the
position and that a positive policy was necessary. He had opposed any
encouragement to the insurrection in the beginning, seeing no hope for
its success; but public opinion all over Europe and in America had
by this time become so pronounced, and committees were beginning so
widely to form to aid the Cretans, that there seemed a chance of
intervention and a certainty of large assistance in money and moral
encouragement. He took the responsibility of openly giving aid to the
insurrection, but he still had not the clear understanding of the want
of a concentrated direction in Crete. The bands refused to coöperate,
and while Coroneos in the central districts carried on a brilliant
system of harrying and raiding the Turkish detachments, the chiefs in
the eastern and western sections remained inert, getting the principal
portion of the supplies (as the blockade runners went mostly to
the coasts of those districts) but doing the least of the work.
Comoundouros dared not risk offending the many political partisans
by imposing on the volunteers whom he sent over a competent and
concentrated command. But as a collateral means of pressure the new
ministry set to work organizing a movement on the Continent, and it
had the courage to face all the probabilities of a war with Turkey.
At this juncture came the famous blockade runner, the Arkadi, a most
successful contrabandist of the American war, and at every trip she
made she carried away a number of women and children. Meanwhile we
waited for the arrival of the American man-of-war which was to put
the machinery of relief to the non-combatants in operation. She never
came, and in reply to a telegram to Commodore Goldsborough, who was at
Nice, I received the information that he knew nothing of any orders
for Crete. Intrigues had supervened at Constantinople, chief mover in
which was the dragoman of our legation, a Philo-Turkish Levantine, and
the persistent assailant in various American journals of Mr. Morris
and myself. As the result of these intrigues the order to the admiral
was recalled. In March a corvette, the Canandaigua, came for a short
stay, but the manner of the officers towards me, and the observations
of most of the officers on what they considered a sort of "slave
trade," i.e. the carrying of women and children, made me very glad to
see her sail again. I made a little use of her, however, by persuading
the captain to run down to Retimo with me to inspect the condition of
the refugees in that town, and to distribute the money, etc., with
which I had been furnished by the committee at Athens for that
purpose. I also induced the captain to run over to Peiraeus to
reorganize the consulate there, the consul having run away, leaving
the office in the hands of his creditors, from whom I rescued the
archives, the only property on the place, and not liable to seizure
for his debts. I took the same opportunity to exchange views with the
Greek ministers, and began a friendship with Tricoupi which lasted as
long as he lived. The captain sympathized with me, but he had had his
orders, and the officers in general (two of the younger ones took an
opportunity to tell me how glad they would have been to aid the Cretan
families) were pro-Turkish. But the Turks did not know all the facts,
and the visit of the Canandaigua was a moral support to me.
The hostility between Mustapha Pasha and myself had now become so
open that all intercourse ceased. For months my children had not
gone beyond the threshold, and I myself was openly threatened with
assassination; the butchers in the market were forbidden to serve
me with meat, and I got supplies only indirectly. Canea was so well
beleaguered by land by the insurgents that we had scanty provision
of produce at the best, nothing being obtainable from the territory
beyond the Turkish outposts. The Austrian steamer brought weekly a
few vegetables, but the cattle within the lines were famished and
diseased, and there was no good meat and little fish, the fishermen,
who were Italians, all going home. I finally sent to Corfu for the
little yacht on which I had made quarantine, and, pending her arrival,
sent Laura and the children to Syra. When the Kestrel arrived, we
spent most of our time on board, running between the ports of Crete
and between Crete and the Greek Islands, generally followed by a
Turkish gunboat, for Mustapha persisted in regarding me as the
go-between in Greco-Cretan affairs, and while the zapties watched my
door, the Cretan post went to and fro through the gates of the city
unsuspected.
I was no longer of any importance except as a witness of events and
was disposed to resign and go to Greece, for the expense of living had
become greater than I could bear, with my income of $1000. The Porte
threatened to revoke my exequatur, than which nothing could have
pleased me more, for the support of my government had become merely
nominal, though I had never varied from my instructions. The grand
vizier seemed to understand that, and the threat was withdrawn, while
pressure was applied at Washington to induce the government to recall
me, a minister _ad hoc_ being appointed to the United States. Mr.
Seward at first consented, being probably by that time thoroughly
tired of the Cretan, question, but, the Russian legation applying
pressure on the other side, the consent was revoked and I remained.
