general, on the 29th of September, 1862, on account of his success at
the battle of Wood Lake, the announcement of his promotion being in a
telegram, as follows:
"Washington, D. C., Sept. 29, 1862.
"_Major General Pope, St. Paul, Minn._,
"Colonel Henry H. Sibley is made a brigadier general for his
judicious fight at Yellow Medicine. He should be kept in command
of that column, and every possible assistance sent to him.
"H. W. HALLECK,
"_General in Chief_."
His commission as brigadier general was not issued until March 26, 1864,
but, of course, this telegram amounted to an appointment to the
position, and if accepted, as it was, made him subject to the orders of
the president; so, notwithstanding his dispatch to me, stating that the
Indians, if convicted, would be forthwith executed, he could not very
well carry out such an extreme duty without first submitting it to the
federal authorities, of which he had become a part.
My view of the question has always been that, when the court martial was
organized, Colonel Sibley had no idea that more than twenty or
twenty-five of the Indians would be convicted, which is partly
inferrable from his dispatch to me, in which he said he had "apprehended
sixteen supposed to have been connected with the late outrages." But
when the matter assumed the proportions it did, and he found on his
hands some three hundred men to kill, he was glad to shift the
responsibility to higher authority. Any humane man would have been of
the same mind. I have my own views, also, of the reasons of the general
government in eliminating from the list of the condemned all but
thirty-nine. It was not because these thirty-nine were more guilty than
the rest, but because we were engaged in a great civil war, and the eyes
of the world were upon us. Had these three hundred men been executed,
the charge would have undoubtedly been made by the South, that the
North was murdering prisoners of war, and the authorities at Washington,
knowing full well that the other nations were not capable of making the
proper discrimination, and perhaps not anxious to do so if they were,
deemed it safer not to incur the odium which might follow from such an
accusation.
EXECUTION OF THE THIRTY-EIGHT CONDEMNED INDIANS.
The result of the matter was that the order of the president was obeyed,
and on the 26th of December, 1862, thirty-eight of the condemned Indians
were executed, by hanging, at Mankato, one having been pardoned by the
president. Contemporaneous history, or, rather, general public
knowledge, of what actually occurred, says that the pardoned Indian was
hanged, and one of the others liberated by mistake. As an historian, I
do not assert this to be true, but as a citizen, thoroughly well
informed of current events at the time of this execution, I believe it
to be a fact. The hanging of the thirty-eight was done on one gallows,
constructed in a square form, capable of sustaining ten men on each
side. They were placed upon a platform facing inwards, and dropped all
at once by the cutting of a rope. The execution was successful in all
its details, and reflects credit on the ingenuity and engineering skill
of Captain Burt of Stillwater, who was intrusted with the construction
of the deadly machine. The rest of the condemned Indians were, after
some time, taken down to Davenport in Iowa, and held in confinement
until the excitement had generally subsided, when they were sent west of
the Missouri and set free. An Indian never forgets what he regards as an
injury, and never forgives an enemy. It is my opinion that all the
troubles that have taken place since the liberation of these Indians,
with the tribes inhabiting the western plains and mountains, up to a
recent date, have grown out of the evil counsels of these savages. The
only proper course to have pursued with them, when it was decided not to
hang them, was to have exiled them to some remote post,--say, the Dry
Tortugas,--where communication with their people would have been
impossible, set them to work on fortifications or other public works,
and allowed them to pass out by life limitation.
The execution of these Indians practically terminated the campaign for
the year 1862, no other event worthy of detailed record having occurred;
but the Indian war was far from being over, and it was deemed prudent to
keep within the state a sufficient force of troops to successfully
resist all further attacks, and to inaugurate an aggressive campaign in
the coming year. The whole of the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Regiments,
the Mounted Rangers, some artillery organizations, scouts and other
troops were wintered in the state at various points along the more
exposed frontier, and in 1863 a formidable expedition, under command of
General Sibley, was sent from Minnesota to crush the enemy, which was to
be aided and cooperated with, by another expedition, under Gen. Alfred
Sully, of equal proportions, which was to start from Sioux City, on the
Missouri. After the attack at Birch Coulie and its relief, Little Crow,
with a large part of his followers, branched off, and went to the
vicinity of Acton, and there attacked the command under Capt. Richard
Strout, where a severe battle was fought, in which several of Captain
Strout's men were killed. On the 3d of July, 1863, Crow ventured down to
the neighborhood of Hutchinson, with his young son, probably to get
something which he had hidden, or to steal horses, and while he was
picking berries, a farmer named Lamson, who was in search of his cows,
saw him and shot him dead. His scalp now decorates the walls of the
Minnesota Historical Society.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1863.
