THE EVOLUTION OF FREE WILL.
Two distinct theories may be held by the Evolutionist with respect to
volition, both of them being strictly causational, and, therefore, of a
scientific, as opposed to a mystical character.
He may hold, in the first place, the double aspect theory pure and
simple, according to which all developments of mind are merely dependent
concomitants of the development of nerve ramifications, with consequent
growths of nerve-cells, ganglions, and the more considerable nerve
plexuses, culminating in the growth of a brain. This evolution of a
nervous and cerebral system he may hold to be wholly due to the action
of molecular and other motions upon a mass of colloid substances of such
a constitution as to be fittest, under the action of these external
stimuli, to form lines for the transmission of motions and for the
discharge of these motions into certain otherwise formed contractile
structures called muscles. He will consider that they eventually acquire
a power of retaining these motions, so that the effect of all the
motions thus caused is not immediate but deferred. And since all motions
received are not immediately concerned with the welfare of the organism,
he may suppose that separate masses of nervous matter are produced, in
which these motions are stored in an organised form, related indirectly
rather than directly to the motor apparatus. According to this theory
the whole system of determining causes is purely physical. In the simple
organisms the response of muscular action to incident motions is quick,
direct, and unhesitating. Such action is called reflex or automatic, and
is as unconscious as chemical activity. But when the system becomes more
complex, when nerves cross each other, when cells and junctions are
formed, and more particularly when the storages of motions are formed,
as just referred to; then compoundings and recompoundings of nervous
motions take place, and, according to the strength of the various
currents, to the facility of discharge, and to various physical local or
general conditions, the action becomes slower and more hesitating. Under
these circumstances, it is held that the nervous system becomes
conscious. A double aspect then arises, and the actions which thereafter
take place may be described either in terms of the relations of the
various molecular motions in the nervous and cerebral systems, or in
terms of feeling; but all the same the latter is merely the secondary
aspect of series of changes altogether determined by the motions and
structure of the former. On this theory memory is the revived motion of
a nerve structure; feeling is a consciousness of interaction between
different nerve motions; trains of thought are the reverberations of
great varieties of motions throughout the system and brain;
consciousness resulting from the mingling of the nerve currents and the
consequent conflict and retardation of effects.
The element of mystery here lies in the secondary or subjective aspect,
but it is placed strictly without the line of deduction and is a merely
unexplained accompaniment of a series of changes otherwise fully
accounted for.
A second theory--as strictly causational as the former--recognises the
presence of a subjective factor. In some of the quotations from Mr.
Spencer's "Psychology," given above, it will have been seen that, at the
point of development of nerve junctions when different currents meet in
the developed ganglion and in proportion as the system becomes more
complex, Mr. Spencer asserts not only the rise of a secondary aspect,
but of an additional factor. The element of mystery here is the entrance
of this additional factor, capable of taking part as an active agent in
the affairs of the organism. But since it is itself the result of
experience and the organization of experiences of the physical nervous
system, it is strictly of a causational or deductive order, and after
its unexplained inception, it has to be studied strictly in the
scientific order of development and action. Notwithstanding that it
plays a part in the conduct of life, and notwithstanding that its
dependence upon physical organization and development is so intimate,
and that this development again cannot be understood without
it--notwithstanding all this incomprehensibleness of relation and our
ignorance of its origin, the Evolutionist maintains the orderly
development of organism and actions, including the subjective as
resultants of the relations of original factors, although he may be for
the time being ignorant of the nature of the processes.
It will therefore be seen that in either case he holds the deterministic
theory of volition, and believes all purposed actions to be actions
determined by pre-existing causes, whether he regards these causes as
the structure and condition of nerve centres, or as feelings and
thoughts, or whether he regards them as ascribable to some law of
correlation between the two.
Nevertheless, it seems to be incumbent upon all writers dealing with
the subject of Ethics to define their position as to the Free Will
controversy. It is needless to say that we accept unreservedly the
deterministic theory, though it may be necessary to attempt its
reconciliation with the consciousness in persons of Free Will.