The Turkish demand included the recall of Morris, but as his
operations were carried on through me my removal was the principal
object. I had now the satisfaction of seeing the disgrace of Mustapha
Kiritly, who was recalled as a failure, and Hussein Avni came out as
_locum tenens_ for the Sirdar, Omar Pasha, the Croat. With Hussein
Avni I made another attempt to enter into conciliatory relations with
the government, and offered my services for any negotiations it might
be desirous of entering into, but the conviction of my hostility to
the Turkish government was so rooted that I saw clearly that no belief
was entertained in my good faith.
Hussein Avni took no steps against the insurgents, but an impatient
subordinate commander, with a division, made an attempt to penetrate
into Selinos, and, being beaten, ravaged the plains about Kissamos,
hitherto unmolested. Whole villages, which had submitted without
resistance, were plundered, the women violated by order of the
officers, in some cases until death ensued. All who were able to
escape hid in the caves along the shore, and made their way in small
boats, as opportunity offered, to Cerigotto. I ran over in the
Kestrel and saw two boats arrive, so freighted that it was almost
inconceivable that they should have made a sea voyage of twenty miles
even in calm weather. I saw a man of ninety who had been wrapped in
cloths saturated with oil, to which fire was set, and who was left to
burn, but whose friends came back in time to save his life, though I
saw the fresh scars of the burning over his whole breast. Meanwhile
the Arkadi came and went without interference, and the insurrection
was practically unmolested.
Omar Pasha arrived on the ninth of April, and, two days after, 2000
insurgents attacked the guard of the aqueduct which supplied Canea
with water, and were repelled, the plan of attack having been betrayed
by a miller of the vicinity; but the main object of the Cretans had
been to show a sign of virility to the new commander-in-chief, and the
object was attained with the loss of three killed. Omar landed with
great ostentation, having brought a magnificent outfit, cavalry,
staff, horse artillery, etc., etc., all in new and brilliant uniforms;
but the astute Cretans rejoiced in the change, for the cunning of
Mustapha Kiritly was more dangerous to them than Omar Pasha and his
European tactics.
I went to pay my respects and renew my offers of good services if
conciliation were to be attempted, expecting to see a civilized
general, but I found only a conceited and bombastic old man who
had not the least idea of what he had undertaken. He pooh-poohed
conciliation, and assured me that his plans were so perfect that
within two weeks after his setting out for the conquest of the island
all would be over and the insurrection at his mercy. I ventured
to suggest that he would find the country more difficult than he
supposed, and that the total want of roads would be a grave obstacle
to such rapid success. He replied that it could not be more difficult
than Montenegro, and he had conquered that, etc., and I left him
greatly relieved as to the probability of success in his operations.
He employed two weeks in his preparations, and then set out for the
conquest of Sphakia, moving in two columns, with a total force of
15,000 men, his own division taking the pass of Kallikrati, giving
access to Sphakia from the east, and held by Coroneos, and that of
Mehmet Pasha moving against Krapi, the pass on the north held by
Zimbrakaki and the Greek bands. Both divisions were driven back to
the plains. The savage excesses which followed this double defeat far
surpassed anything we had known. Villages which had long been at peace
and within the Turkish lines were put to sack, and the last outrages
of war inflicted on the unfortunate inhabitants. The cruelties which,
under Mustapha, were the occasional deeds of subordinate commanders or
the consequence of partial defeats, became, under Omar, the rule by
order to all the detachments, and Omar himself took his share of the
booty and the pick of the captive girls for his own harem.
As I had the testimony of European officers in the Turkish service
given me freely, in disgust at the proceedings of the sirdar, I did
not depend on insurgent reports of these things. While the Egyptian
troops remained I had constant and detailed information from their
European officers. A German officer, by the name of Geissler,--Omar's
chief of artillery,--died of dysentery at Canea during the campaign,
and, his effects being sent in to the consulate of France for
transmission to his family, I had the chance to see his diary, in
which were noted the incidents of the campaign. One entry which I
copied was this: "O. Pasha ordered the division to ravage and rape,"
the village being one where the inhabitants had never taken part in
the insurrection. "All villages were burned," wrote Geissler, and all
prisoners murdered or worse. The chiefs of four villages, who came in
voluntarily to make their submission, were beheaded on the spot, and
the population soon abandoned all villages in the route of the army,
which, not being able to make any impression on the insurgent force,
avenged itself on the inoffensive Christians whenever any fell into
their hands. Nothing more savage and needlessly cruel has taken place
in the history of the Ottoman empire than the deeds of the Sirdar
Croat.