The remnant of Little Crow's followers were supposed to be rendezvoused
at Devil's lake, in Dakota Territory, and reinforced by a large body of
the Upper Sioux. An expedition against them was devised by General Pope,
to be commanded by General Sibley. It was to assemble at a point near
the mouth of the Redwood river, some twenty-five miles above Fort
Ridgely. On the 7th of June, 1863, General Sibley arrived at the point
of departure, which was named Camp Pope, in honor of the commanding
general. The force composing the expedition was as follows: One company
of pioneers, under Captain Chase; ten companies of the Sixth Regiment,
under Colonel Crooks; eight companies of the Tenth Regiment, under
Colonel Baker; nine companies of the Seventh, under Lieutenant Colonel
Marshall; eight pieces of artillery, under Captain Jones; nine companies
of Minnesota Mounted Rangers, under Colonel McPhail; seventy-five Indian
scouts under Major Brown, George McLeod and Major Dooley; in all 3,052
infantry, 800 cavalry and 148 artillerymen. The command, from the nature
of the country it had to traverse, was compelled to depend upon its own
supply train, which was composed of 225 six-mule wagons. The staff was
complete, consisting of Adjutant General Olin, Brigade Commissary
Forbes, Assistant Commissary and Ordnance Officer Atchison, Commissary
Clerk Spencer, Quartermaster Corning, Assistant Quartermaster Kimball,
Aides-de-camp Lieutenants Pope, Beever, Hawthorne and A. St. Clair
Flandrau, Chaplain, Rev. S. R. Riggs.
The column moved from Camp Pope on June 16, 1863. The weather was
intensely hot, and the country over which the army had to march was wild
and uninhabited. At first the Indians retreated in the direction of the
British line, but it was discovered that their course had been changed
to the direction of the Missouri river. They had probably heard that
General Sully had been delayed by low water and hoped to be able to
cross to the west bank of that stream before his arrival to intercept
them, with the future hope that they would, no doubt, be reenforced by
the Sioux inhabiting the country west of the Missouri. On the 4th of
July the expedition reached the Big Bend of the Cheyenne river. On the
17th of July Colonel Sibley received reliable information that the main
body of the Indians was moving toward the Missouri, which was on the
20th of July confirmed by a visit at Camp Atchison of about three
hundred Chippewa half-breeds, led by a Catholic priest named Father
Andre. On becoming satisfied that the best fruits of the march could be
attained by bending towards the Missouri, the general decided to relieve
his command of as much impedimenta as was consistent with comfort and
safety and would increase the rapidity of its movements. He therefore
established a permanent post at Camp Atchison, about fifty miles
southeasterly from Devil's lake, where he left all the sick and disabled
men, and a large portion of his ponderous train, with a sufficient guard
to defend them if attacked. He then immediately started for the
Missouri, with 1,436 infantry, 520 cavalry, 100 pioneers and
artillerymen, and twenty-five days' rations. On the 22nd he crossed the
James river, forty-eight miles west of Camp Atchison, and on the 24th
reached the vicinity of Big Mound, beyond the second ridge of the
Missouri coteau. Here the scouts reported large bodies of Indians, with
Red Plume and Standing Buffalo among them.
BATTLE OF BIG MOUND.