We here make a distinction between theories of Will and theories of Free
Will. What we have just been considering have been theories of will or
volition. They are of the deterministic order because in either case the
actions are wholly determined by preceding facts. Human and all actions
of organisms are held to be merely resultants of pre-existing factors
and their relations. This is the theory held by all scientific
philosophers, and the one most analogous to what we know of physical
science as well as most in conformity with actual experience of human
conduct. Another theory--arising no doubt in the mystery of the
secondary aspect or in the mystery of the origin of the subjective
factor, denies the rigidity of the scientific order, and asserts the
presence and activity of a _self-determining factor_, thus placing
volitional action beyond the scientific order of the dependent and
related successions of cause and effect.
Perhaps, however, we would be more correct in attributing the confidence
with which this theory of a self-determining power is sometimes held to
another cause. There is in all human beings the consciousness of a power
more or less developed to regulate their own actions; and this process
of self-regulation is held to be inconsistent with the deterministic
theory. There can be no doubt that there is such a consciousness and we
think there can be no doubt also that there is such a power. The
superficial evolutionist, indeed, may admit the consciousness, which he
may explain as a secondary aspect of conflicting nerve-currents, and
laugh in his sleeve at the egotistic vanity of a trustful man proud of
his power of Will. But we think a deeper explanation, and one more
commensurate with the phenomena, is to be found: and this brings us back
to the distinction, as indicated at the outset of this section, between
theories of Will or Volition, and theories of Free Will or the power of
regulating one's own conduct.
Will, in its scientific sense, is merely volition, _i.e._ the mental
state accompanying or immediately preceding action. The nature of the
action, good, bad, or indifferent, is immaterial. Technically speaking,
all volitions are equal, viewed as such. The volition for the time being
is the Will for the time being. The Will of a man is the totality of his
volitions during the whole of his lifetime. It is a general or
collective term relating to conscious actions, or states of
consciousness immediately preceding actions, and is not the name of an
entity.
But if Will is the volition for the time being, irrespective of any
qualitative characteristic, then we have to inquire as to the
applicability to it of the term "Free." Now this term is antithetical to
the two terms "restrained" and "constrained." Thus if a man's actions
are hindered or forcefully prevented by the Will of others, that man's
actions are not free. But if some of a man's motives are restrained or
his actions constrained by the predominance of some other of his
motives--as, for instance, when he performs actions which his conscience
tells him are wrong--in his Will not free? The actions are his
volitions. If some motives are restrained, and therefore not to be
considered free, still the others which have gained the predominance
have thereby become his Will; their operation proves their non-restraint
or freedom, and the volition or Will is still free. The action is an
evidence of freedom. Volition is always free. It is of different kinds,
but this does not affect the conclusion that volition proves its own
freedom. The Will is always and under all circumstances free.
But although this disposes of the question theoretically, the ordinary
man remains unconvinced, and clings to his belief in a Free Will, which
is not merely this technical and universal Free Will, but must be
interpreted as a power he feels himself to possess of choosing and
determining his own actions; and if we say to him, "Undoubtedly you have
this power; but your choice, and therefore your volition and consequent
action, is still determined in the same manner as if you had not
recognized the power," he will demur, and, logically or illogically, he
will deny your position, and hold to his consciousness of what he calls
his self-determining power over his own actions, which he places out of
the line of Determinism, however unmeaning or paradoxical his assertions
may be proved to be.
It is this state of consciousness, this clinging to the belief held by
many men in their own _power of self-rule_ over their own general
conduct, and by most men in their own control over some of their
activities, that Evolution is bound to account for and explain.
Evolutionists do not sufficiently mark off this _practical_ part of the
question from the _theoretical_ part, and thus leave imperfectly
explained the consciousness of the so-called "Free Will." They deem
that the explanation of Free Will is included in an explanation of Will,
and therefore they only deal incidentally and imperfectly with
self-rule. The confusion arises from the term Free Will having two
meanings--the theoretic or scientific one, as opposed to Determinism,
and the practical one, as implying the power of self-rule, choice,
effort, and determination.
That there exists such a power of self-regulation is a fact recognized
in every department of social intercourse--in the attribution of praise
or blame, in the teachings of the moralist, in the eye of the law, and
in the process of education. Every individual is supposed to have a
command over his own actions, except such as are purely automatic. It is
not supposed that men are responsible for their congenital tastes or
abilities; but all members of the community are held responsible for
their actions towards other members of the community, and to a certain
extent they are judged to be wise or foolish with regard to themselves,
on the supposition that they are able to carry out a purposed conduct.
