A RETROSPECT OF EVENTS--A COMBINATION OF UNFORTUNATE CIRCUMSTANCES
INVOLVE LEADING OFFICERS.
That the campaign on the Niagara frontier might have been conducted on
lines which would have proved much more satisfactory for the success
of the Canadian forces, is admitted. It seemed to be a combination
of errors and omissions from the beginning, which furnished food for
unfavorable criticism and condemnation by journalistic and arm-chair
critics which created impressions on the public mind that exist even at
the present day. Of course each critic would have done different--this
plan or that plan "should have been" adopted, regardless of all military
rules. The trite saying that "nothing succeeds like success" should be
supplemented by adding, "and nothing more reprehensive than failure." In
military operations success or defeat are in the scales, and the least
little occurrence is liable to outbalance the other. No matter how
carefully a commanding officer may lay his plans, or how minutely he may
explain them to his staff and subordinates, if one does not do his part
in promptly carrying out instructions at the proper moment, the whole
machinery is thrown out of gear, and failure is the inevitable result.
In the first place, while Gen. Napier's plan of campaign was excellent
in itself, there were several very important things omitted that were
essential to its success. That of the greatest importance was the lack
of proper provision being made for obtaining information of the exact
position and movements of the enemy, such as a corps of competent scouts
could have given. That omission is fatal to the success of any military
movement. Again, those who were in command of columns on the 2nd of June
do not seem to have had an intelligent idea of the country they were
about to move over, and had to rely on whatever chance information they
could obtain, much of which, in the excited state of the minds of
the people, was unreliable. To condemn any particular officer for an
unlooked-for disaster is a serious matter, unless such defeat is clearly
the result of his own negligence, or some movement of which he had
personal control. Therefore critics should always be careful to put the
saddle of blame on the right horse.
As Col. Peacocke had been assigned to the immediate command of the
troops operating on the Niagara frontier by Gen. Napier, it will be
noted (as related in a former chapter) that he arrived at Chippawa on
the evening of June 1st, with a considerable number of regular troops
and a complete battery of field guns, manned by experienced gunners of
the Royal Artillery. His reinforcements from Toronto and St. Catharines
were closely following, and quickly available. That night he sent Capt.
Akers across the country with definite orders to Lieut.-Col. Booker to
move eastward to Ridgeway by rail at 5 o'clock the next morning, and
effect a junction with his (Col. Peacocke's) column at Stevensville at
10 o'clock. These instructions stated that Col. Peacocke would leave
Chippawa at 6 a.m., and in accordance with this programme Lieut.-Col.
Booker proceeded to carry out his orders. On the other hand, it was
nearly 8 o 'clock before Col. Peacocke left Chippawa, which threw the
whole programme out of joint by nearly two hours. Various excuses were
made for the delay, but some of them were not very tenable. The regulars
had had a good night's rest, and the volunteers (who were all on the
ground at Chippawa before 4.30 a.m.) were eager and willing to proceed.
Why he did not leave Chippawa by at least 6 o'clock (in the cool hours
of the morning) is not sufficiently clear. A pilot engine was sent up
the line of the Erie & Niagara Railway early in the morning, upon which
were Lieut.-Col. John Hillyard Cameron and a detail of riflemen from the
St. Catharines Battery of Artillery. They made a reconnaissance nearly
as far as Black Creek, and returned with the report that they had not
observed any signs of the enemy between Chippawa and that point. This
was before Col. Peacocke started on his march. Why could it not have
been possible for him to have moved a portion of his advance up by train
as far as Black Creek, was a question that was prevalent at the time.
But Col. Peacocke was not apparently taking any chances. He appears to
have been overly cautious, and was disposed to adopt the old-time method
of plodding along the beaten trail. Here again he made a mistake in
taking "the longest way around" to reach Stevensville, while the intense
heat and dust began to tell on his troops, which compelled him to halt
at New Germany about 11 o'clock. Before reaching there he was informed
of the disaster at Ridgeway by parties who had arrived from the
battle-field. Why, then, did he not push on in search of the enemy,
instead of remaining at New Germany until 5.30 p.m.? is another
question. Excuses are easily framed and plausibly given in reports,
but the country generally, and his soldiers particularly, have always
thought that he might have managed to have got into a conflict with the
enemy in some way. Col. Peacocke was a very fine gentleman, and had the
reputation of being a skilful military officer, but his extreme caution
in this campaign spoiled all chances of any success in winning the
renown that might have been his portion had he acted with snap and
celerity of movement in battering the Fenian army before they left
Canada. He had the opportunity, the men and the guns, but he let his
golden chances slip by while he idly passed away the time "resting" at
Chippawa and New Germany.