The general, expecting an attack on the 24th, corralled his train, and
threw up some earthworks to enable a smaller force to defend it. The
Indians soon appeared. Dr. Weiser, surgeon of the First Rangers,
supposing he saw some old friends among them, approached too close and
was instantly killed. Lieutenant Freeman, who had wandered some distance
from the camp, was also killed. The battle opened at three p. m., in the
midst of a terrific thunderstorm, and after some sharp fighting, the
Indians, numbering about fifteen hundred, fled in the direction of their
camp, and were closely pursued. A general panic ensued, the Indian camp
was abandoned, and the whole throng, men, women and children, fled
before the advancing forces. Numerous charges were made upon them,
amidst the roaring of the thunder and the flashing of the lightning. One
private was killed by lightning, and Colonel McPhail's saber was knocked
out of his grasp by the same force.
The Indians are reported to have lost in this fight, eighty killed and
wounded. They also lost nearly all their camp equipment. They were
pursued about fifteen miles, and had it not been for a mistake in the
delivery of an order by Lieutenant Beever, they would undoubtedly have
been overtaken and destroyed. The order was to bivouac where night
caught the pursuing troops, but was misunderstood to return. This
unfortunate error gave the Indians two days' start, and they put a wide
gap between themselves and the troops. The battle of Big Mound, as this
engagement was called, was a decided victory, and counted heavily in the
scale of advantage, as it put the savages on the run and disabled them
from prosecuting further hostilities.
BATTLE OF DEAD BUFFALO LAKE.
On the 26th the command again moved in the direction of the fleeing
Indians. Their abandoned camp was passed on that day early in the
morning. About noon large bodies of the enemy were discovered, and a
brisk fight ensued. Attacks and counter attacks were made, and a
determined fight kept up until about three p. m., when a bold dash was
made by the Indians to stampede the animals which were herded on the
banks of a lake, but the attempt was promptly met and defeated. The
Indians, foiled at all points, and having lost heavily in killed and
wounded, retired from the field. At night earthworks were thrown up to
prevent a surprise, but none was attempted, and this ended the battle of
Dead Buffalo Lake.
The general was now convinced that the Indians were going toward the
Missouri, with the intention of putting the river between them and his
command, and, expecting General Sully's force to be there to intercept
them, he determined to push them on as rapidly as possible, inflicting
all the damage he could in their flight. The campaign was well
conceived, and had Sully arrived in time, the result would undoubtedly
have been the complete destruction or capture of the Indians. But low
water delayed Sully to such an extent that he failed to arrive in time,
and the enemy succeeded in crossing the river before General Sibley
could overtake them.
BATTLE OF STONY LAKE.
On the 28th of July Indians were again seen in large numbers. They
endeavored to encircle the troops. They certainly presented a force of
two thousand fighting men, and must have been reinforced by friends from
the west side of the Missouri. They were undoubtedly fighting to keep
the soldiers back until their families could cross the river. The troops
were well handled. A tremendous effort was made to break our lines, but
the enemy was repulsed at all points. The artillery was effective, and
the Indians finally fled in a panic and rout towards the Missouri. They
were hotly pursued, and, on the 29th, the troops crossed Apple creek, a
small stream a few miles from the present site of Bismarck, the capital
of North Dakota, and pushing on, struck the Missouri at a point about
four miles above Burnt Boat Island. The Indians had succeeded in
crossing the river with their families, but in a very demoralized
condition as to supplies and camp equipage. They were plainly visible on
the bluffs on the opposite side. It was here that Lieutenant Beever lost
his life while carrying an order. He missed the trail and was ambushed
and killed. He was a young Englishman who had volunteered to accompany
the expedition, and whom General Sibley had placed upon his staff as an
aide.
Large quantities of wagons and other material, abandoned by the Indians
in their haste to cross the river, were destroyed. The bodies of
Lieutenant Beever and a private of the Sixth Regiment, who was killed in
the same way, were recovered and buried. It was clear that the Indians,
on learning of the magnitude of the expedition, never contemplated
overcoming it in battle, and made their movements with reference to
delaying its progress, while they pushed their women and children
toward and across the river, knowing there was no resting place for them
on this side. They succeeded admirably, but their success was solely
attributed to the failure of General Sully to arrive in time. General
Sibley's part of the campaign was carried out to the letter, and every
man in it, from the commander to the private, is entitled to the highest
praise.