And even if in various particulars it is seen that they do not possess
such a power, they, or the persons responsible for their earlier
education are blamed for their want of this power since it is held to be
one of the most characteristic and valuable possessions of humanity.
Thus we find the judicious parent, from the very first, endeavours to
inculcate in the child habits of command over his temper and his
appetites. The youth who has received the lessons of wise counsellers,
who has been imbued with the lessons of Christianity, who has drunk in
the teachings of the ancient moralists, and framed his ambitions upon
the severe examples of early Greece and Rome, or who has found his
sympathies excited by the dreams of modern philanthropy, knows that the
foundation of all his personal greatness is in his power of
self-command. It is no idle verbiage that of the rhetorician, the
preacher, the philosophical novelist, the poet, when they exhort to the
cultivation of the powers of the Will in their varied representations of
the aspirations and struggles of noble humanity. There is something that
calls forth the moralist's sympathies in the poet's appeals to the power
of Will, and there is no grander spectacle in all this universe than to
witness the battle of the will-power of a man against difficulties and
oppositions of all sorts; none the less if the scene of the conflict be
in the region of his own heart and mind, rather than in the wider field
of the battle of life.
The evolutionist is bound to account for this amongst the other
phenomena of human existence. The principles of such an evolution are
contained in Mr. Spencer's "Psychology," but the development is not
elaborated in detail, and is well worthy of a special study. We have
previously roughly indicated the outlines of such a study; and as the
special psychological question has been treated in an interesting and
suggestive manner by the Rev. T. W. Fowle in the number of the
"Nineteenth Century" for March 1881, we will find it convenient to take
this article as the text or basis of our own remarks.
The writer's argument appears in brief to be this. In the course of
Evolution, man became self-conscious (see p. 392). This consciousness of
self led, first of all, to self-preservation, then to self-assertion,
and finally to self-pleasing. "When man first uttered the words or
rather felt the impression to which language subsequently gave definite
shape and force, '_I will_ live in spite of all the forces encompassing
my destruction,' then was Free Will created upon the earth."
Note here, that Will is changed to Free Will in the course of a single
sentence, and that this "Free Will" is simply human action predominant
over external difficulties, which should therefore rather be called
Will, and is certainly not the Free Will or self-rule which we have now
under consideration. Hence arises a certain amount of confusion, as
witness p. 393:--"We ascribe, then, man's consciousness of _Free Will_
to the concentration of all his pre-human experiences into one
imperative determination to preserve, to assert, and to please himself."
Thus, "Free Will," in the mind of the writer, is simply the human Will
as opposed to the forces of nature. Nothing is said about the exterior
opposing wills of others, though surely he must intend them also to be
included in the environment. At the same time we do not know that it
makes the particular point under consideration more difficult of study,
although these external wills form a considerable part of the objects
determining the activities of the self. Yet, as our particular point of
study is _self_-rule, this extension of the reference to external forces
does not directly affect the argument.
But it will be seen that the Will or Free Will mentioned here, and
defined as self-assertion and determination to please one's self, is
self-assertion as opposed to environment--a self-assertion which,
irrespective of the qualities or nature of the motives comprised in that
self, determines to work out its own pleasure there and then in spite of
all opposition. Such a state is well illustrated in the first
self-assertions of childhood--its so-called _wilfulness_; for as
embryology illustrates the stages of biological evolution, so does
childhood illustrate the stages of mental and moral evolution. This
self-assertion is also illustrated in the conduct of the insane and of
the rude, rough, uneducated minds of the masses. Still it is not what is
meant by Free Will, but the very reverse; for such persons are said to
be slaves to their passions or motives. This is undoubtedly Egoistic
_Will_; and therefore theoretically, as before distinguished, it is
_free_: but it is not the Free Will, the self-rule we are now in search
of. This sort of self-assertion is the determination to please oneself,
_irrespective of consequences_. But when it is known that consequences
recoil upon self--when the _element of time_ is taken into account, and
the self is found to be continuous, then there is reflection, and
by-and-by succeeds caution, restraint, and the co-ordination of actions
to a given end. This is the germ of self-rule which is mistakenly
regarded as identical with the self-determination of volition.