Capt. Akers was another officer whose action in consenting with the
ideas of Lieut.-Col. Dennis to change the plans of their commanding
officer is inexplicable. Why these two officers should have dared to
assume such responsibility is beyond all comprehension. A soldier's
first duty is obedience to orders, and as these had been definitely
issued by Col. Peacocke, it was manifestly not their business to change
them, but to see that they were rigidly carried out. For that purpose
Capt. Akers had been specially despatched from Chippawa to Port
Colborne; but in less than half an hour after his arrival he was busily
engaged with Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Lieut.-Col. Booker in concocting a
new plan of campaign. After deciding on what they intended to do, they
condescendingly notified Col. Peacocke of the change in his own plans,
and without, waiting for a reply they started off for Fort Erie on
the steamer "W. T. Robb" to put them in execution. Such assumption was
certainly astounding, and no doubt Col. Peacocke had a choleric fit
when he was apprised of it. This was another mistake, which contributed
largely to the defeat of Col. Peacocke's purposes, and left a cloud on
the military prestige of both Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Capt. Akers. As
Lieut.-Col. Booker had also been persuaded to join in the new plan,
he was making his arrangements to do so when he received an imperative
order by telegraph from Col. Peacocke to adhere to his original
instructions.
As Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Capt. Akers sailed away in high hope from Port
Colborne, they probably built the fairy air castles which were doomed to
totter and fall before night. It did not seem to occur to them that Col.
Peacocke's sanction to, and co-operation in, their change of plan would
be necessary to ensure success. Therefore their disappointment must have
been great when they found that Lieut.-Col. Booker failed to arrive at
Fort Erie at 7 o'clock, as provided in their new arrangement. At this
hour Lieut.-Col. Booker was leaving Ridgeway (in pursuance of his latest
orders) on his march for Stevensville, and soon after had the misfortune
to strike the enemy in force. And thereby hangs another tale of a grave
mistake, which brought considerable censure to that officer. The story
of the battle is told elsewhere, and need not be repeated.
In the light of official reports and the testimony of officers and
men who were engaged in the battle of Lime Ridge, the disaster which
occurred to Lieut.-Col. Booker's column (almost in the moment of
victory) can be attributed wholly to a fatal order being given at the
most critical time in the progress of the fight. Lieut.-Col. Booker had
up to that eventful moment displayed singular sagacity and wisdom in the
handling of his troops, and had correctly followed the usual military
rules which would be applicable to the occasion. But somebody appears to
have originated the report that the enemy were about to make a cavalry
charge, and at this crisis, when the troops were ordered to "Form
square," the demon of disaster suddenly appeared. It was the proper
order to have given had there really been a cavalry force advancing, but
as the alarm originated in the imagination of others, for which there
was no valid reason, the movement proved a mistake which turned the tide
of battle and caused the dire disaster for which Lieut.-Col. Booker was,
and is to this day, most unjustly blamed. A little reflection on the
part of his critics might have tended to tone down their asperity and
given him some credit for what he did do, both before and after the
unfortunate order was given. But some person had to take the blame,
and Lieut.-Col. Hooker was made the victim of circumstances. Here was
a volunteer Colonel (who had never previously commanded a brigade)
suddenly placed in command of the whole column because he happened to
be the senior officer present, and ordered to advance across the path
of the enemy to make a junction with Col. Peacocke's forces at
Stevensville. His orders were to leave Port Colborne at a certain hour,
which he did--exactly on time. He was handicapped in many ways, yet he
did his duty and carried out the orders he received to the letter. He
had neither cavalry, artillery or scouts with his column, so that his
position was not a very enviable one. Had Capt. Akers remained with Col.
Booker instead of going off on an excursion with Lieut.-Col. Dennis
on the tug "Robb," his presence might have made some difference in the
fortunes of the battle at Lime Ridge. Lieut.-Col. Booker had no staff
officer to assist him, and in this position Capt. Akers might have been
of some service, and won more glory than he did in the campaign. As to
Lieut.-Col. Booker's conduct on the field at Lime Ridge (which was so
unfavorably commented upon by the public press and carping critics who
accepted the multitude of erroneous rumors that were prevalent during
that period of excitement), it may lie stated that the whole affair was
fully investigated by a Military Court of Inquiry, composed of three
competent officers of high and honorable standing, who took the sworn
testimony of a large number of officers and men who were engaged in the
battle. As the whole evidence, and a full report of the proceedings of
the Court, are published as an appendix to this book, it will prove very
interesting to the reader, and serve to give an intelligent idea of
the events narrated, from which you can draw your own conclusions as to
whether Lieut.-Col. Booker was unjustly censured or not.
Another officer who was roundly condemned by the officers and men under
his command, and by the public generally, for his singular conduct
during the engagement at Fort Erie, was Lieut.-Col. J. S. Dennis, who
was in command of the expedition on the steamer "W. T. Robb." Grave
charges were filed against this officer, which resulted in a Court of
Inquiry being appointed to investigate the case. As the charges made
and the finding of the Court will be found in the latter portion of the
appendix of this book, the writer will not discuss them here. Suffice
it to say that the officers and men of the force which he landed on the
dock at Port Erie on the 2nd of June, and placed in great jeopardy and
peril, were not at all satisfied with the opinion of the Court, which
they considered in the nature of a "white-wash" for Lieut.-Col. Dennis
(and a thin coat at that), as the President of the Court dissented from
the finding of his two colleagues on two charges, but was over-ruled by
them.