On August 1st the command broke camp for home. As was learned
afterwards, General Sully was then distant down the river 160 miles. His
delay was no fault of his, as it was occasioned by insurmountable
obstacles. The march home was a weary but uneventful one. The campaign
of 1863 may be summed up as follows: The troops marched nearly 1,200
miles. They fought three well-contested battles. They drove from eight
to ten thousand Indians out of the state, and across the Missouri river.
They lost only seven killed and three wounded, and inflicted upon the
enemy so severe a loss that he never again returned to his old haunts.
For his meritorious services General Sibley was appointed a major
general by brevet on Nov. 29, 1865, which appointment was duly confirmed
by the senate, and he was commissioned on April 7, 1866.
In July, 1863, a regiment of cavalry was authorized by the secretary of
war to be raised by Major E. A. C. Hatch, for duty on the northern
frontier. Several companies were recruited and marched to Pembina, on
the extreme northern border, where they performed valuable services, and
suffered incredible hardships. The regiment was called Hatch's
Battalion.
CAMPAIGN OF 1864.
The government very wisely decided not to allow the Indian question to
rest upon the results of the campaign of 1863, which left the Indians
in possession of the country west of the Missouri, rightly supposing
that they might construe their escape from General Sibley the previous
year into a victory. It therefore sent out another expedition in 1864,
to pursue and attack them beyond the Missouri. The plan and outfit were
very similar to those of 1863. General Sully was again to proceed up the
Missouri with a large command, and meet a force sent out from Minnesota,
which forces when combined were to march westward, and find and punish
the savages if possible. The expedition, as a whole, was under the
command of General Sully. It consisted of two brigades, the first
composed of Iowa and Kansas infantry and cavalry, and Brackett's
Battalion, to the number of several thousand, which was to start from
Sioux City and proceed up the Missouri in steamboats. The second
embraced the Eighth Regiment of Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, under
Colonel Thomas, mounted on ponies; the Second Minnesota Cavalry, under
Colonel MacLaren; the Third Minnesota Battery, under Captain Jones. The
Second Brigade was commanded by Colonel Thomas. This brigade left Fort
Snelling on June 1st, and marched westward. General Sibley and staff
accompanied it as far as Fort Ridgely. On the 9th of June it passed Wood
Lake, the scene of the fight in 1862. About this point it overtook a
large train of emigrants on their way to Idaho, who had with them 160
wagon loads of supplies. This train was escorted to the Missouri river
safely. The march was wearisome in the extreme, with intensely hot
weather and very bad water, and was only enlivened by the appearance
occasionally of a herd of buffalo, a band of antelope, or a straggling
elk. The movements of the command were carefully watched by flying bands
of Indians during its whole march. On July 1st the Missouri was reached
at a point where now stands Fort Rice. General Sully and the First
Brigade had arrived there the day before. The crossing was made by the
boats that brought up the First Brigade. The column was immediately
directed toward Cannon Ball river, where 1,800 lodges of Indians were
reported to be camped. The Indians fled before the approaching troops.
On the last of July the Heart river was reached, where a camp was
formed, and the tents and teams left behind. Thus relieved, the command
pressed forward for an Indian camp eighty miles northward. On the 2d of
August the Indians were found in large numbers on the Big Knife river,
in the Bad lands. These were Unca-Papa Sioux, who had murdered a party
of miners from Idaho the year before, and had given aid and comfort to
the Minnesota refugee Indians. They were attacked, and a very spirited
engagement ensued in which the enemy was badly beaten and suffered
severe losses. The place where this battle was fought was called
Ta-ka-ho-ku-tay, or "The bluff where the man shot the deer."
On the next day, August 3d, the command moved west through the Bad
Lands, and just as it emerged from this terribly ragged country it was
sharply attacked by a large body of Indians. The fight lasted through
two days and nights, when the enemy retired in haste. They were very
roughly handled in this engagement.
General Sully then crossed to the west side of the Yellowstone river,
where the weary soldiers found two steamboats awaiting them, with ample
supplies. In crossing this rapid river the command lost three men and
about twenty horses. From this point they came home by the way of Forts
Union, Berthold and Stevenson, reaching Fort Rice on the 9th of
September.