The term "self-preservation" has a wide and also a restricted sense. It
may simply mean the continuance in existence of the body; or if the self
is equivalent to the preservation of the activities comprised in that
self, _whatever those activities may be_--lust, hate, benevolence,
æsthetic feeling, &c.--then it implies the continuous gratification of
those activities. This understanding of self-preservation is dependent
on the length of time for which the self is expected to continue. The
religious man, believing in a God and a future life, preserves what he
esteems his self--_i.e._, his moral and religious being--even in
martyrdom. But if there is no future life, then the self that has to be
preserved is the self as it is, whatever that may happen to be--gross or
refined.
There are no better recognised traits of Free Will--_i.e._,
self-rule--than the power of self-denial, self-abnegation,
self-sacrifice. These cannot be explained by any definition of Free Will
founded on self-assertion and self-preservation merely. Then, again,
self-education, the designed alteration of the character, and the
intentional acquirement of self-control, can hardly be held to be
consistent with simple self-assertion. Self-assertion is the assertion
of self as it is. The resolution to alter is the denial of
self-preservation as regards the existing self. The adaptation to
environment involved in self-abnegation is the opposite to
self-assertion.
Are we to suppose that the Free Will predicated of man is an universal
possession of all? If it is a _theoretical_ question, it must be granted
that all men's wills are free. But if it is a practical question as to
the strength of the Will as opposed to external forces, and held to be
free in proportion to its relative strength of self-assertion, surely
Free Will is a variable quality. If, again, it is a practical question
as to the power of self-rule, are we to suppose that all men have it in
equal degrees? Do the idiot and the maniac possess it, or on the
contrary is it possessed unequally by men, and by some not at all?
The writer says, p. 391, "Now, from the moment that self became an
object of consciousness, it became also a motive."
This consciousness of self is a consciousness of the totality of the
activities, a consciousness of the unity of that totality, a
consciousness of the continuance of that totality for a more or less
certain future. The motive consequent upon such recognition must be the
longest continuance of that self, the greatest amount of gratification
of the activities of that self, the avoidance of pains to that self, and
the aggregation of more activities by that self.
The result of that motive would be the co-ordination of actions to
attain the final end thus set before the total self, and the
subordination of particular motives to their proper places in the
co-ordinative scheme. But as the total self is in relation to
environment, that environment, physical or societarian, has to be taken
into account; and as consequences of actions recoil upon the individual
at a later time, the results of actions have to be taken into account.
Therefore there is brought into activity a large amount of rational
consideration and judgment as to the eventualities of conduct in regard
to the 'total self'; and finally it is found that action must take one
of two forms: either the environment must be adjusted to the
organism--this is a form of Will--or the organism must be adjusted to
the environment--this is Free Will or self-rule--_i.e._, the Free Will
as here understood. This is the solution implied in the writer's
statement that "from the moment that self became an object of
consciousness it became also a motive."
This rational view of self as an aggregate of faculties and motives
likely to last a certain length of time, and surrounded by a social
environment which has in great measure formed it, and which exercises
upon it a continual pressure, brings forward the relation of Free Will
to Ethics in the fact that the acquired power of self-rule has to take
into account, in-so-far as it exists in the individuals forming the
social coercions and approvals, and in so far as the Ego approaches the
normal standard of regulating his own sympathies, which together in an
instructed community make up personal responsibility to the ethical law,
and supply the ethical as distinguished from the merely altruistic
motive.
The evolutionist's definition of life is "the continuous adjustment of
inner to outer relation," or of organism to environment. The principles
and results of this continuous adjustment, in the modifications of
structure and function, and their transmission by heredity in gradually
more permanently established forms, is well understood from the writings
of Mr. Darwin, Mr. Spencer, and others.
The progress of development in the human race has consisted in the
_establishment of correspondences_ of a definite and permanent character
between organism and environment. Why it should have been possible for
such a grand development to take place as that which has actually taken
place lies beyond the limits of our subject; but if Evolution is true,
the fact remains that the human organism has continually been increasing
the number of its correspondences, in accordance with the increasing
complexity of its surroundings. Roughly, this establishment of relations
with the external world may be classed under two divisions, each
containing a great variety of details. Firstly, the class of cognitions,
including the knowledge of the physical world, the field, the forest,
the stream, the animals, the sky and heavenly bodies, and also the
knowledge of men, and their ways in society; secondly, the class of
direct relations with other individuals, such as the relations of wife,
children, parents, chiefs, involving also property, and inducing the
feelings of love, friendship, hate, justice, and other social
affections.