Two changes in the position now took place in favor of the Cretan
non-combatants. The influence of Russia at Alexandria induced the
viceroy to withdraw his troops in spite of the opposition of Omar, and
after the disastrous end of that campaign the remainder were embarked
for Egypt, 10,000 surviving out of the 24,000 who had landed under
Schahin Pasha. The other change was the removal of Derché, whose
uselessness even to his own government had finally become evident. His
successor--Tricou, a quick-witted Parisian, of a character entirely
opposed to the Turcophile Derché--asked permission to follow the army
in the next movement, which was intended to be for the subjugation of
the central provinces, and Omar bluntly refused. As Tricou had orders
from his own government to accompany the army, this impolitic refusal
threw him at once into the opposition with us.
Omar marched by Retimo towards Candia, watched by Coroneos, and, when
the army reached the valley of Margaritas, it was surrounded and
furiously attacked by Coroneos and all the bands of the immediately
surrounding country, and completely bottled up. One of the European
officers with Omar assured me that they had given up all hope of
rescue. The fire of the Cretans penetrated to their tents, and that
of Omar was several times pierced. Omar had, before setting out, sent
orders to Reschid Effendi, who commanded at Candia, to come and meet
him, and Reschid, a more competent commander, with a strong body of
irregulars, fighting day and night, succeeded in effecting a junction
and opening the way. In this affair, again, the jealousy of the Greeks
lost a most brilliant opportunity for a victory which would have
undoubtedly finished the war. Petropoulaki, a Mainote _palikari_ of
the great insurrection of 1827-30, sent over from Greece to direct
affairs about Ida, was called on by Coroneos to reinforce the
resistance to the passage of Rescind, but refused to move or even send
Coroneos a much-needed supply of ammunition, so that the latter
was obliged to retire. On this march there was a repetition of the
incident of the great insurrection, in the stifling of all the
families who had taken refuge in one of the caves which abound in
Crete, by making a huge fire in the entrance. My informant was an
Italian colonel under Omar, who was an eye-witness of the event.
Omar next announced a comprehensive movement which was to sweep the
insurgents from east to west, and surround them in Sphakia, when he
would finish with them. He began by an attack on the position of
Lasithe, where were gathered about 5000 insurgents,--sufficient if
they had had one commander; having many, they were, after temporary
successes, scattered and dispersed east and west, Omar following those
who went westward. I ran down to Candia, in the Kestrel, to get the
earliest news. Harried, and with several partial defeats, the army was
finally concentrated at Dibaki, on the south coast; but, instead of
sweeping the country as Omar had proposed doing, it was embarked on
the fleet and transported to the eastern foothills of Sphakia, and
debarked at Franco Castelli, the scene of the debarkation of Mustapha
in his Askyphó campaign. With much hard fighting, but greatly aided by
the want of coöperation amongst the insurgents and their allies, one
division penetrated to Askyphó, but was unable to get further, and,
being cut off from all communication with its base of supplies, was
obliged to retreat to Vrysis, Omar always remaining on his ironclad,
while Reschid, who was by far the most competent soldier in the
Turkish army in Crete, was obliged to retreat towards Candia, followed
by Coroneos, and, reaching that place mortally wounded in a parting
fight with the Greek chief near Melambos, died at Candia a few weeks
later. While at Candia I received most of my information from the son
of Reschid Pasha.
Omar, having ravaged and murdered along the southern coast, was
obliged to take ship and sail round with the entire army to the point
from which he had started. He landed at Canea, having lost, mostly by
disease, from 20,000 to 25,000 men in a three months' campaign, and
effected nothing except the destruction of six hundred villages and
the murder of hundreds of Cretans. The reports of Tricou had made it
necessary for the French government to recognize the real condition
of affairs, for he had set his agents in the island to collecting the
authentic cases of Turkish barbarity, a ghastly roll. His irritation
against the sirdar, on account of the discourteous manner of refusal
of the permission to accompany the army, was intensified by an
insulting remark which Omar made to Captain Murray, concerning Tricou,
and which Murray repeated to me and I to Tricou; and the war was
thereafter to the knife. Tricou crushed the Croat in the end, and
the Russian and French governments came to an accord for the
transportation of the non-combatants to Greece. In consequence, four
French ships, three Russian, two Italian, and, not to be left alone,
three Austrian and one Prussian, rapidly carried to Greece all who
wished to escape from the island. It was unnecessary, as there was no
longer any danger from the Turkish army; but it was, I suppose, in
pursuance of some political scheme which had brought France and Russia
together. The Turkish army was nowhere in force or spirit to penetrate
into the interior, and the demoralization was such that soldiers
deserted from battalions ordered for Crete. The military hospitals in
Crete were full, and the troops so mutinous that operations had become
impracticable beyond holding and keeping up communication with the
blockhouses and posts within easy reach.