On this trip General Sully located Forts Rice, Stevenson and Berthold.
On reaching Fort Rice, considerable anxiety was felt for Colonel Fisk,
who, with a squad of fifty troops, had left the fort as an escort for a
train of Idaho immigrants, and had been attacked 180 miles west of the
fort, and had been compelled to intrench. He had sent for
reenforcements, and General Sully sent him three hundred men, who
extricated him from his perilous position.
The Minnesota brigade returned home by way of Fort Wadsworth, where they
arrived on September 27th. Here Major Rose, with six companies of the
Second Cavalry, was left to garrison the post, the balance of the
command reaching Fort Snelling on the 12th of October.
In June, 1865, another expedition left Minnesota for the west, under
Colonel Callahan of Wisconsin, which went as far as Devil's lake. The
first, second and fourth sections of the Third Minnesota battery
accompanied it. Again, in 1866, an expedition started from Fort
Abercrombie, which included the first section of the Third Battery,
under Lieutenant Whipple. As no important results followed from these
two latter expeditions, I only mention them as being parts of the Indian
war.
The numbers of Indians engaged in this war, together with their superior
fighting qualities, their armament, and the country occupied by them
gives it rank among the most important of the Indian wars fought since
the first settlement of the country on the Atlantic coast. But when
viewed in the light of the number of settlers massacred, the amount of
property destroyed, and the horrible atrocities committed by the
savages, it far surpasses them all.
I have dwelt upon this war to such an extent because I regard it as the
most important event in the history of our state, and desire to
perpetuate the facts more especially connected with the gallant
resistance offered by the settlers in its inception. Not an instance of
timidity is recorded. The inhabitants engaged in the peaceful pursuits
of agriculture, utterly unprepared for war, sprang to the front on the
first indication of danger, and checked the advance of the savage enemy
in his initial efforts. The importance of battles should never be
measured by the number engaged, or the lists of killed and wounded, but
by the consequences of their results. I think the repulse of the Indians
at Fort Ridgely and New Ulm saved the State of Minnesota from a disaster
the magnitude of which cannot be estimated. Their advance was checked at
the very frontier, and they were compelled to retreat, thus affording
time and opportunity for the whites to organize for systematic action.
Had they not met with this early check, it is more than probable that
the Chippewas on the Upper Mississippi and the Winnebagoes in the Lower
Minnesota valley would have joined them, and the war have been carried
into the heart of the state. Instances of a similar character have
occurred in our early wars which illustrate my position. The battle of
Oriscany, which was fought in the Revolutionary War in the valley of the
Mohawk, between Rome and Utica, was not more of an encounter than
Ridgely or New Ulm, yet it has been characterized as one of the decisive
battles of the world, because it prevented a junction of the British
forces under St. Ledger in the west and Burgoyne in the east, and made
American independence possible. The State of New York recognized the
value of Oriscany just one hundred years after the battle was fought, by
the erection of a monument to commemorate it. The State of Minnesota
has done better, by erecting imposing monuments on both the battlefields
of Ridgely and New Ulm, the inscriptions on which give a succinct
history of the respective events.
The state also presented each of the defenders of Fort Ridgely with a
handsome bronze medal, especially struck for the purpose, the
presentation of which took place at the time of the dedication of the
monument, on the twentieth day of August, 1896.
The medal has a picture of the fort on its obverse side, surrounded
by the words, "Defender of Fort Ridgely, August 18-27, 1862." Just
over the flag staff, in a scroll, is the legend, in Sioux,
"Ti-yo-pa-na-ta-ka-pi," which means, "It shut the door against us,"
referring to the battle having obstructed the further advance of the
Indians. This was said by one of the Indians in the attacking party in
giving his view of the effect of the repulse, and adopted by the
committee having charge of the preparation of the medal as being
appropriate and true. On the reverse side are the words, "Presented by
the State of Minnesota to----," encircled by a wreath of moccasin
flowers, which is the flower of the state.