The establishment of a correspondence between the organism and the
environment, of such a definite character as to be transmitted by
heredity, involves the establishment of motives. The stomach without
food experiences hunger, a want, and forms a motive. So of the other
organs, and so of all other established relations inwoven in the
organism. However subtle and refined any established relation may be,
but less in proportion to its later order of development, and directly
as its necessity to existence, so its force. It experiences a want in
respect of its correlate, and this want becomes a motive or incentive to
its own gratification.
The kinds of actions, then, may be distinguished as--
The Functional, such as the action of the heart, the intestines, &c.
These are wholly involuntary.
The Emotional Involuntary, such as the feelings and desires, and the
muscular expression of some of them, as in laughing, crying, &c.
The Emotional Volitional, or actions proceeding from the emotions, and
constraining the muscles to the means of their gratification.
Here must be added the Rational Volitional; and if the rational choice
of actions and ordering of conduct, in which the emotions and passions
play a subordinate part as factors in a general estimate or judgment,
can be interpreted as a recognition of "self as an object," and the
establishment of a correspondence therewith, then the "motive of self"
as advanced by the essayist may be considered as the highest motive of
the Emotional Volitional class. Thus self as an enduring whole becomes
established as the predominating object in the mind of the Ego, towards
which object or ideal attainment in continuity, and in expansiveness of
relation the motives of the individual turn--co-ordinating to it all the
more special motives; and evolving in a higher degree the powers of
self-rule.
In this manner Self-Rule or Free Will is explained and vindicated as a
natural possession of humanity and one of its highest and most
characteristic attainments. At the same time it is found to be
consistent with a Deterministic scheme and not to require the assistance
of an incomprehensible Self-Determining Power on the part of the Ego.
The Deterministic theory as regards the actions and conduct of an
individual is not, however, so narrow in its purview as this. It
recognises a great many kinds of conditions as the more or less direct
or remote causes of actions. It recognises--
_Heredity_, by which the physical qualities, and emotional and
intellectual tendencies, of the parents, more or less obscurely known on
account of intermixture, are transmitted to the offspring. The child is
born with a certain inherited constitution, containing potentially
within it a course of development through certain physiological changes
up to decay and old age. This constitution is one of a definite
character, having definite proportions of parts, as of head, chest,
abdomen, &c., and definite relations of systems, such as nervous,
vascular, muscular, visceral, &c., and partly as a consequence of this
the child also possesses mental and moral tendencies which, while very
susceptible of influence, are primarily derived by heredity.
_Action of Environment._--From the moment of birth, (or sooner), the
organism comes into relation with very complex conditions, which
variously affect its course of development. The suitable or unsuitable
conditions of the mother's health, food, warmth, sleep, &c., influence
the development of the child; and thenceforward all through life the
conditions of nourishment, diet, climate, exposure, disease, accident,
&c., have strong and recognisable effects upon the organism, physical
and mental.
_General Tuition_, or the education by contact with the members of the
family, playmates, companions, and the great body of the individuals of
the environment with whom the child or youth comes into contact, into
the general tone and principles of his age, country, class, or sect,
gradually fashioning him into a certain pattern, shaping the general
mode of his life, and forming within him certain standards of action,
certain codes of obligation, moral or ceremonial, certain customs,
fashions, &c., as well as implanting in him the convictions, theological
or otherwise, of his time.
_Special Tuition._--Tuition affects the whole of the activities of the
individual according to the nature of the training, its suitability or
unsuitability, its persistence, and the force exerted. The value of a
long course of direct education is well understood in all civilised
communities, and in modern times is recognised as one of the great means
of effecting the general improvement of society, if only it could be
thoroughly applied.
_The Education of Circumstances_ affects not only the physical
constitution, but also very much the mental and moral qualities of the
individual. And as these circumstances are widely varied and the
hereditary tendencies very different, the results will be widely diverse
in different individuals; but there is no doubt that a condition of
poverty or of affluence, good or ill usage, neglect or over-governing, a
solitary or a social condition, surroundings of town or country, status
of parents, nature of and facilities for amusements and studies, the
degree of early responsibilities, the kind of business occupation or
other avocation, all largely affect the conduct and modify the motives
of the individual.