Omar Pasha having failed to make any impression, A'ali Pasha, the
grand vizier, came out in October, 1867, to try conciliation. He
offered all that the Cretans could desire, short of annexation to
Greece,--an assembly of their own, freedom from taxation for a term of
years, a prince of their own election without reserve, and the half of
the customs receipts. I waited on him, as I had on the former envoys
of the Sultan, as a matter of etiquette, and was surprised by the just
and reasonable tone and substance of his propositions. They seemed
even better for the Cretans than annexation to Greece, and I so
represented them to Mr. Morris. But I received from him the orders of
General Ignatieff to urge the Cretans to reject them, as the certain
alternative was their independence and annexation to Greece. I obeyed
my orders without concealing my own sentiments in favor of the
acceptance of the offers of the grand vizier.
A'ali made on me an impression of honesty and justice such as I
had never seen in any Turkish official. He dissembled none of his
difficulties, and discussed the questions arising out of the position
without reserve. For the first time since the affair began I felt
my sympathies drawn to the Turkish aspect of the political question
involved. I had long seen that Crete could not be governed from Athens
without a course of such preparation as the Ionian Islands had had;
they would never submit to prefects from continental Greece; they
felt themselves, as they really are, a superior race, superior in
intelligence and in courage; but the men from Athens had persuaded
them that the only alternative to submission to the Sultan was
annexation, and, meanwhile, the ships of Europe were carrying their
families to Greece, where they were to remain practically as hostages
for the fulfillment of the Greek plans. The Russian influence was now
strengthened by the service rendered in the deportation of the women
and children, and the Greek influence by the maintenance of them in
Greece.
The offers of A'ali Pasha were rejected without being weighed. A'ali
used no arts; he offered bribes to no one; he showed what the Sultan
was ready to offer and guarantee, and listened patiently to all that
the consuls or the friends of the Cretans said, but it was too late.
Meanwhile fighting had ceased, for the Turks dared not go into
the interior, and the Christians, having neither artillery nor
organization, could not attack the fortified posts or the walled
cities. The fighting men in the mountains were provided with food from
Greece, and had lost the habits of industry which would have made
peace profitable. Dissensions arose amongst the chiefs, and the best
of them went back to Greece to urge the carrying of the war into the
continental provinces of Turkey. The conclusion of the war by the
proffered autonomy of Crete was utterly ignored by all who had any
influence in bringing about a solution.
The Russian government now concluded to take the direction of matters.
Its minister at Athens required Comoundouros to fall in with a plan
for a general movement in all the Balkan provinces under Russian
direction, Russia beginning to fear a pan-Hellenic rising. To this
Comoundouros gave a peremptory refusal; it was a Greek movement and
should remain under Greek direction. The king of Greece had married
a Russian princess, and during his stay at St. Petersburg had given
himself up to the influence of the court. He was a weak, incapable
young man, and the absolutist atmosphere suited his temperament
perfectly, and the independence of Comoundouros did not. Under the
requisition of the Russian minister, the king dismissed the ministry
of Comoundouros. The Chamber refused its confidence to the new
ministry, and the Russian minister then made the formal proposal to
Comoundouros that if he would accept the programme of St. Petersburg
he should come back to power. This proposal was also rejected, and
the Chamber was dissolved, and in the new elections, by the most
outrageous exercise of all the expedients that could be applied,
Comoundouros and all his principal adherents were excluded, and a
subservient Chamber elected, under the shadow of a ministry of affairs
composed of men of no party and no capacity. The popular feeling ran
so high that an insurrection was imminent, and was averted only by
the formal promises of the ministry to carry on the war in Crete with
renewed energy; but, at the same time, the means were withdrawn from
the Cretan committee, who were the most capable and honest, as well as
patriotic, people to be found in Athens. Never had the condition of
affairs been so favorable for the realization of a thorough Greek
policy. The Greeks on the Continent were ready and all the Turkish
empire was in a ferment. Joseph Karam, prince of the Lebanon, was
waiting at Athens on the plans of the Greek government to give the
word for a rising in his country. The election having given the
ministry the majority it desired, it gave place to Bulgaris, the
Russian partisan, and colleagues nominated by the Russian minister for
the distinct purpose of suppressing the Cretan insurrection.