And it is wonderful in a highly developed and complex state of society,
where the possession of great wealth creates a large leisure class, and
the enormous activity pervading the whole ever tends to put the
organisms included into every possible relation with the outer world,
and with every relation that can grow up in its own complex social
mixture--it is wonderful, we say, in such circumstances, the number of
motives that will grow up. The relations extend to the past and the
future. The most paltry, evanescent, and adventitious relations become
more or less motives of action, and grow more or less established in the
individual and more or less transmitted to posterity. Besides the great
number of these relationships, there is the difference of kind. Many are
of a concrete sort; as for instance, the love of dogs, horses, &c.;
others are of a very abstract description. These latter are principally
the outcome of social and intellectual relationships. They are
generalisations of conduct, or they are abstractions of the intellect.
Virtue, ideal conduct, justice, beauty, truth, science, philosophy, a
perfected humanity, all become realised abstractions, as it were, with
which a relation is established, and which, therefore, assume the guise
of motives seeking their means of gratification. We recognize the fact
that abstractions may become objects of motives, as distinct from the
concrete objects which are definitely in relation with corresponding
affections of the organism. These abstractions grow into definite parts
of self, and, if they largely predominate in an individual, he will
become a martyr rather than abandon his devotion to them. He will esteem
them the principal part of self, and let his body perish rather than act
against them. Such organic abstractions may, indeed, become the objects
of the most powerful passions, before which concrete objects sink into
utter insignificance. We have found that the recognition of the
continuous or "total self" can become such an object and induce the
establishment of a corresponding motive.
At the outset, we distinguish the province of Reason, in which is
included the calculation of the results of actions, and the devising of
the best means for accomplishing a desired end without incurring pains
and inconveniences. If a certain end is desired, the intellect has to
forecast the outcome of different modes for effecting the desired
result, and to discern that which secures the end with the fewest
drawbacks. The end may be good or bad; the motives may be of the most
elevated and generous character or they may be of the worst; but all the
same, it must be duly considered what is the best means of securing it.
What would be the result if I did this? on the other hand, would it not
be better to do that? It will be seen that here there is no choice
between motives, no dispute to settle between conflicting principles and
passions, but only a kind of mental calculus or intellectual
engineering. This state of the mind is sometimes taken to be the
exercise of a choice, and it may be so; but it is of a different kind to
that involved in self-rule, which we now approach.
As a power of very gradual growth must we regard that cognition, (with
its subsequent establishment as an object and a motive in the human
organism) which recognises the Self as a whole--as a whole at any given
time, and as a whole extending over seventy years, and perhaps
indefinitely longer!
Man's total self can become an object of thought and that object a
motive, as distinguished from any of the particular motives of which it
is made up. Man's future self may be an object of thought as well as the
present; and man's Continuous Self may become a constant and
all-predominating object of regard and interest--an all-absorbing
motive. Indeed, so far may this go, that the long continuous self
prospected after death may and has been so much an object of motive as
to overshadow and dwarf every interest of the present. And if this
Continuous Self is recognised by the Reason as the complete object, the
one and chief motive--and it must be so since it includes every motive
at every instant of time--then the Reason accords to it and claims for
it a _ruling_ position, a claim before which every other must give way.
There is no doubt that this is substantially taught, although in
different terms of exposition, in all ethical books and in all verbal
precepts of good counsel.
The psychogeny of this development of the continuous self into an object
and a motive is to be found in the intellectual recognition of the
actual order displayed by nature in the processes of life. It is the
harmonising of the volitional actions with the laws of natural change.
We have seen that the process of life is the continuous adaptation of
organism to environment. But this is a natural, non-volitional process.
Change in the environment produces change of organism to correspond with
it. When cognitions are developed the sequences of action are foreseen,
the changes of environment are foreseen, the developments of organism
are foreseen; a generalisation is made of all the factors, and logical
conclusions drawn as to the necessary adaptations. Then follows a
rational or intentional adaptation of organism and environment, due to
the motive of Self which we have just considered; this rational or
intentional adaptation may be either incidental or continuous, and the
adaptation may be either of organism or of environment. And in this
calculus the relation of the individual to the mass of individuals
constituting society must be taken into account.
A man having regard to his continuous self finds himself in a certain
position. The motive relating to the continuous self determines that his
conduct shall be regulated by the best regard for that continuous self.