Omar Pasha went home in disgrace in November, and left in charge
Hussein Avni, who had a plan of paralyzing the insurrection by
building lines of blockhouses across the island and isolating the
bands. With much pain and expense a number of blockhouses were built
and roads made in the western provinces; but, with the exception
of another fruitless attack on Zurba, nothing really serious was
attempted on either side in the island. The Turkish hospitals were
full of fever and dysentery patients, and the insurgents harried all
the country round about with perfect impunity. Most of the houses
around us at Kalepa were occupied as hospitals, and the very air
seemed infected by the number of sick; there were 3000 in and around
Canea.
In this condition the year 1867 went out and the third year of the
insurrection began. The Greek government sent supplies enough to keep
the men under arms from starving, and the Turkish could send no more
troops, so that there were only, after garrisoning the fortresses,
about 5000 troops available for any operations. One of the European
officers told me that the total force remaining out of eighty-two
battalions, of which most had come to Crete full, was 17,000 men
effective. A party of the consuls and officers of the men-of-war in
the port made a picnic at Meskla in August, and witnessed a fight
between the Cretans and Zurba and the Turks at Lakus, in the course
of watching which I had a shot fired at me from the Turkish trenches,
which came so near that the lead of the bullet striking a rock at my
side spattered me from head to foot, and as we returned to Canea we
were surrounded by the insurgents at Theriso, having lost our road
in the dark, and most of the party taken prisoners. I and my veteran
cavass, Hadji Houssein, broke through with a guest,--Colonel
Borthwick, an English officer in the Turkish service,--escaping down a
breakneck hillside in the dark to save him and his two orderlies from
capture by the insurgents, a trifling thing for us who were known as
the friends of the Cretans, but a serious matter possibly for Turkish
soldiers in fez and uniform. We made a reckless race down the
mountain, leaving our horses and my photographic apparatus under the
care of Dickson, and just succeeded in reaching the Turkish outpost
in advance of a party of Cretans who followed the road down to cut us
off. The post which we reached was under the command of a major, and
Borthwick, who outranked him, ordered out a relieving party to go up
the road and rescue the consuls, but the frightened major went up the
road, out of sight, and waited there till we were gone, and then came
back. He complained to Borthwick on receiving the order, "But you know
that is dangerous,"--a fair expression of the feeling of the army as
to their service at that time. They were too demoralized to make any
impression on the insurgents.
Laura had recently been confined with our Bella, her third child, and
our physician--a kindly and excellent Pole, attached to one of the
hospitals--ordered us all out of the island as soon as she was able to
travel, for, to use his expression, "he would not guarantee the life
of one of us if we remained in the island two weeks longer." We
had been living for over two years a life of the deprivations and
discomfort of a state of siege. At one time I had been confined to
the house for three months by a scorbutic malady which prevented my
walking, my children had been suffering from ophthalmia brought by the
Egyptians, and Laura was in a state of extreme mental depression from
her sympathy with the Cretans, while the absolute apathy prevailing in
the island made me useless to either side. It was most gratifying to
me that A'ali Pasha recognized my good faith and comprehension of the
position, for not only did he, before he left the island, give me
distinctly to understand that he considered me a friend, but told the
Turkish minister in Athens, Photiades Pasha, that the government of
Constantinople had been greatly deceived regarding me, and that if
they had taken my advice in the beginning they would have avoided
their difficulties. I left for Athens in September of 1868, convinced,
as were the intelligent chiefs of the Cretans, that the Greek
government intended to abandon the insurrection. I left the consulate
in the hands of a new vice-consul--an Englishman long resident in the
island,--my Greek vice-consul having died during the insurrection, and
I had decided not to return at the end of my leave of absence; but I
did not resign, as I knew that both the Turkish and my own government
wanted me to do so.
The agitation in America on behalf of the Cretans had been pushed
too energetically and under bad management, and had been followed by
indifference, and the government would willingly have recalled me, but
had no pretext for doing so, as I had always obeyed my orders. Nothing
was done, however, to make it more possible for me to remain in the
island. I had, in the second year of the war, determined to resign on
account of the pecuniary difficulties of my position. We were living
in a besieged town, with all necessaries of life at famine prices,
and, since my brother's death, I had no fund to draw on for my
excessive expenses. The Cretan committee in Boston, considering my
resignation probably fatal to the insurrection, had promised that they
would be responsible for any expenses above my salary, and on that
understanding a friend in New York--Mr. Le Grand Lockwood, a wealthy
banker--had offered to advance me any necessary sums. In accordance
with this offer I had drawn on him for what I needed, the amount
reaching, at the end of my residence in Crete, nearly three thousand
dollars. Arrived at Athens I took a tiny house under Lycabettus,
which was simply furnished for us by the local and principal Cretan
committee.
I found the committee convinced that the government of Bulgaris had
decided to stifle the insurrection in pursuance of the Russian plan,
and it had sent in its resignation, which the ministry had not
accepted. The minister of foreign affairs came to me at once to beg
me to persuade them to withdraw the resignation, assuring me that the
ministry had no intention of abandoning the Cretans, but was even
ready to increase the subsidy, and was preparing an expedition on a
larger scale than any previous one to revive it, and that it would, to
insure its efficiency, take direct charge of the organization of it.
On these assurances, I prevailed on the committee to withdraw its
resignation, which probably averted an insurrection in Athens. The
provisional government in Crete meanwhile appealed to Coroneos to
come back and take the general direction of the insurrection, and he
consented on condition of being furnished the means required, which he
estimated at £10,000. The ministry rejected the offer, alleging want
of means, and immediately proceeded to organize an expedition which
cost more than double the amount. This was put under the direction of
the old Petropoulaki, a partisan of Bulgaris, and the chief who had
refused to help Coroneos in the attack on Omar Pasha at Margaritas.
The volunteers were so openly enrolled and mustered, and all other
preparations made with so little disguise, that I was convinced that
the ministry intended by (what had hitherto been avoided) undisguised
violation of international law to provoke the Turkish government to
take action. The bands paraded the streets of Athens under the
Cretan flag, passing under the windows of the Turkish legation; the
government gave them two guns from the arsenal, and they were openly
embarked in two steamers, and landed in Crete without molestation by
any of the Turkish men-of-war. They sent the guns back, and, when
attacked after debarkation, separated into two divisions, neither of
which offered any resistance, the smaller being attacked and cut to
pieces at once, the larger taking refuge in Askyphó, where, without
waiting for an attack, they made immediate overtures of surrender, and
did at last surrender unconditionally the island as well as their own
force, without any communication with or authority from the recognized
Cretan provisional government, but carrying with them the insurgents
of the western provinces. There remained about five thousand
insurgents in the eastern part of the island in good condition for
resistance.
In compliance with what was evidently a preconcerted plan between
the Turkish and Greek governments, the Englishman Hobart Pasha, the
admiral in command of the blockading fleet, who had not offered
to interfere with the expedition of Petropoulaki, the place of
debarkation of which was publicly known, waylaid in Greek waters the
Ennosis, the blockade runner of the committee, which had replaced the
Arkadi, captured by the Turkish ironclads, and chased her into the
port of Syra, which he then proceeded to close by anchoring across
the entrance to the harbor. On the news of this reaching Athens, the
Cretan committee sent to Syra a blockade runner, lying as a reserve at
Peiraeus, with orders to torpedo the admiral, torpedoes having been
prepared for other contingencies at the arsenal of Syra, and I
accompanied the bearers of the order. A spy in the committee gave
immediate information to the Turkish minister, and, as our steamer
went out of Peiraeus, we saw the smoke arise from the chimneys of a
French corvette, lying off the arsenal, and two or three hours after
we had entered, the corvette arrived and sent off a boat to Hobart
Pasha, who immediately weighed anchor, and went to sea. The Greek
government took no action and made no protest against this violation
of international law, first by attacking the Ennosis in Greek waters,
and then by blocking the entrance to the port. Its conduct left no
question as to its complicity with the action of Admiral Hobart.