And it must be admitted at once that technically it is not qualitatively
related to any abstraction, such as virtue, &c., unless, indeed, virtue
be interpreted as the establishment of such a harmony, but has regard
purely to the establishment of the most harmonious correspondence
between himself and his environment for the remainder of his life. It
might be that such a resolve would result in a system of ethics, but we
wish to limit the consideration to our special subject.
And, in the first place, we must recognise the _quantitative_ character
of such an adaptation. The self is surrounded by an enormous and highly
complex environment; but it may, from heredity, or want of education, or
perverse education, be a very narrow, poor, meagre, little self, having
very few, weak, feeble correspondences with the environment. A pig in
his stye may be well adjusted to his environment; but his
correspondences with the external world are few in number and of small
intensity. We would therefore assert with Mr. Spencer as a corollary
from the continuous adjustment of the organism and the environment, not
merely the establishment of a convenient _modus vivendi_, but an
adjustment of the organism by enlargement of the number of its
correspondences with the environment, so as to render the adjustment
between organism and environment more perfect by making the former
co-extensive with the latter. In proportion to the number of points of
interest or correspondences established between organism and
environment, so is the perfection of the continuous self. In this manner
then Free Will or Self-Rule in its very nature is related to the
conception of a continuous self towards which it acts as the object of a
motive, and possesses also an ethical bearing with regard to the
enlargement of the correspondences with the external world. For what is
there of greater interest in the external world than the subjective
individuals of our surroundings, the society of which we form a part,
the mysterious past out of which we came and the dependent nations of
the future which we are helping to make?
It is evident that in thus setting up the continuous self as an object,
whose realisation is to be the ruling power in the regulation of
conduct, (whether this self be the complete self we have just
contemplated, or the incomplete self which we may happen to be, and to
be pretty well contented with,) a certain amount of self-regulation will
always be necessary in order to effect the object in view, and at
occasional crises a very great amount of struggle and effort will have
to be exerted in order to put down the influence of some active motive
which would, by its hasty and blind gratification, mar the result of
that line of conduct already decided upon as the best. Here will come in
the conflict of passion with reason, and of impulse with prudence, which
is really of the greatest practical interest in our study.
And here we find, as one of the chief motives in such a conflict, the
motive of _regard for the continuous self_. It is not always a ruling
motive. It is best that it should be so. The object of education and
self-culture is to make it so. But at any rate it is a motive, and a
strong one. In proportion to its predominance is the amount of
self-rule, of self-control, and, as we read it, of Free Will.
Thus the rational regard for self becomes recognised as a motive. The
Rational Volitional becomes the Emotional Volitional. It has been
recognised in many philosophies under various names, advanced sometimes
as a motive, sometimes as the very self of self, and sometimes
designated by the term "self-determining power," &c.; but its true
character and genesis is best explained by Evolution.
The great practical question is this: Has man the power of choice
amongst motives? Has he the vaunted power of self-rule? and can he
cultivate it?
We can only reply that, as a matter of fact, some men have it and some
have not; that some have in some respects and not in others. As a matter
of possibility, most men may attain in a considerable degree to the
power of self-rule by judicious self-culture: and in the education of
the young, more particularly in home education, a very high standard in
this respect may be attained. Some feeble minds and flighty or
impassioned natures, as well as idiots, may not be able to reach it, and
some fools may lose it after they have got it; but as a general rule
and a safe fact for all to accept, we may say that a high degree of
self-rule may by most people be attained, and that the possession of it
is for the most part happiness.
Adopting, then, the statement of the essayist, "from the moment that
self became an object of consciousness it became also a motive," we
would add the element of time and recognise a continuous self. Then,
placing the statement in a subordinate position, as part of the general
evolution of life--which is the continuous adjustment of organism and
environment--and acknowledging the growth of reason, we would define the
course of action which results from all these factors as _the rational
quantitative and continuous adjustment of organism and environment_.
This is the Evolutionist formula of Free Will or self-rule.
Thus the consciousness of choice and of the power of self-rule receives
an explanation on the Evolution of Deterministic hypothesis in this
respect, that the recognition of the continuous self as an object of
thought and an important object of interest and regard, _becomes thereby
a motive determining action and conduct_, even against the immediate
urgencies of passion. Determinism is thus acknowledged to be a correct
theory: but the dignity of the claim for self-rule and free choice is
vindicated, and the attainment of it by most people is shown to be both
desirable and feasible.